Decolonial Futurism: A Focus on Kazakhstan’s Pavilion at the 60th Venice Biennale

Kazakh artists have traditionally been marginalized in the global art scene due to political intricacies and a complex cultural identity. With historical influences and colonization by both Russia and China, Kazakh artists are now carving out a unique artistic identity and sharing it with international audiences. The Kazakh pavilion "Jerūiyq: Journey Beyond the Horizon" at the 60th International Art Exhibition of the Venice Biennale, from April 20 to November 24, represents a major milestone in changing perceptions of Kazakh art. Staged in the Naval Historical Museum, the exhibition reinterprets the ancient legend of Jerūiyq, drawing inspiration from Kazakh myths and the visionary journey of the 15th-century philosopher Asan Kaigy. The word "kaigy" means "pain" in Kazakh, symbolizing the nation's traumatic encounters with modernity's darker aspects: the devastating famine of the 1930s, the craters left by nuclear tests in Semey, the shrinking of the Aral Sea, and the wounds inflicted on the Kazakh landscape. The exhibition traces the evolution of Kazakh utopian imagination from the 1970s to today through artists’ visions of ideal worlds, where their utopian imagination merges with the artistic movement of "decolonial futurism." On behalf of TCA, Naima Morelli interviewed curator Anvar Musrepov on the concept and significance of Kazakhstan's participation in the Venice Biennale. TCA: How did the idea for the Kazak pavilion “Jerūiyq: Journey Beyond the Horizon” evolve? A.M: In our curatorial research, we found that the theme of utopia and futuristic imagination has concerned several generations of Kazakhstan's artists since the 1970s. Using this as a starting point, we decided to establish, in chronological order, a collection of works by multiple generations of artists. Divided by decades, the collection manifested a wave of Kazakh futurism, including themes of spirituality, cosmism, nomadism, and utopian ideas. This in turn, will help formulate a term to comprehensively describe and unite all these intuitions that have concerned Kazakh artists in different historical periods. [caption id="attachment_18933" align="aligncenter" width="522"] Sergey Maslov, "Baikonur" at the Venice Biennale [/caption]   TCA: The exhibition’s title alludes to the ancient legend of Jerūiyq. What is it about and  how have you interpreted it? A.M: Jeruiq is an ancient legend about a utopian land that according to many myths, was sought by Asan Kaigy, advisor to the first Kazakh khans Zhanibek and Kerey. Legend describes it as a land that has fermented, a place where time has stopped, a land full of vividness, devoid of disease or longing. We found in this ancient Kazakh legend, an ideal metaphor to unite all the intuitions presented in the exhibition and manifest the chronology of post-nomadic futuristic imagination. If established, the definition of this unique phenomenon, could become a movement in Kazakh art. TCA: What can you tell us about the philosopher Asan Kaigy? A.M: Asan Kaigy is a quasi-historical character who features in Kazakhstan’s rich oral tradition where history and memory are passed down from mouth to mouth. Every region of Kazakhstan has local legends about miracles performed by Asan Kaigy. One such legend says that he found Zheruyik when he and his people passed through a rock and entered another, metaphysical dimension. TCA: How did you select the participating artists? A.M: We identified key works from each decade from the 1970s to the present day. Unfortunately, many works worthy of inclusion were omitted for various reasons, including managerial and administrative issues such as logistics, insurance, and the scale of our pavilion. However, as a continuation of this theme, we are planning an exhibition in Kazakhstan that will serve as an anthology of works within the concept of the pavilion. TCA: How was the exhibition curated to allow interaction between artworks spread across different rooms? A.M: We began with the nomadic perception of time, which differs from the Eurocentric linear perception of a narrative with a beginning and an end, forming instead, a cycle of rebirth; a closed circle associated with the changing seasons, where winter represents death and spring, renewal. In our pavilion, the artworks and halls form a closed system that balances utopias and dystopias through the lens of Kazakh artists. TCA: The pavilion reflects the dark side of modernity, referencing tragic events in the country’s recent history. Were artists directly