

EUROPEAN HUMANITIES UNIVERSITY

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Programme for Bachelor of Social Sciences

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**TERRITORIAL ACHIEVEMENTS OF IS OUTSIDE MIDDLE EAST**

BACHELOR THESIS

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Vilnius, 2019

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Territorial achievements of IS outside Middle East: Bachelor thesis / Mikalai Dziadok; supervisor PhD Uladzislau Ivanou; European Humanities University. Academic Department of Social Science. – Vilnius, 2019. – 79 p.: 6 ill., – Summary in Blarusian. – Bibliogr.: p. 59 - 69 (100 titles).

**Key words:** *ISIS, ISIL, the Islamic State, Jihadism, Islamism, Terrorism, Middle East, Afghanistan, Libya, Pakistan, Nigeria, Philippines, political Islam*

*The object of this bachelor thesis* - contemporary Jihadism, expressed in a form of military organizations, which are united in a self-proclaimed caliphate. The subject is (better known as ISIS, or IS, or ISIL) around the world, except Middle East, which have real and determined foothold on the ground.

The goal will be reached through solving the research objectives. These are to find out:

*The Subject of the bachelor thesis* - the branches of international insurgent organization “The Islamic State”. *The goal of the bachelor thesis* - to find out the preconditions of the emergence and strengthening of the IS cells in the countries where they were never seen before.. *Objectives of the bachelor thesis* – to find out

- a) in which countries outside Middle East the IS is strong enough to capture and keep territories?
- b) What was the preconditions of the IS territorial advance in these countries?
- c) What are the factors of vulnerability?
- d) Why the IS and the ideology of Jihadism spills out the Middle East for the recent years?

Methods used are case study overview, content analysis and interview method we have come to a conclusion that factors. The conclusion we have come to is that preconditions of the strong and competitive IS organizations in a country lay mostly in social factors.

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## LIST OF ACRONYMS

**AQIM** - Al-Qaeda on Islamic Maghreb

**Bay`a** - official pledge of allegiance to the Caliph

**Jihadism** - Militant Islamism. An ideology, implying violent fighting with the “unbelievers” as one of its major pillars.

**IS** – Islamic state

**Islamism** - political Islam.

**IS-K** – Islamic state-Khorasan province

**IS-L** - Islamic state in Libya

**IS-P** – Islamic state on Philippines

**IS-WA** - Islamic state - West Africa

**IMU** – Islamic movement of Uzbekistan

**MILF** – Moro Islamic Liberation Front

**MNLF** – Moro National Liberation Front

**Murtad** – “an apostate” in Islam

**Qafir** - “a disbeliever” in Islam

**Wilayat** - An Islamic state province

## INTRODUCTION

The importance of our final work is determined by the two major factors. The first one is geopolitical turmoil, continuing in the Middle East since the beginning of the Arab Spring (2011). The protests, revolutions and rise of religious radicalism, which gave birth to ISIS, tended to spill out of Middle East, and now we observe the ISIS branches as far as on Philippines and Indonesia. It pushes us to an assumption, that political Islam may be a great factor of the political changes in many countries even outside Middle East.

The second one is a terrorist threat that stems from the increasing Islamist activities in Muslim countries. As Islamists perceive the European, US, and even many Arab countries population as “qafir” (unbelievers) or “murtad” (apostate), the spill of the Islamism poses direct threat to security of millions of people, and as we can see on an example of what ISIS did on the captured lands (Yazidi genocide, slavery, mass executions of Shia and Alawite Muslims etc.), and of the terrorist attacks in Europe (Berlin truck attack 2016 – 11 dead<sup>1</sup> and Manchester bombing - 22 dead<sup>2</sup>) this threat is more than real and deserves studying.

The object of our study is contemporary Jihadism, expressed in a form of military organizations, which are united in a self-proclaimed caliphate. The subject is the branches of international insurgent organization “The Islamic State” (better known as ISIS, or IS, or ISIL) around the world, except Middle East, which have real and determined foothold on the ground.

The goal of our study is to find out the preconditions of the emergence and strengthening of the IS cells in the countries where they were never seen before.

The goal will be reached through solving the research objectives. These are to find out:

- a) In which countries outside Middle East the IS is strong enough to capture and keep territories?
- b) What were the preconditions of the IS territorial advance in these countries?
- c) What are the factors of vulnerability?
- d) Why the IS and the ideology of Jihadism spill out the Middle East for the recent years?

Methods we are going to use during our survey is analysis of publications and studies on our topic, interviewing, case study overview, and content analysis of the propagandist production of the IS branches outside the Middle East and the comparison of the information on the each analyzed branch.

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1 CNN. Berlin Christmas market: 12 dead, 48 hospitalized in truck crash [online] [cited 21.05.2019] Available from <https://edition.cnn.com/2016/12/19/europe/berlin-christmas-market-truck/index.html>

2 THE SUN. Manchester Arena bombing victims – the 22 people killed in the terrorist attack at the Ariana Grande concert [cited 22.05.2019] Available from <https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/3627708/manchester-arena-bombing-victims-terror-attack-ariana-grande-anniversary/>

The sources of our study are: the media publications regarding the topic, the studies regarding the IS branches outside Middle East and on related topics, the interviews with the experts: Alexandr Korenkov and Yigal Levin, and the video-production of the Islamist militants from the countries where they operate.

For further narrowing the field of our study, we should say that we will not take all the ISIS branches and sells outside Middle East – because they are very numerous, and the information about them is often very hard to gain. Instead, we are going to study the organizations, which have seized and control (or at least, controlled for some time) the area on the ground, executing explicit political rule on them.

Theoretical importance of the work is a contribution to understanding the process of radicalization, revolutionary changes of the societies and the reasons why Islamism wins the sympathy of the masses of certain countries.

Practical importance of the work is contribution to a concrete measures, both on national and international level, which can be made not only to fight but to prevent emergence of sectarian militants in a vulnerable countries.

The empirical part of the work starts with the case study overview, where we give a short overview of the major parameters of the IS branch in country of interest.

## 1.1. THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL PART

### 1.1. Boundaries of the research

First of all, we should define what we understand under “Middle East”. The Cambridge dictionary defines Middle East as “*the area from the eastern Mediterranean to Iran, including Syria, Jordan, Israel, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Iraq, and sometimes also Egypt*”<sup>3</sup>.

The concept of Middle East is geographically flexible, “*The most common but exclusive definition of the Middle East at the time of writing extends to Egypt in the West, Iran in the East, the Arabian Peninsula in the South and Turkey in the North (although occasionally Turkey and, more rarely, Egypt are omitted).*”, says **Greta Scharnweber**, in her work, “What and where is the Middle East”<sup>4</sup>.

Thus, we will follow the most common definition and will study the IS branches all over the world, **except** Bahrain, Cyprus, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, United Arab Emirates and Yemen, which do have foothold on the ground.

Using interview of experts, analysis of the academic literature and publications of media we have find out that there are 5 countries which correspond our criteria:

1. Do not belong to Middle East;
2. Have IS branches;
3. These branches have territory under IS control, or had it before.

These are Afghanistan, Libya, Nigeria, Philippines, and, probably, Somalia.

We have decided to overview them all and analyze the results of our overview, but exclude Somalia from our study because of lack of the information regarding local IS branch and whether it has real foothold on the ground.

As mentioned previously, we are going to analyze only the branches, which had foothold on the ground. It means, they owned for certain time (regardless was it days or years). More concretely, they have cleansed the territories from the previous authority and implemented (or tried to implement) their own way of governing on this territory, and this fact was somehow admitted by the government or a media. Thus, we would not review the cases, where IS holds unmanned territories.

As many of other jihadist groups were previously not belonging to ISIS and pledged allegiance later, we will review all of them – regardless when they have pledged allegiance.

3 Cambridge dictionary. The Middle East. [online] [cited 21.05.2019] <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/middle-east>

4 SCHARNWEBER, Greta. What and where is the Middle East. pp. 1-2. [online] Available from Internet: [https://csme.indiana.edu/documents/cirricula/MEPolicyCouncil\\_What-WhereMiddleEast.pdf](https://csme.indiana.edu/documents/cirricula/MEPolicyCouncil_What-WhereMiddleEast.pdf)

## 1.2. Literature and video overview

For this research we have reviewed and analyzed many researches and publications in media. Some of them were thoroughly analyzed, some were reviewed superficially. Here are the major sources we were working with.

The researches we use are:

- “The trials and travails of the Islamic State in Pakistan”, by Justin V. Hastings and Farah Naz<sup>5</sup>. A study, showing the establishment and the organizational problems of IS-K. We have chosen it, because it is one of the few studies on this topic.
- “TTP’S Safe Havens in Afghanistan: A Constant Threat to Pakistan’s Internal Security”, by Arshad Mahmood and Shaheen Akhtar<sup>6</sup>. A study devoted to an Islamist organization Tarik-e-Taliban-Pakistan. We have chosen it because it lets us go deeper in the context of the Afghanistan and Pakistan relations with insurgence groups.
- “Online extremism and the communities that sustain it: Detecting the ISIS supporting community on Twitter”<sup>7</sup> by Matthew C. Benigni, Kenneth Joseph, and Kathleen M. Carley. The study shows the dynamic of usage of Twitter by ISIS. We have chosen to find out the information concerning the IS branches outside Middle East, and role of social media in their establishment.
- "Who are the European Jihadis"<sup>8</sup> by GLOBSEC Defense and Security program. The study is dedicated to an analysis of 225 cases of individuals, accused in terrorism throughout 11 EU countries and defining the demographic and social traits of European Jihadi insurgents. This study is important for us, because this data, being carefully and critically replicated on non-European countries may help us to spot the social\demographic group of risks and make assumptions about the preconditions of Islamist radicalization.
- “Islamic State Propaganda: Key Elements of the Group’s Messaging”<sup>9</sup> by Charlie Winter. The study analyses the dataset of over 1,700 separate official propaganda campaigns produced and disseminated by the Islamic State since Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was declared caliph in June 2014. This information is useful for our research to compare the IS propaganda narratives all over the world.

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5 HASTINGS Justin V., NAZ Farah The Trials and Travails of the Islamic State in Pakistan. [interactive] 2017. [viewed 21.05.2019] Access through Academic Search Complete (EBSCO Host).

6 ARSHAD Mahmood, SHAHEEN Akhtar. TTP’s Safe Havens In Afghanistan: A constant Threat to Pakistan Security [interactive] 2017. [viewed 21.05.2019] Access through Academic search complete (EBSCO Host).

7 BENIGNI Matthew, C., JOSEPH Kenneth, CARLEY Kathleen M., Online extremism and the communities That Sustain It: Detecting The supporting Community on Twitter. [interactive] 2017. [viewed 21.05.2019] Access through Academic search complete (EBSCO Host).

8 GLOBSEC project midterm report. Who Are The European Jihadis? Available online: [https://www.globsec.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/GLOBSEC\\_WhoAreTheEuropeanJihadis.pdf](https://www.globsec.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/GLOBSEC_WhoAreTheEuropeanJihadis.pdf)

9 WINTER, Charlie. Islamic State Propaganda: Key Elements Of the Group Messaging. Available online: <https://jamestown.org/program/islamic-state-propaganda-key-elements-of-the-groups-messaging/>



- “Countering the Islamic State in Libya” by Christopher S. Chivvis.<sup>10</sup> That’s an article, devoted to an establishment of the IS in Libya and efforts of government to counter it. We have chosen this article to review, because Libya is a country of our interest.

- “Libya: Teetering Between War and Diplomacy The Islamic State’s Role in Libya’s Disintegration” by Yehudit Ronen<sup>11</sup>. *“This analysis explores post-Qaddafi Libya as it becomes a failed state, alongside international efforts to mend its internal rifts and restore an effective government and thereby halt its national disintegration”* - abstract states. We have chosen this study, because Libya is a country of our interest and this text may tell directly what we need.

- “Making the Sky Relevant to Battle Strategy: Counterinsurgency and the Prospects of Air Power in Nigeria” by Samuel Oyewole<sup>12</sup>. This study is dedicated to a use of Air force against IS in Nigeria, and we should have observed it to try to find out facts and sources which may be important for us.

- “Footprints of ISIS in South Asia – A Challenge to Regional Peace and Stability” by Shabana Fayyaz<sup>13</sup>. The study is dedicated to establishment and the political nature of the IS branches in South Asia. It is important for us, because it is one of the very few studies concerning this topic.

- “An Analysis of Inspire and Dabiq: Lessons from AQAP and Islamic State’s Propaganda War” by Haroro J. Ingram<sup>14</sup>. This study *“analyzes how Inspire and Dabiq seek to appeal to and radicalize English-speaking Muslims<sup>15</sup>. [...] concludes by identifying key lessons for counterterrorism strategic communications campaign and message design”*, as abstract says. This study was chosen for overview, because it concerns the IS outside Middle East and thus may provide us with a reliable information of our sphere of interest.

In addition, other important sources we have used in the work are:

a) The media articles we use for the research are the publications of The Independent, The Guardian, The Time, BBC news and others, which are estimated as reliable in terms of describing tendencies of Jihadism. The preference is given to analytical publications, publications, containing the opinions of experts and reports on the ground.

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10 CHIVVIS Christopher, S. Countering the Islamic State in Libya. [interactive] [viewed 21.05.2019] Access through Academic search complete (EBSCO Host).

11 RONEN, Yehudit. Libya: Teetering Between War And Diplomacy. The Islamic State’s Role in Libya’s Disintegration. 2017.[viewed 21.05.2019] Access through Academic search complete (EBSCO Host).

12 OYEWOLE, Samuel. Making The Sky Relevant To Battle Strategy: Counterinsurgency and the Prospects of Air Power In Nigeria [2017] [viewed 21.05.2019] Access through Academic search complete (EBSCO Host).

13 FAYYAZ, Shabana. Footprints of ISIS in South Asia – A Challenge To Regional Peace And Stability . 2017.[viewed 21.05.2019] Access through Academic search complete (EBSCO Host).

14 INGRAM Haroro, J. An Analysis Of Inspire And Dabiq: Lessons From AQAP And Islamic State’s Propaganda War 2017.[viewed 21.05.2019] Access through Academic search complete (EBSCO Host).

15 Ibid.

Among them we've examined such articles as "The fight is not over': fears of Isis resurgence in Philippines" by The Guardian<sup>16</sup>. "Isis fighters in Afghanistan are communicating with UK terror cells, defense secretary Gavin Williamson says" by The Independent<sup>17</sup>. "Islamic State is having a hard time taking root in Pakistan" by Washington Post<sup>18</sup>. "Sub-Saharan Africa becoming new battleground against violent extremism as jihad 'goes south'"<sup>19</sup> by The Independent, "The countries, where ISIS is growing in Africa" by The Time<sup>20</sup>. and many others.

**b)** The propagandist videos of Jihadists. The videos, which ISIS makes and distributes, take a high share in sources of our research – they give us the unique information, because they represent the Jihadists not from the point of view of Western observer (skeptical or hostile) but from within. Thus, by these videos, Jihadists demonstrate what kind of image they are up to expose from the outer world, what impression they want to make both on hostile and friendly part of auditory.

The majority of videos analyzed, were made by ISIS-related agencies Al-Furat (الفرات, «The Euphrates»), Al-Furqan (الفرقان, "The Criterion") is the 25th chapter of the Qur'an) Al-Hayat (الحياة, "The life" and Amaq ("Depth") media agency (وكالة أعماق الإخبارية). All of them are downloaded from the Telegram-bot @NearEastHelperbot.

To go deeper into the context, we've examined videos, concerning not only the Islamic state in countries of our interest, but also of the Islamic state in Iraq and Syria, and the Jihadists groups which was not considered ISIS before, but have pledged their allegiance to ISIS in certain time. Here are the most significant ones:

- Video "Zaboi murtadov.mp4" ("The slaughter of murtads")<sup>21</sup>, languages, Russian, Arabic, dated 01.11.2015 is dedicated to the assassination of an activist of anti-islamist movement "Raqqa is being slaughtered silently" in October, 2015.

- Video "Kurdy.mp4" ("Kurds"). Language Russian, Arabic. Dated 04.09.2015 is dedicated to "debunking" the idea of nationalism as anti-Islamic, criticizing and delegitimizing the SDF, YPG and

16 THE GUARDIAN. 'The fight is not over': fears of Isis resurgence in Philippines. [online] [cited 21.05.2019] <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/feb/08/the-fight-is-not-over-fears-of-isis-resurgence-in-philippines>

17 THE INDEPENDENT. Isis fighters in Afghanistan are communicating with UK terror cells, defence secretary Gavin Williamson says [online] [cited 21.05.2019] <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/isis-afghanistan-terror-cells-uk-gavin-williamson-attacks-manchester-bomb-a8519986.html>

18 THE WASHINGTON POST. Islamic State is having a hard time taking root in Pakistan [online] [cited 21.05.2019] [https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia\\_pacific/islamic-state-is-having-a-hard-time-taking-root-in-pakistan/2015/12/05/](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/islamic-state-is-having-a-hard-time-taking-root-in-pakistan/2015/12/05/)

19 THE INDEPENDENT. Sub-Saharan Africa becoming new battleground against violent extremism as jihad 'goes south' [online] [cited 21.05.2019] <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/sub-saharan-africa-isis-boko-haram-al-qaeda-terror-attacks-islam-jihad-extremism-a8689126.html>

20 THE TIME. The Countries Where ISIS Is Growing in Africa. [online] [cited 21.05.2019] <http://time.com/4236959/the-countries-where-isis-is-growing-in-africa/>

21 Telegram, @NearEastHelpbot. Aviable on Telegram messenger. Viewed 10.05.2019

the PKK, and the prove of a statement, that the Islamic state is not waging war on Kurds, but fights secularism and nationalism, promoted by the PKK<sup>22</sup>.

- Video “Nosiachie bremya svoey ummy.mp4” (“Those who bear the burden of their Ummah”)<sup>23</sup>. Language Russian. Dated 13.11.2015 and dedicated to foreign fighters in ISIS.

- Video “Zaschitniki religii-2 13.12.2015.mp4”<sup>24</sup> (“The defenders of religion”). Language Russian. Dated 13.12.2015 and dedicated to ISIS military operations in Iraq.

- Video “Dazhe esli eto nenavistno neveruijuschim 16 november 2016.mp4”<sup>25</sup> (“Even if it is hated by the non-believers”) dated 16.12.2016 and dedicated to the history and the establishment of the ISIS and its fights with the “rafidites” (Shia muslims).

