Progress in Planning xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Progress in Planning
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/progress
Contesting the coast: Ecosystems as infrastructure in the Mississippi River
Delta
Joshua A. Lewisa,b, , Henrik Ernstsonc,d
⁎
a
Stockholm Resilience Centre, Stockholm University, SE-106 91 Sweden
The ByWater Institute, Tulane University, 6823 St. Charles Avenue, New Orleans, LA 70118, USA
c
KTH Environmental Humanities Laboratory, Division of History of Science, Technology and Environment, KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Teknikringen 74D-4tr, SE100 44 Stockholm, Sweden
d
Department of Geography, School of Environment, Education and Development, The University of Manchester, Manchester, M13 9PL, UK
b
A R T I C L E I N F O
A B S T R A C T
Keywords:
New Orleans
Deltaic landscapes
Environmental politics
Urban ecology
Expertise
We develop an analytical repertoire for understanding historical interrelationships between water infrastructure,
regional environmental politics, and large-scale coastal ecosystems. In doing so, we scrutinize how notions of
urban resilience, climate adaptation, and ecosystem-based infrastructure are influencing contemporary planning
practice. Our account from New Orleans and the Mississippi River Delta traces several large-scale hydrological
engineering projects with origins in the early 20th century, which aimed to restructure the landscape for more
effective maritime transportation, flood protection, and urban drainage. The account then turns to a discussion
of a massive and ongoing planning project, which aims to restore the historical dynamics of the Mississippi River
Delta, diverting the river into nearby coastal wetlands to provide storm protection for vulnerable communities,
most especially New Orleans. Our analysis shows how the development of water infrastructure systems in the
region produced cleavages in the region’s body politic and eco-hydrology, generating disputes that threaten to
slow or obstruct the plan’s implementation. The study shows how the forms and discourses of political contention in the present are deeply informed by past decisions regarding the placement, operation, and maintenance of water infrastructures in the region. The conflicts that emerge from these cleavages comprise the
primary obstacle facing ecosystem-based strategies aimed at securing New Orleans and other major settlements
in the region from storm surges. This raises fundamental challenges for planning practice, which are explored
here through a discussion of situational dissensus, conflicting rationalities, and pathways for democratic institutional innovation.
1. Introduction
Over the past decade, scholars and policymakers have focused on
coastal cities as the frontline for the impacts of rising seas and coastal
storms (Hallegatte, Green, Nicholls, & Corfee-Morlot, 2013). Sea level
rise projections have steadily increased over the same period, with
current estimates suggesting that a minimum one-meter rise in sea level
will likely occur during the 21st century (Giosan, 2014; Pachauri et al.,
2014). Concurrently, research on cities has grown considerably, as report after report heralds the arrival of the “Anthropocene,” the “urbanization of humanity,” and “planetary urbanization” as more people
move to cities and human activity acts as a powerful driver of atmospheric and geological processes (Brenner & Schmid, 2011; Crutzen,
2006; Steffen, Grinevald, Crutzen, & McNeill, 2011). Thus a particular
intersection of large-scale trends in human population, global sea level,
and political discourse is occurring: Firstly, humanity is increasingly
urban and coastal. Secondly, that same coastal terrain and population is
increasingly vulnerable to extreme events. Third, noted scientists have
declared a new ecological and political reality that acknowledges
human influence over planetary-scale processes, a moment some have
described metaphorically as the nailing of a “golden spike,” which
marks the passing of one geological epoch to the next.1 As this term
suggests, various forms of infrastructure are at the root of the human reshaping and dominance of the landscape, especially so in urban regions,
and especially along coastlines where water is both a vital asset and a
dynamic natural force.
Corresponding author at: 6823 St., Charles Avenue, 627 Lindy Boggs Center, New Orleans, LA 70118.
E-mail address: jlewis9@tulane.edu (J.A. Lewis).
Interesting for our purposes is that the original usage of the term “golden spike” has an origin in the construction of large-scale infrastructure. A golden spike was used to ceremonially
commemorate the completion of the transcontinental railway across the US frontier in 1869. The railroad and the golden spike signified Anglo-American dominance of the continent’s
landscapes and peoples. Thanks to Ashley Carse for pointing out this parallel.
⁎
1
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.progress.2017.10.003
Received 4 January 2016; Received in revised form 13 October 2017; Accepted 20 October 2017
0305-9006/ © 2017 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
Please cite this article as: Lewis, J.A., Progress in Planning (2017), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.progress.2017.10.003
Progress in Planning xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
J.A. Lewis, H. Ernstson
Urbanized coasts and deltas like those found in Louisiana are economically and ecologically dynamic spaces, which makes Louisiana an
intriguing and valuable case study to gain more general understanding
and contribute to a rapidly growing literature. With increasing intensity, coastal cities now discuss the impending effects of elevated seas
and swollen storm surges, with urban and environmental planners developing ideas around the role of flood protection infrastructure and
coastal ecosystems in buffering storm impacts (Ahern, 2007;
McGranahan, Balk, & Anderson, 2007). The risk is real and not so far
into the future. As Seto (2011) estimates, by 2050, global population
could grow by 2.7 billion people, mostly in small and medium sized
cities in Africa and Asia, with coastal and deltaic cities being a “preferred migration destination over other locations” (Seto (2011): 104).
Concurrently, and with direct effect in Louisiana, projections suggest
that unprotected coastal terrain less than two meters above sea level
could be inundated by 2100 (Giosan, 2014; Pachauri et al., 2014).
While many human settlements along coastlines will be forced to retrofit, modernize, or adapt flood protection systems, this is especially
true in river deltas, where naturally occurring and human induced soil
subsidence and coastal land loss are leaving low-lying settlements
dangerously exposed to tidal action and storm surges. A conventional
emphasis on structural barriers, levees, and floodgates is increasingly
seen by engineers, policymakers, and coastal citizens as only one
component of a more holistic approach to coastal resilience, as evidenced across various initiatives: in the Netherlands, with a focus on
“living with water;” in the Louisiana Coastal Master Plan (CPRA, 2007,
2012, 2017); New York City’s 2013 Special Initiative for Rebuilding and
Resiliency; and recent announcements of a national flood protection
strategy in Great Britain (Barbier, Georgiou, Enchelmeyer, & Reed,
2013; Spalding et al., 2014; Wamsley, Cialone, Smith, Atkinson, &
Rosati, 2010). Retrofitting or adapting existing water infrastructures, or
the creation of “hybrid” infrastructures has also been suggested as a
way to build and maintain protective wetland buffers around or within
cities (Spalding et al., 2014). This literature and related policy initiatives demonstrate that ecosystem-based infrastructure projects are
becoming more broadly articulated and adopted to address these
challenges − along with an important planning research agenda.
It is possible to appreciate the novelty and utility of hybrid and
ecosystem-based infrastructure, while not de-emphasizing the deeply
contested character of these coastal land and waterscapes. Our empirical account will show how the externalities of urbanization through
the building of infrastructural networks have come to extend into areas
beyond the city limits and into ecologically dynamic riverine and estuarine environments, unleashing deep-seated biophysical relations
that come back and haunt planners, animating contemporary conflicts.
In parallel we will develop an analytical approach for understanding
infrastructure, coastal ecosystems, and planning disputes as historically
intertwined. With this we hope to deepen ongoing discussions around
coastal planning, urban resilience, and climate change adaptation.