inspired by such to create work for the exhibition? A.M: Certainly, these themes are the leitmotif of many works of Kazakh art. For example, Yerbolt Tolepbay’s "The End of the World," painted during the Cold War, reflects the anxiety of a period when people expected the world to end. During the famine in Kazakhstan, locals likewise, believed the end of the world was nigh. After the advent of Islam, apocalyptic narratives also became part of Kazakh mythology, merging with pagan culture. In the same hall, we find works by Lena Pozdnyakova and Eldar Tagi. The sound installation “Presence” includes traditional Kazakh mattresses depicting stages of the Aral Sea desiccation. The Semipalatinsk test site becomes the central image in Anvar Musrepov’s post-apocalyptic movie “Alastau,” filmed in the exclusion zone still affected by radiation. TCA: The theme of “decolonial futurism" is currently predominant in the art world. What does the term mean to you, within the context of this show?  A.M: In the early 2000s, the international art scene discovered a new phenomenon in Kazakh art. Artists of the time were searching for their identity and often exaggerated the image of steppe barbarians, portraying an image of self-exoticization to European audiences. Today, this perception has changed significantly. In modern Kazakhstan, we no longer feel like barbarians; we want to move beyond this stigmatization and conveying our current state, recreate an image drawn from our local perspective. TCA: How important are events like the Venice Biennale for Kazakh artists to assert a distinct artistic identity? A.M: During the years of independence, artists, researchers, and writers have worked extensively to make sense of the past; a history that was silenced during the Soviet period. Kazakhstan, like other countries under Soviet rule, was subjected to the future projections and utopias dictated by Moscow. Now, we have the opportunity to create our vision of the future without reference to the metropolis, aligning with other movements of decolonial futurism. This approach allows us to achieve a more complete and diverse picture of the future, overcoming the limits of Western futurism, and creating our unique image of the future. TCA: This is the second time Kazakhstan has exhibited in its own pavilion at the Venice Biennale. Did you reference  themes of the first and add another layer, or instead, start afresh? A.M: The theme of the first pavilion was somewhat different and focused on the artist Sergei Kalmykov. Certainly, given that we worked within the same cultural context, parallels can be drawn. This time however, we decided to approach the theme from the perspective of the chronology of utopian and futuristic imagination, tracing a line from the earliest related works to those of the present day. TCA: Why do you think Kazakh artists have historically been underrepresented in the global art scene? A.M: The fact that Kazakhstan is participating for only the second time in this prestigious event, reflects the status of contemporary art and its transformations and trends to date. During the Soviet period, Kazakhstan was a closed country, making it difficult for foreigners to obtain visas. The subsequent isolation from international competition has certainly left its mark, which continues to this day. TCA: What is the public response to the Kazakh pavilion? A.M: We have received a lot of positive feedback from colleagues around the world, in praise of our innovative approach, unexpected angle, and convincing research. It was important for us to showcase the intuitions that existed across different generations of Kazakh artists. We are not inventing Kazakh futurism; we are simply collecting works from various periods within a single framework to garner discussion on a possible movement in Kazakh art. This movement currently lacks a specific term and is still in the process of formation.   The project was made possible thanks to sponsors and especially, Halyk Charity. [caption id="attachment_18934" align="aligncenter" width="300"] Naima Morelli[/caption] The interview for The Times of Central Asia was conducted by Naima Morelli, an arts writer and journalist specialized in contemporary art from Asia-Pacific and the MENA region. She has written for the Financial Times, Al-Jazeera, The Art Newspaper, ArtAsiaPacific, Internazionale and Il Manifesto, and is a regular contributor to Plural Art Mag, Middle East Monitor and Middle East Eye. In addition to curatorial texts for galleries, she is the author of. three books on Southeast Asian contemporary art.