- Video “Zvon mechei-2. avgust 2012 god.mp4”<sup>26</sup> (“A clash of swords-2. August 2012 year”) dated August, 2012. It displays the preparation to a raid on the Iraqi town Haditha and the raid itself, occurred at March, 5. 2012.

- Video “Zvon mechei 4. Ijun 2014.mp4”<sup>27</sup> (“A clash of swords 4”. June 2014”), shows military activity of ISIS in 2014 and earlier, and its propagandist measures in captured cities.

Also videos, directly related to our topic, e.g. videos of the ISIS cells outside Middle East, were examined. Such as:

- “Zemlya allaha obshirna”<sup>28</sup> (“The land of Allah is extensive”), dated 4.03.2018 a video, dedicated to so-called “Wilaya Khorasan” in Afghanistan.

- “Miting v podderzhku IGIL”<sup>29</sup> (“Meeting in support of ISIS”) - an Indonesian video, dated 24.12.2016, allegedly showing the protest rally in support of ISIS in Indonesia.

- “Okhota na Sakhautov”<sup>30</sup> (“Hanting on sakhautes”), dated 2015. A Libyan video, depicting Libyan ISIS (Wilaya Barkah) fights with their internal enemies.

- “Ludzi, kotoriye govorili pravdi”<sup>31</sup> (“People who spoke the truth”), dated 23.01.2019, dedicated to a “Shahids” of IS in Somalia.

While looking for the studies related to our topic, we have not found any researches with topic, corresponding to ours. Neither there are researches which study the development of IS outside Middle

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22 Telegram, @NearEastHelpbot. Aviable on Telegram messenger. Viewed 10.05.2019

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid.

25 Ibid.

26 Ibid.

27 Ibid.

28 Ibid.

29 Ibid.

30 Ibid.

31 Ibid.

East – as a sole issue, nor there are researches which compare ISIS groups outside Middle East between each other.

But we have certain separate researches which study ISIS branches outside Middle East and their activities. Such as “The trials and travails of the Islamic State in Pakistan”, by Justin V. Hastings and Farah Naz<sup>32</sup>, “Footprints of ISIS in South Asia – A Challenge to Regional Peace and Stability”<sup>33</sup> by Shabana Fayyaz and many others.

### 1.3. Basic concepts and terms

The theoretical framework of our research is international relations. We perceive IS as a non-conventional part of international system, where, among other actors, it plays certain role as a non-state actor. As international relations framework encompasses international security, state sovereignty and terrorism, the IS, its specialties and developments totally fits into this theoretical framework.

Within this study we will use theoretical approach of realism. This approach was used by Kenneth Waltz in his "Theory of International Politics"<sup>34</sup> and Francis A. Beer & Robert Hariman in their work "Realism, post-realism and ISIS".<sup>35</sup> According to this approach, state and its institutions, especially institutions of armed coercion, play the crucial role, and the “anarchy” seems to be the natural state of existence of the system. This approach is suitable for our case, because states are the main enemies, and in the same time, if it is possible to say so, the main “environment” of their existence. In the same state, IS itself proclaims itself as a state - a Caliphate, and tries to act, behave, and pose itself as a state even in smallest details, drawing its legitimacy from the Quran and Calif Al-Baghdadi <sup>36</sup>.

Also it is apparent that the main way the IS tries to reach its goals is violence - in the name of state and its legitimacy.

### 1.2. Methodology

The five major methods we have chosen are:

1. Publication analysis;
2. Comparison method;

32 HASTINGS Justin V., NAZ Farah The Trials And Travails Of The Islamic State In Pakistan. [interactive] 2017. [viewed 21.05.2019] Access through Academic Search Complete (EBSCO Host).

33 FAYYAZ, Shabana. Footprints Of ISIS in South Asia – A Challenge To Regional Peace And Stability 2017.[viewed 21.05.2019] Access through Academic search complete (EBSCO Host).

34 WALTZ Kenneth, N. Theory of international politics [online] [cited 21.05.2019] [https://dl1.cuni.cz/pluginfile.php/486328/mod\\_resource/content/0/Kenneth%20N.%20Waltz%20Theory%20of%20International%20Politics%20Addison-Wesley%20series%20in%20political%20science%20%20%20%201979.pdf](https://dl1.cuni.cz/pluginfile.php/486328/mod_resource/content/0/Kenneth%20N.%20Waltz%20Theory%20of%20International%20Politics%20Addison-Wesley%20series%20in%20political%20science%20%20%20%201979.pdf)

35 BEER Francis, A., HARIMAN Robert [online] [cited 21.05.2019] <https://www.e-ir.info/2018/01/17/realism-post-realism-and-isis/>

36 THE NEW YORK TIMES. Specis Megan. The Evolution of ISIS: From Rogue State to Stateless Ideology [cited 21.5.2019] <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/20/world/middleeast/isis-history-facts-islamic-state.html>

3. Video content analysis;
4. Interview method;
5. Case study overview;

These methods were chosen, first of all because they seem to be the only accessible. As we cannot make field research because of obvious limitations (visiting of the territories occupied by ISIS and collecting the information from ISIS members seems impossible on a current stage), the only thing we can do is analyze the information of the different sources and compare it.

### **1.2.1. Publications analysis**

Analysis of the content of publications covers the texts described in part 1.1.2. (literature and video review). Analysis of the texts of the media and the academic works was chosen because media outlets seem to follow the development of ISIS quite thoroughly – as ISIS is on the focus of the media attention since 2013. Information, provided by them, is usually taken from the correspondent directly from the trouble spot and governmental officials.

And to make our analysis relevant, timely and scientifically accurate, we also need to know who and how studied our topic, or contiguous topics before. We assess scientific researches of our object (contemporary Jihadism) as one of the most reliable sources of information and indispensable element of the relevant study.

We extract the information according to criteria needed and attach it to a case study overview or analysis we already have. For this purpose we use methods described in “The content analysis guidebook” by Kimberly A. Neuendorf<sup>37</sup>.

### **1.2.2. Comparison method**

Comparison method is important because it allows us to see similarities and differences in IS emergence and operation in countries of interest. Through revealing these similarities and differences we are going to see the circumstances, the unique features of each IS branch, expose even more information about the context of the development of the IS within each country and, in turn, answer the questions of our study. We use this method with a pattern described by David Collier’s article “The

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37 NEUENDORF Kiberly A. The Content Analysis Guidebook Second Edition. [cited 21.5.2019]  
<https://academic.csuohio.edu/kneuendorf/SkalskiVitae/SkalskiNeuendorfCajigas17.pdf>

comparative method”<sup>38</sup> and the PhD work of Oinus. М “Сравнительный метод в общественных науках”<sup>39</sup> (“The comparative method in social science”).

### 1.2.3. Video content analysis

Analysis of videos was chosen, because we cannot compose the adequate opinion on the nature of our subject (insurgent organization) while listening anyone but the organization itself. The discourse, context, and the message of the ISIS propagandist videos need to be examined to understand who they are and answer the questions of our research.

During the analysis of the videos, mentioned in part 1.1.2., we were paying the most attention to:

1. What is said in video, both by respondents or by a off-screen voice;
2. What is shown on the video;
3. What is the general idea or a concept - what does the IS propagandists wanted to say.

To prepare the usage of this video we have examined the video content analysis guide by British security industry association<sup>40</sup>.

Analysis of the researches, is necessary, because we are making is also a research, and we need the expert knowledge, based on academic methodology, to build an adequate survey.

### 1.2.4. Interview method

Interviewing was chosen as one of the most easy and affordable way to get expert knowledge on the subject in direct interplay with an expert – thus having a possibility to ask him as much and possible and go deeper into details which we are interested in. The interviews we’ve made, was based on a short questionnaire of six questions, similar to each expert.

Interviews were conducted according to methods and advice of the “Interviews for research” guide by Canada volunteerism initiative<sup>41</sup>.

The respondents were chosen first of all by the personal preferences of the author, by searching the people with decent expertise in the subject within his social circle.

Our experts are Yigal Levin and Alexandr Korenkov.

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38 COLLIER David. The comparative method. [cited 21.5.2019] Available online <http://polisci.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/people/u3827/APSA-TheComparativeMethod.pdf>

39 ОЙНУС М.Э. Сравнительный метод в общественных науках. [cited 21.05.2019] <https://www.dissercat.com/content/sravnitelnyi-metod-v-obshchestvennykh-naukakh>

40 BRITISH SECURITY INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION. An introduction to video content analysis – industry guide [cited 21.05.2019] <https://www.bsia.co.uk/Portals/4/Publications/262-introduction-video-content-analysis-industry-guide-02.pdf>

41 EASWARA M., ZARINFOUSH F., Interviewing for research. [cited 21.05.2019] [http://sectorsource.ca/sites/default/files/resources/files/tipsheet6\\_interviewing\\_for\\_research\\_en\\_0.pdf](http://sectorsource.ca/sites/default/files/resources/files/tipsheet6_interviewing_for_research_en_0.pdf)

**Yigal Levin**, born 1986, is a former lieutenant of Israeli army, who was in service for 4 years. Now he is an expert and a participant of a “Rebel research centre” NGO, Kiyv<sup>42</sup>. He was chosen because he was a participant of a Gaza war (2008-2009) and because he is a prominent Middle East expert for Ukrainian mass media.

**Alexandr Korenkov**, born 1987, is a director of International centre of security studies and a researcher of insurgent groups. We have chosen him because of his expertise in the field of IS and contemporary Jihadism.

Author also made tries to attract more experts for this study. In particular, I have written to an International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR) of King's College London with a request of take an interview with the experts, familiar with this topic. But the answer was that all the experts are busy on the moment.

Also I have written to a professor Alaya Allani, a professor of contemporary history at the Faculty of Arts of Manouba, Tunis. But I got no response.

Also I have contacted with a Belarusian newspaper “Zviazda”, who’s correspondent Zakhar Burak specializes on Middle East and terrorist groups, in order to interview him. But I got no response from the newspaper.

The shortened version of the interview and the questionnaire are presented in the annex.

#### **1.2.5. Case study overview method**

Case study overview method was chosen as we have to distinguish and separate each of the state from others, as a separate case, in order to understand the specialties and unique features of the development of the IS in this country. Each case is intended to be separately examined and overviewed by certain criteria, before we can compare them and draw general conclusion. In each case study we first define if the country suitable for our research (not Middle East, IS presence, foothold approved), how it emerged and developed and the main milestones of its activity.

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42 <https://issuu.com/rebelresearchcenter> , <https://www.facebook.com/RebelResearchCentre/>

## 2. PRACTICAL PART

### CASE STUDY OVERVIEW OF THE ISLAMIC STATE TERRITORIAL ACHIEVEMENTS OUTSIDE MIDDLE EAST

In this case study overview we are going to observe the major parameters of the IS branches outside Middle East in countries of our interest. For better understanding, according to our goals and objectives, I propose the next parameters of the case study:

1. Facts, approving that the country is, basically, a country of our interest;
2. Emergence of development of the IS branch in this country;
3. Activity of the IS branch in this country.

The initial approve is important to make sure that we do the relevant work. Observation of the emergency of the IS branch was chosen as a criteria because it is crucially important to us to fixate and establish the circumstances and details of how the IS emerged and gained certain success in the country where previously it haven't exist and did not hold the territory.

Listing the major activities is important because only the real deeds on the ground are the indicator of both strength, intentions and real possibilities of the groups. Through the timeline of the activity we see what this group really is.

#### 2.1. Afghanistan/Pakistan

Afghanistan is a country of our interest because its official presence and foothold is approved by the number of sources.

Expert Yigal Levin, while answering the questions named Afghanistan as one of the countries where ISIS has a foothold (Appendix 1). Territorial presence of ISIS was also approved by Alexandr Korenkov in his interview (Appendix 1).

BBC in its review of ISIS activity and presence after the fall of official Caliphate, pointed on Afghanistan as on one of the countries with presence of ISIS militants, but without mention about foothold. (see pic. 1).

*“The group [IS-Khorasan], which includes a number of former Pakistani Taliban fighters, has seized territory in eastern Afghanistan” - The Washington Post says<sup>43</sup>.*

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43 THE WASHINGTON POST. Islamic State is having a hard time taking root in Pakistan [online] [cited 21.05.2019] [https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia\\_pacific/islamic-state-is-having-a-hard-time-taking-root-in-pakistan/2015/12/05/](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/islamic-state-is-having-a-hard-time-taking-root-in-pakistan/2015/12/05/)




We have taken the Afghanistan IS cells together with Pakistan, because of two reasons:

a) Wilayat Khorasan, which is official brand of the IS in Afghanistan, also comprises part of Pakistan and even India. And as India is too big to be included in our list, and IS-affiliated terrorist activity there is minor, we have narrowed our analysis to Afghanistan and Pakistan. But historically Khorasan region encompasses parts of modern day Iran, Central Asia, Afghanistan, and Pakistan<sup>44</sup>.

b) Many of the IS-K (Islamic state – Khorasan) activity was implemented in a Pakistani territories, laying close to the Afghanistan border, which gives strong evidence that it was implemented by the same group which is active in Afghanistan (see pic.2)

## Islamic State group and Al-Qaeda around the world

■ Islamic State group and Al-Qaeda    ■ Al-Qaeda  
■ Islamic State group



\*Groups are not present in all parts of the countries identified

Source: US Intelligence Community, 2018

BBC

рис.2.1<sup>45</sup>

44 CSIS. Islamic State Khorasan (IS-K) [cited 21.05.2019] Available online <https://www.csis.org/programs/transnational-threats-project/terrorism-backgrounders/islamic-state-khorasan-k>

45 BBC. IS 'caliphate' defeated but jihadist group remains a threat. [cited 22.05.2019] Available online: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-45547595>

## Emergence and the development

In 2014, Pakistani national Hafiz Saeed Khan was chosen to spearhead IS-K province as its first emir. He have pledged allegiance to al-Baghdadi in October 2014<sup>46</sup>.

On January 10, Khan and his followers had released a video pledging allegiance to IS which also featured the beheading of a captive Pakistani soldier<sup>47</sup>.

IS-K was officially announced, as reported, by the IS spokesperson Abu Muhammad al-Adnani in a video and message in January 26, 2015, and was posted on the IS-related forums the end of January<sup>48</sup>.

Since then, two senior commanders of IS Khorasan have been killed in NATO-led actions in Afghanistan. The first to be eliminated, on February 9, 2015 in the Kajaki district of Afghanistan's Helmand Province, was Abdul Rauf Khadim, the "deputy governor" of Khorasan<sup>49</sup>.

Later, on August 6, 2015 the Jihadist movement "The Islamic movement of Uzbekistan" (UMI) issued a 2,5 minutes video where their leader Usmon Ghazi and his fighters are shown taking an oath of allegiance, in Arabic, to IS and its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi<sup>50</sup>.

During the first years of IS-K activity many oath of allegiance followed from other sectarian militant groups like Ansar ul-Khilafa wal Jihad (formerly, Tehrik-e-Khilafat Jihad) and Jundullah from Pakistan<sup>51</sup>.

IS-K also was fueled by a "large number" of defectors from the major Jihadist force of a region – Taliban. Some of defectors were quite a high-ranked, such as former Taliban and IMU commander Qari Hekmatullah, who pledged allegiance to IS-K in 2016<sup>52</sup>.

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46 CSIS. Islamic State Khorasan (IS-K) [cited 21.05.2019] Aviable online <https://www.csis.org/programs/transnational-threats-project/terrorism-backgrounders/islamic-state-khorasan-k>

47 ROUL Animesh. 'Wilayat Khurasan': Islamic State Consolidates Position in AfPak Region [cited 21.05.2019] Aviable online: <https://jamestown.org/program/wilayat-khurasan-islamic-state-consolidates-position-in-afpak-region/#.VSspbPmUe4Y>

48 HINDUSTAN TIMES. IS announces expansion into AfPak, parts of India [cited 21.05.2019] Aviable online: <https://www.hindustantimes.com/india/is-announces-expansion-into-afpak-parts-of-india/story-6oLyWpPxodwnb0jt1rhCbP.html>

49 ROUL Animesh. 'Wilayat Khurasan': Islamic State Consolidates Position in AfPak Region [cited 21.05.2019] Aviable online: <https://jamestown.org/program/wilayat-khurasan-islamic-state-consolidates-position-in-afpak-region/#.VSspbPmUe4Y>

50 RADIO FREE EUROPE. IMU Declares It Is Now Part Of The Islamic State. [cited 21.05.2019] Aviable online: <https://www.rferl.org/a/imu-islamic-state/27174567.html>

51 ROUL Animesh. 'Wilayat Khurasan': Islamic State Consolidates Position in AfPak Region [cited 21.05.2019] Aviable online: <https://jamestown.org/program/wilayat-khurasan-islamic-state-consolidates-position-in-afpak-region/#.VSspbPmUe4Y>

52 CSIS. Islamic State Khorasan (IS-K) [cited 21.05.2019] Available online <https://www.csis.org/programs/transnational-threats-project/terrorism-backgrounders/islamic-state-khorasan-k> ; and ROUL Animesh. 'Wilayat Khurasan': Islamic State Consolidates Position in AfPak Region [cited 21.05.2019] Available online: <https://jamestown.org/program/wilayat-khurasan-islamic-state-consolidates-position-in-afpak-region/#.VSspbPmUe4Y>

According to the CSIS Transnational Threats Project's recent report on Salafi-jihadist groups, IS-K has a fighting force of between 600 and 800 militants as of October 2018. These numbers are down from peak levels in 2016 when its fighting force numbered between 3,000 to 4,000 militants<sup>53</sup>.

By September, 2018, the US military estimates there are around 2,000 fighters allied to the group operating in the country by September, 2018<sup>54</sup>.

IS-K founding emir, Hafiz Saeed Khan, was killed by a United States airstrike in Nangarhar province, Afghanistan, on July 26, 2016<sup>55</sup>.

Following Khan's death, IS-K has had three subsequent emirs, all of whom have also been eliminated by the United States in targeted strikes<sup>56</sup>.

### Activity

Here we describe the major terrorist attacks made by IS-K since the moment of declaration. Both in Afghanistan and in Pakistan the major form of activity of the IS-K was the attacks on Shia muslims, the security forces and rival Islamist groups. Though, in Pakistan, before the IS-K formal annunciation, IS presence was felt in the form of occasional unfurling of the black flag, graffiti on the walls supporting the Caliphate and the appearance of Islamic State stickers, mostly in Karachi, Lahore and the Punjab city of Taxila in late 2014<sup>57</sup>. At around the same time, the provincial government of Balochistan uncovered massive Islamic State recruitment drives in Hangu district in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and in the Kurram tribal agency in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)<sup>58</sup>.

