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Regulators and Redskins

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Abstract

We examine the correlation between federal government activity and performance of the capital’s National Football League team, the Washington Redskins. We find a positive, non-spurious, and robust correlation between the Redskins’ winning percentage and bureaucratic output, measured by pages published in the Federal Register. Because the Redskins’ performance is prototypically exogenous, we give this result a causal interpretation and provide a plausible, causal mechanism: bureaucrats must make “logrolling” deals to expand their regulatory power, and a winning football team offers a shared source of optimism to lubricate such negotiations. We do not find the same correlation when examining congressional activity.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Clemson University, Clemson, USA

    Bentley Coffey & Robert D. Tollison

  2. George Washington University, Washington, USA

    Patrick A. McLaughlin

Authors
  1. Bentley Coffey
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  2. Patrick A. McLaughlin
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  3. Robert D. Tollison
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Correspondence to Robert D. Tollison.

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The views and opinions expressed by the authors do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government, the United States Department of Transportation, or the Federal Railroad Administration and shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes.

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Coffey, B., McLaughlin, P.A. & Tollison, R.D. Regulators and Redskins. Public Choice 153, 191–204 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-011-9781-3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-011-9781-3

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