Reporter in Turkmenistan Freed After Four Years in Jail

Authorities in Turkmenistan have released a freelance reporter who was jailed for several years on a fraud conviction that media groups alleged was retaliation for his journalism. Nurgeldi Halykov, who has worked for the Turkmen.news website, was arrested in Ashgabat on July 13, 2020 and freed on Saturday, the Committee to Protect Journalists said on Monday. Halykov was detained the day after the Netherlands-based website published a photo that it received from him in which a World Health Organization delegation is seen at a local hotel during the COVID-19 pandemic, according to the committee. Turkmenistan strictly controls the media, making it hard to get information about what is going on in the Central Asian country. The government there did not report a single case of COVID-19, though there are widespread doubts about the government’s transparency regarding the impact of a virus that has killed millions of people worldwide. The photo of the WHO representatives was taken by an Ashgabat resident who saw them sitting by the pool of the Ashgabat Yildiz Hotel, Turkmen.news said. The resident posted the photo on Instagram and Halykov, “who had previously studied with this girl in the same school, saw it. He thought it necessary to send the photo to the editorial office of Turkmen.news,” the website reported. “The girl was identified from CCTV cameras. She and six of her friends, relaxing by the hotel pool, were called to the police. The police looked through all her photographs, including personal ones, restored previously deleted photographs, and reread all her correspondence with other people. Then they began to study contacts in the address book and her friends on Instagram,” the news outlet said. Halykov was detained and sentenced in September 2020 after being convicted of failing to repay a loan, according to Turkmen.news. It said a former close friend made the complaint about a $5,000 debt that Halykov allegedly owed. The Committee to Protect Journalists said it was glad that Halykov had been released and it urged the Turkmen authorities “to improve the country’s international reputation by liberalizing the media environment so that independent reporters do not have to work clandestinely or under fear of arrest.” Turkmenistan’s state news agency did not mention Halykov’s release in its report on Monday. The main news was the visit to Ashgabat of South Korean President, Yun Suk Yeol, and his talks on trade and other issues with Turkmen President Serdar Berdimuhamedov. Other prominent articles talked about the start of the grain harvest and the Turkmen president’s recent participation in a mass bicycle excursion in Ashgabat.

Story of a Statue: Turkmenistan Shapes National Identity

The giant bronze statue of a robed man holding a book stands on the southern outskirts of Turkmenistan’s capital, Ashgabat, and is visible from many parts of the city. Including the granite base, it is more than 80 meters high. The sculptor says the rising sun illuminates the structure at dawn, giving it a hallowed aura. Diplomats and other dignitaries recently assembled for the inauguration of the statue of Magtymguly Pyragy, a revered poet and philosopher who serves today as a state-sponsored symbol of national and cultural identity. Some carried bouquets of flowers as they walked up the steps toward the looming monolith. Later, there were fireworks, a multi-colored light show and a drone display in the sky that formed the image of a quill pen. Led by President Serdar Berdimuhamedov, the ceremony on May 17 marked the 300^th anniversary of the official birthday of Pyragy, who is little known outside Central Asia but is vital to a campaign of national cohesion in a country whose brand of personalized state control often seems opaque and eccentric to observers. Pyragy was born in the 18^th century in what is today Iran, and is associated with Sufi spiritualism. He wrote about love, family and morality, and also laced his poetry with yearning for Turkmen solidarity at a time of conflict and fragmentation. Today, his image adorns postage stamps and banknotes in Turkmenistan. A theater carries his name. A symphony. A street. A university. People put his verse to songs at festivals. His lines form aphorisms in Turkmen, a Turkic language spoken in parts of Central Asia. Turkmenistan is of interest to foreign powers for its deep energy reserves, but this year its diplomats made an intense push in world capitals to get people interested in something else about the country: Magtymguly Pyragy. They promoted events about the poet in cities including Washington, Paris, Beijing and Seoul. The message was, as the state news agency put it, that Pyragy´s work is “an invaluable asset of all mankind.” Indeed, the park where the giant Pyragy statue stands in Ashgabat also contains much, much smaller statues of writers from other parts of the world, including William Shakespeare, Fyodor Dostoevsky, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe and Rabindranath Tagore. One commentator has even compared Pyragy to German philosopher Immanuel Kant, saying they were born around the same time and had similar ideas. Russian granite was transported in nearly 100 railway cars to Ashgabat for construction of the new Pyragy statue, according to contractor Alexander Petrov. The statue is among the more grandiose monuments in a capital studded with them. Sculptor Saragt Babayev noted that the statue shows Pyragy in a turban, in contrast to an older image of the poet that shows him wearing a peaked Astrakhan hat, which was made of sheep fur and had no religious significance. That image dates to the time when Turkmenistan was part of the Soviet Union and Moscow was cracking down on expressions of Islamic piety. “During the time when the poet lived and worked, the turban was a part of the clothing of imams, theologians and, in general, highly educated people such as Magtymguly Pyragy,” Babayev said, according to media outlet Turkmenportal. The sculptor said that “today's historians have agreed and accepted the new image of the poet in which he appears with a turban.” The Soviet authorities promoted their own version of Pyragy’s legacy, portraying him and other Turkic literary figures who lived before the Russian Revolution  as “proto-Socialist visionaries,” Michael Erdman, a curator at the British Library, wrote in 2021. Pyragy died in 1807, more than a century before the Bolshevik takeover. However the poet’s legacy is shaped, some of his work holds up in today´s uncertain times. “Do not take for granted the state of the world,” Pyragy wrote.