Here we will list the most prominent terrorist attacks of the IS-K from the moment of declaration to nowadays.

Date	Death toll	Details
<b>2015</b>		
18.04.2015	35	IS-K's first major attack: the Nangarhar bombing <sup>59</sup> .

53 CSIS. Islamic State Khorasan (IS-K) [cited 21.05.2019] Available online <https://www.csis.org/programs/transnational-threats-project/terrorism-backgrounders/islamic-state-khorasan-k>

54 THE INDEPENDENT. Isis fighters in Afghanistan are communicating with UK terror cells, defence secretary Gavin Williamson says. [cited 21.05.2019] Available online <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/isis-afghanistan-terror-cells-uk-gavin-williamson-attacks-manchester-bomb-a8519986.html>

55 CSIS. Islamic State Khorasan (IS-K) [cited 21.05.2019] Available online <https://www.csis.org/programs/transnational-threats-project/terrorism-backgrounders/islamic-state-khorasan-k>

56 ibid.

57 ROUL Animesh. 'Wilayat Khurasan': Islamic State Consolidates Position in AfPak Region [cited 21.05.2019] Available online: <https://jamestown.org/program/wilayat-khurasan-islamic-state-consolidates-position-in-afpak-region/#.VSspbPmUe4Y>

58 ibid.

13.05.2019	46	The group carried out its first attack in Pakistan as eight gunmen raided the Ismaili community's bus in Karachi's Safoora Chowrangi area <sup>60</sup> .
2016		
23.07.2016	80	IS-K twin blast strike against Shia demonstration in Kabul, Afghanistan. 231 wounded <sup>61</sup> .
08.08.2016	74	IS-K attacked the Government Hospital of Quetta in Pakistan with a suicide bombing and shooting <sup>62</sup> .
24.10.2016	61	Three heavily armed insurgents carried out an attack on the Balochistan police training college in Quetta, Pakistan. 165 injured <sup>63</sup> .
12.11.2016	52	An explosion at a remote Sufi Muslim shrine in the Pakistani region of Balochistan. More than 100 injured <sup>64</sup> .
2017-2018		

59 OBSERVER RESEARCH FOUNDATION. Pakistan's dangerous denial of ISIS presence in the country [cited 21.05.2019] <https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/pakistans-dangerous-denial-of-isis-presence-in-the-country-45572/>

60 ibid

61 PAKISTAN TODAY. More madness, more bloodshed in Afghanistan. [cited 21.05.2019] Available online: <https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2016/07/23/twin-blasts-in-kabul-kill-50/>

62 DUNYA NEWS. Death toll in Quetta civil hospital blast soars to 74. [cited 21.05.2019] Available online: <http://dunyanews.tv/en/Pakistan/348993-Death-toll-in-Quetta-civil-hospital-blast-soars-to>

63 DAWN. 61 killed in twin suicide attacks as terrorists storm police training college in Quetta. <https://www.dawn.com/news/1291999/60-killed-in-twin-suicide-attacks-as-terrorists-storm-police-training-college-in-quetta>

64 BBC. Pakistan Shah Noorani shrine bomb kills 52 [cited 21.05.2019] <https://www.bbc.com/news/37962741>

16.02.2017	90	A suicide bombing took place inside the Shrine of Lal Shahbaz Qalandar in Sehwan, Sindh, Pakistan, where pilgrims were performing a Sufi ritual after the evening prayers. Over 300 injured <sup>65</sup> .
16.07.2017	149	Mustang massacre: the second deadliest terror attack in the history of the country <sup>66</sup> .
20.10.2017	56	At least 56 people have been killed in a suicide bomb attack at a Shiite mosque in the Afghan capital Kabul <sup>67</sup> .
28.12.2017:	50	IS-K attacked a Shiite cultural centre in Kabul, Afghanistan. Over 80 injured <sup>68</sup> .
22.04.2018	69	A suicide blast people and wounded dozens more at a voter registration center in Koche Mahtab Qala, in the Dashte Barchi area of western Kabul, Afghanistan <sup>69</sup> .
13.07.2018	128	A suicide bomber has killed at least 128 people at a campaign rally in south-western Pakistan. A local candidate was among the dead in the Mastung town. Earlier, a bomb attack on a similar rally in the northern town of Bannu killed four people. The attacks come ahead of general elections on 25 July <sup>70</sup> .

65 GEO.TV. Sehwan blast: Death toll reaches 90 as two more victims succumb to injuries [cited 21.05.2019] Available online: <https://www.geo.tv/latest/131752-Sehwan-blast-Death-toll-reaches-90-as-two-more-victims-succumb-to-injuries>


66 OBSERVER RESEARCH FOUNDATION. Pakistan's dangerous denial of ISIS presence in the country [cited 21.05.2019] <https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/pakistans-dangerous-denial-of-isis-presence-in-the-country-45572/>

67 DW. Afghanistan mosque blasts: Dozens dead in suicide bomb attacks [cited 21.05.2019] Available online: <https://www.dw.com/en/afghanistan-mosque-blasts-dozens-dead-in-suicide-bomb-attacks/a-41056584>

68 ALJAZEERA. Kabul blast at Afghan Voice, Tebyan centre kills dozens. [cited 21.05.2019] Available online: <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/12/kabul-killed-suicide-attack-afghan-voice-171228063628772.html>

69 FOX NEWS. ISIS suicide bombing at Afghanistan voter registration center kills 57 [cited 21.05.2019] Available online: <https://www.foxnews.com/world/isis-suicide-bombing-at-afghanistan-voter-registration-center-kills-57>

70 BBC. Pakistan election: More than 100 die in bomb attacks on poll rallies [cited 21.05.2019] Available online: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-44824619>



**pic.2.2<sup>71</sup> IS attacks against civilians 2017-2018**

Attacks attributed to the IS-K doubled in the year 2017 as compared to 2016<sup>72</sup>.

IK-K also it has mocked and threatened the United States in its official media streams and called for lone-wolf attacks in the West<sup>73</sup>.

According to Center of strategic and international studies (CSIS), IS-K has been responsible for nearly 100 attacks against civilians in Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as roughly 250 clashes with the U.S., Afghan, and Pakistani security forces since January 2017<sup>74</sup>. (See pic. 2.)

Since January 2017, IS-K has executed 84 attacks against civilians in Afghanistan and 11 in Pakistan. In Afghanistan, 819 civilians have been killed across 15 provinces, with the highest levels of violence in Kabul and Nangarhar. IS-K focused on Kabul and key provincial capitals during the October 2018 parliamentary elections, and future attacks are likely to follow a similar pattern; with presidential elections scheduled for 2019, IS-K “sleeper cells” will continue to plan “visible and

71 CSIS. Islamic State Khorasan (IS-K) [cited 21.05.2019] Available online <https://www.csis.org/programs/transnational-threats-project/terrorism-backgrounders/islamic-state-khorasan-k>

72 OBSERVER RESEARCH FOUNDATION. Pakistan’s dangerous denial of ISIS presence in the country [cited 21.05.2019] <https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/pakistans-dangerous-denial-of-isis-presence-in-the-country-45572/>

73 CSIS. Islamic State Khorasan (IS-K) [cited 21.05.2019] Available online <https://www.csis.org/programs/transnational-threats-project/terrorism-backgrounders/islamic-state-khorasan-k>

74 ibid.



disruptive attacks” in Kabul, Herat, and Jalalabad. In Pakistan, IS-K is responsible for the deaths of 338 civilians since January 2017<sup>75</sup>.



**pic.3<sup>76</sup> IS clashes with Afghan Taliban 2017-2018**

Since January 2017, the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) has recorded 207 clashes between IS-K and the Afghan Taliban<sup>77</sup>. See pic.3.

Local officials said fighters following IS have seized some territory from the Taliban in at least six of 21 Nangarhar districts.

75 CSIS. Islamic State Khorasan (IS-K) [cited 21.05.2019] Available online <https://www.csis.org/programs/transnational-threats-project/terrorism-backgrounders/islamic-state-khorasan-k>

76 ibid.

77 ibid.




рис.4 (author's)

They are Batikot, Achin, Deh Bala, Naziyan, Rodat and Chaparhar and, probably, Shinwar. According to provincial council chief Ahmad Ali Hazrat and Nangarhar member of parliament Haji Hazrat Ali. Local army spokesman Noman Atefi said IS had established a presence in “seven or eight” districts<sup>78</sup>.

Later on, in January-March 2016 it was reported that IS-K was driven off from 4 of captured districts: Batikot, Achin, Chaparhar and Shinwar<sup>79</sup>.

And, as being the part of a “command which loses” looks not so tempting, several high-ranked IS-K officers defected their organization and rejoined the Taliban<sup>80</sup>.

78 REUTERS. Exclusive: In turf war with Afghan Taliban, Islamic State loyalists gain ground. [cited 21.05.2019] Available online. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-islamic-state/exclusive-in-turf-war-with-afghan-taliban-islamic-state-loyalists-gain-ground-idUSKCN0P91EN20150629>

79 ALARABIYA. Afghan president: ISIS being wiped out in Afghanistan [cited 21.05.2019] Available online: <https://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/asia/2016/03/06/Afghan-president-ISIS-being-wiped-out-in-Afghanistan.html> ; and VOA. Taliban Captures IS Bases in Afghanistan. [cited 21.05.2019] Available online. <https://www.voanews.com/a/taliban-captures-islamic-state-bases-in-afghanistan/3131609.html>

80 FDD'S LONG WAR JOURNAL. Senior Islamic State Khorasan leaders defect to Taliban. [cited 21.05.2019] Available online. <https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/04/senior-islamic-state-khorasan-leaders-defect-to-taliban.php>



## 2.2. Philippines

Philippines is a country of our interest, because of the well-known “Battle of Marawi”, where IS-affiliated groups Abu Sayyaf and Maute group captured the Mindanao island for several month<sup>81</sup>.

As expert Yigal Levin says, Philippines are in the list of countries where the Islamic state has a foothold. (annex 1). Alexandr Korenkov also mentioned Philippines as a country with territory, captured by the IS-affiliated groups. (see Annex 1).

### Emergence and the development

IS-P was built by number of groups, among which Abu Sayyaf and Maute group are the most prominent. Their self-designation is IS-Lanao, but it is not common for IS propaganda - they use "IS on Philippines" instead, Alexandr Korenkov says (see Annex 1).

As reported, Isnilon Hapilon, a head of one of Abu Sayyaf faction, pledged allegiance to ISIS in 2014. ISIS responded by making him an emir, or commander, but stopped short of naming him as governor of his own Wilayat of IS<sup>82</sup>.

According to other sources, In February, 2016, ISIS officially recognized Isnilon Hapilon as leader of its Southeast Asia regional operations, and admitted the territory of his operations as Wilayat<sup>83</sup>. As Alexandr Korenkov says in his interview, the situation with presence of Wilayat in Philippines is vague – it is not clear, is it officially recognized by the IS core and Abu-Bakhr Al-Baghdadi himself, or just unofficially established. (see Annex 1).

As USA-today asserts, referencing on Singapore-based International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, in Philippines more than 60 groups have pledged allegiance to ISIS<sup>84</sup>. But such a big number seems doubtful, because it does not correspond neither to the level of insurgent activity in Philippines, nor to an “environment” - let us remember that each group should have its own base of support, infrastructure and territory for operation.

The most prominent and the crucial for our research episode is so-called Battle for Marawi, where IS-P was involved. On May 23, 2017, government forces clashed with armed fighters of IS-P - Abu Sayyaf and the Maute group. The siege was triggered when the military tried to arrest Isnilon Hapilon<sup>85</sup>. The battle lasted for 5 month, during which the insurgents burned a Catholic church, the city

81 CNN Philippines. Remembering the Marawi crisis. [cited 21.05.2019]

<http://nine.cnnphilippines.com/news/2018/05/22/remembering-marawi-crisis.html>

82 THE TIME. The Battle for Marawi City [cited 21.05.2019] Available online: <http://time.com/marawi-philippines-isis/>

83 INQUIRER.NET. Firefight erupts between gov't troops, Maute group in Lanao Sur [cited 21.05.2019] Available online: <https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/848201/firefight-erupts-between-govt-troops-maute-group-in-lanao-sur#ixzz5okCAWuSo>

84 USA TODAY. ISIS targets Philippines to expand foothold in region [interactive] [viewed 21.05.2019] Access through Academic search complete (EBSCO Host)

85 ALJAZEERA. What happened in Marawi? [cited 21.05.2019] Available online:

<https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/10/happened-marawi-171029085314348.html>

jail and two schools before occupying the main streets and major bridges of the city. Churchgoers and residents were taken hostage and a police officer was beheaded. On the evening of the attacks, Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte declared martial law across the entire island of Mindanao<sup>86</sup>.

After the Marawi was taken back to the government control in the end of October, 2017, IS-K continued attacks on both the Christian civilians and the army.

### Activity

It is important to mention, that both Abu Sayyaf and Maute group were active on Philippines before the battle for Marawi. Some of their activity were also filmed, as, for example an Abu Sayyaf 36-minute low quality video “Philippines. Boi na ostrove Basilan, 2011”<sup>87</sup> (Philippines. Fights on a Basilan island), showing the firefight between insurgents and Philippine army.

Date	Death toll	Details
<b>2016</b>		
20.02.2016	none	Maute group initial clash with government forces. The patrol base of the Army's 51st Infantry Battalion in Butig town, Lanao del Sur <sup>88</sup> .
26.11.2016	none	Member of Maute group were involved in firefight with soldiers <sup>89</sup> .
13.09.2016	14	Davao bombing. Blast on a night market killed 14 people in September, 13, 2016. Insurgent spokesperson Abu Rami said this blast was a "call for unity" among Islamic guerrilla fighters and “the warning” for Duterte-led government <sup>90</sup> .
<b>2017</b>		
23.05.2017	Over 1000	Battle for Marawi became, with no doubt, the hour of triumph

<sup>86</sup> ibid.

<sup>87</sup> Telegram, @NearEastHelpbot. Aviable on Telegram messenger. Viewed 10.05.2019

<sup>88</sup> CNN PHILIPPINES. Butig clashes: What we know so far [cited 21.05.2019] Available online

<http://nine.cnnphilippines.com/regional/2016/03/02/Butig-Lanao-del-Sur-clashes-Maute-group.html>

<sup>89</sup> INQUIRER.NET. Firefight erupts between gov't troops, Maute group in Lanao Sur [cited 21.05.2019] Available online:

<https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/848201/firefight-erupts-between-govt-troops-maute-group-in-lanao-sur#ixzz5okCAWuSo>

<sup>90</sup> RAPPLER. Abu Sayyaf claims responsibility for Davao blast – report. [cited 21.05.2019] Available online.

<https://www.rappler.com/nation/145045-abu-sayyaf-responsibility-davao-explosion>

23.10.2017		<p>for all groups united under IS-K brand. The insurgency involved many foreign fighters, from countries like Malaysia and Indonesia, as well as Yemen and Chechnya<sup>91</sup>. There are several evidences that the groups also recruited a large number of child soldiers, many from local schools in Marawi<sup>92</sup>.</p> <p>During the battle IS-K raised their flags on a several buildings, implemented the kind of the authority on the square relatively equal to 12x8 kilometers.</p>
<b>2019</b>		
25.01.2019	3 (insurgents)	Phillipino army overruns Maute camp in Lanao del Sur and kills 3 insurgents. 3 soldiers wounded <sup>93</sup> .
27.01. 2019	20	Two bombs planted by the IS-K at a Roman Catholic cathedral in southern Philippines have killed 20 people and injured dozens more <sup>94</sup> .

The examination of Abu Sayyaf, which is a “more Islamic” offshoot of Moro National Liberation Front (Funding Terrorism in Southeast Asia) previous activity shows that, most probably, the major form of activity of the group was kidnapping for ransom, threatening to behead and beheading the hostages.<sup>95</sup> But the group was also implementing the acts of terror against the civilians, like the Davao bombing.

91 THE TIME. The Battle for Marawi City [cited 21.05.2019] Available online: <http://time.com/marawi-philippines-isis/>

92 ALJAZEERA. What happened in Marawi? [cited 21.05.2019] Available e online: <https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/10/happened-marawi-171029085314348.html>

93 RAPPLER. Army overruns Maute camp in Lanao del Sur, kills 3 terrorists. [cited 21.05.2019] Available online. <https://www.rappler.com/nation/221887-army-overruns-maute-camp-lanao-del-sur-january-2019>

94 BBC NEWS. Jolo church attack: Many killed in Philippines [CITED 21.05.2019] Available online. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-47018747>

95 THE TIME. ISIS-Linked Militants in the Philippines Are Threatening to Behead Two More Hostages. [viewed 21.05.2019] Access through Academic search complete (EBSCO Host)




рис. 5. Made by author via Google maps. (the picture is certain simplification, because as reported, not the whole city was captured).

During the battle Amaq news agency issued the number of propagandist video, dedicated to the Marawi offense. One of them, named “Protivostoyania v maravi prodolzhaiysa 21 dzien” <sup>96</sup> (The confrontation in Maravi continues for 21 day) and dated 12.06.2017, shows the IS-K fighters (often with many IS symbols on their foreheads or anywhere) battling the governmental forces, using firearms (including machine guns) and executing captured people (allegedly state officials).

The video “Unichtozhenie i zhganie soderzhimogo cerkvi 04.06.2017 Maravi”<sup>97</sup>. (The destruction and burning the decoration of church), dated 04.06.2017 shows the demolition of interior of the Marawi church.

On October 23 2017, five months to the day from the start of the siege, Delfin Lorenzana, Philippine defense minister, declared there were no more "militants" in Marawi after troops overpowered the remaining fighters<sup>98</sup>. Thus, the battle lasted for 5 month and left over 1000 dead<sup>99</sup>.

The liberation of Marawi was not equal to elimination of the IS-P, but after it the scale of activity decreased drastically. For example, we have not found any propagandist videos of the group, belonging to the period after the Marawi battle.

### 2.3. Nigeria

<sup>96</sup> Telegram, @NearEastHelpbot. Aviable on Telegram messenger. Viewed 10.05.2019

<sup>97</sup> ibid.

