

ISAO SO 400-1

Emerging State and Local Cybersecurity Laws and Regulations Impacting Information Sharing

Draft Document

V .5

ISAO Standards Organization

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY STATE LAWS 1 1

2 An Information Sharing and Analysis Organization (ISAO) is any group of individuals or

- 3 organizations established for purposes of collecting, analyzing and disseminating cyber or relevant information in order to prevent, detect, mitigate, and recover from risks.
- 4
- 5 events or incidents against the confidentiality, integrity, availability and reliability of
- 6 information and systems.¹
- 7 Separate but similar, Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs) provide central
- 8 resources for gathering information on cyber threats to critical infrastructure and for 9 information sharing between the private and public sectors.
- 10 ISAOs and similar organizations can be a critical resource in providing cyberthreat
- 11 information (CTI) and deterrence and resilience support to states and localities. In
- 12 connection with such activities, parties must be aware of the fact that state and local
- 13 laws have the potential to affect both service and compliance.
- 14 The relevance and applicability of these laws varies based on the terms of the law and
- 15 the promulgating jurisdiction's reach. Relevance and applicability will also vary based on
- 16 the location of an ISAO, the nature and experience of its members, and the manner in
- 17 which the ISAO operates. The content of these state and local laws might discourage or
- 18 encourage information sharing, or otherwise influence ISAOs operational choices. It is
- 19 important, therefore, for an ISAO to understand what types of state and local laws might
- 20 be relevant to their general operations, and to take steps to become aware of the
- 21 specific provisions of such laws and any incentives or restrictions that they impose. In 22 that this is a dynamic field, such provisions also should be monitored periodically. For
- 23 these reasons ISAOs should conduct active research and consider contributing,
- 24 consistent with their resources, to the writing or revision of any legislation or regulation
- 25 that directly or indirectly affects their specific area of focus. This could help ensure
- 26 legislation is effective, has no unintended impacts, and also may educate the legislators
- 27 about their needs.
- 28 It is generally understood that ISAOs are established to collect and share various forms
- 29 of threat vector and cyber security risk information, along with compliance and other
- 30 effective practices. This type of information could include intelligence about such things
- 31 as breaches, hacks, exploits and vulnerabilities, but generally not Personally Identifiable
- 32 Information (PII), or information that can be used to identify specific individuals, such as
- 33 Social Security numbers, addresses, or drivers' license data. To date, much of an
- 34 ISAOs' attention to legal and policy developments, pertaining to information sharing,
- has understandably been drawn to the federal and international levels. At the federal 35
- level, attention has often focused on Executive Orders relevant to information sharing 36

¹ ISAO SO (nd). Frequently Asked Questions. <u>https://www.isao.org/faq/</u> retrieved October 30, 2019.



- 37 and on the passage and implementation of, and continuing developments related to, the
- 38 2015 Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act (CISA). Since becoming law, CISA has
- 39 generated significant public comment and discussion, and has undergone various
- 40 phases of implementation and refinement in its administration.² Internationally,
- 41 especially recently, much of the focus has been on the strong privacy laws being
- 42 implemented in Europe and elsewhere, particularly the European Union's General Data
- 43 Protection Regulation (GDPR).³
- 44 There has been far less focus on how state and local laws or proposals directly or
- indirectly affect ISAOs. Even if there is no direct or indirect effect, they might still be of
- 46 relevance and may inhibit or encourage information sharing or create additional
- 47 opportunities for ISAOs.
- 48 Recently, however, ISAOs and others have been compelled by developments to focus
- 49 attention on state and local legislation and regulation, particularly with respect to the
- 50 communication and retention of PII. Every state and territory now has a law governing
- 51 breach notification and there is significant variance among them. Thus, breach subject
- 52 reporting requirements aside, the sorts of information that a state or locality might
- 53 benefit receiving from or sharing with an ISAO can also vary.
- 54 Of increasing significance at the sub-Federal level is the fact that a number of states
- 55 have enacted, or are considering, legislation modeled upon the GDPR. Chief among
- these is California's Consumer Privacy Act, which becomes effective January 1, 2020.
- 57 Nevada has passed a similar law and Illinois has promulgated a privacy statute focusing
- on biometric data. Although the terms of emergent state and local law is yet to be
- 59 determined, the importance of this evolving legal array is highly significant. For
- 60 example, some states are considering, or are in the process of passing and
- 61 implementing, laws that pertain to Personally Identifiable Information (PII). Although
- 62 these laws have not defined PII at this time, most ISAOs intend to and successfully
- 63 steer away from collecting any such information PII, other than about their own
- 64 employees.