Is Afghanistan Ready for Dialogue with Central Asia on Water Issues?

Against the backdrop of the silence of Central Asian countries, as well as their lack of a coordinated position on the construction of the Qosh Tepa Canal in northern Afghanistan, the Taliban are moving forward with the project with growing confidence and without regard to their neighbors.

Last October, at the ceremony to mark the launch of the second phase of the canal’s construction, Afghan Deputy Prime Minister Abdul Salam Hanafi called Qosh Tepa, “one of the most significant development projects in Afghanistan,” while its realization should remove all doubts about the capabilities of the new Afghan authorities, he added.

There is no point in discussing the economic rationale for the canal; like other practical measures taken by the Taliban in the water and energy sphere, for Afghanistan, where 90% of the population is employed in agriculture, the provision of irrigation water is undoubtedly an important task. According to the UN, over the past four decades, desertification has affected more than 75% of the total land area in the northern, western, and southern regions of the country, reducing the vegetation of pasture land, accelerating land degradation, and impacting crop production.

However, this socio-environmental problem affects the interests of all the peoples of Central Asia, which geographically includes the entire north of Afghanistan. It arose as an objective need for development, and solving it requires the combined efforts of all countries in the region, which is already on the verge of a serious water crisis that threatens not only economic development, but also the lives of millions of people.

In general, the Taliban have emphasized their openness in matters of trans-boundary water management, but, so far, these are only statements. They are more motivated by political issues around their international recognition. That is why it is important for them to participate in global events, such as UN climate change conferences, but they have yet to take part in any climate talks. Hopefully, Afghan representatives will be invited to the COP29 Global Impact Conference in Baku this November, especially since one of the key topics of this forum will be a “just energy transition.” It would be interesting to hear what the Taliban have to offer.

Though the authorities in Kabul have had some success in water regulation with Iran, the same cannot be said about Central Asia. This clearly owes to the fact that the five Central Asian republics have not taken a unified position on trans-boundary waters with Afghanistan. And their southern neighbor has taken advantage of this – to date, Kabul has not held any full-fledged official consultations with any Central Asian country on the Qosh Tepa Canal.

However, just as bilateral formats will not yield results (unlike in Iran's case), the Taliban leadership will not be able to resolve water issues easily with the Central Asian countries.

Afghanistan is not a party to the Central Asian Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Joint Management on the Utilization and Protection of Water Resources from Interstate Sources. It was signed in Almaty back in 1992, at the dawn of the independence of the five republics, while a civil war was raging in Afghanistan.

Back then, the Central Asian states relied on the regulatory base between the USSR and Afghanistan, which in one way or another regulated the use of trans-boundary waters, including the Treaty Concerning the Regime of the Soviet-Afghan State Frontier (1958), Protocol between the USSR and Afghanistan on the Joint Execution of Works for the Integrated Utilization of the Water Resources in the Frontier Section of the Amu Darya River (1958) and the Agreement on Joint Study of the Possibilities of Integrated Use of Water and Energy Resources of the Pyanj and Amu Darya Rivers (1964), among others. In addition, the Agreement on Cooperation in the Development and Management of Water Resources of the Pyanj and Amu Darya Rivers was signed by Tajikistan and Afghanistan in 2010.