<sup>98</sup> ALJAZEERA. What happened in Marawi? [cited 21.05.2019] Avaiable Available online: <https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/10/happened-marawi-171029085314348.html>

<sup>99</sup> ABS CBN NEWS. Army says battle for Marawi to end soon, 1,000 dead [cited 21.05.2019] Available online <https://news.abs-cbn.com/news/10/16/17/army-says-battle-for-marawi-to-end-soon-1000-dead>

IS-Nigeria, also known as “Boko Haram” fits our criteria, because both of our experts, Yigal Levin and Alexander Korenkov point on this country as on a place where IS has area under its control. (see Annex 1). The Telegraph, in its article “Boko Haram is now a mini-Islamic state with its own territory” asserts that the organization had an area of 20 000 square miles under its control by January, 2015<sup>100</sup>.

### **Obstacles of emergence and development**

When we speak about IS in Nigeria, or IS-WAP, we speak, basically about Jihadist group Boko Haram ("Western education is sin"), which pledged allegiance to Abu-Bakr Al-Baghdadi in March 2015, and acted before as a separate group.

Boko Haram emerged as a Islamist sect under Sheik Yusuf Muhammed in Maiduguri, Nigeria, in 2002. The Sect survived the heavy military crackdown against its members during the Kanama insurrection of 2003–2004. It also survived the death of Yusuf, and about 700 members in its 2009 uprising that spread across the north-eastern Nigeria, which radicalized the group a lot<sup>101</sup>.

Boko Haram re-emerged as a Jihadist insurgent group under the leadership of Abubakar Shekau in 2010. The organization has survived amid a series of leadership struggles and factional crises since 2009. In response to a series of arrests and assassinations of their members, Boko Haram has initially developed in collaboration with AQIM, Al Shabaab, Ansar Al-Dine (Mali) and, finally, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS)<sup>102</sup>.

April 14, 2014 - Boko Haram militants kidnap approximately 276 teenage girls from a boarding school in Chibok in Borno. Officials there say some of the girls were able to escape. The kidnapping sparks global outrage and a #BringBackOurGirls campaign on social media. Since now, around 200 of them remain captive<sup>103</sup>.

Boko Haram membership strength ranged from 15,000 to 50,000 fighters, according to 2016 data. Amid these are 3,000–4,000 fighters from Cameroon. The insurgent relied on proselytization at the initial stage and graduated to conscription of fighters and outsourcing of operations to mercenaries across the Lake Chad region and beyond. It also practices conscription of child and women as fighters, spies, traps, armor bearers, transporters/porters, cameramen, technicians, cooks, sex slaves and medics.

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100 THE TELEGRAPH. Boko Haram is now a mini-Islamic State, with its own territory. [cited 2.305.2019] Available online: <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/nigeria/11337722/Boko-Haram-is-now-a-mini-Islamic-State-with-its-own-territory.html>

101 OYEWOLE, Samuel. Making the Sky Relevant to Battle Strategy: Counterinsurgency and the Prospects of Air Power in Nigeria. [2017] [viewed 21.05.2019] Access through Academic search complete (EBSCO Host).

102 *ibid*.

103 CNN. Boko Haram Fast Facts. [cited 21.05.2019] Available online: <https://edition.cnn.com/2014/06/09/world/boko-haram-fast-facts/index.html>

Boko Haram established its sanctuary in the Sambisa game reserve (an East of the Nigeria, near the Cameroon border), which is 60,000 km in size. In response to the COIN pressure in Nigeria and the weak security presence along the border, the insurgents expanded across the Lake Chad region and maintained several facilities in Chad, Cameroon, and Niger<sup>104</sup>.

In April, 2018 UNICEF claimed Boko Haram has kidnapped more than 1,000 children in northeastern Nigeria since 2013<sup>105</sup>.

January 29, 2019 - The UN Refugee agency says escalating attacks by Boko Haram militants have forced 30,000 people out of Nigeria's northeast into Cameroonian borders over the weekend. The United Nations says more than 250,000 people have already been displaced from northeast Nigeria, and surging militant attacks targeting civilians have forced thousands more to run for their lives each day<sup>106</sup>.

After declaring allegiance to ISIS in March 2015, the self-proclaimed Caliphate was renamed as IS-WA. IS posted the video of Boko Haram pledges allegiance on its Telegram channel on October 30, 2016, it has de facto accepted the pledge<sup>107</sup>.

In the first half of 2015, the Nigerian troops were joined by troops from Chad, Cameroon, and Niger to liberate the occupied territory by the IS-WA. Towns Damasak, Bama, Dikwa, Malam Fatouri were reportedly taken back during March-July 2015<sup>108</sup>.

In May, 2015 it was reported that the last area controlled by Boko Haram in Nigeria is the Sambissa Forest<sup>109</sup>.

In December 2015 Muhammadu Buhari, the President of Nigeria, claimed that Boko Haram was "technically defeated" and it was reported that 1,000 women had been rescued from Boko Haram in January 2016<sup>110</sup>.

February 19, 2018 - A Justice Ministry statement says that a Nigerian high court has convicted 205 Boko Haram suspects for their involvement with the insurgent group, and the suspects were sentenced to jail terms ranging from three to 60 years. The court also freed 526 suspects, including minors, for lack of evidence and ordered they be sent to their state governments for "proper rehabilitation."

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104 *ibid*.

105 CNN. Boko Haram Fast Facts. [cited 21.05.2019] Available online: <https://edition.cnn.com/2014/06/09/world/boko-haram-fast-facts/index.html>

106 *ibid*.

107 COMBATING GERRORISM CENTER. Sub-Saharan Africa's Three "New" Islamic State Affiliates. [cited 22.05.2019] Available online: <https://ctc.usma.edu/sub-saharan-africas-three-new-islamic-state-affiliates/>

108 COMBATING GERRORISM CENTER. Sub-Saharan Africa's Three "New" Islamic State Affiliates. [cited 22.05.2019] Available online: <https://ctc.usma.edu/sub-saharan-africas-three-new-islamic-state-affiliates/>

109 REUTERS. Mapping Boko Haram's decline in Nigeria. [cited 22.05.2019]

<http://blogs.reuters.com/data-dive/2015/05/05/mapping-boko-harams-decline-in-nigeria/>

110 CNN. Nigeria Boko Haram: Militants 'technically defeated' - Buhari. [cited 22.05.2019]. Available online. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-35173618>



In February, 2018 A map produced by the U.S. development agency in February and seen by Reuters shows how ISWA territory extends more than 100 miles into the northeastern Nigerian states of Borno and Yobe, where government has in many areas all but vanished after a decade of conflict<sup>111</sup>.



рис. 6. IS-WA operation (light) and approximate control (grey) area by 2019. Made by author via Google maps.

### Activity

Here we observe the most prominent military activity of Boko Haram since the March, 7th, 2015, when organization have pledged allegiance to ISIS. Actions, performed by the group outside the Nigeria are also observed.

Date	Death toll	Details
<b>2015</b>		
5.04 2015	24	Boko Haram militants dressed as preachers killed citizens of Kwafaja Village in Borno State, with some reports claiming that up to 50 were killed <sup>112</sup> .
12.06.2015	37	Several days of nighttime raids on six remote villages in Northeastern Nigeria <sup>113</sup> .

111 REUTERS. Islamic State ally stakes out territory around Lake Chad. [cited 22.05.2019] Available online: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-security/islamic-state-ally-stakes-out-territory-around-lake-chad-idUSKBN110063>

112 NEWSWEEK. Boko Haram Militants Dress as Preachers to Kill 24 in Nigeria. [cited 22.05.2019] Available online: <https://www.newsweek.com/boko-haram-militants-dress-preachers-kill-24-nigeria-319903>

16.06. 2015	24	Twin Suicide Bomb attacks in Chad capital. More then 100 wounded. Attacks targeted the police headquarters and a police academy <sup>114</sup> .
22.06.2015	30	Maiduguri Mosque Bombing in a at crowded mosque by 2 young female suicide bombers. Boko Haram marks the start of Ramadan by targeting a mosque that they see as falling short in following 'The Prophet'. The second teen appeared to run away and blew up further away, killing only herself, eyewitnesses said <sup>115</sup> .
1.07.2015	145	Boko Haram militants raid three villages in the northeastern Nigerian state of Borno <sup>116</sup> .
3.09. 2015	30	Boko Haram militants attack a crowded market in Kerawa, Cameroon and an infirmary near a Cameroonian military camp.145 also injured <sup>117</sup> .
17.11. 2015	32	A blast in the northeastern Nigerian city of Yola, at a marketplace. Also 80 wounded <sup>118</sup> .
<b>2016</b>		
27- 28.01.2016	65- 100	Armed raid and a suicide bombing against villages in Dalori and outskirts of Maiduguri, the capital of Borno Province <sup>119</sup> .

113 WSJ. Boko Haram Attacks Leave 37 Dead in Nigeria's Northeast, Witnesses Say. [cited 22.05.2019] Available online: <https://www.wsj.com/articles/boko-haram-attacks-leave-37-dead-in-nigerias-northeast-witnesses-say-1434133069>

114 NDTV. Security Clampdown in Chad Capital After 'Boko Haram' Suicide Attacks <https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/security-clampdown-in-chad-capital-after-boko-haram-suicide-attacks-772351>

115 THE HAMILTON SPECTATOR. 30 killed at crowded mosque by 2 young female suicide bombers in northeast Nigeria. [cited 22.02.2019] Available online: <https://www.thespec.com/news-story/5690394-30-killed-at-crowded-mosque-by-2-young-female-suicide-bombers-in-northeast-nigeria/>

116 CNN. Boko Haram Fast Facts. [cited 21.05.2019] Available online: <https://edition.cnn.com/2014/06/09/world/boko-haram-fast-facts/index.html>

117 CNN. Boko Haram Fast Facts. [cited 21.05.2019] Available online: <https://edition.cnn.com/2014/06/09/world/boko-haram-fast-facts/index.html>

118 THE NEW YORK TIMES. Boko Haram Is Suspected After Explosion in Nigeria Kills 32. [cited 22.05.2019] Available online: <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/18/world/africa/after-explosion-in-nigeria-kills-32-boko-haram-is-suspected.html>

119 THE NEW YORK TIMES. Boko Haram Raid in Nigeria Kills at Least 65. [cited 22.05.2019] Available online: <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/02/world/africa/brutal-boko-haram-raid-in-nigeria-kills-as-many-as-100.html>



February 2016	88	Militants from Boko Haram attack two villages in northeast Nigeria. In another attack, two female suicide bombers kill 58 people at a Nigerian refugee camp for villagers fleeing terrorism <sup>120</sup> .
14.06. 2016	52	10 and then 42 fishermen were killed by militants at Lake Chad in Cameroon <sup>121</sup> .
10.08.2016	4	Boko Haram militants burned 60 houses, shot four villagers dead, and abducted one child <sup>122</sup>
08.11.2016	41	<p>Separate attacks in Nigeria, Niger and Cameroon.</p> <p>-A gunman killed more than 30 gold miners in a remote area of northern Nigeria in Maru.</p> <p>-4 people have died and 6 others injured after 2 suicide bombings in Maiduguri.</p> <p>-At least five Nigerian soldiers were killed and three others injured in an attack in Banibagou, Niger.</p> <p>-Two civilians were killed, three soldiers injured and 100 houses were set on fire in Far North Region, in Cameroon<sup>123</sup>.</p>
<b>2017</b>		
07.08.2017	31	Fishermen were killed by Boko Haram jihadists in two separate attacks on islands in Lake Chad in northeastern Nigeria <sup>124</sup> .

120 CNN. Boko Haram Fast Facts. [cited 21.05.2019] Available online: <https://edition.cnn.com/2014/06/09/world/boko-haram-fast-facts/index.html>

121 INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TIMES. Bodies of 42 fishermen butchered by Boko Haram pulled from Lake Chad [cited 22.05.2019] Available online: <https://www.ibtimes.co.uk/bodies-42-fishermen-butchered-by-boko-haram-pulled-lake-chad-1565498>

122 THE MUSLIM NEWS. Cameroon: 4 people killed in Boko Haram attack [cited 22.05.2019] Available online: <http://muslimnews.co.uk/news/campaign-on-terror/cameroon-4-people-killed-boko-haram-attack/>

123 REUTERS. Gunmen kill 30 gold miners in northern Nigeria: police. [cited 22.05.2019] Available online: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-mining-idUSKBN13320N>; and NIGERIA NEWS TODAY&BREAKING NAIJA NEWS. Local news Boko Haram suicide bombers kill 4 in Borno. [cited 22.05.2019] Available online: <https://www.legit.ng/1043151-boko-haram-suicide-bomber-kills-4-borno.html>  
ANADOLU AGENCY. Niger: At least 5 soldiers killed in terrorist attack [cited 22.05.2019] <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/niger-at-least-5-soldiers-killed-in-terrorist-attack/681398>

124 VANGUARD. Boko Haram kills 31 fishermen in Borno, sends warning to troops in Baga [cited 22.05.2019] Available online: <https://www.vanguardngr.com/2017/08/boko-haram-kills-31-fishermen-borno-sends-warning-troops-baga/>

21.11.2017	50	A suicide attack in the north of Nigeria <sup>125</sup> .
<b>2018</b>		
19.02.2018	none	IS-WA raids the Government Girls Science and Technical College in the northeast Nigerian town of Dapchi, kidnapping 110 students of the college <sup>126</sup> .
1.03.2018	5	Attack on a displacement camp in Rann, Borno State. At least 3 Nigerian aid workers and injuring three others. Three International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) aid workers are abducted. Later on the ICRC says abducted aid worker Saifura Hussaini Ahmed Khorsa, 25, has been killed. Abducted midwife Hauwa Mohammed Liman is executed after a deadline for negotiations expires <sup>127</sup> .
1.05.2018	86	Mubi suicide bombings. Two suicide attacks at a mosque and a market in Mubi, a town in the state of Adamawa in northeastern Nigeria. 58 others were injured <sup>128</sup> .
22.11.2018	70	Insurgents overran a Nigerian army battalion at Metele Village in Guzamala Local government in Borno State <sup>129</sup> .
<b>2019</b>		
12.05.2019	11	IS-WA insurgents attacked the Nigerian army base in Borno. Jihadists captured tank three armed vehicles, At the same time Nigerian army claimed to implement raids against the IS, killing 7 Jihadists <sup>130</sup> .

## 2.4. Libya

125 LE FIGARO. Nigeria: au moins 50 morts dans un attentat-suicide [cited 22.05.2019]. Available from the Internet:

<http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/2017/11/21/97001-20171121FILWWW00089-nigeria-50-morts-dans-un-attentat-suicide.php>

126 SAHARA REPORTERS. Abducted Dapchi Girls in 'Boko Haram town' in Yobe, Claims Rep Available online:

<http://saharareporters.com/2018/03/02/abducted-dapchi-girls-boko-haram-town-yobe-claims-rep>

127 CNN. Boko Haram Fast Facts. [cited 21.05.2019] Available online: <https://edition.cnn.com/2014/06/09/world/boko-haram-fast-facts/index.html>

128 ALJAZEERA. Nigeria mosque attack death toll rises to 86.[cited 22.05.2019] Available online:

<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/05/nigeria-mosque-attack-death-toll-rises-86-180502162539760.html>

129 PREMIUM TIMES. How Boko Haram killed 'over 70 soldiers' in Metele attack – Survivor. [cited 22.05.2019] <https://www.premiumtimesng.com/regional/north-east/296967-how-boko-haram-killed-over-70-soldiers-in-metele-attack-survivor.html>

130 CNN. Boko Haram Fast Facts. [cited 21.05.2019] Available online: <https://edition.cnn.com/2014/06/09/world/boko-haram-fast-facts/index.html>

Libya fits the criteria of our research, because presence of IS foothold there is approved by a number of sources. These are both academic works (Countering the Islamic State in Libya by Christopher S. Chivvis<sup>131</sup>. "Libya: Teetering Between War and Diplomacy The Islamic State's Role in Libya's Disintegration: by Yehudit Ronen)<sup>132</sup> and media publications such as "ISIS-linked Camps in Libya Fan Concerns About Growing Militant Threat" by The Time<sup>133</sup>.

### **Emergence and development**

The precondition of the IS-L emergence was the fall of Gaddafi and the Libyan civil war. Since 2014, or even earlier, Libya has been a failed state with fighting governments. The United States and its European allies have struggled to form a government of national unity from the feuding factions of a country. UN-sponsored Presidential Council was working from makeshift headquarters on a naval base in Tripoli's harbour, where it coexisted uneasily with a parliament backed by Islamists. Meanwhile, a third governing body formerly recognized by the international community as sovereign carried on in the eastern town of Tobruk. The self-appointed leader of the Libyan National Army, General Khalifa Hiftar, was consolidating military power in the east, while the militias aligned with the city of Misrata in the west continued to dominate in Tripoli and other parts of the country<sup>134</sup>.

In 2014, ISIS leadership in Raqqa, Syria, began reaching out to sympathizers in Libya, sending emissaries, redirecting financial and other resources, and promoting the infiltration of jihadists into the country<sup>135</sup>. In April 2014, a group of these young men, known as the Bataar Brigade, returned from Syria to Derna city, joined the radical Islamic Youth Shura Council and gradually took control of the town. In October 2014, the Islamic Youth Shura Council pledged its allegiance to ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. But later on Another local jihadi group, the Abu Salim Martyrs Brigade – which was of earlier provenance and represented an older generation of jihadists – successfully retook most of the town from the Islamic Youth Shura Council, which was pushed to Derna's outskirts, where it remains today<sup>136</sup>.

131 CHIVVIS Christopher, S. Countering The Islamic State In Libya. [interactive] [viewed 21.05.2019] Access through Academic search complete (EBSCO Host)

132 RONEN Yehudit. Libya: Teetering Between War and Diplomacy The Islamic State's Role in Libya's Disintegration. [viewed 10.05.2019] Access through Academic search complete (EBSCO Host)

133 THE TIME. ISIS-linked Camps in Libya Fan Concerns About Growing Militant Threat. [cited 22.05.2019] Available online: <http://time.com/3621015/isis-in-libya/>

134 CHIVVIS Christopher, S. Countering The Islamic State In Libya. [interactive] [viewed 21.05.2019] Access through Academic search complete (EBSCO Host).

135 ibid.

136 CHIVVIS Christopher, S. Countering The Islamic State In Libya. [interactive] [viewed 21.05.2019] Access through Academic search complete (EBSCO Host).

In September ISIS leader Baghdadi helped orchestrate the takeover of Derna by dispatching one of his senior aides, Abu Nabil al Anbari, an Iraqi ISIS veteran who had spent time with Baghdadi, in a U.S. detention facility in Iraq, according to Benotman<sup>137</sup>.

In November, 2014 Baghdadi formally established the branch after announcing he had accepted oaths of allegiance from fighters in Libya<sup>138</sup>.