² The Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act (CISA) is a federal law designed to improve cybersecurity in the United States through enhanced sharing of information about cybersecurity threats. https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senate-bill/754

³ GDPR is a European Union (EU) regulation on data protection and privacy, protecting all individuals within the EU. Its reach further includes citizens of other countries (such as the United States) who share their personal information with European businesses or potentially even businesses operating from abroad who gather information from those in the EU. GDPR came into effect May 25, 2018 and violations carry potentially severe penalties. Generally, the GDPR requires that companies be transparent about what personal data they are collecting, what they are using customer's data for, with whom they are sharing it, allows customers to access and make certain decisions about personal data pertaining to them, and emphasizes the need to obtain consent before using data or disclosing it to a third party and to allow persons the right to be "forgotten." While a matter of importance to many American companies, the significance to ISAO members lies in the fact that much of developing U.S. law is being modeled upon the GDPR.



- 65 A number of states are looking to provide incentives for entities to engage in voluntary
- 66 information sharing, as CISA sought to do at the federal level. Finally, some cities and
- other jurisdictions are beginning to develop sharing centers or "hubs," which collect,
- share, and disseminate information. These sharing centers could become resources for
- 69 ISAOs to take advantage of and help them better serve their members. In view of the 70 fact that some state and city offices have been subject to hacks and exploits that have
- fact that some state and city offices have been subject to hacks and exploits that have interrupted various services and facilities and others have been forced to succumb to
- 72 costly ransomware demands, the desire for cooperative efforts involving ISAOs ought to
- 73 be increasing.
- 74 This document is intended to highlight current examples of legislation so that ISAOs
- 75 know what types of developments to watch for and consider. It is not intended to be
- 76 comprehensive, exhaustive, or to provide legal advice. As previously mentioned,
- information reporting and sharing is a dynamic and changing environment which any
- 78 entity must monitor.

79 **2 STATE LAWS**

- 80 As noted above, many state and local legislators, as well as regulators and other
- 81 stakeholders, have used the laws of other nations as models in implementing strong
- 82 privacy legislation. The California Consumer Privacy Act is the prime example of this
- 83 activity, but as noted, every state and U.S. territory has laws and regulations governing
- 84 data breaches.

85 2.1 GDPR AS AN INFLUENCE ON THE STATES

86 Many state laws focus on privacy rights and not information sharing. The wide 87 applicability of these laws affect and can be applied to any entity that acquires or shares 88 PII. This may be relevant to an ISAO in its capacity as an employer or recipient of 89 certain financial information, but it can also be relevant to an ISAO if it receives personal 90 data from its members, perhaps for sharing. That being said, ISAOs typically do not 91 intend to, nor do they, collect personal data PII for sharing (since it typically is not 92 necessary to satisfy their purposes). In the event, however, that an ISAO does collect 93 personal information or data about its employees or about individuals related to its 94 members, it is critical that it be aware of and consider these privacy laws. 95 As is mentioned above, the prime, though far from the only, example of emergent state

- 96 law is California's new privacy law originally passed in 2018. It is known as the
- 97 *California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018* and is sometimes referred to as "GDPR Lite."
- 98 The law's purpose is to "...ensure the privacy of Californians' personal information
- 99 through various consumer rights. Consumer rights established ... include the right to
- 100 know whether a person's personal information is being collected and whether it is being
- sold; the right to have businesses delete a person's personal information; the right to



- 102 opt-out of or opt-in to the sale of a person's personal information."⁴ The breach of any of
- 103 these provisions could result in a business being required to pay damages to a
- 104 customer whose rights are violated, injunctive or declaratory relief, or other damages
- 105 the court deems proper.⁵ The Act was introduced and passed quickly to derail a
- 106 citizens' ballot initiative that many in industry thought could be even more onerous that
- 107 otherwise would have been included on California's November 2018 election ballot. The
- sponsors of the ballot initiative agreed to take a step back if the legislation was passed.
- 109 There have been numerous proposals in other states to take on some of the same
- subjects as the new California privacy law. Nevada, as noted, recently followed suit. In
- 111 July 2019, New York passed the Stop Hacks and Improve Electronic Data Security Act
- 112 (SHIELD Act), which expands the definition of PII for New York residents to include
- biometric data, username or email address in combination of password or security
- 114 questions, and account numbers, credit or debit card, if they can be used exclusively to
- 115 access accounts.⁶ In the past, there has been uncertainty if exfiltration of PII or
- 116 accessing the data constitutes a breach. In the case of ransomware, some attackers
- only access the data without acquiring it. Under the SHIELD Act, New York joins a few
 other states that consider having access to the data as constituting a breach.⁷ As of
- other states that consider having access to the data as constituting a breach.⁷ As of
 October 23, 2019, the expanded definition of PII took effect and the law requires
- 120 notification of impacted residents, state, regulators, and under certain conditions
- 120 nonneation of impacted residents, state, regulators, and under certain conditions 121 consumer reporting agencies.⁸ In addition, businesses are still required to notify the
- 122 New York Attorney General, New York Secretary of State, and the Division of the State
- 123 Police in the case of a breach.
- 124 In several states, legislation often requires that breach notification be provided to the
- 125 state attorney general and specifies notification timetables, available fines, etc. A court
- 126 may also impose penalties on a business in addition to the payment of attorney's fees if
- 127 the customer prevails in their suit.
- 128 Some of these emergent state laws allow for private rights of action without any
- 129 compliance safe harbor and, often, without the need for plaintiffs to show economic loss
- 130 or other material damages. The SHIELD Act does not provide a private action, instead
- the state attorney general may bring actions to enjoin violations and obtain civil
- 132 penalties.9