Qosh Tepa, referred to as a “national pride project” in Afghanistan, is of strategic importance for the country. However, it is sure to have a negative impact on the countries located in the lower reaches of the Amu Darya. You do not need to be an expert to understand this. In the absence of dialogue and transparent actions, this rhetorical threat may turn into a very serious, real challenge for the countries of Central Asia in the near term.

In the spirit of geopolitical rivalry, all sorts of political theories and opinions have sprung up around the Qosh Tepa project.

For example, opponents of the Taliban have declared their intention to populate the future fertile areas along the canal with Pashtuns from the east of the country, including repatriates from Pakistan and families of members of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, which would be a blow to natives of the north (Tajiks, Uzbeks, Turkmen, and Hazaras).

Another version is that the region along the Qosh Tepa will be a magnet for the terrorist organization Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), which, it is argued, will create sleeper cells here with an eye to Central Asia. Moreover, according to this version, ISKP will use the Qosh Tepa Canal to intensify the fight against the Taliban and turn “national pride” against the Taliban, at whose hands all the peoples of Central Asia would suffer.

Anti-Western versions point to plans for the U.S., claimed to be financing the project, to play the “water card” in Central Asia through Qosh Tepa and thereby have greater influence in the region. It would also oppose Chinese interests, such as the development of oil fields in northern Afghanistan and the Belt and Road Initiative.

All these versions have one thing in common – direct threats to the countries of Central Asia, which, of course, cannot but alarm them. However, currently, the Central Asian countries are taking a wait-and-see approach, preferring to work with Afghanistan bilaterally, even though, it must be noted, there are no results to be seen.

It is important for the Taliban to understand that water cannot be a subject of bargaining and should not be considered a lever of political and economic pressure on Afghanistan’s northern neighbors. The Central Asian countries have acquired existential experience in dealing with issues of joint water use and can act as a united front to protect their interests.

The Central Asian countries proceed from an understanding that one way or another, the Qosh Tepa Canal will be operational, and in the future new precedents for water use will arise on the long border with Afghanistan (the total length is over 2,292 km of which more than 1,298 km is a river). It is important how this and other projects in this sphere will turn out. It remains unclear whether the canal bed will be lined – which would prevent significant loss of water – whether technical standards will be followed, and what the regime for servicing the complex hydraulic structure will be, among many other questions to be answered.

Water is a sphere for joint, responsible decisions. The Qosh Tepa Canal may, in fact, be the starting point for, as the Taliban themselves claim, the development of good neighborly relations based on mutual respect. This is especially true given the growing regional paradigm around Afghanistan.

Meanwhile, the Central Asian countries do not need to come up with a new institution for dialogue with Kabul – the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea (IFAS) has been around since 1993, described by Kazakhstan's President Tokayev at the IFAS summit in Dushanbe in September 2023 as “one of the few successful mechanisms of regional cooperation, demonstrating the agency of Central Asia in the international arena.”

Nothing prevents Afghanistan from joining this Central Asian club on water issues. For a start, Afghanistan could be granted observer status in the Interstate Commission for Water Coordination (ICWC), which is the only body in Central Asia authorized to make binding decisions on current and future issues of interstate water allocation and use.

There is no other way for the Taliban, since on the issue of joint water use Central Asia has agency and is expanding it.

Child Malnutrition Hits Central Asia

In its recently published report “Child Food Poverty 2024,” UNICEF has identified 63 countries, including four Central Asian countries, where child malnutrition has reached a  crisis point.

The indicator of food ration determines children’s food security. It was developed by UNICEF and the World Health Organization (WHO). For healthy growth and development, children should consume at least five products from the following eight groups:

1. Breast milk
2. Grains, roots, tubers, and plantains
3. Pulses, nuts, and seeds
4. Dairy products
5. Fresh foods
6. Egg
7. Vitamin A-rich fruits and vegetables
8. Other fruits and vegetables.

If children consume products that belong to just two groups, they live in extreme nutritional poverty; if they consume products belonging to three-four groups, they live in a moderate state related to nutrition. If they consume products belonging to five or more groups, they are considered not to be in a poor situation related to nutrition.

Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan have average levels of child malnutrition, Turkmenistan has a low level, and Tajikistan has a high level.