According to other sources, it happened in October, 2014<sup>139</sup>.

Al-Baghdadi recognized three Libyan "provinces": Barqa (in the east), Tripolitania (west) and Fezzan (south) as being part of the "caliphate." In order not to complicate our research, we will review the activity of all three as a one group and call it IS-L.

The town of Sirte with population of 128 000, was the biggest city under the IS-L control in Libya. Before the rapid strengthening of IS-L, jihadist group Ansar al-Sharia, one of the groups responsible for the 2012 attack on the US diplomatic compound in Benghazi, provided some rudimentary governance in there. In early 2015, however, ISIS effectively staged a coup, and took over the city. By the end of 2015 ISIS successfully pushed out remaining Ansar al-Sharia loyalists and established full control over the city and several of its surrounding towns<sup>140</sup>.

Thus, the IS-L was in control of the 128-thousand towns for almost a year. IS established itself as the local government, set up headquarters in the Ouagadougou Conference Center, took over local television and radio stations, deployed religious-compliance police and began to administer sharia<sup>141</sup>.

As of spring 2016, ISIS thus controlled a 160-mile swathe of central Libyan territory that severed Tripoli and Misrata from Benghazi, Tobruk and other eastern cities. This territory, however, was much reduced in June when a push by Misratan forces against the less well-defended towns around Sirte reduced IS to an area around the heart of the town itself. In early 2016, reports suggested the group counted as many as 6,000 fighters in its ranks.

In early 2016, ISIS also sought to expand its territory beyond Sirte, attacking the oil facilities at al-Sidr and Ras Lanuf, but was repelled by the Libyan Petroleum Facilities Guard and other local forces.

In July, 2016 there are believed to be 3,000-6,000 ISIS fighters in Libya, 70 percent of who are foreigners<sup>142</sup>.

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137 CNN. ISIS comes to Libya [cited 22.05.2019] Available online: <https://edition.cnn.com/2014/11/18/world/isis-libya/>

138 REFWORLD. Country Reports on Terrorism 2017 - Foreign Terrorist Organizations: Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant-Libya (ISIL-LIBYA). [cited 22.05.2019] Available online: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/5bcf1f40a.html>

139 ISIS atrocity in Libya demonstrates its growing reach in North Africa. [cited 22.05.2019] Available online: <https://edition.cnn.com/2015/02/16/africa/isis-libya-north-africa/>

140 CHIVVIS Christopher, S. Countering The Islamic State In Libya. [interactive] [viewed 21.05.2019] Access through Academic search complete (EBSCO Host).

141 *ibid*.

142 WASHINGTON REPORT ON MIDDLE EAST AFFAIRS. How to combat Islamic State in Libya? [viewed 10.05.2019] Access through Academic search complete (EBSCO Host)

In May 2017, ISIL-Libya was reported to have around 500 fighters<sup>143</sup>.

In August, 2017, IS-L, driven out from the big cities, still controlled the certain territories and implemented its authority on certain territories, trying to administrate them and behave itself as a legitimate authorities. If we believe propagandist video "Kontrolniy punkt Islamskgo gosudarstva mezhdru Abu Bakrin i Dzhafra 27.08.2017" (The IS checkpoint between Abu Kaerin and Dzhafra)<sup>144</sup>, they staged checkpoints on the roads, arresting alleged army officers or state officials.

In December, 2017 - there were still around 500 IS fighters in Libya<sup>145</sup> which says that their number reduced drastically since the end of 2015 and remains stable.

In January and September 2017, U.S. air strikes killed an estimated 100 ISIL fighters in Libya<sup>146</sup>.

According to September, 2018 data, ISIL-Libya is no longer in control of any major cities in Libya but continues to operate in rural regions in southern Libya and in the western town of Sabratha<sup>147</sup>.

To further complicate the picture, ISIS is far from being the only radical group in Libya. Although by 2016 ISIS had become the largest and fastest -growing jihadist group in Libya (according to July 2016 estimation), it is not hegemonic and exists within a complex jihadist milieu. Many of Libya's other major jihadist groups – the Abu Salim Martyrs Brigade in Derna and Ansar al-Sharia, for example – are linked in one way or another to the Islamic State's main regional competitor, AQIM.

Date	Death toll	Details
<b>2015</b>		
January 2015,	26	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Cyrenaica branch published photos claiming to show the execution of two Tunisian journalists who had been kidnapped in September 2014<sup>148</sup>.</li> <li>-suicide attack on a luxury hotel in Tripoli that killed eight people, including a U.S. contractor<sup>149</sup>.</li> <li>-murdering 16 people in an attack on a Libyan army checkpoint<sup>150</sup>.</li> </ul>

143 REFWORLD. Country Reports on Terrorism 2017 - Foreign Terrorist Organizations: Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant-Libya (ISIL-LIBYA). [cited 22.05.2019] Available online: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/5bcf1f40a.html>

144 Telegram, @NearEastHelpbot. Available on Telegram messenger. Viewed 10.05.2019

145 CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE. When the Islamic State Came to Libya. [cited 22.05.2019] Available online: <https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/02/10/when-islamic-state-came-to-libya-pub-75541>

146 REFWORLD. Country Reports on Terrorism 2017 - Foreign Terrorist Organizations: Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant-Libya (ISIL-LIBYA). [cited 22.05.2019] Available online: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/5bcf1f40a.html>

147 Directorate4 Telegram channel. [cited 22.05.2019] Available online: <https://t.me/directorate4>

148 INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TIMES. ISIS Claims To Have Executed Two Tunisian Journalists. [cited 22.05.2019] Available online: <https://www.ibtimes.com/isis-claims-have-executed-two-tunisian-journalists-1777782>

149 REFWORLD. Country Reports on Terrorism 2017 - Foreign Terrorist Organizations: Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant-Libya (ISIL-LIBYA). [cited 22.05.2019] Available online: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/5bcf1f40a.html>

150 ibid.

15.02.2015 (a date of video release)	21	IS released a video showing the beheading of 21 Christian Egyptians who had been kidnapped in Sirte <sup>151</sup> .
February, 2015	40	Bomb attacks against a petrol station, a police station, and the home of parliamentary speaker Agila Salah in the town of al-Qubbah. “Dozens” of injured <sup>152</sup> .
19.04.2015 (a video release)	45	The killing of approximately 30 Ethiopian Christians in Libya. 15 of the men were beheaded, and another group of the same size were shot in the head <sup>153</sup> .
<b>2016</b>		
7.01.2016	60	A truck bomb attack against a police training center in Zliten. At east 200 wounded <sup>154</sup> .
<b>2018</b>		
28.10.2018	5	5 people were killed and at least 10 policemen were abducted in an attack on the town of Fuqaha, several police stations were also set on fire. IS also controlled the town for several hours <sup>155</sup> .
24.11.2018	8	IS attack on Tairbu town on a outheast Libya. 13 policemen injured, city mayor, member of municipal council, and 9 more people abducted <sup>156</sup> .
<b>2019</b>		
09.04.2019	2	IS attacked the town of Fukakha. Several buildings were burned. The town was left without electricity. The killed were the chief of the defense of the town and the chief of local municipal council <sup>157</sup> .

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151 ibid.

152 ibid.

153 REUTERS. Islamic State shoots and beheads 30 Ethiopian Christians in Libya: video. [cited] Available online: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-islamicstate-killings/islamic-state-shoots-and-beheads-30-ethiopian-christians-in-libya-video-idUSKBN0NA0IE20150419>

154 DAILY MAIL. An Islamic State affiliate claims credit for Libya attack [cited 22.05.2019] Available online: <https://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/ap/article-3390100/An-Islamic-State-affiliate-claims-credit-Libya-attack.html>

155 MAIL ONLINE. An Islamic State affiliate claims credit for Libya attack. [cited 22.05.2019] Available online: <https://thedefensepost.com/2018/10/29/libya-suspected-isis-attack-al-fuqaha/>

156 Directorate4 Telegram channel. [cited 22.05.2019] Available online: <https://t.me/directorate4/3890>

157 Directorate4 Telegram channel. [cited 22.05.2019] Available online: <https://t.me/directorate4/4918>

The significant gap in the activity of IS-L in 2016 and 2017 may be expelled by the state military offensive in the end of 2015, the intensification of the US airstrikes and the removal of the group from the inhabited areas. We should also keep in mind that if we judge the group activity to the actions they publish and distribute via media, we will not know about minor and unsuccessful actions.

### 3. ANALYSIS OF THE EXPERT INTERVIEWS AND PERSPECTIVE

#### 3.1. Analysis for IS-K

Here we are going to analyze facts, tendencies and sources regarding Islamic state – Khorasan, which were not included in case study overview, but are crucially important for the objectives of our study.

Though for today the might of the IS-K seems to be not too impressing, the expansion of the organization in Afghanistan and Pakistan may look as a pretty typical pattern of the IS-K expansion outside Middle East.

In Afghanistan and Pakistan, IS-K implements its typical strategy: delegitimizing of the local governments, degrading public trust in democratic processes (especially intensifying the attacks during the elections), sowing instability.

For example, up to 2018 parliamentary elections in Afghanistan, IS-K warned citizens in Nangarhar province, *“We caution the Muslims in the province from approaching election centers, and we recommend that they stay away from them so as to safeguard their blood, as these are legitimate targets for us.”* Later on IS-K claimed multiple attacks on “elections centers” and security forces during the Afghan parliamentary elections, following through on their warning to *“sabotage the polytheistic process and disrupt it”<sup>158</sup>*.

As indicated by trends in terrorist attacks in 2014 and 2015 as it and its allies have resorted to extreme violence to differentiate themselves from the competition – and try to execute the deadliest terrorist attacks<sup>159</sup>.

In Pakistan the IS-K was not strong as in Afghanistan – because of more strong central authority and security forces. Also, as Justin V. Hastings and Farah Naz argue, Islamic State’s competition problems were exacerbated by its internationalist ideology, which was at odds with that of many groups in Pakistan, and allowed opposing groups to present themselves as reasonable alternatives to other actors<sup>160</sup>.

And as we can see that most terrorist attacks in Pakistan were implemented in a regions close to Afghani border. The mountain landscape – hard for executing military operations and easy to guerrillas to hide when necessary. Because of the same reasons, part of the Afghanistan-Pakistan borders are really hard to control, and this makes possible for insurgents to leak.

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158 CSIS. Islamic State Khorasan (IS-K) [cited 21.05.2019] Available online <https://www.csis.org/programs/transnational-threats-project/terrorism-backgrounders/islamic-state-khorasan-k>

159 HASTINGS Justin V., NAZ Farah The Trials And Travails Of The Islamic State In Pakistan. [interiactive] 2017. [viewed 21.05.2019] Access through Academic Search Complete (EBSCO Host).

160 ibid.



At March, 2016, Afghanistan's President Ashraf Ghani said that the ISIS group has been defeated in the eastern parts of the country. But obviously this statement does not correspond to the truth. Propagandists video of IS-K, named “Unichtozhenie murtadov v otmestku”<sup>161</sup> (The elimination of murtads as a revenge) dated June, 24 2017, shows, among all, the execution of the alleged "spies" of a government. The latest 25-minutes video, "Zemlya Allaha obshirna"<sup>162</sup> (The land of Allah is spacious), dated 04.04.2018 shows military, religious and political activity of an IS-K; executions, establishment of the ISIS flag on a roof of a building (allegedly, administrative one) and the pledge of allegiance to IS-K of some young boys, allegedly locals. Which says that IS still feels itself pretty freely on a certain territories, implementing their policies, trying to behave as a “real” state. Also, some researchers point out that, suffering losses in Iraq and Syria, IS seems to relocate their militants and redistribute their resources towards Khorasan region, which may be seen by IS-K leadership as a possible fertile ground for new Caliphate<sup>163</sup>.

It is also seems that it was a hard times for IS-K to win the domination of the ground, because they had to deal with a strong and traditional player: Taliban, which, in certain extent, monopolized both Jihadist and national-liberation agenda in a region. It is not a surprise that they started their battle with a fierce confrontation with Taliban and trying to gather under their umbrella the Jihadists, who are, in bigger or lesser extent, are unsatisfied with Taliban rhetoric and deeds, maybe considering them too moderate or too nationalist. And at least for the first time they had a success in it, because several Taliban and al-Qaeda-linked Islamist groups, both violent and non-violent, already had similar sectarian and caliphate-centric worldviews – and thus, were eager to join IS-K<sup>164</sup>.

But still, a presence with other Jihadist groups may play both for and against the possible strengthening of IS-K, because, as Pakistan has more then two dozens of Jihadist groups<sup>165</sup> they can be rivals to their domination in region, but also they can join IS-K. The decision of these groups may strongly depend on the financial offerings of IS-K. Apparently, the core structure of IS (Iraq and Syria) invested in the IS-K, which is confirmed by experts of CSIS: “*To that end, the Islamic State has invested some financial resources in its Khorasan province—as much as several hundred thousand dollars—to improve its networks and organization in Central Asia*”<sup>166</sup>. And, collaterally confirmed by

161 Telegram, @NearEastHelpbot. Aviable on Telegram messenger. Viewed 10.05.2019

162 Telegram, @NearEastHelpbot. Aviable on Telegram messenger. Viewed 10.05.2019

163 ARSHAD Mahmood, SHAHEEN Akhtar. TTP’S Safe Havens In Afghanistan: A Constant Threat To Pakistan’s Internal Security [interactive] 2017. [viewed 21.05.2019] Access through Academic search complete (EBSCO Host).

164 ROUL Animesh. ‘Wilayat Khurasan’: Islamic State Consolidates Position in AfPak Region [cited 21.05.2019] Available online: <https://jamestown.org/program/wilayat-khurasan-islamic-state-consolidates-position-in-afpak-region/#.VSspbPmUe4Y>

165 THE WASHINGTON POST. Islamic State is having a hard time taking root in Pakistan [online] [cited 21.05.2019] [https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia\\_pacific/islamic-state-is-having-a-hard-time-taking-root-in-pakistan/2015/12/05/](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/islamic-state-is-having-a-hard-time-taking-root-in-pakistan/2015/12/05/)

166 CSIS. Islamic State Khorasan (IS-K) [cited 21.05.2019] Available online <https://www.csis.org/programs/transnational-threats-project/terrorism-backgrounders/islamic-state-khorasan-k>

an evidences: *“Unlike the Taliban, they (IS) don’t force villagers to feed and house them. Instead, they have lots of cash in their pockets and spend it on food and luring young villagers to join them<sup>167</sup>”*.

Thus we may predict that the future of IS-K will depend on number of factors, such as:

- a) Policy of local Jihadist groups, especially Taliban;
- b) Amount of money which major IS “investors” would invest in this projects;
- c) The general policy of the Afghanistan and Pakistan authorities: security policy, social policy, religious policy.

### 3.2. Analysis for IS-P

Here we are going to analyze facts, tendencies and sources regarding Islamic state – Philippines, which were not included in case study overview, but are crucially important for the objectives of our study.

On Philippines we see a whole set of preconditions, which could be a fertile ground for creation of a militant insurgent group. These are ethnic tensions and religious tensions in one coherent case: Moro (a collective term for various Muslim indigenous groups), were experiencing fierce oppression from the colonization and dominating Christian authorities. Marginalization of this part of population both by two attributes making the possibility of armed struggle against the government even more possible. Most of Moro live on Mindanao, where poverty rates are higher and the provision of education is lower than in the rest of the country<sup>168</sup>.

So, basically, it is not a surprise, that before the emergence of IS, many other groups, mostly islamist, were active on an archipelago: MNLF, MILF, Abu Sayyaf, Maute group, and others.

The prominent factor, which made the IS-P guerrilla relatively successful, was the landscape and nature of the Philippines: jungle and huge number of islands make traditional military operations really hard, and the airstrikes less effective, also providing a lot of possibilities to strike and run for the insurgents. This factor is also reinforced by the fact that southern Philippines also have a tradition clan feuds. One of the reasons the militants have been able to hold on for so long, says a military official, is that Marawi’s buildings are replete with hideouts, sniping niches and basement shelters built with clan warfare in mind,” the Time asserts<sup>169</sup>.

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167 REUTERS. Exclusive: In turf war with Afghan Taliban, Islamic State loyalists gain ground. [cited 21.05.2019] Available online. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-islamic-state/exclusive-in-turf-war-with-afghan-taliban-islamic-state-loyalists-gain-ground-idUSKCN0P91EN20150629>

168 THE TIME. The Battle for Marawi City [cited 21.05.2019] Available online: <http://time.com/marawi-philippines-isis/>

169 ibid.

Another precondition is presence of a long-standing conflict with two other groups involved: The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and its offshoot, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, have fought for either greater autonomy or full independence for Mindanao for decades. Since 1969 the Moro conflict have taken over 150 000 lives<sup>170</sup>.

And since the city of Marawi it is the largest Muslim city in Philippines<sup>171</sup> it is not a surprise that it became the centre of the troubles.

The specifics of the Philippino case, interrelationship between the insurgent group and the nature of the IS-K goals are pretty well-shown in an episode, depicted by the Time:

*“It November, 2016 a former MNLF commander, Omar Ali—who popularly goes by the name Solitario—went to the foothills of Lanao del Sur’s Butig mountains for a meeting with Maute brothers Omarkhayam and Abdullah, considered the masterminds of the assault on Marawi. [...]*

*That November meeting was his first encounter with the Maute brothers. [...] He also knew the Philippine authorities well: as an MNLF commander, Solitario spent years fighting them. He’d been in Tripoli, Libya, and later in Jakarta for the signing of successive peace agreements, and was a former mayor of Marawi. “I proposed to [the Mautes] to temporarily stop fighting the government until the program of the President, of changing the political structure and system, can be started,” says Solitario, referring to Duterte’s plan to implement federalism in the Philippines, which would give greater autonomy to Mindanao. Should the President not make true on his promise, Solitario told the Maute brothers, they could take up their guns again.*

*But, says Solitario, the Maute brothers were not interested in compromise or in greater political autonomy for the Maranao. They were against non-Muslims interfering in their affairs. They were also against Shia Muslims and “obstructionist” Sunni Muslims. And they were prepared to kill them. Says Solitario: “[They told me] we have to do a cleansing process. We do not want Muslims to be neutral. They either have to join us or be our opponent: you are with us or you are against us.” Solitario isn’t sure whether the Maute brothers picked up their ideology during their schooling in Jordan and Egypt [...]. Either way, he says, “when they arrived [back from overseas] they brought with them that virus”<sup>172</sup>.*

This episode shows us a considerable difference between IS-related groups and the “traditional” rebels of the region. The former put greater attention on religion and far more radical in their demands, that’s, their only way to develop or to show off is escalating the conflict - they cannot exist out of the

170 ABS-CBN NEWS. 150,000 killed, P700B lost in Mindanao war. [cited 22.05.2019] Available online: <https://news.abs-cbn.com/video/nation/regions/02/25/15/150000-killed-p700b-lost-mindanao-war>

171 ALJAZEERA. What happened in Marawi? [cited 21.05.2019] Available online: <https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/10/happened-marawi-171029085314348.html>

172 THE TIME. The Battle for Marawi City [cited 21.05.2019] Available online: <http://time.com/marawi-philippines-isis/>

conflict, otherwise, their niche will be immediately occupied by the other groups - often better organized and more popular among locals.