⁴ See: California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018. Assembly Committee on Appropriations, Lorena Gonzalez Fletcher, chair. SB 112. Date of Hearing August 29, 2019.

⁵ See § 1798.150 of the California Consumer Privacy Act

⁶ See: <u>https://www.offitkurman.com/blog/2019/08/18/stop-hacks-and-improve-electronic-data-security-act-shield-act/</u>

⁷ See: <u>https://www.varonis.com/blog/nys-shield-law-updates-to-pii-data-security-and-breach-notification/</u>

⁸ See: <u>https://www.insideprivacy.com/data-security/new-york-passes-new-data-security-and-breach-notification-requirements/</u>

⁹ See: <u>https://datamatters.sidley.com/new-york-enacts-stricter-data-cybersecurity-laws/</u>



- 133 While these laws do not single out ISAOs or information sharing specifically, they are
- 134 important to note. They represent a baseline of actual or potential state privacy
- 135 legislation that ISAOs should be aware of, as more states are considering or are
- implementing similar privacy laws of general applicability. By understanding what a
- particular state's privacy law says and being aware of the repercussions for violations,
 ISAOs will have an additional reason to avoid collecting such personal data. In the
- 139 event ISAOs do collect any such data, they need to maintain an active compliance
- 140 program to prevent unauthorized disclosures and avoid legal liability. This need is
- 141 magnified if ISAO members operate in multiple states or internationally. And, if an ISAO
- 142 decides that it somehow needs to gather and potentially disseminate PII, it should
- 143 consider purchasing cyber risk insurance.

144 2.1.1 INFORMATION SHARING OFFICERS

145 GDPR has not only influenced state privacy laws, but its influence can also be seen in 146 changes to the roles of certain state officers, such as state Chief Information Officers 147 (CIOs). GDPR defines the role of Data Protection Officers (DPOs)-and mandates that 148 they be heavily involved in data collection and dissemination of information. CIOs are increasingly expanding their responsibilities in some of these areas.¹⁰ Aspects of a 149 DPO's role (such as being a business's single point of contact who is responsible for 150 151 every stage of data collection) will likely be absorbed into the responsibilities and job descriptions of CIOs in some states.¹¹ This may give more state CIOs a clear role in 152 information sharing. In turn, this can create opportunities for ISAOs to partner with 153 154 states to provide and receive more information for the benefit of members as well as 155 provide insight into how states view information sharing best practices and concerns. 156 The state of Oregon, for example, is in the process of creating its own "Cybersecurity" Center for Excellence," which will act as a new ISAC.¹² The state CIO's job within the 157

- 157 Center for Excellence," which will act as a new ISAC.¹² The state CIO's job within the 158 Cybersecurity Center for Excellence entails coordinating information sharing relating to
- 158 Cybersecurity Center for Excellence entails coordinating information sharing relating 159 any cybersecurity risks. The CIO will further act as a liaison with the National
- 160 Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) in the United States
- 161 Department of Homeland Security, as well as other federal agencies, and other public
- 162 and private entities.
- 163 Once the CIO receives any relevant information, including threat information, he or she 164 may disseminate the information to the appropriate sources including other ISAOs or

¹⁰ The role of state chief information officers is not a new idea in the United States. In fact, its prevalence led to creation of the National Association of State Chief Information Officers ("NASCIO") in 1969 (see:

<u>https://www.nascio.org/</u>). Later, state chief information security officers (CISOs) became more prevalent too, and they often are included in NASCIO. Increasingly, however, new state laws are creating additional responsibilities for CIOs.

¹¹ Section 4, Article 37 of GDPR describes the role of DPOs. This officer is the single point of contact within a business or an organization involved with data processing tasks. Many CIOs will take on this role.
¹² See:

https://www.pdx.edu/cps/sites/www.pdx.edu.cps/files/Cybersecurity%20Needs%20Assessment%20Final%20Draft.pdf



- 165 ISACs, MS-ISAC, the federal government, law enforcement agencies, public utilities,and private industry.
- 167 The changing roles of state CIOs concerning information sharing and privacy, as seen
- 168 in Oregon, may be useful for ISAOs to monitor and learn about. The broadening of state
- 169 CIO roles may create opportunities and precedents.