Residents of Turkmenistan Urged Not to Disseminate What’s Happening in the Country

In the city of Turkmenbashi, local authorities, including the khakimlik (mayor's office), the National Security Ministry (NSM), the court, the police, and elders, are holding meetings with youth and cultural workers. At these meetings, they are warned not to disseminate information about events in the country, such as natural disasters and traffic accidents, on the internet or to journalists.

The meetings are hosted mainly by elders who reprimand the youth.

“They demanded not to share pictures and videos of someone asking for money for a sick child and not to write comments under posts about problems,” a cultural worker said during an anonymous conversation.

Meeting participants claim that the elders said, “There are no countries without faults, and faults need to be hidden.” They also emphasized that freedom on the internet should not lead to the spread of negative information.

Authorities stated that citizens who distributed videos about the Ashgabat floods have already been identified, and most were cultural workers.

"Cultural workers are lighthearted, and all the videos and information leaking online are mostly what you're doing. All problems come either from singers or actors, and the people following them,” a cultural worker was quoted as saying by an NSM official.

The elders and representatives of the khakimlik also urged parents to monitor how their children use the internet and what sites they visit and read. Participants in the meeting were required to use VPN programs approved by the authorities and only share positive photos, videos, and messages about the country online.

Human Rights Organization Demands Release of Tajik Journalist

The Washington DC.-based human rights organization Freedom Now and the American law firm Dechert LLP have sent a letter to the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, calling for the release of the Tajik journalist and human rights activist Mamadsulton Mavlonazarov.

The letter says that the 72-year-old Mavlonazarov, also known as Muhammadi Sulton, was imprisoned for criticizing Tajikistan's authorities. The journalist, a former state security colonel, was arrested in 2022 and sentenced to seven and a half years in prison on charges of publicly calling for a violent change in the constitutional order, and insulting representatives of the authorities through the media or the internet.

In their appeal to the UN, the signees state that Mavlonazarov's current condition is unsatisfactory, and voice fears for his health. He has severe swelling of his legs and kidney problems, due to which he has been hospitalized several times.

“We hope that the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention will conclude that Mavlonazarov's detention violates his fundamental right to freedom of expression, in violation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and he should be released,” the letter reads.

It is also reported that after he resigned from the state security agencies, Mavlonazarov became a journalist, and was repeatedly threatened for his critical articles, which were published on his Facebook page. Human rights activists claim that he was convicted for his posts and comments about the May 2022 events in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region (GBAR).

Mavlonazarov's detention came in June 2022 after he sharply criticized Tajik security forces' “counter-terrorism” operation in Rushan district and Khorog, which, according to official figures, resulted in 16 deaths and, according to independent sources, about 40. A month earlier, the Tajik authorities had announced the “neutralization of an organized criminal group” in GBAR.

Central Asian Public Opinion is the Latest Battle Front Between Putin and Zelenskiy