During the fight for Marawi IS-K were also noticed in using child soldiers, which is also a typical feature for “traditional” IS. *“The [youngest] ISIS boys were around 12 or 13 years old. They had guns. They were wearing black suits with the flags of ISIS. There were so many armed men. We feared for our lives.”* - The Time tells<sup>173</sup>.

It may be explained by the fact that the insurgents were blocked and isolated, and had no possibility to get reinforcement, and thus, used the child soldiers as a “last resort”.

No extensive use of the suicide bombing was noticed during the battle for Marawi and other episodes of the insurgency – which is also a special feature of Philippine IS.

The other feature was extensive and long-lasting usage of Facebook for the IS propaganda and mobilization of the followers, which could be explained by a fact that over 60 million Philipinos have access to the internet; of those, 97 percent are on Facebook: local telecoms offer free access to the social media site without the need for a paid data plan<sup>174</sup>.

It is also important to mention, that the IS-P, which is, generally, an alliance of two big groups: Maute group and Abu Sayyaf, is, in fact a collaboration of two pretty different entities. Abu Sayyaf is an old organization, split from the quite moderate national-liberation Islamist group MNLF. It is very active in kidnapping for ransom but less active in spreading Islam. Some of the former hostages even notice that Abu Sayyaf members “have a sketchy notion of Qu’ran”<sup>175</sup>.

While the Maute group seems to be much younger, strictly salafi Jihadists and pledged its allegiance to the IS very soon after its establishment.

Still, these two groups became allies of each other and the enemies of MILF and MNLF, which are both declared war on IS-P, along with Philippine government.

As The Time reports, that only during the first six months of 2016, Abu Sayyaf made the equivalent of \$7.3 million from ransom<sup>176</sup>. Thus we may hazard a conjecture that, at least for some time, the groups had a division of roles, where one was aimed on extraction of money and the other was concentrated on military operations.

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173 ibid.

174 THE ASIA FOUNDATION. [cited 22.05.2019] Available online: Philippines: The Black Flag Flies on Facebook <https://asiafoundation.org/2019/02/13/philippines-the-black-flag-flies-on-facebook/>

175 THE ATLANTIC. Jihadists in Paradise. [cited 22.05.2019] Available online: <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2007/03/jihadists-in-paradise/305613/>

176 THE TIME. The Battle for Marawi City [cited 21.05.2019] Available online: <http://time.com/marawi-philippines-isis/>

The uniqueness of the Philippine case is that Muslims consist only 6% of the population<sup>177</sup>. Compare with (with 86, 7% of Sunni Muslims for the Afghanistan<sup>178</sup>. 5% Sunni Muslims for Pakistan<sup>179</sup>. Thus, if in Afghanistan\Pakistan the IS insurgency was made on behalf of an overwhelming majority, in Philippines it was made on behalf of minority, or, at least “not persuasive” majority. It is an important difference.

When comparing the case of IS-P with the IS-K we see both similarities and differences. The major similarity is that they conduct their struggle in circumstances of a competition, trying to win the race with other rebel groups. But not like in Afghanistan, where the Jihadist arena was occupied by one big player - Taliban, who became the main rival and enemy for IS-K.

And unlike in Afghanistan (and other cases: Libya and Nigeria, as we may see later), the Marawi insurgency was not successful in comparison. Only 5 month of hard keeping part of the city - that was the peak of IS-P might. Factors which predetermined it, most probably, were the geographical remoteness, which prevented foreign fighters from joining Jihad in Mindanao, low absolute and relative numbers of Muslim population (2,9 mln of Muslims live in Mindanao, which is not a very great social base for massive insurgency) and poor financial support from the core IS - most probably, because this region was not prioritized by the IS leadership.

Regarding the forecast of the future IS-P activity we may say that proliferation and the success of the group may be reinforced by the following factors:

- The social policy of Duterte government, and the following governments, which would marginalize and exclude the Moro population.
- Ideological bankruptcy and failure of the primary rebel groups: MILF and MNLF. If they would not be seen by the radicalized Moro as a “protectors” anymore, it will push at least some potential enemies of the regime to join the IS-P as a more radical and ruthless force.
- The financial and ideological “investment” of the central core of the IS to a Philippine wilayat. If they will choose Philippines as a primary source of such an investment, we may expect a great flow of fighters, which would make such cases as occupation of Marawi repeat.

Though the possibility of a Syrian scenario (state disintegration and mass civil war) seems less likely in Philippines, we should expect the continuance of insurgency and periodical rise of the insurgent activity, as the reasons it stems from were not removed by the government.

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177 PHILIPPINE STATISTIC AUTHORITY. 2015 Philippine statistical yearbook. [cited 22.05.2019] Available online: <https://psa.gov.ph/sites/default/files/2015%20PSY%20PDF.pdf#56>

178 CIA WORLD FACTBOOK. Philippines. [cited 22.05.2019] Available online: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html>

179 CIA WORLD FACTBOOK. Pakistan. [cited 22.05.2019] Available online: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pk.html>

### 3.3. Analysis for IS-WA

Here we are going to analyze facts, tendencies and sources regarding Islamic state – West Africa, which were not included in case study overview, but are crucially important for the objectives of our study.

Nigeria's case is specific in many terms. First of all, some researchers stress the tribal nature of Boko Haram (IS-WA insurgency), saying that the Kanuri people play the first role in it. They point on such facts that the IS-WA leader (more precisely, one of its two leaders), Abubakar Shekau has established Boko Haram's unofficial headquarters in the town of Gwoza in Borno state, which area is the homeland of Shekau's own ethnic group, the Kanuri.

They even say that the IS-WA loses its grip is looser wherever other groups hold sway<sup>180</sup>.

Kanuri also have prevalence in the ranks of IS-WA<sup>181</sup>.

But this issue seems controversial by a number of factors and need further research to get a considerable answer.

IS-WA case provides to us interesting example to judge about the internal dynamics of IS and the power relationships within the group. In the March 2015, Shekau pledged bay'a to the Islamic State, which it accepted, transforming Boko Haram— at least nominally—into the first (and still only) sub-Saharan African Islamic State Wilayat, known as Wilayat West Africa. But Shekau's interpretation of takfirism, or the justifications by which Muslims can rightly be attacked in the orchestration of jihad, conflicted with that of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of the Islamic State. The former considered the latter too radical<sup>182</sup>.

Finally, it came to an Islamic State announced in August 2016 that Shekau had been replaced by Abu Musab al-Barnawi, believed to be the son of Boko Haram's founder, Mohammed Yusuf. But , Shekau rejected the change in leadership, asserting that he remained in charge of ISWAP/Boko Haram. Though he has remained largely silent since then, Shekau recently resurfaced in late December 2016, asserting that, contrary to statements from the Nigerian government, the group had not been driven from its stronghold in the Sambisa Forest<sup>183</sup>.

In fact, Shekau disobeyed the authority of Abu-Bakr Al-Baghdadi and challenged his image as a Caliph. And nothing happened - Shekau is still commanding his forces, they still consider themselves

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180 THE TELEGRAPH. Boko Haram is now a mini-Islamic State, with its own territory. [cited 2.305.2019] Available online: <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/nigeria/11337722/Boko-Haram-is-now-a-mini-Islamic-State-with-its-own-territory.html>

181 AFRICAN ARGUMENTS. Boko Haram and the Kanuri Factor – By Michael Baca  
<https://africanarguments.org/2015/02/16/boko-haram-and-the-kanuri-factor-by-michael-baca/>

182 COMBATING GERRORISM CENTER. Sub-Saharan Africa's Three "New" Islamic State Affiliates. [cited 22.05.2019] Available online: <https://ctc.usma.edu/sub-saharan-africas-three-new-islamic-state-affiliates/>

183 COMBATING GERRORISM CENTER. Sub-Saharan Africa's Three "New" Islamic State Affiliates. [cited 22.05.2019] Available online: <https://ctc.usma.edu/sub-saharan-africas-three-new-islamic-state-affiliates/>



Caliphate. By January, 2017 IS-WA has two factions: the al-Barnawi-led faction that controls territory in the Lake Chad Basin area in northern Borno state and the Shekau-led faction, which controls land in central and southern Borno state, including in the group's historical stronghold of the Sambisa Forest.

Out of these separate factors, along with the “split story” we may assume that looks like “the core” of IS (namely, ISIS) do not have effective control over its provinces, and pledge of allegiance along with declaring Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi as an Emir, is a more symbolic step, then a real characteristic of a leadership structure. It is proven with a disobedience of Abubakar Shekau and the split within IS-WA. We also see, that there is no correlation of time and targets between the IS-P, IS-K, IS-WA and IS-C: they do not coordinate their attacks neither among themselves, nor with the Core. All together it lets us assume, that, despite formal allegiance and submission to the ISIS, all regional IS branches outside Middle East enjoy high level of independence and are allowed to act according to local specifics.

It corresponds with an expert opinion that IS-WA's ties to Islamic State in the Middle East are limited.

*“What's clear from ISWA primary source documents is that ISWA has asked IS for theological guidance on who it is lawful to attack”, “ISWA is the largest IS affiliate, but it's very much a Nigerian organization. It doesn't have foreign fighters coming, it's hard to get to this place”<sup>184</sup>.*

Analysts stress, once again, the intention of IS-WA to behave itself as a state on occupied territories. According to January, 2015 data, on a peak of its might, just before pledging allegiance to IS, Boko Haram's fighters have achieved mastery over 11 local government areas with a total population exceeding 1.7 million people, according to the official 2006 census<sup>185</sup>.

*“The extremists are inside the community – they provide public services where the state has failed,” said Bineta Diop, an official of the African Union. Speaking to The Independent last week at a conference in Marrakech, Morocco, called Atlantic Dialogues, she added: “They bring water, sanitation, education. They provide opportunities to young people they don't otherwise have. There is a need to address the basics elements of human security and not leave it to extremists”<sup>186</sup>”.*

The way of acting of IS-WA, yet, is much similar to those we have seen in Philippines. It is destruction of the churches (Despite being the headquarters of the 7th division, created deliberately for fighting Boko Haram, 70 of the 150 churches in his diocese of Maiduguri had been destroyed by Boko

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184 REUTERS. Islamic State ally stakes out territory around Lake Chad [cited 22.05.2019] Available from: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-security/islamic-state-ally-stakes-out-territory-around-lake-chad-idUSKBN1I0063>

185 THE TELEGRAPH. Boko Haram is now a mini-Islamic State, with its own territory. [cited 2.30.2019] Available online: <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/nigeria/11337722/Boko-Haram-is-now-a-mini-Islamic-State-with-its-own-territory.html>

186 ibid.



Haram)<sup>187</sup>, spectacular assassinations of the captured prisoners, filmed on camera (the typical example is on video “Nigeria. Amak. kazn soldat”<sup>188</sup> dated 1.04.2019 (Nigeria. Amaq. An execution of the Nigerian soldiers), where the speaker speaks solely about religion and intention to kill disbelievers: (*“I invite every non-believer to believe before we kill him”*), without mentioning anti-colonialist agenda or Nigerian politics) and guerilla-style attacks (Video “Obstrel IGILom pozitsiy nigeriyskay armii v Majdaguri. 23 fevralya 2019”<sup>189</sup> (Shelling of the Nigerian army positions in Majdaguri, 23.02.2019) which show the firing of several improvised rockets (named in video as “Grad” rockets) in the desert by the alleged IS insurgents).

Significant difference here is that IS-WA goes really far in killing Sunni Muslims, which, as said previously, became even the reason of tensions between Shekau and IS leader.

Regarding the environment, where the IS-WA emerged, we should say, that it considerably differs with this of Afghanistan and Philippines. Most of all - by almost total absence of the rival groups for Boko Haram. That made IS-WA the strongest challenge for the Nigerian state ever. The outstanding cruelty, high mobilization capacities (Nigeria population is 203 million, 51% of whom are Muslim<sup>190</sup> make the organization really strong, which gains reflection in its territorial achievements by 2015. Among other reasons experts name “*lack of strong governments, lack of government services, and lack of opportunities*”<sup>191</sup>.

The “lack of opportunities” here looks much more suitable, because if we treat “strong government” as a government, which do not afraid to use a force, or has a large possibilities for it, Nigerian government would not be a weakest - it suppressed Islamist revolts for years, and did not restrain itself from murdering the previous Boko Haram leader, Mohammed Yusuf, in jail.

There is another evidence, that strength of IS-WA lies in their social policy. As The Independent says, referring on researcher Mr Lyammouri, “*militants often began infiltration by co-opting local leaders and offering help with agriculture and other services. “It’s more than just radicalisation or ideology,” he said, in a presentation to former diplomats, researchers, and journalists.*

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187 THE INDEPENDENT. Sub-Saharan Africa becoming new battleground against violent extremism as jihad ‘goes south’ [online] [cited 21.05.2019] <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/sub-saharan-africa-isis-boko-haram-al-qaeda-terror-attacks-islam-jihad-extremism-a8689126.html>

188 Telegram, @NearEastHelpbot. Available on Telegram messenger. Viewed 10.05.2019

189 Telegram, @NearEastHelpbot. Available on Telegram messenger. Viewed 10.05.2019

190 CIA WORLD FACTBOOK. Nigeria. [cited 22.05.2019] Available online:

<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ni.html>

191 THE INDEPENDENT. Sub-Saharan Africa becoming new battleground against violent extremism as jihad ‘goes south’ [online] [cited 21.05.2019] <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/sub-saharan-africa-isis-boko-haram-al-qaeda-terror-attacks-islam-jihad-extremism-a8689126.html>

*“Some of the youth joined did it for money, some joined for ideology. Some joined because they had no other option. There was no state. The groups were providing services that the state wasn’t providing”<sup>192</sup>”.*

The forecast for the future of IS-WA is many the same that for other organizations. It will depend on:

1. Social policy of the Nigerian state;
2. It’s military might and the assistance of foreign countries in fighting IS-WA;
3. The capacities and strength of the core IS in its intention to send money and foreign fighters to Nigeria.

### 3.4. Analysis for IS-L

Here we are going to analyze facts, tendencies and sources regarding Islamic state – Libya (more precisely, three Wilayats: Fizan, Barqa, Tarabulus), which were not included in case study overview, but are crucially important for the objectives of our study.

The situation of IS-L is much similar to a Afghanistan where the competition to a name of "the first and the best Jihadists" took place. As mentioned above, IS-L continue to compete with Ansar As-Sharia, Islamic Youth Shura Council and others. The tribal nature of Libyan society forces it to attract different ethnicities and tribal leader on its side. Washington Post says that *“in line with the Islamic State’s media methodologies in Mesopotamia, it [IS-L, - author] released a video message on Jan. 20 from two ethnic-Tuareg members of the Islamic State in Wilayat Tarbulus calling for individuals and jihadis in Azawad (a term used by some locals as a name for northern Mali) to pledge baya to Baghdadi and make hijrah (emigration) to the Islamic State in Libya. One of the men, Abu Umar al-Tawrigi, stated: “I call my Tuareg brothers to migrate to the Islamic State and that they give bay’a to emir al-muminin [leader of the faithful] Abu Bakr Al- Baghdadi”<sup>193</sup>”.*

IS-L also could benefit from using the post-Gaddafi tensions within the split Libyan society. As Sirte was Gadhafi’s hometown, outside of which he was shot by rebels in October 2011, Sirte remained a counter-revolutionary stronghold, resisting occupation by revolutionary forces for months. As a result, it was neglected and excluded in post-Gadhafi Libyan politics. By 2015, economic conditions

192 THE INDEPENDENT. Sub-Saharan Africa becoming new battleground against violent extremism as jihad ‘goes south’ [online] [cited 21.05.2019] <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/sub-saharan-africa-isis-boko-haram-al-qaeda-terror-attacks-islam-jihad-extremism-a8689126.html>

193 THE WASHINGTON POST. The Islamic State’s mode. [cited 22.05.2019] Available online: [https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/01/28/the-islamic-states-model/?utm\\_term=.336b5db2248e](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/01/28/the-islamic-states-model/?utm_term=.336b5db2248e)

there were poor and insecurity was rife, making it fertile ground for jihadists ready to offer some semblance of governance to the local population<sup>194</sup>.

The important detail in Libya's case is that Libya is de-facto failed state, with governments, often incapable of providing social services for the population. And that the area where IS-L, especially with the financial support from abroad, can win the ground. IS-L have been seen in considerable propagandist, ideological and social work with local population such as conducting the forum "*The Caliphate Upon the Manhaj [methodology] of the Prophet*" on November 25 2015 and providing aid to the poor and needy and given gifts and sweets to children in Benghazi<sup>195</sup>.

In Barqa, ISIS activities extend far beyond what has been written on Darnah. The group has publicized activities such as burning cigarette cartons; destroying waterpipes used for smoking; demolishing "polytheistic" statues and shrines; and persuading Muslims in open-air markets to leave their commercial activities and join them at the mosque (more coercive measures are used in Syria and Iraq). Its activities have included distributing "medical guidance" in Cyrenaica, general aid to the needy, and sweets and gifts to children in Benghazi. In Tripoli, IS-L has benefited from meetings with locals and distributions of cash and clothing<sup>196</sup>.

The same efforts was reflected in two propagandists viideo "IA Amaq Zhizn v Livijskom gorode Sirt pod controlem IGIL"<sup>197</sup> ("A live in Libyan city of Sire under the ISIS control") dated 06.12.2015. The video is short (just about 1 minute) has no voice off, and shows the picture of peaceful and routine daily life: children playing, shops visited by the residents, cars on road. The message, conducted by the creators is that life under IS is regular, peaceful and safe. This picture should inspire people to believe in IS as in a powerful and serious structure, which is strong enough to guarantee peace and safety to those who live under it.

The other video, "Zhizn v Livijskom gorode Sirt pod controlem Igil 21 dekabrya 2015"<sup>198</sup> ("A live in Libyan city of Sire under the ISIS control") dated 21.12.2015. Is literally identical by its message and form, only the picture differs.