170 **2.2 INCENTIVES**

- 171 Some states have realized the importance of information sharing not only with the
- 172 federal government, but among their own state entities. his has led some state
- 173 governments to create incentives through legislation to encourage information sharing.
- 174 Among such incentives are "safe harbors" that can insulate a defendant from some or
- all liability in enforcement actions or litigation. ISAOs promote information sharing by
- working with private and often public sector stakeholders to create best practices and
- 177 share cyber threat information on a voluntary basis.¹³ State laws do not usually
- 178 mandate that companies participate in information sharing with ISAOs, but ISAOs can
- potentially use state support as another mechanism to promote the services that ISAOs
- 180 can provide.
- 181 For example, Ohio enacted Senate Bill 220, also known as the Ohio Data Protection Act
- 182 (DPA)¹⁴, which took effect in November 2018. This law's purpose is to "provide a legal
- 183 safe harbor to covered entities that implement and maintain a specified cybersecurity
- 184 program."¹⁵ The law states:
- 185 Sec. 1354.02. (A) A covered entity seeking an affirmative defense under sections 1354.01 186 to 1354.05 of the Revised Code shall do one of the following: (1) Create, maintain, and 187 comply with a written cybersecurity program that contains administrative, technical, and 188 physical safeguards for the protection of personal information and that reasonably 189 conforms to an industry recognized cybersecurity framework, as described in section 190 1354.03 of the Revised Code; or (2) Create, maintain, and comply with a written 191 cybersecurity program that contains administrative, technical, and physical safeguards for 192 the protection of both personal information and restricted information and that reasonably 193 conforms to an industry recognized cybersecurity framework, as described in section

¹³ See: <u>https://www.isao.org/about/</u>

¹⁴ See: <u>https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/ohio-s-data-protection-act-27275/</u>

¹⁵ A "covered entity" under this statute includes any business that accesses, maintains, communicates, or processes personal information or restricted information in or through one or more systems, networks, or services located in or outside this state. See full Bill Text here: <u>https://www.legislature.ohio.gov/legislation/legislation-summary?id=GA132-SB-220</u>



- 194 1354.03 of the Revised Code. (B) A covered entity's cybersecurity program shall be 195 designed to do all of the following with respect to the information described in division 196 (A)(1) or (2) of this section, as applicable : (1) Protect the security and confidentiality of 197 the information; (2) Protect against any anticipated threats or hazards to the security or 198 integrity of the information; (3) Protect against unauthorized access to and acquisition of 199 the information that is likely to result in a material risk of identity theft or other fraud to
- the individual to whom the information relates.¹⁶

201 In essence, under the new Ohio law, the businesses who choose to implement written 202 cybersecurity programs and best practices may claim an affirmative defense that can free them from liability if there is a breach in their system and customer PII is 203 204 compromised. DPA is intended to provide an *incentive* to encourage businesses to 205 achieve a higher level of cybersecurity through voluntary action.¹⁷ DPA does not, nor is 206 it intended to, create minimum cybersecurity standards that must be achieved.¹⁸ nor should it be read to impose liability upon businesses. New York's SHIELD Act contains 207 208 similar compliance provisions as DPA: however, it does not provide an "expressed 209 affirmative defense against state tort actions for entities with compliance information 210 security programs."¹⁹

- 211 This Ohio law does not require companies to participate in information sharing. 212 However, the possibility of additional liability protections may sway some companies to 213 decide to participate. ISAOs could consider reaching out to companies who fall within 214 the definition of a covered entity and invite and encourage new members to join by 215 using the additional liability protections provided by the bill as an incentive. Companies may see these additional liability protections as reason to engage in information sharing 216 217 and as a potentially valuable addition to written cybersecurity plans or policies, thereby 218 showing the state that they are taking important and valuable steps to guard against 219 data or privacy breaches.
- Additionally, ISAOs located within Ohio might want to consider whether they also wish to have written cyber policies and measures in place, thereby allowing an ISAO itself to qualify for the affirmative defense. By having these policies and programs, the ISAO

¹⁷ The affirmative defense is to a cause of action sounding in tort (negligence, invasion of privacy, etc.), including

¹⁶ See: <u>https://www.legislature.ohio.gov/legislation/legislation-summary?id=GA132-SB-220</u>

allegations of a data breach resulting from a failure to implement reasonable information security controls. ¹⁸ In addition to certain initiatives like Ohio's legal safe harbor law, there are other state initiatives that may be sector specific. New York's financial institution's cybersecurity law is a prime example. Beginning September 4, 2018; banks, insurance companies, and other financial service institutions that are regulated by DFS are required to be in compliance with new provisions of cybersecurity regulations. These provisions require a covered entity to establish written incident response plans, comply with breach notification policies, have policies in place concerning the disclosure of information to third parties, and comply with data retention policies. See more at: https://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/press/pr1808081.htm

¹⁹ See: <u>https://datamatters.sidley.com/new-york-enacts-stricter-data-cybersecurity-laws/</u>



223 might have an additional defense available if ever needed in an Ohio action against224 them.

