By Amin Saikal
The Syrian situation is becoming more complex by the day. A new set of regional alliances between opposite sides in the conflict is emerging in a rebuff to the United States and its allies in the region. Russia is set to gain wider influence in the Middle East than could have been anticipated a year ago.
President Vladimir Putin has made a calculated move by taking advantage of America's vulnerabilities in order to secure a strong Russian foothold in the Middle East that will enable it to play a significant role in shaping the post Pax-Americana regional political and strategic landscape. He has sought to achieve this objective by adopting several consequential policy measures. Three of these are worth stressing.
The first is to save the Assad regime at all costs, even if it means more destruction and killing in Syria, as has been witnessed in Russia's relentless air bombing of all Syrian opposition groups, not only in Aleppo but elsewhere in the country. Moscow has remained totally impervious to all international criticism and has blamed the US and Western allies for the Syrian tragedy. It has turned up its nose at Washington's decision to end all contact with Russia over Syria, which has essentially killed any chances of a political settlement of the Syrian crisis for the foreseeable future. To ensure its long-term interest in Syria and through it in the region, Moscow has also just announced that it will establish a permanent military base in Syria's Latakia – the heartland of the ruling Syrian Alawite minority.
The second is to deepen and widen its relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran, which has a strategic partnership with Syria, organic ties with the Lebanese Islamist Hezbollah, and influential relations with the Iraqi government and several powerful elements among Iraq's Shia majority. Moscow has made a common cause with Tehran in support of the Assad regime as Iran could not ensure the survival of the regime, at much financial and military cost, from early 2011 until Russia's escalation of its military involvement in Syria a year ago.
Russian President, Vladimir Putin, right, and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.Credit: Chris McGrath
This does not mean that Iran will allow itself to be relegated as a secondary player in Syria. To the contrary, it will do its best not to let Russia become the determining power in the country, as Syria is a critical part of Iran's regional security architecture. In light of this and Iran's historical distrust of Russia, one could expect a possible degree of tension between Tehran and Moscow when and if the Syrian conflict is settled in one way or another.
The third is to reverse its hostile relations with Turkey following Turkey's shooting down of a Russian fighter almost a year ago to close camaraderie following the failed coup attempt against President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in July this year. Following Erdogan's offer of an apology to Putin for the plane incident in June, Putin responded eagerly by not only expressing full support for Erdogan after the coup, but also by welcoming the latter to a warm reception in Moscow, which has now been reciprocated by Erdogan.
In the latest developments, the two sides have agreed to increase military and intelligence contacts, and affirmed the need for aid to get through to the besieged Aleppo, where some 250,000 inhabitants are trapped in appalling conditions under constant bombardment by the Russian and Syrian governments. They have also signed an agreement for the construction of two pipelines to export Russian gas to Turkey. This is all despite the fact that Turkey is an important member of NATO and has supported the opposition to the Assad regime.
Ankara and Moscow have been driven to the point of close co-operation by their antipathy towards the United States and Putin's ambitions for a strong niche in the Middle Eastern-Mediterranean region. Erdogan is angry with Washington for not having extradited Fethullah Gulen, the spiritual leader of the Hizmet movement, whom Ankara has accused of having orchestrated the coup attempt.
These developments do not augur well for the United States or its Western and regional allies, most importantly Israel. In spite of their differences, Moscow's entente with Tehran and Ankara entails a major strategic shift in the region. It not only diminishes the grounds upon which the US and its two main European allies – France and Britain – have called for an investigation of the Russian and Syrian governments' operations in Aleppo as war crimes, but must also be worrying for Israel and a matter of concern for the Gulf Arab states and the Gulf Co-operation Council, led by Saudi Arabia. The latter and Israel regard Iran and Hezbollah as their mortal enemies, and yet they are emerging as influential actors on the borders of Israel and within the GCC's space.
It is not clear what wider consequences the changing regional situation could bring about, but it appears that now a resolution of the Syrian conflict and defeat of the so-called Islamic State rests more on co-operation between Moscow, Tehran and Ankara than on operations by the US-led international coalition. While Putin, whose authoritarian grip on Russia's domestic situation and foreign policy has stunned many, is riding high, the US is embroiled in acrimonious presidential electoral politics and is losing its grip on the Middle East.
Amin Saikal is distinguished professor of political science, Public Policy Fellow and director of the Centre for Arab and Islamic Studies (the Middle East and Central Asia) at the Australian National University.