This is accomplished by historicizing a contemporary political
controversy stemming from an ambitious proposal to harness the land
building capacity of the Mississippi River to protect New Orleans and
coastal Louisiana from storm surges. While the science of re-engineering the Mississippi is oriented towards grappling with the future,
the politics of this initiative are very much grounded in the past. At the
core of the controversy lies the fact that over the last century the deltaic
plain has been cut-off from new sediment inputs and it is rapidly
eroding into the Gulf of Mexico (Blum & Roberts, 2009). This land loss
places millions
of people and trillions of dollars of infrastructure at heightened risk
from hurricane storm surges. The first major infrastructural asset at risk
is the Lower Mississippi River port complex, the largest port complex in
the western hemisphere by tonnage (AAPA, 2013). Secondly, the oil
and gas extraction, conveyance, and refining infrastructure in the region enables over 25% of US oil and gas production. Over 40% of US
refining capacity is situated along the region’s coastline (Batker et al.,
Meanwhile, a new conceptual language is beginning to permeate
research and planning initiatives along urbanized coasts − adaptation,
ecosystem-based, resilience, emergence, uncertainty. These terms reflect
the broader move in the environmental and social sciences towards
complex systems-oriented approaches that stress non-linear change,
scalar relationships, and linked social-ecological processes (Adger,
Hughes, Folke, Carpenter, & Rockström, 2005; Ernstson, Barthel,
Andersson, & Borgström, 2010; Folke, 2006). This represents a turn
from approaches that have typically emphasized engineering, equilibrium, and command and control (Holling & Meffe, 1996). For example, emerging approaches to water planning for coastal cities emphasize blending traditional water infrastructure with “ecosystembased” strategies that strives to mobilize the ‘natural’ capacities of
coastal ecosystems to mitigate the impacts of sea-level rise and coastal
flooding. Reading across the coastal ecosystems initiatives of The
Netherlands, UK, New York and Louisiana, a common feature is that
they draw upon “resilience thinking” (Folke, Hahn, Olsson, & Norberg,
2005). This follows a more general policy trend (Evans, 2011), where
resilience works as a master narrative to organize other scientific information in order to describe the urgent need for coastal cities to invest
in adaptive capacity, ecological restoration and environmental management to enhance their capacity to recover and live with climatedriven uncertainty. Large private and state funds have brought together
‘ecosystem-based infrastructure’ with ‘resiliency’ expertise. Beginning
in 2013, the Rockefeller Foundation’s “100 Resilient Cities” initiative
has worked to embed resilience discourse in urban governance in cities
worldwide. A partnership between the US Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD) and the Rockefeller Foundation recently
provided $1 billion to US communities to develop resilience strategies.
In describing their partnership with HUD, Rockefeller’s president
claimed that “[b]uilding resilience will minimize the impact of the next
shock, while also improving life in communities day-to-day, allowing
them to yield a resilience dividend. Everyone wins."2 But suggestions
that ‘everyone wins’ in the implementation of large-scale infrastructure
projects, “ecological” or otherwise, neglects the deep historical divisions, stubborn infrastructural embeddedness, ecological surprises, and
territorial conflicts that permeate these initiatives.
Where state agencies and philanthropists see “urban resilience”
strategies with inclusive benefits, Hodson and Marvin (2010) view
these developments as a push for “urban ecological security.” They
describe a move in urban governance towards policies they characterize
as “secure urbanism and resilient infrastructure,” and suggest that
urban resilience can be seen as an increasingly elite-driven governance
strategy in which infrastructure and ecosystems are aligned with strategies of capital accumulation. This observation gives rise to concerns
that urban resilience, if enacted narrowly as an accumulation strategy
and spatially exclusionary planning tool, could in fact reproduce and
entrench economic inequality and produce “new peripheries constructed by enclosure” (p. 210). This perspective resonates with the
work of Adger (2003) and Adger et al. (2005) and Nelson, Adger, and
Brown (2007) who warn that “many present strategies for adaptation
reduce the vulnerability of those most able to mobilize collective action
and those with greatest access to decision making. Most adaptation, in
other words, does not necessarily reduce the vulnerability of those most
at risk.” This paper uses historical analysis to examine the roots of these
contradictions in coastal Louisiana. More specifically the article traces
the historical transformation of an estuary on the periphery of New
Orleans, Louisiana along the US Gulf Coast. In parallel we use this case
study to develop an alternative theoretical framework to understand
the predicament of coastal urban regions in the wake of large-scale
biophysical changes.
2
“HUD Launches $1 Billion National Disaster Resilience Competition” Rockefeller
Foundation Press Release. Available from: http://www.rockefellerfoundation.org/
newsroom/hud-launches-1-billion-national. Accessed December 13, 2014.
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Fig. 1. USGS map showing historical and projected
land loss in Louisiana, 1932–2050. Note the position
of Lake Borgne, a key location in this account, and its
surrounding wetlands, and degree of land loss.
prioritize urban flood protection over that of coastal communities, and
actually accelerate, not slow, coastal land loss. Competing claims on
expertise and scientific understanding are also at work, with certain
coastal geologists skeptical that river diversions will have any substantial positive impact, while others see diversions as the region’s key
to survival. With public pressure to ‘fix the coast’ at an all time high
following several catastrophic disasters, newly organized planning authorities within the state of Louisiana have sought to reimagine the
Mississippi River Delta as a vast system to be centrally managed
through water infrastructure and state institutions. Planners consequently present coastal wetlands built by the Mississippi River as a
degraded natural system that must be restored to its historical functionality. This ecological view of the delta is historical in its grasp of the
physical development of the delta’s land forms, but historical geometries of social power implicated in prior modifications to natural processes are typically left outside discussions around the region’s future.
This recognition by state planners that the delta is in rapid decline
and that critical infrastructure and major cities are increasingly at risk,
has heralded, we mean, a new enthusiasm by elite interests to assert
new (and as we will see quite old) forms of territorial governance in the
urban periphery. In this journal, Marshall (2014) productively discussed how “spatial imaginaries” of territory are part and parcel of the
politics of infrastructure provision, and so-called “big planning.”
Marshall, drawing upon Massey (2005), points out that any given
“spatiality,” can be viewed not as an a priori or given territory, but as
an emergent geography constructed through uneven geometries of social power and a particular set of spatial or territorial logics and imaginaries. In this regard, New Orleans and the Mississippi Delta present
an intriguing environment to scrutinize the advent of “ecosystem-based
infrastructure” in the coastal zone, and historicize the existing infrastructures and the uneven socioecological relations that such initiatives
strive to transform.
Our case study then contributes a careful tracing of the origins of a
contemporary controversy through the establishment of infrastructure
projects in the early 20th century. The study shows how the forms and
discourses of political contention in the present are deeply informed by
past decisions regarding the placement, operation, and maintenance of
large-scale water infrastructures in the region. The benefits and hazards
associated with these canals, pumps, gates, and levees have been unevenly distributed, and the current opposition to river diversions has
emerged within the community impacted most negatively by these initiatives. As we will describe, this historical process can be viewed as
2014). The New Orleans metropolitan area has over a million people
that live on the Mississippi River’s alluvial plain. The Mississippi River
Delta has lost 1900 square miles (c. 4900 km2) of land over the past
century, with another 700 square miles (c. 1800 km2) expected to disappear over the next 35 years (Day et al., 2014). A series of intense
hurricanes beginning with Katrina in 2005 have accelerated this land
loss process, caused billions of dollars in property damage, disrupted
global flows of petroleum, coal, and grain, and killed almost 2000
people in the Mississippi Delta. The 2010 British Petroleum oil disaster
in the Gulf of Mexico brought further ecological and economic impacts
to the region, particularly for coastal fishing communities (Austin et al.,
2014; Sumaila et al., 2012; Upton, 2011). Recently, state officials have
even conceded that while major infrastructural interventions and land
building projects may slow overall land loss, the Mississippi Delta will
shrink substantially over the next century even under a best case scenario for sea level rise and prompt project implementation (CPRA,
2017).
With land loss in coastal Louisiana at a critical stage (Fig. 1), and the
viability of the region’s major cities under scrutiny by observers, the
State of Louisiana and the US Government are currently developing a
long-term plan to re-engineer the delta’s hydrology, in part through the
re-introduction of freshwater and sediment into the delta’s estuaries
through the construction of diversion control structures along the banks
of the Mississippi River (Fig. 2 displays The 2012 Coastal Master plan).
The fines and legal settlements associated with the 2010 BP oil disaster
are bringing billions of dollars in funding to Louisiana to begin implementing these projects, an unexpected windfall for the initiative.
