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Medical Journal of Australia
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MJA 201 (3) · 4 August 2014
Building a culture of co-creation in research
Robin Gauld
MA, PhD
Professor,1 and
Independent Chair2
1 Department of Preventive
and Social Medicine,
University of Otago,
Dunedin, New Zealand.
2 Southern Health Alliance
Leadership Team, Southern
District Health Board
and Southern Primary
Health Organisation,
Dunedin, New Zealand.
robin.gauld@
otago.ac.nz
doi: 10.5694/mja14.00658
What should governance for integrated
care look like? New Zealand’s alliances
provide some pointers
Multidisciplinary leadership teams and flexible approaches are helping
streamline New Zealand’s health care system
Online first 21/07/14
While the search continues for governance ar-
rangements that support health system and
service integration,1,2 developments in New
Zealand provide useful new insights. New Zealand pres-
ently has 20 district health boards (DHBs) planning and
funding regional hospital and other services, and around
30 primary health organisations (PHOs) that plan and fund
elements of general practice and primary care for enrolled
patients. These two sets of arrangements have functioned
largely separately from one another, despite DHBs fund-
ing PHOs and both having common populations.3 New
Zealand’s policymakers and health care providers have
concluded that it is no longer acceptable nor sustainable to
operate a health system with parallel structures that lack
coordination or a governance model that supports this.
In response, from mid 2013, New Zealand moved to
implement a governance model across the entire country,
aimed at integration by requiring an alliance between each
DHB and corresponding PHOs. This followed investment
in 2010 in nine pilots. The alliance concept derives from the
construction industry, where independent companies col-
laborate, rather than compete, to ensure that large, complex
projects are delivered on time and within budget. While the
health alliances are forced by policy, they are an example
of an experimental governance model4 that, evaluations
of the pilots suggest, provide considerable promise.5 For
example, alliances have helped drive important new ini-
tiatives that provide better support for complex patients in
primary care settings by enabling general practitioners to
work together with hospital specialists and other providers.
While early days, there is some evidence of reductions in
emergency department admissions and of more services
traditionally provided in hospital settings being delivered in
the community, such as specialist outpatient consultations,
older people’s health, and emergency response services
that might otherwise require a hospital visit. Importantly,
those involved in alliances believe it is a model that helps
steer health system and service design in an important
new direction.5,6
Some important factors underpin the alliances. Members
should
be clinical leaders from across the health system, with
influence and respect among colleagues;
have capacity to bring resources to the alliance table so
decisions can be implemented; and
very importantly, cast aside sectoral interests, work to
assist one another, and take a whole-of-system approach
to planning and decision making based on what is best
for the patient and health system.
Alliance goals variously include shifting services from
hospitals to primary care or creating new arrangements
combining elements of both service domains to, for exam-
ple, reduce avoidable hospitalisation or improve chronic
condition management. The key, as noted, is to focus on
and work towards what makes best sense in the context of
integration to the players in the local health system.
All DHBs now have an alliance leadership team (ALT),
membership of which is determined by the DHB and PHO
and evolves as an ALT sees fit. Members are likely to include
doctors, nurses, allied health professionals, others from hos-
pital and primary care settings, and those with resources,
such as the chief executives of the DHB and respective
PHOs and consumer representatives. Each member signs
a charter spelling out the rules of engagement and focus
of the ALT, which then sets local priorities and plans how
these will be met.
There is flexibility for how an alliance goes about its ac-
tivities. Many ALTs are focused on developing service-level
alliance teams (SLATs). These are work streams that include,
again, a combination of clinical leaders and management.
The Southern Health Alliance Leadership Team, of which I
am Independent Chair, has chosen initially to create SLATs
for acute service demand management; outpatient services;
diagnostics; rural health; community and hospital pharma-
ceuticals; frail older people; and respiratory conditions. To
illustrate how a SLAT functions, initial respiratory SLAT
work involved a workshop including hospital emergency
department and respiratory physicians, GPs, nurses and
ambulance services. Resulting actions include identifying
frequently hospitalised patients, providing nurse-led care
plans for them and ensuring that the patient’s GP and,
where necessary, hospital services are involved in this, and
developing primary care-based options for ambulance ser-
vices. Development of web-based clinical pathways aimed at
integration, involving health professionals from the primary
and hospital sectors, is also governed by the ALT.
In the Canterbury region, where alliance development is
more established, dozens of people from different parts of
the health system are involved. With care design decided
on advice of a SLAT, it is then up to the ALT and its member
organisations to pool or shift resources to support new con-
figurations. This process is being propelled by new flexible
funding arrangements, whereby the PHO can use existing
ring-fenced allocations in new ways as decided by the ALT.
The DHB is expected to contribute to this pool which will
grow with time, along with the level of joint risk sharing,
as an alliance work program advances.
How alliance performance will be measured is an impor-
tant question that the government is tackling. An impending

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MJA 201 (3) · 4 August 2014
Supplement
Integrated Performance and Incentive Framework incorpo-
rates a range of system-wide measures, including patient
experiences with the system, requiring an effective alliance
and integration in order to perform well.7
Like Australia and other countries, New Zealand’s public
hospitals and GPs work with quite different incentives and
business models.8 Yet, alliances have provided a powerful
method of bringing health professionals together from
different parts of the system and motivating them to work
collaboratively on what services should look like from a
patient and clinical perspective. Given their relatively em-
bryonic state, the challenge now is to monitor closely how
the alliances perform over time and consider lessons for
policymakers elsewhere.
Competing interests: No relevant disclosures.
Provenance: Commissioned; externally peer reviewed.
1 Beech R, Henderson C, Ashby S, et al. Does integrated governance lead to
integrated patient care? Findings from the innovation forum. Health Soc
Care Community 2013; 21: 598-605.
2 Nicholson C, Jackson C, Marley J. A governance model for integrated
primary/secondary care for the health-reforming first world — results of a
systematic review. BMC Health Serv Res 2013; 13: 528.
3 Gauld R. New Zealand’s post-2008 health system reforms: toward re-
centralization of organizational arrangements. Health Policy 2012; 106:
110-113.
4 Fierlbeck K. The changing contours of experimental governance in
European health care. Soc Sci Med 2014; 108: 89-96 .
5 Lovelock K, Martin G, Cumming J, et al. The evaluation of the better, sooner,
more convenient business cases in MidCentral and the West Coast District
health boards. Report to the Health Research Council, January 2014.
University of Otago and Victoria University of Wellington, 2014.
6 Timmins N, Ham C. The quest for integrated health and social care: a case
study in Canterbury, New Zealand. London: The King’s Fund, 2013.
7 Integrated Performance and Incentive Framework Expert Advisory Group.
Integrated Performance and Incentive Framework. Expert Advisory Group
Final Report. Wellington: IPIF EAG, 2014.
8 Gauld R, editor. Comparative health policy in the Asia-Pacific. Maidenhead,
UK: Open University Press, 2005.