Pete Worley

In this article, I begin by saying something about what metacognition is and why it is desirable within education. I then outline how Plato anticipates this concept in his dialogue Meno. This is not just a historical point; by dividing the cognitive self into a three-in-one—a ‘learner’, a ‘teacher’ and an ‘evaluator’—Plato affords us a neat metaphorical framework for understanding metacognition that, I contend, is valuable today. In addition to aiding our understanding of this concept, Plato’s model of metacognition not only provides us with a practical, pedagogical method for developing a metacognitive attitude, but also for doing so through doing philosophy. I conclude by making a case for philosophy’s inclusion in our school systems by appeal to those aspects of philosophy (the conceptual, the self-consciousness and the epistemological) that are metacognitive or that are conducive to developing metacognition, as revealed by the insights afforded us by Plato’s Meno and Theaetetus.

In this paper, I identify a confusion that follows from how open and closed questions are ordinarily understood. I draw a distinction between two kinds of open and closed question: ‘grammatical’ open and closed questions and ‘conceptual' open and closed questions. I claim that this distinction resolves a confusion identified in the first part of this paper and I reply to anticipated, possible objections to the distinction. The second part of the paper describes a practical questioning strategy called ‘the question X’ that I have developed, making use of the distinction from the first part of the paper. The question X shows how the best of both closed-ended questioning and open-ended questioning can be combined in classroom questioning to maintain the focus and specificity of closed questioning while also maintaining the richness and invitation to say more of open questioning. In addition, the strategy of the question X also encourages the formulation of standard form thinking an...

Drawing on fifteen years of experience as a practitioner of doing philosophy in primary (ages 3-11) and secondary (ages 11-18) school classrooms, I will describe and attempt to justify (appealing to ownership and philosophical dialectic) two broad, over-arching principles, presence and absence: the extent to which a facilitator influences (presence) or deliberately refrains from influencing (absence) philosophical enquiry. While it is expected that the facilitator will and should be present in the discussion, this paper pays special attention to the extent to which a facilitator judges that presence appropriate. I revisit the notion of open and closed questions but, instead of considering the structural aspect (Worley 2015b), I address the psychological dimension of open and closed questioning, what I have called ‘Open Question Mindset’ (OQM) and its opposite ‘Closed Question Mindset’ (CQM). I consider two of the main ways in which teachers commonly demonstrate CQM: ‘Guess-what’s-in...

I begin with two beliefs about the value of P4/wC that are widely held in P4/wC practice: a) that P4/wC is good because there are no right and wrong answers and b) that P4/wC is good because it develops critical thinking/reasoning skills. I identify a problem that follows from the holding of these two beliefs: that, under one construal, if there are no right and wrong answers then there can be no possibility of criteria necessary for the development of proper, formal critical thinking, which is an evaluative and eliminative process. I explain how a working ‘weak’ definition of ‘critical thinking’ is insufficient and that a ‘stronger’ definition is needed. I provide such an understanding by appealing to a distinction between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ critique. My claim is that disagreement is not sufficient for critical thinking to be taking place in critical philosophy sessions, as this may be no more than the sharing of opinions or expressions of disapproval. What is needed is attention to the internal structure of arguments that have been offered during philosophical discussions.

Peter Worley (BA MA FRSA) will clarify some key differences between approaches to doing philosophy with children and briefly introduce his own work. He will also briefly answer the question 'can children do philosophy?' but will then turn to the question of whether philosophy at tertiary level can learn anything from philosophy at primary level. He will look at the presentation of information, the role of dialogue, assessment and teaching.

In this article, I begin by saying something about what metacognition is and why it is desirable within education. I then outline how Plato anticipates this concept in his dialogue Meno. This is not just a historical point; by dividing the cognitive self into a three-in-one – a ‘learner’, a ‘teacher’ and an ‘evaluator’ – Plato affords us a neat metaphorical framework for understanding metacognition that, I contend, is valuable today. In addition to aiding our understanding of this concept, Plato’s model of metacognition not only provides us with a practical, pedagogical method for developing a metacognitive attitude, but also for doing so through doing philosophy. I conclude by making a case for philosophy’s inclusion in our school systems by appeal to those aspects of philosophy (the conceptual, the self-consciousness and the epistemological) that are metacognitive or that are conducive to developing metacognition, as revealed by the insights afforded us by Plato’s Meno and Theaetetus.

A philosopher shares his insight into the responses of both students and teachers alike when basic philosophy is introduced into class to help them better understand one another. The listening teacher A teacher recently reported to me, when reflecting on the impact of the philosophy sessions I had run with her Year 3 class, that she had noticed how the children had started to answer questions differently. Before, they had replied with short answers, whereas now she'd noticed that they had begun to elaborate more. An important shift had happened, but not only in the children; the teacher had begun to inhabit a new mindset: she was listening and asking questions differently. The change in the children was simply the impact of a change in her. The first advice I will give to a teacher asking about how to foster good speaking and listening in a classroom is: speak well and listen well. I've named the mindset she made a shift towards open question mindset (OQM).