While some features of this plan (dredge and fill, shoreline protection,
oyster reef construction) enjoy broad support from the region’s residents, the implementation of river diversions has emerged as the
major political sticking point. Many coastal scientists and engineers
claim that the entire plan to prevent the delta from sinking into oblivion
depends chiefly on the construction of large-scale river diversions. As
the chairman on the state’s Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority (CPRA) recently remarked, “In the next 10 years, we will likely
determine the footprint of the state of Louisiana… You’ve got to take a
step back and really look and think big picture: Which areas can be
saved and should be saved?” (Jacobs, 2015).
An organized opposition to so-called ‘river diversions’ has developed as state planners move forward with designs and identify funding
mechanisms. Opponents have cast diversions as potentially devastating
infrastructural interventions that will ruin productive fisheries,
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Fig. 2. Southeastern section of the 2012 Louisiana Coastal Master Plan. The brown shaded areas indicate areas slated to receive freshwater and sediments via river diversions.
Source: CPRA (2012).
The article proceeds as follows. In the following section we provide
an overview of the conceptual framework developed through the article. Section 3 presents the historical account, which shows how infrastructural networks associated with urban drainage, flood protection, and maritime transportation have transformed New Orleans’
eastern periphery over the 20th century. Section 4 demonstrates how
river diversion infrastructure has been put forward as a way to resolve
the ecological contradictions laid bare by the ecological transformations wrought by 20th century water infrastructure, and traces the
emergence of opposition to river diversions in neighboring St. Bernard
Parish. We conclude in Section 5 with a discussion of the theoretical
themes of the article and make policy recommendations regarding the
planning process for river diversions and coastal resilience planning at
large. Section 6 concludes the paper.
one in which the urban center of New Orleans and its associated agglomerations of financial capital, institutional capacity, and political
power, has sought to rework its periphery to secure its economic position and enroll peripheral ecologies into the infrastructure of urban
drainage, flood protection, and maritime transportation. As sea-level
rise projections continue to alarm coastal communities globally, the
politics around river diversions in Louisiana reveal important insights
into potential impediments and politics of large-scale coastal infrastructure planning.
Through working with this case study, we have come to develop a
framework around the core heuristics of infrastructural zones, ecological
regimes, and socioecological cleavages. This framework aims to situate the
contemporary politics around river diversions within a longer historical
and broader geographical context. The account then draws upon archival research, in-depth interviews, focus groups, GIS analysis, and
participant observation to account for the development of the adversarial state of affairs surrounding the region’s resilience strategies. If
New Orleans and the Mississippi River Delta are to endure as population centers into next century, the Mississippi’s alluvial plain must
undergo profound hydrological and morphological transformations.
Just political processes, and just outcomes for those communities most
at risk and most impacted by the adaptation of the delta’s footprint are
critical (though woefully underemphasized) aspects of the coastal restoration initiative at large.
2. Theoretical framework
Grasping socio-political, technological, and ecological processes in
tandem, over long time scales, is a complex conceptual undertaking.
The theoretical framework developed here attempts to build understanding of contemporary political disputes by elucidating how infrastructure, ecosystems, and politics are historically co-produced. The
following section outlines how drainage systems and shipping canals
comprise infrastructural zones intended to predictably convey various
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restoration or infrastructure strategies might be.
The distinction between ‘landscapes’ and ‘infrastructures’ is increasingly blurry, especially along coastlines and waterways. Ashley
Carse’s analysis of the Panama Canal provides for us an important
analysis of how infrastructures that “jostle for territory” to secure infrastructural zones, also “produce environments” (Carse, 2012; Carse
2014:14). The Panama Canal locks place high demands on surface and
subsurface freshwater flows in the canal’s vicinity as they are needed to
continuously re-fill the canal with water to convey global maritime
traffic. The surrounding waterscape is thus critical to the canal’s basic
functionality. This requires the disciplining of the wider landscape—and its residents. While Panama Canal authorities strive to
maximize freshwater storage by reforesting the slopes around the waterway, at times this conflicts with local agricultural practices and rural
development programs. Due to its centrality in global trade, the technical standards used in the Panama Canal are subsequently applied in
distant waterways and ports that seek to participate in the global infrastructural zone anchored by the Panama Canal, which in turn generates further ‘local’ conflicts in other locations (Carse & Lewis, 2017;
Ramos, 2014). The notion of infrastructural zones helps to interpret our
empirical material in terms of the territorial, spatial, and environmental
aspects of infrastructure projects, how they actively produce landscapes, and how ‘local’ conflicts are connected across vast geographies
(Bowker & Star, 1999; Carse, 2012, 2014; Edwards, 2010; Star &
Ruhleder, 1996). The Panama Canal example reveals how infrastructural zones enroll territories to facilitate certain forms of mobility
and connectivity, while foreclosing upon others.
flows of waste, water, and commodities across geographic variation.
These zones fragment urban space and generate peripheries while simultaneously facilitating particular forms of global connection.
Altering ecological relations through infrastructure can trigger profound environmental transformations we refer to as ecological regime
shifts. In our case, regime shifts have undermined flood protection
systems and altered previous natural resource-based livelihoods to restructure social interests. Over time, these cascading effects have coalesced into what we view as socioecological cleavages, persistent partitions in hydro-ecological systems and human communities with serious
political implications in the present. When urban interests—from engineers, town planners to port administrators and environmentalists—seek to reorganize the urban periphery to improve
flood protection and cope with climate change they are met by resistance from groups whose interests have become entangled and
shaped by ecological regime shifts. Despite the dire circumstances and
rational political arguments for further infrastructural interventions in
the periphery, planners and decision-makers are faced by situational
dissensus − political opposition emerging out of historically place-based
dynamics that are difficult to address through deliberative planning and
collaborative governance. In the following section we introduce this
conceptual sequence in greater detail, before turning to the swamps,
infrastructures, and controversies brewing in coastal Louisiana.
2.1. Infrastructural zones
Infrastructural zones are assemblages linked through technical standards, intended to generate “comparable results in disparate domains”
(Barry, 2006: 11). Water infrastructure facilitates both place-based environmental transformations and also movement and communication
across distance (Carse, 2012, 2014; Carse & Lewis, 2017). This means
that the pipes and canals that crisscross the Mississippi Delta are not only
from ‘here’, but are made manifest through wider circuits of political
patronage, scientific expertise and technical standards from a multitude
of ‘elsewheres.’ These are the geographies that emerge as places are simultaneously connected, disconnected, and transformed by urbanization
and globalization (Barry, 2006). Our paper examines four such infrastructural zones – clusters of technology and expertise assembled to: 1)
drain flood-prone terrain for urbanization; 2) provide structural protection to communities against flooding; 3) facilitate maritime transportation and connect the delta to global trade pathways; and 4) adapt the
delta’s hydromorphology to protect human settlements from the conjoined effects of sea level rise and storm surges.