The settings were starkly different. An Uzbek honor guard in elaborate uniform greeted Russian President Vladimir Putin after he arrived at Uzbekistan’s Tashkent airport on May 26 for a state visit. Two days earlier, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy gave an interview to Central Asian media in his signature army-green combat-ready t-shirt, sitting in the ruins of a Kharkiv printing house destroyed by Russian missiles.  With the war in Ukraine into its third year, Putin’s trip to Uzbekistan represents part of his broader mission to nurture long-standing trade and security ties with Central Asian countries, who have been trying to walk a delicate line in their relationships with Russia. Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev welcomed Putin with a literal embrace. Their official meeting the next day was scheduled to address bilateral issues and views on “current regional problems,” reported Russia’s state-run news agency Tass.  While in Uzbekistan President Putin had boasted that Russia was Uzbekistan’s biggest trading partner with export growth by 23% this year and had invested over $13 billion in the country. He called Uzbekistan to be the biggest state in Central Asia; praised Mirziyoyev’s language policy that protects Russian language in schools and as an official language in Uzbekistan. Russia has started exporting gas to Uzbekistan through Kazakhstan, with some of the gas staying in Kazakhstan. Some analysts argue that Russia can circumvent sanctions by partly relying on imports, mainly from Europe, that come through Central Asia.  Over in the war-torn Ukrainian city of Kharkiv, President Zelenskiy’s interview with six journalists from Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, some openly affiliated with Radio Free Europe and the Soros Foundation, included a discussion on how to deepen solidarity between the people of Central Asia and Ukraine over a shared anti-Russian sentiment. Zelenskiy tells Central Asians to drop their balancing act towards Russia In the interview, President Zelenskiy challenged Central Asian countries to overcome their economic dependencies and security vulnerabilities and adopt Ukraine’s hardline posture against Russia. The region’s leaders “are still [positioned] more in the Russian direction because of fear of the Kremlin. We [the Ukrainians] have made our choice, we are fighting,” Zelenskiy said, according to a Russian transcript of the interview published by Kazakh media outlet Orda.kz. Zelenskiy told Central Asians and others who are “trying to balance” their relationships with Russia to "not wake the beast" that this strategy will not work because “the beast does not ask anyone: he wakes up when he wants”.  Zelenskiy warned Central Asian people that alongside the Baltic states and Moldova, they, too, face a risk of being invaded by Russia given their Russian populations, which the Kremlin may decide to intervene to protect, as it did in Ukraine. He also added grimly, “if you, your people, resist becoming part of Russia, you will inevitably be waiting for a full-scale invasion, death and war.” Calling on the world to unite against Russia, President Zelenskiy recommended that Central Asians isolate Russia economically and diplomatically, arguing that “balancing acts” to help their economy in the short-term are fleeting whereas values, such as, respect and friendship are “eternal”.  Does Ukraine’s message of solidarity resonate in Central Asia? The premise of President Zelenskiy’s point – that such widespread hostility against Russia either already exists or can be stirred up among the region’s people – is not at all a given.  The first reason is tangible economic and practical considerations that go much further than the “fear of the Kremlin” presumed in President Zelenskiy’s interview. Russia and Central Asian countries cooperate in multiple international groups such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Commonwealth of Independent States. All five Central Asian republics also belong to the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which provides mutual defense commitments similar to NATO’s Article 5 as well as crisis response mechanisms, and maintains a military presence at bases in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.  More significantly, Russia comprises a significant proportion of Central Asian states’ foreign trade. As an example, in 2021, imports from Russia represented 42.5 per cent of Kazakhstan’s total imports. Additionally, the legacy of economic ties and infrastructure from the Soviet Union depends on integration between neighboring countries. Anvar Kuspanov, a 44-year-old lawyer from Kazakhstan, gives the critical example of water reservoirs where Russia’s water discharge can have a tangible effect on the levels of Kazakhstan’s rivers.  Ukraine’s pleas to the West to sever energy ties with Russia proved difficult even for the European Union to implement. Some 15% of the bloc’s gas came from Russia in 2023 while Austrian gas imports from Russia stood at an astounding 98 per cent in 2023. Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) exports from the U.S., Qatar, Nigeria and Algeria have made up for Europe’s shortfalls. Landlocked Central Asia, on the other hand, does not have the luxury of such alternative sources, and their most feasible trade route continues to pass through Russia, at least until the Trans-Caspian Middle Corridor increases capacity. Access deficiencies severely impacted the region’s supply chains, pushing inflation up to almost 12 per cent in 2023 compared to a global average of 6.5 per cent. The people, for the large part, want their leaderships to focus on pragmatism in world affairs over national sympathies or ideologies. According to Kuspanov, “breaking economic and diplomatic ties with Russia at once would be suicide”, not to mention the adverse effects it would have on numerous economic associations in which these countries participate. “They say, keep your friend close and your enemy closer,” points out Sultan D., a 66-year-old