Hard though it is for a Brit to admit, the French are conducting the climate negotiations brilliantly
This does not come easily for a Brit to admit, but the French are – as my Irish wife would say – playing a blinder in their conduct of the climate summit here in Paris. They have kept the famously hornery negotiators hard at work and movingly steadily forward without (so far) any of the usual dramas, until the possibility of a strong, worldwide agreement to address climate change has finally, if tantalisingly, come into sight.
There is, of course, an awfully long way to go; the big issues remain unresolved and, with the talks officially due to end tomorrow (though they are almost certain to overrun), time is running short. But the contrast with the last climate summit, in Copenhagen six years ago, could hardly be more stark.
By this stage in the Danish capital negotiations had totally broken down: it took a heroic effort by world leaders, cramped in a small room, personally negotiating a new agreement line by line to salvage anything at all. But this time seasoned veterans of the negotiations say that things have so far progressed further than they had ever expected.
The French leadership is almost universally – and almost embarrassingly fulsomely - praised, even in open session. They have shown great forbearance and tact in sticking with the text that negotiators have already been working on for years, making them work hard – late into each night - progressively narrowing and eliminating differences on point after point whereas, by this stage in previous conferences, the governments chairing them had lost patience with the haggling over words (and even commas) and issued new texts of their own.
This may seem an abstruse point, but in the highly-charged, ego-driven, sensibility-dominated atmosphere of climate negotiations – where decisions can only be reached by consensus among 195 governments – it is vital. By honouring the negotiators’ efforts so far, instead of effectively dismissing them as a waste of time – egos and sensibilities are assuaged and the process has so far run remarkably smoothly.
Bringing heads of government at the beginning of the conference – rather than, as is usual, at the end – has proved to be another masterstroke. Almost invariably they pledged their commitment to a strong agreement and that – and wide consultations between Francoise Hollande and other leaders in the run-up to the summit – enabled the French President to build up what one close observer calls “a network of promises”.
As a result, when difficulties arise, the co
nference chair – the hugely respected former Prime Minister Laurent Fabius – has been able to defuse them so far by calling on the relevant minister and saying, in effect: “Your boss has told my boss that he (or she) wants a strong agreement. So what can we do to resolve this little difficulty?”.
As a result of all this, several of the less contentious issues on the table have been successfully resolved, including paragraphs on capacity building in developing countries, the transfer of technology to them and ensuring compliance with the eventual terms of the agreement. Two really important issues are close to being agreed, a long term goal of complete decarbonisation of the world economy in the second half of this century, and a review mechanism by which countries will meet again every few years progressively to tighten their cuts in emissions. Negotiators also seem to have decided to park the hugely contentious issue of payments for “loss and damage” caused by global warming to the territory and economies of the most vulnerable to be revisited at a later meeting.
But, as ever in these negotiations, nothing is agreed until everything is agreed and major issues remain unresolved, including: how far (and how) the agreement will be made legally binding; the amount of finance provided by richer countries to poorer ones to help them tackle global warming; the hugely difficult issue of how to check that countries are fulfilling their pledges, which many feel could impinge on their national sovereignty; and, perhaps most difficult of all, the extent of special treatment that developing countries will be given under a universal treaty that requires everyone to take action.
The Chinese position remains the most enigmatic; nobody yet seems to know where their red lines are. It is all made more complicated by the fact that the national position will have been hammered out after months of internal negotiations, making flexibility hard in Paris as it proved, fatally, to be in Copenhagen. Yet China has more to lose from breakdown than most (as its leaders recognise, it faces a particular existential threat from climate change) and more to gain from a strong agreement (having taken the lead in developing technologies like wind and solar power to export to a decarbonising world). The authoritarian President Xi, moreover, would have little compunction in overruling the internal Chinese consensus, if he chose to do so.
It may be that what the Chinese want in return for flexibility in Paris is in some entirely different field, like preferential trade treatment. At any rate the deal will probably be cut in a secret phone call between Presidents Xi and Obama. But even if it is the world’s two 1000 lb gorillas who strike the final bargain, it is the skilful organ-grinding of French diplomacy that looks like making it possible.