225 **2.3 GENERAL LEGISLATION CAN BE OF RELEVANCE**

226 Sometimes an ISAO may need to look particularly closely at the jurisdictions most

- 227 relevant to it to uncover relevant laws or developments. Potentially relevant provisions
- 228 may be buried in laws with a purpose broader than cybersecurity or privacy.
- An example is Virginia's Budget Bill (Bill 50002, enacted June 2018). This bill includes a
- provision that provides funding to state police to develop and operate cybersecurity and
- 231 management tools to address any risks, threats, and/or vulnerabilities to data that are
- 232 outside of the scope of their memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the Virginia
- 233 Information Technologies Agency (VITA). The state police collect this information and
- report it to VITA, who in turn actively participates with and shares information with Multi-
- 235 State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC).²⁰
- 236 Furthermore, several states have implemented general laws that protect critical
- infrastructure as well as the PII of their citizens.²¹ The texts of these laws guide state
- 238 entities to follow Emergency Response Plans (EPRs) which have already been
- 239 implemented. These governmentally mandated regimes typically require their
- components to detail training and set forth Business Continuity Plans (BCPs) or Incident
- 241 Response Plans (IRPs) specifically written to address data breaches, including who
- affected entities should report to, when they should report, how the information should be reported, etc. The state of Iowa, for example, not only has a state level information
- 243 be reported, etc. The state of Iowa, for example, not only has a state level information 244 security office, but also reports any data breaches to MS-ISAC. As noted, the breach
- notification laws of all 50 states and U.S. territories vary significantly among themselves,
- but all impose on private data holder's notification and response requirements. These
- laws provide guidance with respect to reporting and, in some cases, best practices.
- 248 Generally, most ISAOs will have no need for sharing PII and do not do so. ISAOs
- should consider obtaining additional guidance on relevant state statutes and
- 250 regulations, highlighting private or state entities who receive funding to perform
- 251 cybersecurity related activities. These laws may open the door for ISAOs to help identify

²⁰ Virginia Information Technology Agency is Virginia's consolidated information technology organization. The Commonwealth Security and Risk Management (CSRM) COV Security Outreach & Information Sharing Team actively participates with MS-ISAC, Local, State (VA Fusion Center and Commonwealth Preparedness Working Group), and Federal Law Enforcement (FBI), and multiple Commonwealth of Virginia Information/Infrastructure Security groups.

²¹ States that have begun enacting broader legislation include, but are not limited to: Arkansas (*regarding emergency powers of bank commissioner, relating to cyberattacks and cybersecurity breaches*); Colorado (*this law concerns the authority of the Joint Technology Committee; regarding data privacy and cybersecurity within state agencies and may coordinate with the Colorado cybersecurity committee*), Maryland (*making proposed appropriations within the state Budget Bill*). See more at: <u>http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/cybersecurity-legislation-2017.aspx</u>



and serve potential recipients who might wish to participate in sharing and becomingISAO members.

254 **3 LOCAL LAWS**

- 255 Municipalities typically have not chosen to implement local laws that would directly
- 256 regulate or affect ISAOs. This does not necessarily mean that municipalities do not take
- cybersecurity precautions. New York City, for example, is in the forefront of
- implementing new cybersecurity policies that may have a major impact on privacy and
- 259 cybersecurity within its jurisdiction.
- 260 The New York City Economic Development Corporation (NYCEDC) unveiled its plan to
- transform New York City into the next cybersecurity "hub," to be known as "Cyber NYC."
- A main driver behind this initiative is the goal of creating thousands of jobs in the
- 263 cybersecurity field as part of Mayor de Blasio's "New York Works Plan."²² The City's
- 264 Chief Information Officer and head of NYC Cyber Command stated, "EDC's Cyber NYC
- initiative establishes a new partnership positioned to powerfully combine expertise in
- technology and business innovation, education, job growth, and community
- collaboration to help fuel our City's forward progress in the rapidly growing industry of
- 268 cybersecurity."
- 269 They will try to accomplish this initiative in three different ways. The first is by opening a
- 270 Global Cyber Center to bring together an international community of corporations,
- investors, and startups. This will enable them to collaborate and share information on an
- international scale.²³ The second method is to develop a workforce through an applied
- learning initiative. For this, the city has selected local colleges to pick from and train
 students through the use of a "Cyber Boot Camp" and other degree and certificate
- initiatives programs. The program initiative anticipates that students from these
- 276 programs will be hired in significant numbers by cybersecurity companies and or firms
- 277 seeking cybersecurity expertise in the area. The final approach the NYCEDC is taking is
- by working with industry leaders (such as Goldman Sachs and Facebook) to collaborate
- and have those firms work on advisory boards, hire students, and advise the overall
- 280 direction of the initiative training provided.
- Initiatives, such as from the NYCEDC, provide potential partnership opportunities for
 ISAOs in various ways. An ISAO might consider joining the initiative as a business who
 could hire out of the boot camp program, which might be helpful in building a trained