As these infrastructural interventions overlap and become part of
ecological relations, they generate path dependencies in ecosystems and
shape dynamics of political contention around water resources. This
observation undergirds our call to examine infrastructural politics historically. The technical standards and spatial topologies of infrastructural
zones are typically fixed within short historical windows wherein scientific experts are called upon by various parties to make claims about
the economic impact, engineering assumptions, and environmental risks
associated with constructing, modernizing, or scaling them back. In our
account we view these windows as critical junctures in the development
of the ecological relations, socio-material flows, and patterns of human
settlement that comprise cities and their peripheries. Decisions at one
juncture can “return” much later (ecosystem collapse, technical failure,
political claims of historical injustice), haunting managers and engineers
with complex problems decades and in some cases, centuries later. These
critical junctures influence the establishment of infrastructural zones that
in turn produce environments that shape deltaic settlement patterns and
the landscape of risk in the region. Moreover, in a dynamic geophysical
setting like the Mississippi River delta, coastal planning policy in the 21st
century is circumscribed by earlier enactments of the landscape. Finding
a large deposit of sand, or an ancient cypress stump in the delta’s soils
can tell you a great deal about how water moved in the landscape in the
deep past, which can provide insights into how effective certain
2.2. Ecological regime shifts
As a material technology that mediates flow, water infrastructure becomes part of the ecosystems in which it intervenes—and over time,
ecosystems might reorganize around the material parameters established
by the infrastructure itself.3 When these changes are severe in how ecosystems operate and function, non-equilibrium ecologists have since the
end of the 1960s (Holling, 1973; Lewontin, 1969) theorized these as
ecological regimes shifts, with a recent rapid proliferation of studies (Lade
et al., 2015; Scheffer & Carpenter, 2003; Scheffer et al., 2009; Walker &
Meyers, 2004). Rocha, Yletyinen, Biggs, Blenckner, and Peterson (2015)
found that regime shifts are especially common in coastal ecosystems, the
“most highly threatened and productive [eco]systems in the world”, and
identified anthropogenic factors as drivers of regime shifts, including “loss
of habitat due to urbanization, human population growth, infrastructure
development, increasing sewage and pollution, declining water quality
and increasing disease risk” (Rocha et al., 2015: 9).
While early studies developed historical understandings of ecological regimes shifts, as in studies of the Florida Everglades (e.g.,
Scheffer & Carpenter, 2003), later studies have relied, sometimes in
problematic ways, on reified and simplifying models, alongside a-historical and moral statements of shifts from “desirable” to “degraded”
ecological “states.”4 Here we stress the necessity of an historical (and
3
We use ‘ecological systems’ or ‘ecosystems’ in this paper as shorthand for material and
geochemical relations that have become stable and ‘systemic’ over time, i.e., produced
and reproduced through mutually reinforcing relations. While the commonplace use of
the word ‘ecosystem’ often refers to a bounded unit or object with clear conceptual and
geographical boundaries, for instance as in “the lake ecosystem”, “the coral reef ecosystem”, or “the forest ecosystem”, we are not making such claims of clear boundaries
when using the word.
4
Ecological regime shifts signify abrupt changes in ecosystems due to historical and
complex interactions among social and ecological factors. The now basic definition states
that ecological regime shifts happen when key biophysical variables pass a “critical
threshold,” for instance through increased nutrients, pollution or salt content in soils or
water, followed by a sudden event, say a drought or flooding. This could trigger a reorganization, either into a comparable relational configuration, thus demonstrating
ecosystem resilience, or shift into a new ecological regime with different mutually reinforcing structures and processes, referred to as an “alternative stable state.” (For more
on this, see e.g., Möllmann, Folke, Edwards, & Conversi, 2015; Rocha et al., 2015)
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center. The cultural repertoires at the disposal of peripheral communities can appear regressive, quaint, or ignorant by elites in the center,
who see the modernization of peripheral territories as important aspects of urban territorial governance (Zarycki, 2007). Our case study
contributes much more attention to how ecological dynamics—mediated through infrastructure and infrastructural zones—shape social
differences and identities across wider landscapes in a development of
Massey’s (2004: 5) notion that “[i]dentities are forged in and through
relations [and] are not rooted or static, but mutable ongoing productions.” Taking in these socioecological cleavages and their production
of conflicting rationalities poses critical challenges for the implementation of ecosystem-based infrastructures that seek to rework
urban peripheries.
The operation and management of large infrastructural systems is a
key point of contention in these sorts of center-periphery conflicts along
urbanized coastlines. Indeed, the historical processes of infrastructure
provision, and the connections, enclosures, and disconnections this
entails, are generative of the ecological discontinuities and political
cleavages that mark the landscapes and polities of urban regions. The
relations between urban and coastal communities in Louisiana show
how contemporary ecosystem-based resilience strategies are faced negotiating across linguistic, cultural, and territorial cleavages that fracture urban regions. These cleavages, wrought through the establishment of infrastructure networks, are generative of complex political
controversies that challenge both the analysis of politics and defy the
tidy descriptions and prescriptions of systems-based approaches to
planning.
thus social and political) ecological approach to understand regime
shifts and their path-dependencies, which more closely follows original
developments of non-equilibrium ecology by Lewontin (1969; Lewontin
(1969; cf. Lewontin and Levins 1985). To this we add that the standardization of water infrastructure opens a window to understand
historically why a restructuration of socioecological processes occurs
over time. Indeed, infrastructure embodies relations to water, sand, and
soil to unmake some relations, while producing new ones. Certain water
infrastructures also transform relations amongst humans, animals, pathogens, vegetation, the bio- litho- and atmosphere. Infrastructures thus
persist, just as technical standards do, over long time periods becoming
socially and ecologically embedded. As we will account for, these
processes generate unexpected effects that challenge traditional notions
of “degradation” and “restoration.”
This dynamic is at work in coastal Louisiana. Flood protection systems prevent the Mississippi’s freshwater and sediments from replenishing its deltaic plain. Subsequently, coastal land loss has accelerated and marine ecosystems have encroached inland. Perhaps
counter intuitively however, deteriorating marshlands happen to be
ideal habitat for several commercially important marine species. This
new ecological regime, rendered real through infrastructure, has produced lucrative commercial and recreational fisheries, but lacks the
capacity to substantially absorb storm surges (Saltus, Suir, & Barras,
2012). Once these new ecological trajectories emerged, people and
institutions were faced with resource intensive efforts to restore previous ecological regimes (sometimes impossible), invest in adaptation
measures that exploit the emergent ecological regime, or take measures
to produce an alternate ecological configuration. Over time, new economic, technological, and cultural dependencies have developed
around emergent ecological regimes. This has generated political constituencies that are committed to maintaining the new status quo, also
observed elsewhere (Holling & Meffe, 1996). What is “degraded,” “restored” or “desirable” is an open and frequently contested matter, and
controversies over which ecological regimes are appropriate and which
‘ecosystem services’ should be prioritized are subject to power-laden
deliberations and conflicts (Ernstson, 2013), which we will attend to.
Decisions made at critical junctures regarding the territorial scope,
hydrological connectivity, and techno-environmental standards of infrastructural zones shape the subsequent development of regional
ecological systems. The territorial scope of ecological regime shifts can
far exceed the infrastructure’s physical footprint, especially when water
is involved. A control structure at one bend in a river can shape landscape configurations hundreds of kilometers away. The power of such
structures to drive ecological outcomes and organize the landscape in
the interest of certain social actors means that these structures carry
politics that extend from the homes in the shadow of a floodwall in New
Orleans to the global circuits of capital and commodities coursing
through the Panama Canal, and beyond.
2.4. Situational dissensus and knowledge controversies
Socioecological cleavages create a real challenge for mainstream
planning, which often strives to forge consensus in a situation where
deep disagreements prevail. A more productive starting point is to account for, and perhaps make room in planning for, what we refer to as
situational dissensus, i.e., a place-based situation where social groups
express deep disagreements shaped by historical socioenvironmental
trajectories.5 This situation requires, we mean, alternative modes of
analysis and planning.
Empirically we can analyze situational dissensus as knowledge
controversies. When large-scale infrastructure intersects with dynamic
ecosystems the consequence is that nobody can truly be ‘in the know’.
This leads to disputes over facts and competency and opens a window
to do empirical analysis. We draw upon constructionist and sociomaterialist studies of knowledge claims in contested urban landscapes
(Erixon Aalto & Ernstson, 2017; Ernstson & Sörlin, 2009, 2013;
Ernstson, 2013) to account for the articulation of a counter-narrative
over how to best intervene in the coastal ecosystems of Louisiana. As
the counter-narrative grew from 2010 (with roots going back a century), a knowledge controversy that had existed among established
experts around assumptions, costs and risks, was forced out of closed
boardrooms and became public. This created an “intense public interrogation [over what] we think we know or, more usually, what ‘experts’
claim to know” (Whatmore, 2009: 587) as a result from the controversy. Our approach, to squarely focus on how dissensus emerges
through historical processes (rather than starting from a position of
seeking out ‘rational interests’ or ‘stakeholders’), calls into question
prevailing planning paradigms. The silver-lining is that while controversies are often viewed negatively, they can be generative in undermining regimes of sense-making to redistribute expertise and open
2.3. Socioecological cleavages
Just as ecological regimes can over time become organized around
the standards and materiality of pipes and canals, social processes and
local politics can be shaped by the spatial configuration of infrastructure networks and environmental management practices. The political processes involved in achieving ecological projects in the urban
periphery are embedded in historical patterns of political power. These
relations can exhibit spatial and social cleavages between the urban
core and polities in peripheral communities.