But of cause, IS-L did not neglect the usual for Jihadist policy of terror and demonstrative execursions. The example is propagandist video "Libya - 12.01.1437 Okhota na Sakhautov 2015"<sup>199</sup>

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194 CHIVVIS Christopher, S. COUNTERING THE ISLAMIC STATE IN LIBYA. [interactive] [viewed 21.05.2019] Access through Academic search complete (EBSCO Host).

195 THE WASHINGTON POST. The Islamic State's mode. [cited 22.05.2019] Available online: [https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/01/28/the-islamic-states-model/?utm\\_term=.336b5db2248e](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/01/28/the-islamic-states-model/?utm_term=.336b5db2248e)

196 THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE. The Islamic State's Expansion in Libya. [cited 22.05.2019] Available online: <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-islamic-states-expansion-in-libya>

197 Telegram, @NearEastHelpbot. Available on Telegram messenger. Viewed 10.05.2019

198 ibid.

199 ibid.

(Libya - Hunting On Sakhautes) dated 25.10.2015 (according to Grigorian calendar; language - Russian).

“Sahautes” or “Sakhawates” on the IS propagandist slang means Sunni Muslims who fights against the IS.

The video shows the pictures of the fighting, short propagandist speeches of the *mujahedeen*, then - the interrogation of the alleged “spies” or *sahautes*, who was allegedly acting against the IS on its territory. The video ends with brutal execution of both and the final speech of the IS fighter.

The main message of the video is that IS maintains strict security on its territory and every attempt to challenge their order will be stopped immediately and brutally. The video aims to strengthen the will of its supporters and give a fright on its enemies.

Then, during the few years, the IS-L passed the way, typical for other non-Middle East branches: emergence, bright and extensive growth, with a peak might, signed by keeping the relatively large territories, and then decline after the massive military operation.

The other special feature of IS-L is that it, most probably, enjoyed the high level of infrastructural and financial support from the core IS. As researchers point, beginning in late 2015, ISIS began to redirect foreign fighters from the Levant to Libya through official organs such as Dabiq (There are an estimated 1,000 Tunisian foreign fighters in Libya alone<sup>200</sup>).

Collaterally we may assume the same with, for example, huge amount of high quality media material (long propagandist videos with different agenda) from IS-L, which was not observed in Nigerian and especially Philippine case.

Also, as an exclusive moment, we should stress the information from one of the researches that Boko Haram has developed increasingly close links to IS-L. According to Christopher S. Chivvis, one recent (though perhaps exaggerated) report, as many as 1,000 Boko fighters had taken a payment of \$1,000 to fight for IS-L. A more credible number today is probably somewhere in the low hundreds, but a number that size is not unthinkable in light of current trends. In addition, there have been reports that Libyans are now leading Boko Haram forces back in Nigeria. There also are some indications that Libyan ISIS may be building links with its partner affiliate in Egypt, the Wilayat Sinai<sup>201</sup>.

The future forecast for IS-L is almost similar with the other IS-L branches. The development and might of his branch will depend on:

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200 CHIVVIS Christopher, S. COUNTERING THE ISLAMIC STATE IN LIBYA. [interactive] [viewed 21.05.2019] Access through Academic search complete (EBSCO Host).

201 CHIVVIS Christopher, S. COUNTERING THE ISLAMIC STATE IN LIBYA. [interactive] [viewed 21.05.2019] Access through Academic search complete (EBSCO Host).

1. The future of the Libyan state (here we would stress that this future is vague and, yet, there is no sign that Libya will resurrect in its previous borders, hence, there is many possibilities that IS-L will continue to have fertile ground at least for mere survival);
2. The possibilities of ISIS in Syria and Iraq to support its affiliate;
3. The military strength of the rivals of IS-L: first of all, the Islamic Youth Shura council and Ansar-AspSharia. Here we should also add that the position of the Western countries and anti-ISIS coalition will also play a great role because of geographical proximity of the Libya to a Europe, which poses huge potential security threat to EU in case of IS-L strengthening.

### 3.5. Interview analysis and summarizing the cases

As said previously, we have asked our experts the questions regarding the emergence of IS groups outside Middle East, preconditions of such an emergence, dynamics, and possible trends of future development.

The coincidence of the answers of our experts was quite high. First of all both of them agreed, that IS pays great attention to a social welfare and infrastructure at the territories they hold. And that is one of the greatest factors of the IS stability and development. Alexandr Korenkov said:

*“There is an orientation on social welfare. Where they want to gain a support of locals (collect taxes) - they make an accent on a social welfare (redistribute money, repair roads), try to blandish the locals (in Iraq, Syria, Libya, Yemen, Somalia, in Nigeria in lesser extent - they prefer intimidation there). They spend on social welfare on the backs of military budget. In a place where they do not proclaim such an aim, they do not pay attention on social welfare, spending the budget on military preparations instead.*

*When they control territory, they spend on social welfare, when do not - they spend on war. But in Iraq and Syria - there is a core, and even if not controlling territory, they spend on social welfare there.”* (see Annex 1)

The same was said by Yigal Levin, regarding the preconditions of IS emergence: *“incompetence of the central authority, collapse of the social structures - and the IS plays as those, who can bring back these social structures”*. (see Annex 1)

This totally corresponds with what have we’ve discovered earlier regarding Afghanistan (the evidence say that IS, unlike Taliban, come with gifting the money, not with its extortion), Nigeria and Libya. The exception here is Philippines - apparently, because of short period of control over territory and limited scale of such a control.

By the way, through the all research we may spot the division of the IS on “The core” and “periphery”. The Iraq\Syria region is a place of an initial establishment of the Caliphate, the place where Caliph physically stay, and, apparently the place of a concentration of both human and the financial resources of the IS. Thus, even though the IS core seems not always have effective tools for political control over the branches (see Boko Haram case), we see that the relationships between branches are not equal. This assumption is approved by Alexandr Korenkov: “*There is a core: Iraq and Syria, and the Wilaya’s group around them*”. (See Annex 1)

Regarding the preconditions of the emergence of the IS, Alexandr Korenkov was the only expert, who stressed the first and the major factor: the existence of a conflict within a country: “*The general tendency: IS controls territory, if there is conflict and they participate in a conflict. The principal preconditions for the IS emergence in certain countries is the existence of certain armed conflict*”.

And we see that this assertion is proved by the cases: in Philippines we have ethnic and religious conflict, in Afghanistan - long-standing conflict between Taliban and the government, in Libya - civil war since 2012, and in Nigeria - tensions between Christian and Muslims, along with severe repressions against the Muslim opposition since 2009.

The other precondition is the dictatorship. Yigal Levin points on it collaterally, saying that IS are tempting its followers to join by the fact that it is the most radical group to revenge the central authority, if you was offended or somehow discriminated. And this assumption is easily proved by the fact: IS do not develop as much as to have foothold in a countries with a effective democratic system. If we look at the EIU democracy chart, we can see most of countries of our interest are either non-democratic or “flawed democracy” and are in a bottom of the list:

Libya, place 154 (of 167), marked as authoritarian;

Afghanistan - place 143 of 167, marked as authoritarian;

Pakistan, place 117 of 167, marked as authoritarian;

Nigeria: place 108 of 167, marked as flawed democracy, authoritarian;

Philippines are showing the best result with place 53 of, marked flawed democracy. And it is important to mention that the Philippines are the very country where ISIS could not establish a long-standing foothold, and whose activity there is minor in comparison with other cases we have reviewed<sup>202</sup>.

The other precondition we have established, - though, its credibility cannot be asserted steadily, is infrastructural and resource aid from the Core of IS. As Alexandr Korenkov said:

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202 DATAWRAPPER.DWCDN.NET. The Economist Intelligence Unit 2018 Democracy Index. [cited 22.05.2019]  
Available online: <https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/jkMCN/2/?abcnewsemdheight=550>

*“If there is a situation of a conflict - the small group of emissary of the IS are driven there. [...] Those emissary firstly do not declare anything. They just stay there, gather information. After they form a first armed group from a loyal people. Separately they form their bases. They do not wage war with anyone, form a military base and gather foreign volunteers there. They form a groups of recruiting: in Syria it was a centers of humanitarian aid, centers of studying Quran. They were teaching them silently and recruiting spies from the locals to know, who has positions and who is strong, who have arms or do not have...”* (See Annex 1)

Though we have not considerable evidences that such a technology was used during the establishment of IS in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Philippines and Nigeria, it was used in Libya, what we’ve said in a previous chapter. (See Annex 1)

To answer the question of what societies and countries are the most vulnerable for the rise of Jihadism, and, more precisely, IS, we may also refer to a GLOBSEC (Bratislava-based think tank) research regarding the personalities of the European jihadists.

GLOBSEC Project midterm report "Who are the European jihadis?"<sup>203</sup> studied the ethnic, demographic and social characteristics of the European jihadists, and found out that:

- European jihadists are predominantly (83%) male;
- Young but not teenage or adolescent (average age 30, 8);
- Mostly homegrown and naturalised (72% are EU citizens);
- Criminal but not “petty” criminal;
- Financed by a variety of different, and predominantly, legal means;
- Unemployed;
- Radicalized via family and friends;
- Slow to mature as radicalization fueling it often takes years;
- Keen to travel to and return from a foreign conflict;
- Uneducated.

As we have not found the similar studies for our countries of interest, we can try to applicate these outcomes to our research, assuming that Jihadists all around the world may have more or less similar reasons for joining the radical Islamist organizations, and thus, outline the preconditions of jihadist insurgency.

Some of the factors listed may be eligible for our analysis:

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203 GLOBSEC project midterm report. WHO ARE THE EUROPEAN JIHADIS? Available online:  
[https://www.globsec.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/GLOBSEC\\_WhoAreTheEuropeanJihadis.pdf](https://www.globsec.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/GLOBSEC_WhoAreTheEuropeanJihadis.pdf)

*"Sizeable chunk of the European jihadi milieu is composed of individuals with long records of participation in radical networks in Europe", GLOBSEC study says and adds that the "almost 64% (or 126 out of 197) of the individuals included in the dataset had first been exposed to a radical ideology more than six months prior to their arrest. Moreover, in 38 cases the first exposure took place more than 5 years before their arrest"<sup>204</sup>.*

It means that Jihadi insurgency is a long-standing problem, which cannot be decided just through physical elimination of existing jihadists. The stake on military strategy counteraction to jihadism helps to clean the spot from the IS authority (like in Philippine case), or stop the terrorist attacks in a short-term perspective, but in long term perspective insurgency will continue, because the future insurgents are "growing up" right now, in the moment, and the "heroic" death of their adherents in the fight with "qafir" will also contribute to Jihadi mythology and propaganda.

*"In 26% (52 out of 197) of all the cases [of the Jihadi insurgents], radicalization was instigated by individuals close to the 2015 terrorism arrestees, either family or friends"<sup>205</sup>.*

As tribal societies (as Afghanistan\Pakistan, Nigeria, Libya) seem to be much less atomized and individualized, comparing with the Western societies, friends, and, especially, family, are playing much bigger role in person's socialization and constitution of his or her beliefs throughout the life there. Thus, this factor could also have been contributed to a possibility of radicalization of future Jihadists in above mentioned countries, and could be put in a line with other factor of risk for other countries.

*"The key offline locality or institution, or entity, that kept coming up in the data analysed for this report was prison: 33% (13 out of 39) of the individuals in the study who had been in prison developed contacts with radical extremists while imprisoned"<sup>206</sup>.*

Thus we may make a guess, those countries, with a high prison population of Jihadists, or suspected Jihadists, or, maybe, even moderate Islamists, add to possibility of the radicalization. For more purity of this outcome the conditions of prison should also be studied (because radical socialization in prison confinement seems to be problematic), but it goes out of our research.

According to GLOBSEC research, only 9% of Europe's Jihadi insurgents finished high school, which may point, that low level of education may be one of characteristic trait of a Jihadist, not only in Europe.

We have not found the rating of percent of population with tertiary education for our cases, but found out that most of our countries are in the bottom of the list of the countries by literacy rate:

In Afghanistan only 38% of population is literate;

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204 GLOBSEC project midterm report. WHO ARE THE EUROPEAN JIHADIS? Available online:

[https://www.globsec.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/GLOBSEC\\_WhoAreTheEuropeanJihadis.pdf](https://www.globsec.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/GLOBSEC_WhoAreTheEuropeanJihadis.pdf)

205 ibid.

206 ibid.



56% - in Pakistan;

60% in Nigeria;

Philippines, once again, show a greatest result - 97%, along with Libya - 91%<sup>207</sup>.

So we may assume that the imaginary “IS sympathising-low education” correlation may be solid for at least part of the countries.

The other important social characteristic of European Jihadists, found by the GLOBSEC research, was that almost 40% of them were unemployed at the time of their arrest, death while staging a terrorist attack, or expulsion for alleged terrorism association<sup>208</sup>.

To prove or disprove this correlation we observe the unemployment rate in countries of interest:

23, 10% for Nigeria;

17, 7% for Libya;

8, 8% for Afghanistan;

5, 9% for Pakistan;

5, 2% for Philippines<sup>209</sup>.

To compare is it high or low, we see that this figure is 3, 6% for the United states and 3,8% for the United Kingdom, hence, we can estimate the level of unemployment of countries of our interest as “high” at least for 3 countries of 5. Thus, the high level of unemployment, yet not being the only and the major factor of successful IS development in the country, may influence towards making it more likely, taken others equal. And once again we should stress that Philippines distracts from the general image.

Thus, the answers on the questions of our research will be:

**a) In which countries outside Middle East the IS is strong enough to capture and keep territories?**

These countries are: Afghanistan, Nigeria, Libya, Philippines. We also could have added Somalia to this list, but refused from the detailed research because of the lack of information.

**b) What was the preconditions of the IS territorial advance in these countries?**

Such preconditions are:

1. Presence of military conflict inside the country
2. It should be predominantly Muslim country (but exceptions exist)

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207 OUR WORLD IN DATA. Literacy. [cited 22.05.2019] Available online: <https://ourworldindata.org/literacy>

208 GLOBSEC project midterm report. WHO ARE THE EUROPEAN JIHADIS? Available online: [https://www.globsec.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/GLOBSEC\\_WhoAreTheEuropeanJihadis.pdf](https://www.globsec.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/GLOBSEC_WhoAreTheEuropeanJihadis.pdf)

209 TRADING ECONOMICS. Unemployment rate. [cited 22.05.2019] Available online: <https://tradingeconomics.com/country-list/unemployment-rate>

3. The low level of democracy and human rights in the country, which cuts the capacities for marginalized and oppressed groups to represent themselves and fight for their rights by a legal means
4. These countries was spotted by the IS core as a possible directions of expansion, which have possible predetermined their efforts to establish the Wilayat inside them and led to sending the representatives and aid to a local Jihadi groups.

**c) What are the factors of vulnerability?**

Factors of vulnerability are generally the same that factors described in the previous answer, but two more should be added:

1. Low education level of the population (Libya is an exception here)
2. High unemployment level of the population.

**d) Why the IS and the ideology of Jihadism spills out the Middle East for the recent years?**

This question cannot have one scientifically accurate answer. Because any answer on this question will just be the interpretation of the data collected. And the interpretation will be strongly dependent on author's ideological and value bias.

On the author's point of view, the main prerequisite was a fact, that Jihadism became a most eagerly-sought and successful revolutionary ideology for a Muslim world. The ideology, which provides - on one side - the social support of the poor, and from the other - the feel of dignity for the fighters, working as a flag of anti-colonial struggle. This ideology has no significant rivals (except the Rojava and the PKK project of the democratic confederalism for Syria), and has been fallen on an extremely fertile ground: high unemployment, armed conflicts already existing (which made armed violence a socially tolerated issue), low educational level, dictatorship regimes, which do not leave people other ways to declare their subjectivity and overcome the oppression,, except armed struggle, and certain human and financial resource of the IS "Core" Caliphate, which is eager to invest in a Jihadist struggle outside Middle East.

## CONCLUSIONS

The goal of our study was to find out the preconditions of the emergence and strengthening of the IS cells in the countries where they were never seen before.

In order to do that, we have examined a number of sources, such as academic sources, studying Jihadism and IS, the media publications regarding the development of IS inside and outside Middle East, and the propagandist videos of the IS inside and outside Middle East. Also we had a talk with two experts.

During the study we have pointed out a list of countries, where IS have the foothold, or had it in the past - with determining the approximate area of this foothold and the period of when it was gained and for how long.

We have examined, how the IS branch was established in each of country, what were the major milestones of it, and traced the most prominent activities of each of the IS branches.

Finally, we have analyzed the collected information in order to get answers on our questions. More precisely, we have found out, what were the preconditions of the territorial advance of the IS i our cases, what are the factors of vulnerability and why does it happen that the ideology of Jihadism, in its IS interpretation, have gained so much supporters and relative success even outside the Middle East region.

Finally, the preconditions we found are:

1. Presence of military conflict inside the country.
2. High level of Muslim population.
3. The low level of democracy and human rights in the country.
4. Presence of certain military, financial and other aid from the “maternal” IS organization in Iraq and Syria.
5. All above mentioned factors would be reinforced by a high unemployment and low educational level in the country.

Some of these factors, anyhow, have exceptions.

The results we obtained may be, on a one side, a ground for further research - to find out even more correlations and logical links regarding our topic, and on the others - as an analytical took to predetermine the countries, where IS can emerge and advance in the coming days.

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## Тэрытарыяльныя заваяванні ІДІЛ за межамі Бліжняга Усходу

Мікола Дзядок.

Рэзюмэ

Аб'ект гэтай бакалаўрскай працы – сучасны джыхадзізм у форме паўстанцкіх арганізацый, аб'яднаных у самаабвешчаны халіфат. Прадмет: аддзяленні Ісламскай Дзяржавы (ІД, альбо ІДІЛ), па ўсім свеце, акрамя Бліжняга Усходу, якія маюць тэрыторыю пад сваім кантролем.

Мэта даследавання – вынайсці перадумовы з'яўлення і ўзмацнення аддзяленняў ІД у краінах, дзе іх раней ніколі не было.

Мэта даследавання дасягнутая праз ягоныя задачы. Задачами з'яўляліся вынайсці:

- а) У якіх краінах за межамі Бліжняга Усходу ІД дастаткова моцная, каб захопліваць і ўтрымліваць тэрыторыі?
- б) Што стала перадумовамі тэрытарыяльных заваяванняў у гэтых краінах?
- в) Якія фактары робяць краіну ўразлівай?
- г) Чаму ІД і ідэалогія джыхадзізма апошнія гады выходзіць за межы Бліжняга ўсходу?