²² See: <u>https://newyorkworks.cityofnewyork.us/?ddownload=1263</u> The New York Works plan is a series of initiatives to create 100,000 jobs within New York City, with the de Blasio administration investing heavily in the cybersecurity industry as well as other fields.

²³ See: <u>https://www.nycedc.com/press-release/nycedc-unveils-global-cyber-center-innovation-hub-and-new-talent-pipelines-secure-nyc#_ftn1</u>

See: <u>https://www.law.com/legaltechnews/2018/10/09/3-ways-nyc-is-looking-to-change-u-s-privacy-and-cybersecurity/?slreturn=20180919132708</u>



workforce. An ISAO might also find opportunities for sharing or obtaining new members
 in connection with the initiative.²⁴

More generally, the public has been made aware that municipalities and the states that empower them have been subject to hacking of public utilities and health facilities. Most concerning, these organizations have been compelled to pay a ransom to de-encrypt and regain access to their data, which have been attacked by both individuals and state sponsored actors. These are the same types of threats that the private sector is exposed to and it is clear that information sharing would benefit all concerned parties. Such sharing should be encouraged and exploited by ISAOs and their members.

293 **3.1 GEOGRAPHICAL SHARING**

294 While some local laws or initiatives might not be specific to ISAOs, it is still helpful to 295 understand other municipal efforts to encourage information sharing. One increasing 296 trend is for municipalities and other governmental entities at similar levels to engage in 297 public-private partnerships that include information sharing. The Federal Bureau of 298 Investigation (FBI) created the InfraGard Program which fosters collaboration and 299 information sharing between public and private partnerships across the United States. 300 Active chapters exist in every state and U.S. territory. (https://www.infragard.org/) This 301 creates additional collaborative opportunities for ISAOs that can benefit their members. 302 It can help them better to understand risk, threat, and vulnerability information, and 303 targets and enables ISAOs to become more involved in relevant geographic 304 communities. ISAOs will want to watch specifically for the establishment of 305 geographically focused information sharing centers. These centers could be productive 306 ISAO partners, magnifying the ability of both ISAOs and governments alike to gain 307 actionable threat and vulnerability information as well as tested best practices to 308 manage or reduce risk. These partnerships can also be equipped to disseminate 309 actionable information efficiently to those entities that would particularly benefit from it. 310 For example, Los Angeles is at the forefront of this kind of sharing. It has implemented a 311 cybersecurity risk, threat, and vulnerability sharing group with city businesses, known as 312 the Los Angeles Cyber Lab. This lab is led by a Board of Advisors including the Mayor 313 of Los Angeles, Eric Garcetti, as well as 28 top businesses and government officials. 314 This Lab begins by sharing information generated from its Integrated Security 315 Operations Center (ISOC). The Lab then allows its members (both businesses and 316 private citizens of the city) to send any compromising cyber information they know of to 317 the Lab. Then, at no cost, the Lab communicates if there are any active phishing 318 schemes, ransomware, or data stealing apps. Additionally, it allows its members to

319 share data with organizations for both public and private exchange. The Cyber Lab



- 320 states that it is the first public entity to implement real time information sharing
- 321 capabilities.²⁵

322 **4 CONCLUSION**

There is a significant and increasing amount of legislative and regulatory activity at the state and local level, some intended to impact information sharing directly, and some

- 325 with broader intentions but which still might be relevant to information sharing entities,
- 326 such as ISAOs. Recent events affecting state and local services and interests magnify
- 327 the utility of information sharing between the public and private sectors. To be effective
- 328 partners in such activities, it is incumbent upon ISAOs to be cognizant of relevant state
- and local laws and regulations. The laws, initiatives, and resources described in this
- document are in various stages of enactment or enforcement. ISAOs should continually
- review individual laws or initiatives as they are dynamic and subject to change.
- 332 Collectively, these state and local laws and policy initiatives identify a landscape that
- are important for ISAOs to understand and monitor.