Political scientists have explored the tensions between centers and
peripheries extensively. The work of Stein Rokkan (Lipset & Rokkan,
1967) is exemplary in this case. Rokkan analyzed how centers like cities
and national capitals tended to be politically dominant and able to
mobilize the architecture of the state to subordinate their peripheries
and regions. Peripheries often resist these attempts at subordination
and work to frame their interests outside of the dominant logic of the
5
In particular we draw upon Watson’s (2003) discussion in planning theory of “conflicting rationalities” (via Foucault), and how Rancière (2010) has conceptualized dissensus as tightly wedded to democracy as the rule by equals. We discuss this further under
Section 5 where we elaborate “situational dissensus” in relation to Whatmore’s (2009)
careful studies of knowledge controversies (as inspired by Isabelle Stengers and Gilles
Deleuze).
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Fig. 3. Historical lobes of the Mississippi River Delta.
The lobe in pink to the east of New Orleans is the St.
Bernard Delta, which is currently degrading and
subsiding, placing communities at risk of flooding
while simultaneously generating productive fisheries. The St. Bernard Delta is a focal area of this
study.
landscape that involves major excavation or drainage, necessarily encounters not only the contemporary land cover pattern – but also millennia of deltaic dynamics that lie, materially real and vital, just beneath the surface. While many infrastructure interventions are designed
to modify flows of surface water, engineers and managers constantly
encounter the subterranean delta environment. In this sense, to carry
out large-scale infrastructure interventions in these watery environments will necessarily connect and disconnect space and (deep) time to
generate unpredictable effects in the present. Large-scale water infrastructures connect and disconnect both space and time. Geographers
and other relational thinkers have described both time and space as
“folded” or “pleated” − in that spatial relations are not necessarily
based upon proximity, but are woven together through specific network
relations that might be intimately connected but spatially distant
(DeLanda, 2000; Murdoch, 2006). As we will see this produces a
daunting task for planning.
for new forms of knowledge construction to shape planning (cf.
Whatmore, 2009). For planning theory, our case study provides openings for rethinking planning in the context of large-scale ecosystem
intervention.
In the following sections we turn to our empirical case study. We
outline how drainage systems and shipping canals comprised infrastructural zones intended to predictably convey various flows of waste,
water, and commodities across geographic variation. These zones
fragmented urban space and generated peripheries while they simultaneously facilitated particular forms of global connection.
However, to alter ecological relations through infrastructure can trigger
profound environmental transformations to produce ecological regime
shifts. In our case, regime shifts undermined flood protection systems
and altered previous natural resource-based livelihoods, re-structuring
social interests. Over time, these cascading effects coalesced into socioecological cleavages, whereby partitions in hydro-ecological systems
and human communities impacted upon political and planning processes creating a situational dissensus. The final section narrates the
politics within such a cleavage centering on the articulation of counterexpertise through collective action.
3.1. Historical dynamics of the Mississippi River Delta
The Mississippi’s immense drainage basin, the fourth largest on
earth, drains two thirds of the continental United States. The Mississippi
River Delta is a river/fluvial-dominated delta that produces vast and
changing lobes of land. This gives the delta its iconic “bird’s foot” that
extends into the ocean and distinguishes it from wave or tidal dominated deltas like the Nile and Ganges–Brahmaputra Deltas. The
Mississippi and its suspended sediments produced the entire landscape
of South Louisiana over the last 6000 years (Fig. 3). The Mississippi
Delta is comprised of a few major distributary channels that have carried the main flow of the river during different episodes of lobe formation over the past 7000 years. Hundreds of slow moving streams
called bayous, some of which are former distributaries of the Mississippi, crisscross the delta. As delta lobes reach further into the Gulf
over hundreds of years, a critical threshold called an avulsion typically
occurs (usually triggered by a major flooding event). A major avulsion
can shift the river’s main course towards a shorter route and steeper
gradient to reach the sea (Slingerland & Smith, 2004). Deprived of new
inputs of freshwater and sediments, the abandoned delta lobes begin to
slowly compact, subside, and erode as they are exposed to wave action
3. Infrastructural zones and ecological change in the Mississippi
River Delta
The long passage of time during which the vast Mississippi River
Delta was formed plays a role in our historical account. As will become
clear, time is not linear here; what happened a very long time ago can
have an effect in the present. Standing in a vast saltmarsh, with no trees
in sight, one might dig down a few meters and discover two thousand
year-old stumps of the Bald cypress (Taxodium distichum), leftovers
from previous versions of the deltaic environment when riverine and
freshwater forces predominated. The inverse could also be true. A dense
coastal forest might be growing atop a saline marshland buried by
riverine sediments. Water moves not only across the surface of the
delta, but invisibly through soil layers and organic materials. The dynamics of these underground flows are only now becoming better understood (Breaux et al., 2013; Kolker, Cable, Johannesson, Allison, &
Inniss, 2013). In this way, any structural intervention in the deltaic
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Fig. 4. Abandoned distributaries of the Mississippi
River, Bayou Bienvenue, and Lake Borgne. The study
area lies between the two abandoned distributaries
and the Mississippi’s active distributary, which flows
through New Orleans. Base imagery 2005, NASA
Landsat 5tm.
troublesome, spurring engineers to build increasingly complex layers of
infrastructural zones meant to control the flows of water into and out of
the basin. The policies and material practices guiding the construction
and maintenance of these projects have been contested by nearby
communities for over a century, giving rise to a popular skepticism
towards water infrastructure planning emanating from state authorities. The following section documents this process in greater detail.
and tidal surges – a process referred to as saltwater intrusion, or marine
transgression.
The interplay of riverine and marine forces generates a spectrum of
water salinity that subsequently drives habitat diversity. The ridgelines
and “natural levees” that line the river’s main course and its abandoned
distributaries might be covered with southern live oak and other
hardwoods, and the soils in these locations are relatively stable and
well-drained. Before the advent of modern municipal drainage, human
settlement was almost exclusively concentrated on these “natural levees” and abandoned distributary ridges (Campanella, 2006; Colten,
2006).
However, our interest lies in the swampy depressions in between
these ridgelines, which are referred to as interdistributary basins or embayments. The soils in these basins and estuaries are comprised primarily of wet clays and layers of swamp and marsh deposits left over
from earlier manifestations of the deltaic system − when the area was
receiving abundant flows of freshwater and fine silt particles in the
form of suspended sediment carried from distant elsewheres of the
North American continent. Where freshwater and riverine forces
structure these interdistributary basins, coastal forests dominated by
bald cypress (Taxodium distichum) and other aquatic trees are common.
As tidal influence becomes stronger, trees give way to a range of fresh,
brackish, and saline marsh grasses, submerged seagrasses, and floating
marshplants. These tidal estuaries, with their salinity driven biodiversity, are important nurseries for marine species, provide habitat for a
rich diversity of migratory birdlife, and have historically produced incredibly abundant harvests eastern oyster (Crassostrea virginica) and
brown shrimp (Farfantepenaeus aztecus).