Метады, скарыстаныя намі ў працы гэта аглядальны аналіз прыкладаў, кантэнт-аналіз і інтэрв'ю.

Выснова, да якой мы прыйшлі, палягае ў тым, што перадумовы з'яўлення моцнай і канкурэнтаздольнай арганізацыі ІДІЛ у пэўнай краіне палягаюць пераважна ў сацыяльнай сферы.

Праца можа быць карысная ў практычнай сферы барацьбы з тэрарызмам, як на тактычным, так і на глыбінным узроўні, таксама яна можа дапамагчы выяўляць краіны, якія найбольш уразлівыя да тэрарыстычнай пагрозы.

## APPENDICIES

### ANNEX 1

#### Interview with Alexandr Korenkov

Надо разделять: есть официальные вилайаты и неофициальные. Они [ИГ — прим, авт.] сами не разбираются. Территория, условное ядро — Ирак и Сирия. Территория постоянного присутствия, там где у них есть вилайат, это Афганистан, Кавказ, где они тоже постоянно о себе заявляют, где у них есть ячейки и сторонники, Алжир (вилайат Джазира), вилайат в Саудовской Аравии, вилайат в Йемене, вилайат на севере Египта, вилайат Западная Африка (Нигерия, территория района Чад), вилайат в Сомали.

#### **- Вилайат – это официальная ветвь или место, где они держат территорию?**

Вилайат — официально признанное отделение халифата. Чтобы стать Виайатом, ячейка, которая там действует, должна отвечать определенным критериям, этих критериев официально нигде нет. Но в пропагандистских журналах у них существует разделение, что вилайат должен во-первых, быть способным защитить и контролировать с оружием в руках эту территорию для того чтобы установить политическую систему, которая в халифате.

Это план Заркави: создать группу, посеять хаос (использовать конфликт или спровоцировать конфликтную ситуацию), потом захватить территорию, и после провозгласить халифат или реализовывать политическую стратегию. Проводить свою политику на этой территории.

И еще должен быть представитель (координатор) от официального центра (чувак из халифата).

По факту, есть официальные вилайаты, но соответствующие этим критериям (вилайат в Саудовской Аравии: у них нет подконтрольной территории, как и в Алжире, создан с целью пропаганды). В Алжире то же самое. Они стараются создавать вилайаты на тех территориях, где есть потенциальная возможность подгрести под себя всех недовольных джихадистов. В Алжире была продолжительная гражданская война и джихадисты создали там вилайат, чтобы показать факт их присутствия, что мы здесь есть. То есть вилайат не как физическая единица, а как план, указание на намерение. То же самое на Кавказе. Там нет территории подконтрольной, но они провозгласили вилайат, чтобы показать, что вот есть центр, куда могут присоединяться все недовольные, либо Аль-каида, либо местные джихадисты.



А есть еще группы, которые контролируют территорию, но не признаны вилайатами. Например, в Филиппинах долгое время, и до сих пор не понятно, является ли там официальным вилайат, или нет. Но когда они контролировали в Марави город, не было сообщения, что группа признана вилайатом, но было сообщение: лидер отделения признан амиром. Где есть группы, они контролируют территорию, участвуют в движении, но не признаны вилайатом. Тоже самое в Марави. Создана группа - отделение ячейки ИГ, и они присягали на верность, контролировали территорию, но не ясно, вилайат или нет. В Конго был создан вилайат Центральная Африка. Но не понятно, есть ли группа и контролирует ли какую-то территорию. Там непонятная ситуация.

Есть ядро, вокруг него официальные вилайаты и есть группы, ячейки в других странах, они не признаны вилайатами, но там действуют.

**- Почему случилось так что ИГ смог контролировать территорию в каждой из этих стран? Какие к этому были предпосылки?**

Тенденция общая, ИГ контролирует территорию там, где есть конфликт и в этом конфликте они участвуют. Основное условие для появления ИГ в определенных странах, это существование определенного вооруженного конфликта.

Есть ситуация конфликта – туда направляется небольшая группа эмиссаров ИГ. Этот эксперимент в лабораторных условиях, так сказать, проведен в Сирии. Эти эмиссары в начале ничего не провозглашают. Просто находятся на этой территории, собирают информацию. После они формируют из более-менее лояльных людей первую группу вооруженную. Отдельно формируют свои базы. На территории они ни с кем не воют вначале, а приезжают и тихонько развивают свою структуру. Формируют военную базу, туда собирают своих сторонников, иностранных добровольцев. Они формируют такие группы рекрутинга, в Сирии это были центры гуманитарной помощи, центры по изучению Корана. Тихонько их учили и из местных набирали шпионов, чтобы узнать какой расклад в городе, кто какую позицию занимает, кто сильный, кто имеет вооруженные силы или не имеет.

Параллельно развивали серию военных объектов, в основном это были военные базы, тренировочные лагеря, которые находились за территорией города и в которых в основном собирались иностранные добровольцы, так как в начале они не делали ставку на местных, т. к. местные могли проявить какую-то слабость в критический момент, перебежать на другую сторону, поэтому собирали иностранных добровольцев, не связанных с населением. Комбинируя с одной стороны рекрутинг, проповедь и военные лагеря, они потихоньку собирали влияние и получали влияние в этом регионе. А потом в определенный момент военным путём захватывали эту территорию. Если местные оказывали сопротивление, то они откатывались

назад, обратно уходили и оставались выжидать удобного момента, а если местные не сопротивлялись (как в Ираке) захватывали город, провозглашали своим городом и местных потихоньку выщемляли.

Это такая стратегия. А условие самое основное захвата территорий – это наличие конфликта, там, где они могут развернуться. И этот конфликт желательно должен быть конфессиональным (в Ираке, Сирии, Йемене).

Вот на Кавказе нет конфессионального конфликта, там есть остатки сепаратистского конфликта: центральная власть против джихадистов, и они пытались там закрепиться, но так как нет у местных жесткого конфессионального конфликта, то им не удалось закрепиться.

Сейчас на Шри-Ланке пытаются разжечь конфессиональный конфликт. Или яркий пример на Филиппинах. На Филиппинах мусульмане составляют меньше 10 % населения. По сути это католическая страна, где только пару островов (Минданао) мусульманские. И там не было жесткого конфессионального противостояния, там был сепаратистский конфликт между мусульманами, которые хотели провозгласить своё независимое государство и получить автономию в составе. И там, разжигая конфессиональный конфликт, ИГИЛ удалось закрепиться. Тоже самое они пытаются сейчас сделать в Египте, где пытаются разжечь конфликт между христианами-коптами и мусульманами-суннитами.

Попытка разжечь межконфессиональный конфликт – это основная причина нападений в Европе, моё мнение. Атакуя христиан в Европе, они провоцируют конфликт и ненависть к местным мусульманам. И мусульманам остаётся или терпеть исламофобию или действовать радикально, и тогда уже дружить с радикальным ИГ, теми, кто в этом шарит.

Таким образом, условие это наличие конфликта. желательно - наличие межконфессионального конфликта.

**- Какое бы ты отметил отличие между развитием ИГИЛ в восточных странах и ближневосточных? Есть ли какая-то существенная разница, специфика.**

То, что в зоне ядра находится ИГ развивается за счет местных ресурсов, местного населения. Ориентир ставится на социалку. Там, где они хотят получить поддержку местного населения (собирают налог), то акцент на социалку (распределяют деньги, ремонтируют дороги) пытаются задобрить местное население (в Ираке, Сирии, было в Ливии, было и есть в Йемене, было в Сомали, в Нигерии в меньшей мере, там занимаются устрашением). Тратят на социалку за счёт военного бюджета. Там, где они не ставят цель задобрить население, а разжечь межконфессиональный конфликт, то они не уделяют внимание на социалку, а весь бюджет идёт на военную подготовку и т. д.

Когда они контролируют территорию, то тратят на социалку, когда не контролируют, то тратят на войну. Но в Ираке и Сирии там ядро, то, даже не контролируя территорию, тратят на социалку. То же самое талибы активно используют. Только не видел еще статей, где бы ИГ выступало бы в роли судей, где они бы решали какие-то конфликты внутри общины.

### **- Какие есть тенденции в развитии групп ИГ за пределами Ближнего востока?**

По ядру: потеряв территорию уходят в подполье, возвращаясь к 2012-13 гг, когда это были партизанские группы, которые использовали засады и потихоньку влезали в незаконный бизнес, чтобы получать финансы.

За пределами ядра, когда они потеряли территорию, то они расползаются по всей стране. Даже освободив территорию от ИГ вы не решаете проблему саму по себе, они еще больше территорию охватывают.

За пределами Ближнего востока, т.к. они не ориентируются на захват территории, в Шри-Ланке, они делают акцент на военную подготовку, на масштабные теракты, и охватывают ранее не включенные в террористическую деятельность страны. В Саудовской Аравии был теракт – нападение на базу службы безопасности – высокоподготовленное серьезное мероприятие, были хорошо вооружены и подготовлены. В Шри-Ланке они провели серьезную и масштабную акцию. Целую неделю страна была подвергнута хаосу, т.к. они систематически подрывали и атаковали местное население.

Там, где они не ставят целью захвата территории, там они используют максимально жестокие способы: теракты, убийство максимального количества местного населения.

Например, в Европе, там где они постоянно атаковали, силовики уже приспособились, в 2018 на 50% терактов меньше, чем в 2017. А там где не было раньше таких терактов, то там и не готовы были к ним, например, в Грузии в 2017 г. в Шри-Ланке.

В Финляндии в прошлом году был теракт. В Швеции, в Конго. И можно предполагать, что теракты могут совершаться в тех странах, про которые мы никогда и не думали, где не было никаких предпосылок для них.

### **- В чем состоит привлекательность идеологии ИГ для жителей за пределами ближнего востока?**

В интервью с иностранными добровольцами (немцы, французы, бельгийцы) красной нитью проходит, что ИГ предложил контрсистемный радикальный подход. Это ИГ для них это единственная политическая сила, которая с одной стороны радикально отрицало существующий порядок во всех проявлениях, а с другой стороны предлагала новый масштабный проект

границы которого выходили за границы существующего мира. Проект, который охватывает жизнь после смерти.

Для местных ИГ предлагало просто самый эффективный пусть и жесткий подход для решения проблем с местной властью (что мы боремся с тиранами), более радикальную, но и более эффективную модель победы над противником. Что привлекает многие местные вооруженные группы.

И третье, это их финт с ушами с халифатом. Для многих это стало рубиконом. Потому что провозглашение халифата стало отправной точки для раскола среди джихадистского мирового движения: сторонников ИГ и противников.

Сегодня нет например, как раньше: «мы там за Бен-ладена, но вроде он пдохой, но здесь прав». Здесь не про Бен-ладена идет [речь, прим. Авт.].

До ИГ джихадисты пытались построить глобальный союз с непонятной целью. Одни предлагали бороться с дальним врагом (Израилем и США), другие с ближним (с тиранами), но главное давайте вместе делать. Теперь есть противники халифата и сторонники, третьего не дано. И это стало привлекательным фактом – провозглашение халифата (многие поехали).

**- Можешь ли ты называть исламизм в его игиловском прочтении самой успешной глобальной радикальной идеологией или революционной идеологией?**

Я бы разделял исламизм и джихадизм. Исламизм – политический проект реформистский, политического переустройства арабских стран с законами шариата (типа Братья мусульмане), они договариваются с существующей системой.

А джихадистский проект – это радикальное отрицание реформизма. Радикально отрицают возможность компромисса. Я выделял бы его в отдельное теоретическое направление, которое ориентирован на определенный политический проект построение халифата. Но мне кажется что он стал второстепенным проектом. Для них важнее попасть в рай (грубо говоря), чем построить халифат. Для них важнее ведение войны, чем построение государства. Поэтому они не являются исламистами в плане политического проекта. Они являются джихадистами – идеология бесконечной войны, потому что они верят, что перед концом света будет глобальная война между крестоносцами и мусульманами. А после конца света начнется судный день. Чтобы быстрее попасть в рай, приблизить судный день нужна война, поэтому вот зачем строить халифат – это перевалочная база, тыл, который позволит тебе вести войну. Поэтому вместо того, чтобы провозгласить халифат (они не пошли в ООН не писали письма: «признайте нас пожалуйста»), они его использовали для того, чтобы расширить свою деятельность, войну за

пределами Ближнего востока и сразу начали атаковать Европу и другие страны. Они не исламисты, с ними можно договориться, а с этими нельзя договориться.

Ну успешной я бы не назвал. В чем мерить успех? Для них успех это приблизить конец свет, успех – всеобщий конец света. С этой точки зрения они не успешны. По уровню влияния? Да, они по сути самые влиятельные. Другие политические радикальные движения на них ориентируются, даже практики у них перенимают. Про другие критерии успешности я бы не говорил, для них успех подразумевает конец мира.

### Interview with Yigal Levin

**- В каких странах за пределами ближнего востока ИГ удерживает земли?**

Афганистан, Нигерия, Сомали. Удерживать территории это эфемерное понятие, потому что везде у них есть как минимум какое-нибудь село. В Сомали у них сёла, в Йемене тоже можешь найдёшь какое-нибудь село. Вопрос в масштабах. Именно большие территории удерживают в Афганистане и Нигерии. Удерживают территории на Синайском полуострове (это Египет). Опять же что такое удерживают территории. Официально они их не удерживают, но по факту контролируют. И такого много очень. Вот на Синайском полуострове формально египетские власти всё контролируют. И на карте ты это увидишь. Но есть места, где они фактически собирают налоги, шмонают машины и довольно спокойно себе разгуливают.

**- Это происходит постоянно, то есть реально в Египте есть места, где ИГИЛ собирает налог по факту?**

Да они много где собирают налог. Да хоть где-нибудь на Кавказе они собирают налог. И ИГИЛ – это такое массовое движение, они всюду. Нет такого чёрно-белого, где прям держат территорию, а где-то они сидят в подвале. Есть много таких серых зон. Например, Ирак, где их официально победили. И на карте их уже там нет, но они там казнят людей при свете дня, свободно ходят патрулируют, устраивают налёты, убивают иракских военных. Вот как это назвать? Контролируют территорию или нет? Но там, где прямо удерживали – Афганистан, Нигерия, Филиппины.

**- Когда был конфликт на Минданао, но с тех пор они удерживают?**

Так нет, они как в джунглях как были, так и сидят. Опять же, считаем ли мы дикие джунгли, в которых нет никакой инфраструктуры, территорией?

**- Почему так произошло? Почему стало возможным, что разрушилась в определенных местах центральная власть и территорию стала удерживать другая группа, которая появилась из ниоткуда? И именно сейчас.**

Они давно уже удерживают. Вообще это социальная политика. Они выступают защитниками мусульман и одновременно помогают им с социалкой. И они успешны там, где центральная власть обанкротилась. В Ираке почему халифат поднялся и несколько лет был, потому что там

был полный коллапс всего. А в Ираке с тех пор у власти шиитская группировка, но понятно, что среди суннитского населения не популярна.

**- Предпосылками ты назовёшь банкротство центральной власти и коллапс государственной системы?**

Некомпетентность центральной власти, коллапс социальных структур, и ИГ выступает как те, кто эти социальные структуры может вернуть. Они обеспечивают [это] людям. Скажем, если ИГИЛ пришёл в какой-то город, то они приходят не с автоматами, а они приходят и организуют социальный центр, где пробивают весь город. Так было в Ракке – столице Халифата. Они не пришли туда сразу с автоматами и не сказали вот сейчас устроим вам блабла. Устроили соц.центр, по исламу, а ислам это распространённая религия, она не запрещена, так что их никто не мог закрыть. Нельзя закрыть в суннитском мусульманском регионе исламский центр. Попутно приходят люди, они им помогают с проблемами и пробивают и узнают город: какое население в городе, какие проблемные, кто авторитетный, кто сильный. Попутно в тайниках копят оружие. Они выходят и занимают политический вакуум и люди их уже знают, так как они им помогали с социалкой. Что вот мы такие мусульмане и всё будет круто. Нехитрая стратегия, но требует нетипичной занудной длительной работы.

Большая часть денег – экспроприации, вымогательства, выкуп за кражу людей. Никто не спонсировал ИГИЛ, только ватники говорят что Америка им спонсирует. Саудовская их не спонсирует, им не выгодно, а в Катаре они принцев похищали.

Если посмотреть как ИГИЛ начинал, то у них был небольшой стартовый капитал, можно сказать секта из трёх анонимусов.

**- Какое отличие между ИГ группами между ближним востоком и остальных странах (Афганистан, Филиппины и т. д.)**

Нет большого отличия. Они создали свою субкультуру, а так как они интернационалисты по факту, то эта субкультура стала их доминирующим нарративом.

**- Какие тенденции в развитии групп ИГ за пределами Ближнего востока: что они усилиются, ослабляются, экспансия происходит, может они склонны перетекать в другие исламские группировки или отказываться от вооружённой борьбы?**

Группировки усиливаются, теракт на Шри-Ланке более 300 убитых. Чтобы так вальнуть, тебе надо тщательно спланировать людей и т.д. то есть надо уметь, грубо говоря, как бы это ни цинично звучало.

**-В чём привлекательность идеологии ИГ для жителей стран за пределами ближнего востока. Почему их к этому тянет?**

ИГ – две штуки:

1. Это идеальная группировка, чтобы мстить. Если ты в селе живешь, а тебя обидела власть, и пойти к ИГ и от их бренда противостоять тем, кто тебя обидел. Где популярен ислам.

2. Крутой узнаваемый бренд. Показательно: на Филиппинах чуваки которые присягнули к ИГ, были неизвестны. Все слышали про маоистов, но никто не слышал, что там есть исламские группировки.

Если бы они просто захватили город, то никто бы не узнал. А они захватили город Марави и присягнули ИГИЛ и весь мир о них заговорил. Все СМИ говорят.

**- Ты бы назвал исламизм самой успешной глобальной революционной идеологии?**

Я как анархист, левак, не считаю так. Для меня революция имеет четкий прогресс.

**- Ты не считаешь ИГИЛ революционерами?**

Есть концепция консервативной революции, я не считаю их революционерами. Их - повстанцами.

**- А если просто радикальной идеологией самой успешной**

Ну да, они самые бескомпромиссные, самые глубинные, которые куда-то идут последовательно. Они успешны в силу массовости, потому что их много ты слышишь только об удачах, о неудачах их не слышишь.