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Utilitarianism

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Handbook of the Philosophical Foundations of Business Ethics

Abstract

This chapter offers a concise discussion of classic utilitarianism which is the prototypical moral doctrine of the utilitarian family. It starts with an analysis of the classic utilitarian criterion of rightness, gives an overview over its virtues and vices, and suggests an overall assessment of its adequacy as a theory of morality. Furthermore, it briefly discusses whether classic utilitarianism holds promise as a philosophy for doing business.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Note that the term “classic utilitarianism” does not refer to the doctrines held by classic utilitarians (Bentham, Mill and Sidgwick). It refers, rather, to a stylized moral system which involves paradigmatic elements of utilitarian moral philosophy.

  2. 2.

    This incompleteness may not be found problematic, as the following example shows: “Jones is driving through a tunnel behind a slow-moving truck. It is illegal to change lanes in the tunnel, and Jones’s doing so would disrupt the traffic. Nevertheless, she is going to change lanes (…). If she changes lanes without accelerating, traffic will be disrupted more severely than if she accelerates. If she accelerates without changing lanes, her car will collide with the back of a truck” [46]. Eric Carlson has pointed out that in this situation the act of (not) changing lanes arguably lacks moral status. The best Jones can do is not to change lanes and not to accelerate. So, if Jones does not accelerate, it is right for her not to change lanes. However, if she accelerates, it is right for her to change lanes, because if she does not, she will crash into the truck in front of her. In and of itself, it is therefore unclear whether the act of (not) changing lanes is right or wrong.

  3. 3.

    Note that this point about interpersonal comparison is confined to hedonism which supposes that “utility” has an objective referent. Modern-day economics has dropped this assumption and has developed ways of comparing utilities, for example, on the basis of a scaling procedure: “It is, of course, possible to define a metric on utility characteristics so that each person’s utility scale is coordinated with everyone else’s in a way that equal social importance is simply ‘scaled’ as equal marginal utility. If interpersonal comparisons of utility are taken to have no descriptive content, then this can indeed be thought to be a natural approach” [37].

  4. 4.

    This suggestion combines two ideas. I take from Rawls the idea of a “constrained utilitarianism” which maximizes utility within certain bounds ([2], p. 281). And I use Homann’s idea that the legal framework is to be used to ensure moral standards (cf. e.g. [51]).

  5. 5.

    I would like to thank Johanna Grießhammer, Ludwig Heider, Benjamin Hensel, Lisa Herzog, Christoph Lütge, and Martin Rechenauer for their useful comments on an earlier version of this paper.

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  1. Technische Universität München, Arcisstraße 21, 80333, Munich, Germany

    Nikil Mukerji

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  1. Peter Löscher-Stiftungslehrstuhl für Wirtschaftsethik, Technische Universität München, München, Germany

    Christoph Luetge

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Mukerji, N. (2013). Utilitarianism. In: Luetge, C. (eds) Handbook of the Philosophical Foundations of Business Ethics. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-1494-6_27

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-1494-6_27

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