Drawing on fifteen years of experience as a practitioner of doing philosophy in primary (ages 3-11) and secondary (ages 11-18) school classrooms, I will describe and attempt to justify (appealing to ownership and philosophical dialectic) two broad, over-arching principles, presence and absence: the extent to which a facilitator influences (presence) or deliberately refrains from influencing (absence) philosophical enquiry. While it is expected that the facilitator will and should be present in the discussion, this paper pays special attention to the extent to which a facilitator judges that presence appropriate. I revisit the notion of open and closed questions but instead of considering the structural aspect (Worley 2015b) I address the psychological dimension of open and closed questioning, what I have called ‘Open Question Mindset’ (OQM) and its opposite ‘Closed Question Mindset’ (CQM). I consider two of the main ways in which teachers commonly demonstrate CQM: ‘Guess-what’s-in-my-head’-questioning and ‘Guess-what’s-in-your-head’-questioning/inferring. OQM, together with the notion of ‘intentional sensitivity’ – sensitivity to the student’s intentions rather than only to the surface-meaning or logical implications of their utterances – allows me to suggest ways in which one may practically meet the requirements of presence and absence. One particular aspect of facilitation that I consider, and recommend being mindful of, is paraphrasing or interpreting, especially with regard to hidden premises that it might be thought implied by things children say. I recommend consciously refraining from interpreting children’s contributions (absence), and instead working hard to elicit or ‘excavate’ (like an archeologist) children’s intentions and meanings through careful OQM questioning (presence).

Drawing on Socrates as an inspiration Peter Worley has developed some guided questioning techniques around the use of closed questions. He argues that, contrary to general opinion, closed questions are to be preferred to open questions in enquiry. He also explains how he has made use of conditional sentences and imaginary selves to help test ideas and generate critical dia-logue with classes of children, clients and ourselves. Where necessary, he provides an explanation of the rationale behind the principles he describes touching on what philosophy is how it should be practiced.

In this paper, I identify a confusion that follows from how open and closed questions are ordinarily understood. I draw a distinction between two kinds of open and closed question: ‘grammatical’ open and closed questions and ‘conceptual' open and closed questions. I claim that this distinction resolves a confusion identified in the first part of this paper and I reply to anticipated, possible objections to the distinction. The second part of the paper describes a practical questioning strategy called ‘the question X’ that I have developed, making use of the distinction from the first part of the paper. The question X shows how the best of both closed-ended questioning and open-ended questioning can be combined in classroom questioning to maintain the focus and specificity of closed questioning while also maintaining the richness and invitation to say more of open questioning. In addition, the strategy of the question X also encourages the formulation of standard form thinking and expression in those questioned.

In this paper, I will outline and analyse the famous demonstration with the slave boy in Plato's Meno dialogue. It is essential that Socrates be shown not to have told the slave boy the answer - the conclusion at 85b - and I will show this by a detailed analysis of the text, revealing that there are no disguised-answers at the crucial moments of the discussion. Next, I will show that Socrates shows a path towards the answer using a method I have called the ‘poria-method’. This is an active, collaborative process that tests candidate-answers with set problems, and then moves, stepwise, from what has been established to what has yet to be established by the introduction of salient concepts; leaving the student with an autonomous role of selection, connection and judgement (inference) so that he engages his understanding to search for the answer which he seeks to discover for himself. Socrates is a teacher only in as far as he provides the conditions for the process of the poria-method to take place. Socrates also employs a method of hypothesis with the boy to test candidate-answers where the boy learns to ‘entertain an idea without accepting it’ in order to move the inquiry forward. All this goes to show that Socrates does not give the answer and, given that we need to show that Socrates does not give the answer to prove the success of the demonstration, we can conclude that the demonstration proves that the slave boy (and the reader) can go from ignorance about the side of the 8-foot figure to, at least, true-belief about the side of the 8-foot figure. Through the demonstration, the slave boy is able to show that he has true-belief though he cannot account for it. But, finally, and perhaps most importantly, the demonstration has also furnished us with a critical method of learning that can be applied in many educational contexts and could play a crucial role in any attempt to gain knowledge, as much today as it did in Plato’s time.

Here is my updated list of Intellectual Virtues that I think embody the sort of thing we might ideally want to measure and evaluate in children doing philosophy. Ambitious, I know! However, I invite people to devise an assessment tool using this list (if not exhaustively). I have also included some of my reflections on this list at the end, identifying four candidate key 'umbrella virtues':

1) Intellectual willingness
2) Intellectual judiciousness
3) Intellectual sensitivity
4) Intellectual responsibility

Also of note is the placement of 'insight' and 'understanding' as overall aims rather than 'truth'.

I would love to know what you all think of this list and my reflections, all of which are provisional (open to criticism, revision or rejection). I have already acknowledged many colleagues who, in conversations with me, have in some way contributed to this list.

(This list first appeared in 40 lessons to get children thinking as an appendix, and when Tim Sprod referred to it in his review of the book for JPS it was only 26 long. I've been adding to it on-and-off ever since.)