The particular interdistributary basin profiled here is a circa
600 km2 estuary that lies between downtown New Orleans and Lake
Borgne, an area we will alternately refer to as the “Bienvenue Basin”
and the “Lake Borgne Estuary.” This area is displayed in Fig. 4. Bayou
Bienvenue, a slow-moving tidal creek, is the primary drainage feature
of the basin, snaking its way along a fresh-saline water gradient. Many
billions of dollars have been invested in the basin in the form of water
infrastructure over the last century. These canals, levees, floodwalls,
pumps, siphons, and river diversions have typically proved
3.2. Contesting infrastructural zones: pumps, siphons and ships
During the early 20th century a major controversy developed
around the establishment of infrastructural zones in the delta. Here we
trace this controversy between several engineering agencies, the Port of
New Orleans, and peripheral communities (Table 1). This dispute
centered on the establishment of two different, and at times competing
infrastructural zones. One aimed to change the landscape to promote
global maritime trade. The other focused on providing urban sanitation,
improving public health, and creating opportunities for urban expasion.
Both were jostling to appropriate ecosystems through their respective
infrastructures and technologies. The engineers of each viewed the
city’s eastern periphery as a multi-functional landscape deemed capable
of producing benefits, profits—and public services for the city, without
taking much notice of peripheral settlements. Indeed, less visible was
how the politics around the establishment of infrastructural zones in the
Lake Borgne estuary came to reflect and reproduce long-standing distributions of social power and territorial control in the region. Indeed,
our first section illustrates how infrastructural investments can generate
not only disputes over planning power, but also trigger abrupt ecological shifts – sometimes irreversible sequences of environmental change
felt by residents and later re-surfacing as politicized narratives of injustice.
The Bienvenue Basin in the city’s eastern periphery forms a good
starting point to illustrate these competing infrastructural zones of
public health/sanitation and maritime transportation. The former involves New Orleans drainage engineers’ implementation of a modern
municipal drainage system between 1900 and 1920. This promised to
expand the city’s footprint by draining groundwater from swamplands
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Table 1
Key institutional actors in coastal planning and infrastructure management in coastal Louisiana.
Institution
Scope of Authority
Infrastructures of Concern
US Army Corps of Engineers ‘Army Corps’
1800-Present
US Federal Agency. Largest water manager in the US.
Manages all major rivers and coastal ecosystems. Developer
and regulator.
Municipal agency. Manages the drainage, sewer, and
drinking water system of New Orleans.
State of Louisiana agency. Land use and water planning
authority throughout metropolitan region.
NGO, coalition of fishing communities, local officials,
seafood industry, scientists.
NGO, coalition of environmental organizations and
scientists.
Louisiana state agency tasked with coastal planning and
restoration.
All large scale navigation, flood protection, and drainage systems in
the region. Restoration projects, river diversions, etc. Premier water
planning agency.
The New Orleans urban drainage system, pumping stations, sewers,
canals.
Vast port facilities, navigation canals, railroad tie-ins, the Mississippi’s
channel.
Potential river diversions, river dredging.
New Orleans Sewerage & Water Board
‘S&WB’ 1900-Present
The Port of New Orleans 1718-Present
Save Louisiana Coalition ‘SLC’ 2012present
Restore the Delta Coalition 1980-present
Louisiana Coastal Protection and
Restoration Authority ‘CPRA’ 2005present
Focus broadly on ‘restoration’ projects, especially river diversions.
Hundreds of coastal “restoration” projects involving shoreline
protection, dredging, etc.
implementation in the Lake Borgne estuary—were intended to produce
better living conditions and open up new real estate in New Orleans.
Further, they were geared to attract a larger share of global maritime
trade through the port’s facilities and waterways. These projects were
not necessarily in conflict with each other and both could provide increased public health, spatial expansion and capital accumulation in
New Orleans. However, the estuary that these projects were attempting
to enroll lay outside the city limits of New Orleans in neighboring St.
Bernard Parish. This geographical contingency produced a conflict between port managers, drainage officials, and St. Bernard interests over
the hydrological modifications, ecological transformations, and economic benefits associated with these projects, which will have farreaching consequences as we trace this historical narrative further. As
will become clear in the next sections, when these projects were rolled
out in New Orleans, they triggered not only ecological regime shifts but
also laid the foundation for socioecological cleavages.
To select Bayou Bienvenue and Lake Borgne as the final disposal site
for the city’s drainage waters had both hydrological and territorial
motivations. The original 1895 plan that sketched the general drainage
scheme imagined the estuary as a promising receptacle for drainage
flows, arguing that the area was:
and improve sanitation and public health (e.g., reducing mosquito habitat), and produce space for urban development (Colten, 2006;
Kelman, 2003).6 Crucially however, this infrastructural zone relied on
aquatic ecosystems that had to be enrolled for sanitary systems to
function properly. Prior to modern drainage, the swamplands that
covered much of New Orleans modern footprint naturally drained into
two different estuaries – Lake Pontchartrain to the North, and Lake
Borgne to the east.7 The Lake Borgne and Bayou Bienvenue estuary,
lying along the eastern city limits of New Orleans, were chosen as a site
for the “final disposal” of the city’s daily drainage. The effect was on
one hand that the drainage system created sub-sea level drained
polders, similar to those found in the Netherlands, which allowed for
urban expansion beyond the natural levees of the Mississippi and other
narrow ridgelines. While environmental historians and geographers
have thoroughly described this process of terraforming and its effects
within the city of New Orleans (Campanella, 2006; Colten, 2006;
Kelman, 2003), less attention has been paid to the other end of the
pumps. This is, on the other hand, where drainage and sewage flows
were sent into local estuarine systems in the city’s periphery to various
effects, which we will return to later. Now we will instead turn to the
maritime transportation infrastructural zone.
The city’s urban drainage system was implemented over the same
period that the Port of New Orleans was pursuing the establishment of
an infrastructural zone that focused on fundamentally transforming
how maritime transportation functioned in the region. This plan in the
early 1900s sought to relocate core port operations from publicly
owned terminals on the banks of the Mississippi, to a public-private
hybrid operation with terminals and infrastructure clustered along
shipping canals dredged through the Lake Borgne estuary. Known in its
later manifestations as “Centroport, USA”, port officials saw this project
as their opportunity to build an “American Rotterdam” by reworking
wetlands into a port complex positioned as a central node in global
shipping networks thought to be revitalized by the successful excavation of the Panama Canal by US engineers in 1915 (Fig. 5). Many of the
leading engineers of the Panama Canal project were recruited to help
design the first phase of Centroport, and the technical standards and
water management practices developed in Panama were transferred to
the Mississippi Delta (Carse & Lewis, 2017; Dabney, 1921).8
Taken together, it should be noted that maritime transport infrastructure and urban drainage infrastructure—both slated for
… mostly uninhabited and a slight pollution of the water has no
disadvantages. It is open to the Gulf [of Mexico], and the tides rise
and fall more rapidly. The greater fluctuations cause a more complete dispersion and a more rapid removal of the drainage water…
Bayou Bienvenu[e], which by dredging can readily be made of
sufficient size to convey the drainage water, runs from the lake
nearly to the levees of the city and can be utilized, without detriment, to receive the drainage flow. It is, also, the natural outfall for
the drainage of a large part of the city. (New Orleans Advisory Board
on Drainage, 1895: 24; our emphasis)
This arrangement was intended to keep pollution out of Lake
Pontchartrain, which had become a popular spot for swimming beaches, resorts, and vacationing New Orleans residents. The city’s chief
surveyor and drainage official proposed the reclamation and development of the Pontchartrain lakeshore in 1874, a project eventually
completed in 1930 (Campanella, 2002). The bayou’s systemic qualities
were thought to compliment the drainage removal and waste assimilation process, as evidenced in the description of the plan above. But by
the time the canals, pumping stations, and waterway modifications
were in place for this scheme, the Port of New Orleans had begun excavating the first phase of their Centroport plan, the Industrial Canal
connecting the Mississippi River and Lake Pontchartrain. The right-ofway for this shipping canal crossed the city’s main drainage canal
nearly perpendicularly (Fig. 6).