pensioner also from Kazakhstan: “As long as we are in close relations with Russia with a common market, customs, and so on, nothing will threaten us (…) Our country got back on its feet, largely because we had healthy, pragmatic relations with Russia.” In practice, successful implementation of this balanced pragmatism by Central Asian leaders has resulted in them being criticized by both Russian and Western partners. Nonetheless, it appears to answer public demands. As Marat T., a 32-year-old store owner in Kazakhstan, says, “There should be pragmatism in politics. We have a huge border with Russia and a brisk trade. They produce a lot of quality goods [that] we can't. So there is no sense in quarreling with Russia for the sake of [demonstrating] friendship with Ukraine, who in principle, did not pay attention to Central Asia all these years”. Adding that he has no sympathy or dislike for either side, Marat summarizes what many of his countrymen may feel: “Ukrainian disputes with Russia have nothing to do with us”.  The second issue complicating Central Asia’s position is cultural and historic ties with Russians.  “This is not our war”, Sultan D. argues and adds, “We have different relations with Russia. Kazakhs live there, Russians live here, and we know each other's culture and customs”. The fact that there is affinity towards Russia and its people in parts of Central Asia risks divisions in the region’s societies. According to Kuspanov, in the northern and eastern parts of Kazakhstan, there are a  large number of pro-Russian citizens who express sympathy for Putin. “I believe that it is not tanks and airplanes that we should be afraid of but information and economic pressure that draws Kazakhstan into other people's conflicts”,  warns Kuspanov and adds, “The battle for minds is being waged from all sides - from both the West and the East (…) We are between two fires”.  The third factor is security concerns. In his interview, Zelenskiy posed a question that particularly resonates with Central Asians: “If Ukraine had retained its nuclear weapons, would Russia have dared to attack us?” All Central Asian states are signatories to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as non-nuclear-weapon states. After inheriting approximately 1,410 nuclear warheads following the Soviet Union's dissolution in 1991, Kazakhstan chose to denuclearize and dismantled its nuclear testing infrastructure.  “In case of any external aggression, Kazakhstan will need help. But will such help come in time and will it come at all?” wonders Kuspanov. China is becoming a stronger deterrent against possible Russian aggression in Central Asia. One example is the increasing military-technical cooperation and bilateral exercises between China and Kyrgyzstan's armed forces. China also conducts multilateral military exercises within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) without Russia, showing its support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Central Asian states. Future security cooperation with China is expected to further develop and can even potentially lead to a new pact that guarantees protection against external aggression. Even with higher hopes of outside support in the face of external aggression, however, it is still better not to agitate the aggressor in the first place. “One should try not to quarrel with neighbors, especially strong ones”, says Sultan D. from Kazakhstan. “People always pay for the mistakes of politicians. Zelenskiy, I remember, promised to end the war in Donbas, but instead he got an even worse war.” Walking the fine line is the only way, for now It is clear that various factors such as their integrated infrastructure systems, extensive trade links, existing collective security formats, tens of joint projects, and strong historical and cultural ties put Central Asians in a different position vis-à-vis Russia than the rest of the world. Yet, balances are shifting, albeit slowly, as Central Asian leaders are carefully diversifying their relationships through developing engagements with China, Turkey, and Western nations such as France, Germany and the USA.  To their credit, Central Asian governments have publicly stayed neutral on the war in Ukraine and largely complied with Western sanctions against Russia, even though a handful of Central Asian entities have been slapped with secondary sanctions. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have also provided humanitarian aid of $2.25 million and $1 million respectively to Ukraine. In line with its diplomatic position on sovereignty, territorial integrity and international law, Kazakhstan has openly stated that it does not recognize the self-declared Donetsk and Luhansk republics. The country appeared to have paid a price for this principled stance, however, as a Russian court ordered the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), which utilizes a Russian controlled terminal in Novorossiysk and land for transit, to suspend activity for 30 days. This negatively impacted Kazakhstan's economy, which relies on hydrocarbons for around 20 per cent of its GDP and uses the CPC for its oil exports.  To date, Ukraine has received over $100 billion, mostly in aid, from the U.S. and its European allies, constituting a lifeline for its defense against Russia’s advancements. Its continuing plight even with such international support, and despite having access to seaports (an advantage Central Asian states lack), is a stark reminder to the region’s countries to keep neutrality, prioritize diplomacy over conflict and firmly stand to protect multilateralism.   In the end, Central Asian states will act in their own best interest, and for the moment, that includes keeping the delicate balance that Zelenskiy wants them to abandon. In his interview with Central Asian journalists, President Zelenskiy said, “I focus on what unites us rather than divides us”. At a time of immense external pressure from all sides, Central Asian leaders are also choosing to focus on the unity and welfare of their own communities.