334

²⁵ See: <u>https://www.lacyberlab.org/what-los-angeles-cyber-lab</u> and See Also: <u>https://www.smartresilient.com/la-cyber-lab-gets-funding-announces-expansion</u>



335 **APPENDIX A - GLOSSARY**

- 336 Selected terms used in the publication are defined below.
- 337 Actor: See threat actor.
- 338 Analysis: a detailed examination of data to identify malicious activity and an assessment
- of the identified malicious activity to existing threat information to say something greater about the data at hand.²⁶
- Attack: attempt to destroy, expose, alter, disable, steal or gain unauthorized access to or make unauthorized use of an asset.²⁷
- Authentication: provision of assurance that a claimed characteristic of an entity is correct.²⁸
- 345 Automated cybersecurity information sharing: the exchange of data-related risks and
- 346 practices relevant to increasing the security of an information system utilizing primarily
- 347 machine programmed methods for receipt, analysis, dissemination, and integration.²⁹
- Availability: property of being accessible and usable on demand by an authorized entity.³⁰
- 350 Center for Infrastructure Assurance and Security (CIAS): is developing the world's
- 351 foremost center for multidisciplinary education and development of operational
- 352 capabilities in the areas of infrastructure assurance and security. The CIAS is a part of
- 353 The University of Texas at San Antonio (UTSA).
- 354 Confidentiality: property that information is not made available or disclosed to
- 355 unauthorized individuals, entities, or processes.³¹
- 356 Control: measure that is modifying risk.³²
- 357 Cyber threat indicator: information that is necessary to describe or identify—

³¹ Ibid

²⁶ ISAO 100-1. (2016, October 14). *Introduction to Information Sharing.* Retrieved from ISAO Support Organization: https://www.isao.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/ISAO-100-1-Introduction-to-ISAO-v1-01_Final.pd

²⁷ ISO/IEC 27000:2018(en). Information technology — Security techniques — Information security management systems — Overview and vocabulary. <u>https://www.iso.org/obp/ui/#iso:std:iso-iec:27000:ed-5:v1:en</u>. Retrieved: October 30, 2019

²⁸ Ibid

²⁹ ISAO 100-1, 2016

³⁰ ISO/IEC 27000:2018(en)

³² ISO/IEC 27000:2018(en)



- malicious reconnaissance, including anomalous patterns of communications that
 appear to be transmitted for the purpose of gathering technical information
 related to a cybersecurity threat or security vulnerability;
- a method of defeating a security control or exploitation of a security vulnerability;
- a security vulnerability, including anomalous activity that appears to indicate the
 existence of a security vulnerability;
- a method of causing a user with legitimate access to an information system or
 information that is stored on, processed by, or transiting an information system to
 unwittingly enable the defeat of a security control or exploitation of a security
 vulnerability;
- malicious cyber command and control;
- the actual or potential harm caused by an incident, including a description of the
 information exfiltrated as a result of a particular cybersecurity threat; or
- any combination thereof.³³
- 372 Cyber Threat Information (CTI): information (such as indications, tactics, techniques,
 373 procedures, behaviors, motives, adversaries, targets, vulnerabilities, courses of action,
 374 or warnings) regarding an adversary, its intentions, or actions against information
 375 technology or operational technology systems.³⁴
- Cybersecurity information sharing: the exchange of data-related risks and practices
 relevant to increasing the security of an information system.³⁵
- 378 Event: occurrence or change of a particular set of circumstances.³⁶
- 379 Incident response: an organized approach to addressing and managing the aftermath of
- a security breach or attack (also known as an incident). The goal is to handle the
- 381 situation in a way that limits damage and reduces recovery time and costs.³⁷
- 382 Incident: a violation or imminent threat of violation of computer security policies,
- 383 acceptable use policies, or standard security practices.³⁸

34 Ibid

³³ ISAO 300-1. (2016, October 14). Introduction to Information Sharing. Retrieved January 23, 2019, from ISAO Standards Organziation: https://www.isao.org/storage/2016/10/ISAO-300-1-Introduction-to-Information-Sharing-v1-01_Final.pdf

³⁵ ISAO 100-1, 2016

³⁶ ISO/IEC 27000:2018(en)

³⁷ ISAO 300-1

³⁸ ISAO 100-1



- Indicator: a technical artifact or observable that suggests an attack is imminent or is
 currently underway, or that a compromise may have already occurred.³⁹
- Information security: preservation of confidentiality, integrity, and availability of
 information.⁴⁰
- 388 Information Sharing and Analysis Organization (ISAO): an ISAO is any group of
- individuals or organizations established for purposes of collecting, analyzing and
- disseminating cyber or relevant information in order to prevent, detect, mitigate, and
- recover from risks, events or incidents against the confidentiality, integrity, availability
- and reliability of information and systems.⁴¹
- 393 Integrity: property of accuracy and completeness.⁴²
- 394 Jurisdiction: The geographic area over which authority extends; legal authority; the 395 authority to hear and determine causes of action.
- 396
- Mitigation: the act of reducing the severity, seriousness, or painfulness of security
 vulnerability or exposure.⁴³
- Monitor: to acquire, identify, scan, or possess information that is stored on, processed by, or transiting an information system.⁴⁴
- 401 Multi-State ISAC: an organization whose mission is to improve the overall cyber security
- 402 posture of state, local, tribal and territorial governments.
- 403 Policy: intentions and direction of an organization, as formally expressed by its top
 404 management.⁴⁵
- 405 Process: set of interrelated or interacting activities which transforms inputs into
 406 outputs.⁴⁶
- 407 Requirement: a need or expectation that is stated, generally implied or obligatory.⁴⁷

- ⁴² ISO/IEC 27000:2018(en)
- 43 ISAO 300-1
- 44 Ibid
- 45 ISO/IEC 27000:2018(en)
- 46 Ibid
- 47 Ibid

³⁹ NIST. (2016, October). Guide to Cyber Threat Information Sharing. NIST Special Publication 800-150. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-150

⁴⁰ ISO/IEC 27000:2018(en)

⁴¹ ISAO SO (nd)



- 408 Security control: the management, operational, and technical controls used to protect
- 409 against an unauthorized effort to adversely affect the confidentiality, integrity, and 410 availability of an information system or its information.⁴⁸
- 411 Security vulnerability: any attribute of hardware, software, process, or procedure that 412 could enable or facilitate the defeat of a security control.⁴⁹
- 413 Sensitive information: information, the loss, misuse, or unauthorized access to or
- 414 modification of, that could adversely affect the national interest or the conduct of federal
- 415 programs, or the privacy to which individuals are entitled under 5 U.S.C. Section 552a
- 416 (the Privacy Act), but that has not been specifically authorized under criteria established
- 417 by an Executive Order or an Act of Congress to be kept classified in the interest of
- 418 national defense or foreign policy.⁵⁰
- 419 Stakeholders: a person, group, or organization that has interest or concern in an 420 organization.
- 421 Threat actor: an individual or a group posing a threat.
- 422 Threat information: any information related to a threat that might help an organization
- 423 protect itself against a threat or detect the activities of an actor. Major types of threat
- 424 information include indicators, TTPs, security alerts, threat intelligence reports, and tool
- 425 configurations.51
- 426 Threat: any circumstance or event with the potential to adversely impact organizational
- 427 operations (including mission, functions, image, or reputation), organizational assets,
- 428 individuals, other organizations, or the Nation through an information system via
- 429 unauthorized access, destruction, disclosure, or modification of information, and/or
- 430 denial of service.⁵²
- 431 Training: NIST 800-84 defines training as "informing personnel of their roles and
- 432 responsibilities within a particular IT plan and teaching them skills related to those roles

- ⁴⁹ Ibid
- ⁵⁰ NIST 800-151
- ⁵¹ Ibid
- ⁵² NIST 800-151

⁴⁸ ISAO SO 300-1



- 433 and responsibilities, thereby preparing them for participation in exercises, tests, and
- 434 actual emergency situations related to the IT plan".⁵³
- 435 Vulnerability: a weakness in an information system, system security procedures, internal
- 436 controls, or implementation that could be exploited by a threat source.⁵⁴
- 437 Working group: a committee or group appointed to study and report on a particular
- 438 question and make recommendations based on its findings.

439

⁵³ NIST SP 800-84 – September 2006 - Tim Grance (NIST), Tamara Nolan (BAH), Kristin Burke (BAH), Rich Dudley (BAH), Gregory White (UTSA), Travis Good (UTSA) - Guide to Test, Training, and Exercise Programs for IT Plans and Capabilities. - https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-84/final ⁵⁴ ISAO 300-1



440 APPENDIX B - ACRONYMS

CIO Chief Information Officer	
CISA Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act	
CTI Cyber Threat Information	
DPA Ohio Data Protection Act	
DPO Data Protection Officers	
ERP Emergency Response Plan	
EU European Union	
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation	
GDPR General Data Protection Regulation	
IRP Incident Response Plan	
ISAC Information Sharing and Analysis Center	
ISAO Information Sharing and Analysis Organization	
ISAO SO Information Sharing and Analysis Organization Standards Organization	
ISO International Standards Organization	
ISOC Integrated Security Operations Center	
IT Information Technology	
MS-ISAC Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center	
NCCIC National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center	эr
NIST National institute of Standards and Technology	
NYCEDC New York City Economic Development Corporation	
PII Personally Identifiable Information	
SHIELD Act Stop Hacks and Improve Electronic Data Security Act	
TTPs Tools, Techniques, and Procedures	

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