The excavation of the Industrial Canal by the Port of New Orleans
interrupted how tidal action operated in the region by adding a deep-
6
Similar investments in the construction of comprehensive publicly financed drainage
systems were widespread during the early 20th century, and some of the leading sanitary
engineers consulted New Orleans authorities (Behrman, 1914; Melosi, 2000).
7
The City of New Orleans is contiguous with its county-level territory, referred locally
as “Orleans Parish.”
8
The ship lock constructed at the intersection of the Mississippi and the Industrial
Canal was designed by veterans of the Panama Canal project, and included a number of
features identical to the Panama locks.
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Fig. 5. Inner Harbor Navigation Canal, also known
as the Industrial Canal, first phase of Centroport. Left
and right bottom renderings show the Industrial
Canal at the time of its completion. Areas in red on
bottom image show terminal space. Port officials
envisioned a Rotterdam-style inner harbor for New
Orleans. Top right photo shows Industrial Canal in
2005, facing north. The original 1923 locks, built by
the Panama Canal’s engineers, are still in place
today, with some of the original equipment still
functioning. (For interpretation of the references to
colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to
the web version of this article.)
Source: Historical renderings from New Orleans
Public Library, Louisiana collection/City Archive.
Photo courtesy Army Corps of Engineers.
who often wrote with great admiration for engineers, wrote:
water connection between Lake Borgne and Lake Pontchartrain. As a
tidal stream, Bayou Bienvenue sometimes flowed towards Lake Borgne,
and sometimes towards Lake Pontchartrain. The Industrial Canal and
Lake Pontchartrain had less tidal influence, which meant that when the
tide from Lake Borgne flowed up Bayou Bienvenue, it pushed into the
Industrial Canal and into Lake Pontchartrain (NOSWB, 1916). For
drainage engineers and municipal authorities, if sewage-laden drainage
waters were pumped directly into the Industrial Canal, it would risk
contaminating the Lake Pontchartrain shoreline.9 After the port’s engineering team stated that they intended to dredge the shipping canal,
they also agreed to construct a siphon that would carry the city’s main
drainage canal underneath the Industrial Canal, allowing for the continuance of the drainage flow to the eastern side and into Bayou Bienvenue (Lewis, 2015). The siphon was thus hailed by its designers as a
technological fix needed for the infrastructural zones to function simultaneously in their politically desirable configuration, including to
not contaminate the waters close to planned elite real estate projects
along Lake Pontchartrain. The drainage siphon project itself was extraordinary complicated, taking three years to construct. Alongside this,
drainage authorities invested heavily in transforming Bayou Bienvenue
into their “Main Outfall Canal”—a name the stream retains on some
maps to this day (Fig. 6). This involved straightening the first kilometer
of the bayou’s course, clearing it of the numerous dead cypress trees
which clogged its channel, and dredging its bottom to a depth of around
4 m. Finally, they built a new drainage pumping station at the bayou’s
headwaters, and installed what they claimed to be the highest capacity
drainage pumps on Earth (Times-Picayune, 15 May 1916).
This spatial nexus of tidal ecosystems, the Mississippi River, an
expansive industrial waterway, and one of the most complex urban
drainage systems ever created were enrolled together in an tenuous
attempt to produce several critical functions simultaneously, with the
potential economic and hydrological benefits to accrue to urban interests in New Orleans. In reference to this achievement, a local journalist
In New Orleans, Man has measured strength with Nature and conquered. He has thrown back the giant Mississippi and made it go
where it listeth [wills] not. He has joined the river and lake, building
gargantuan foundations for his work on the quicksands themselves.
(Dabney, 1921).
But the entire relational ensemble envisioned by engineers in their
maps and networks quickly proved to be both ecologically unpredictable and a source of political contention, even amongst the engineers themselves. The controversy centered on the potential construction of a barrier between Industrial Canal and Bayou Bienvenue.
Drainage officials had been operating under the assumption that once
the siphon underneath the Industrial Canal was completed in 1922,
then the hydrological connection between Bayou Bienvenue and the
Industrial Canal would be closed off by a dam, or a set of ship locks.
Port officials, however, were interested in using Bayou Bienvenue as a
shipping outlet to the Gulf of Mexico, but were not willing to make
additional investments in water control infrastructure at the site.
Several newly built ships used the bayou to reach the ocean during the
First World War, but few ships utilized the bayou after that (NOSWB,
1921). The port’s strategy with regard to enrolling Bayou Bienvenue in
their port operations was to “test the waters,” while holding out for a
federal investment in phase two of Centroport − a deepwater ship
channel through the same estuary which would effectively bypass the
bayou. Until that project was developed however, port officials were
content to send barges of coal and other bulk commodities through the
bayou on occasion to justify keeping the hydrological connections in
place. This vexed drainage officials for obvious reasons and a staff
editorial in the city’s leading newspaper described the predicament:
That waterway [Bayou Bienvenue], joining the Industrial Canal and
Lake Borgne, can be either a drainage ditch or a navigation canal and
it is for the city to decide which of the two purposes will be for the
greater good of the city – not merely now but in that future time
when New Orleans will have attained her full stature as a world
port…Which of them shall be chosen? The uncertainty is almost as
perplexing as that the maiden labors under when proposed to by
9
The drainage and sewage systems in New Orleans are technically separate, but intermingling between the two systems has long been a problem. This is just a further
illustration how technical expertise creates models that sometimes do not abide to historical reality.
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Fig. 6. The city’s main drainage canal and new Industrial Canal cross
perpendicularly.
Source: NOSWB, 1903.
As the ecological effects and spatial slicing up of the estuary began
to come into focus in the early 1920s, fishing and hunting groups,
landowners, and public officials from the Ninth Ward of New Orleans
and St. Bernard Parish became vocal participants in the debate over
hydrological connectivity between Bayou Bienvenue and the Industrial
Canal. Between 1920 and 1935, St. Bernard officials found themselves
briefly sharing hydrological interests with the Port of New Orleans. For
St. Bernard, Bayou Bienvenue’s connection to the Industrial Canal had
two principal benefits. Firstly, it diluted the sewage-laden drainage
flows coming from New Orleans and dispersed them in both St. Bernard
and New Orleans waters, thereby ameliorating acute impacts to fisheries. Second, it was believed that the use of the bayou as the port’s
“Gulf Outlet” could transform swamplands in St. Bernard into lucrative
space for maritime development and industry. While fishing groups
may have taken exception to such developments had they materialized,
in the short term their interests were also reflected in preventing
sewage and drainage waters from overwhelming the estuary’s fisheries.
After a series of public hearings regarding the issue, the City of New
Orleans directed the Sewerage and Water Board to erect a dam between
the Industrial Canal and Bayou Bienvenue in late 1926. In the spring of
1927, St. Bernard officials claimed that the damming of the bayou was
already wreaking ecological havoc in the estuary. As one St. Bernard
official lamented, “…the waters of Bayou Bienvenu have become
stagnated and polluted, and following high tide, the waters flow over
the lands…destroying all vegetation and timber in the territory affected
and have destroyed the fisheries in Bayou Bienvenu as far as Lake
Borgne, and shrimp waters in Lake Borgne” (Times-Picayune, 4 April
1927). The local newspaper noted the collective action forming among
residents and officials in St. Bernard, remarking that “the movement to
obtain relief from the menace occasioned by the polluted condition of
Bayou Bienvenu is assuming concrete form” (Times-Picayune, 4 April
1927). These infrastructurally-induced ecological changes mobilized
peripheral communities against city agencies and sowed a regional
dissensus that became increasingly difficult to address as the path dependencies associated with key hydrological decisions began to set in.
Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, St. Bernard officials worked with
their elected representatives and a few allies at the Port of New Orleans
to push for the removal of the dam, the abatement of pollution, and
rival lovers. She must pick one, knowing that divorces are expensive
and unsatisfactory. Our only fear is that the city, like the young
lady… may live to regret her choice. (Staff editorial, New Orleans
Times-Picayune 1923; our emphasis)
In this passage we can note how the New Orleans elite saw the Lake
Borgne estuary in terms of its utility for the “greater good of the city,”
despite the fact that most of the estuary lies outside ‘the city’ and in
neighboring St. Bernard Parish. There, residents and public officials
narrated the estuary as part of their livelihood and identity, placing it
radically outside the narrow dichotomy of a “drainage ditch” vs. ”navigation canal”. St. Bernard Parish’s economy, especially in the early
1920s, was dependent upon the area’s swamps and marshes for much of
its production. Muskrats, oysters, fish, waterfowl, and shrimp were at
the core of both its economic vitality and its community identity. The
inland reaches of the estuary, closest to New Orleans, were at the time
dominated by freshwater swamp forests—dense stands of cypress and
other wetland tree species. The estuary’s fringe along Lake Borgne was
primarily brackish marshes. This spectrum of salinity and vegetation
supported abundant wildlife and biodiversity, critical to St. Bernard’s
economy and way of life. The reconfiguration of these ecological patterns by elite-driven infrastructure projects also disrupted fishing
practices in St. Bernard and initiated a persistent political situation that
saw urban interests and peripheral communities at loggerheads.
As we’ve established, the city’s drainage system was designed to
convey water into the Lake Borgne estuary and avoid polluting Lake
Pontchartrain. But without a gate or barrier between the bayou and the
Industrial Canal, the drainage was taking a very peculiar route – passing
underneath the western side of the Industrial Canal only to flow into it
from the eastern side. If the port refused to construct a barrier between
Bayou Bienvenue and the Industrial Canal, according to the city’s frustrated drainage chief in 1921, the port would have “nullified the whole
intent and much of the benefit of the city’s main drainage project”
(NOSWB, 1921). Writing a year later as the port refused to act, the drainage commissioner argued in his annual report that since “all important
navigation has ceased to use [Bayou Bienvenue], it is recommended that
the Dock Board be urged to close this cut or install a tidal gate in it to
prevent the pollution of Lake Pontchartrain” (NOSWB, 1922).
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Industrial Canal and the enrollment of the Lake Borgne estuary in the
municipal drainage system triggered several ecological regime shifts
(Table 2). These were modest in comparison to those triggered by the
project’s later phases, but included major fish kills in Bayou Bienvenue,
the conversion of 31 square miles (80 km2) of primarily freshwater
coastal forest within New Orleans to drained and impounded polders,
which were subsequently urbanized and soils were compacted, sometimes below sea level. The excavation of the Industrial Canal converted
500 ha (2 square miles; 5 km2) of coastal forest into open water and
“spoil banks” where dredged materials were disposed.
Before we move on, it is important to highlight some of the theoretical points that this section has developed. What we witness is how
water infrastructures function as a form of territorial and environmental governance. This involved two ostensibly separate infrastructural zones, maritime transport and urban drainage, jostling to
enroll the same territory in their agenda. The massive fixed capital
investments that these infrastructural zones embodied meant that
managers became “locked in” to the politics and ecological dynamics of
the areas their zones traversed. The political and material imperatives
associated with maintaining the various networked elements of the
infrastructural zones (gates, canals, locks, pumps, the bayou itself) also
led to many subsequent investments in water control infrastructure
aimed at maintaining the multi-functionality of the landscape, even as
ecological systems began shifting in response.
One core aspect of the politics involved here lies in which functions
the landscape will be managed to produce. This has been subject to
debates and power asymmetries, as large institutional actors and public
agencies in New Orleans have successfully secured outside funding and
expertise through government and private industry to enact their
agenda. The ecological trajectory of the Lake Borgne estuary therefore,
has been forged through a complex interplay between these water infrastructures, natural processes, and the maintenance of certain waterway standards. We can understand this initial investment by water
managers in the estuary as overcapitalization, creating high-stakes dependencies between the city’s critical urban infrastructures and the
Lake Borgne estuary. From natural resource management literature,
this can be interpreted as an example of “command and control” environmental management, a planning paradigm that Holling and Meffe
(1996) have argued typically suffers from a number of pathologies as it
is forced to confront its own socioecological contradictions. They argue
that the territorial embeddedness of infrastructural zones and other
command and control interventions commonly leads to a scenario in
which “society becomes dependent upon command and control, demands it in greater intensity, and ignores the underlying ecological
change or collapse that is developing” (Holling and Meffe, 1996: 328).
This is certainly illustrated in our case study. Such interventions have
also come to ignore the social dislocations associated with infrastructure; as much as an unexpected ecological shift might undermine
the desired multi-functionality of a landscape, political resistance by
nearby communities can also compromise the capacity of managers to
embed new infrastructure, modernize existing features, and enact new
forms of environmental management.
linking new maritime shipping routes through their territory. These
efforts were unsuccessful. Part of the failure by St. Bernard officials to
keep the two waterways connected is attributable to the expanding role
of the US Army Corps of Engineers (hereafter Army Corps), a federal
water planning agency which was gaining new authority to make
centralized decisions regarding navigation, drainage, land reclamation,
and flood protection. While signaling support for the excavation of a
shipping channel between the Industrial Canal and the Gulf of Mexico, a
senior Army Corps official sided with drainage and public health officials in New Orleans, questioning the suitability of Bayou Bienvenue as
a shipping route due to its crooked and winding course and the instability of soils along its banks (Times-Picayune, 13 June 1929).
The debate around these infrastructural zones could be seen as a
critical juncture in the development of regional environmental politics
and ecological regime shifts. Most of the drainage waters of the city of
New Orleans were concentrated in Bayou Bienvenue, with pumps and
channel modifications in place to counteract tidal inflow and move
wastewater away from the city’s beach resorts, and towards Lake
Borgne.10 Fecal bacteria levels, on the other hand, became concentrated
in the oyster beds along Lake Borgne. Occasionally they reached dangerous levels and had to be closed, causing major inconveniences for
oyster harvesters. These closures were occasionally triggered when facilities on the Industrial Canal dumped chemical pollution into the
drainage system (and thus Bayou Bienvenue), leading St. Bernard officials to make threats, largely rhetorical, to construct a dam of their
own on Bayou Bienvenue, which would theoretically at least, have
forced the drainage system’s outflow to spread over lands in New Orleans (Times-Picayune, 5 January 1972). Interestingly, over decades,
the nutrient laden flows from pumping station No. 5 may have actually
increased the yield of the Lake Borgne shrimp fishery, which became so
highly productive in the areas where bayou waters intermixed with
those of Lake Borgne, that coastal ecologists concluded that New Orleans drainage waters were generating increased productivity (ElSayed, 1961).
Once the Port of New Orleans began working with the Army Corps
to manage and expand the Industrial Canal into the next phase of the
Centroport project, their interest in collaborating with St. Bernard on
using the bayou as a shipping canal waned. This effectively severed
hydrological connectivity between the west and east side of the
Industrial Canal, except for the sewage and drainage water being siphoned underneath it. The prospect of St. Bernard benefiting from the
port expansion languished in uncertainty, while the flow of pollution
and urban waste continued unabated. The excavation of the Industrial
Canal severed the region into two large basins (or polders) with different hydrological influences. This division also coincided with significant ethnic, class, and racial patterns in the area. The neighborhoods
on the western side of the Industrial Canal became mechanically
drained and urbanized polders surrounded by levees. Areas on the
eastern side of the Industrial Canal lagged behind considerably in terms
of urbanization, population growth, and infrastructural investment
(Landphair, 2007). This included not only St. Bernard Parish, but also
the Lower Ninth Ward neighborhood of New Orleans. These areas also
retained a stronger tidal influence and connectivity with the Gulf of
Mexico through Lake Borgne, with greater exposure to high water
events and storm surges. The hydrological and political effects of these
projects began establishing divergent socioecological conditions on either side of the Industrial Canal, and formed the ground for political
division.
The conjoined processes associated with the excavation of the
3.3. Training the delta with levees and dynamite
Thus far we have traced how two extensive engineering projects, the
New Orleans municipal drainage system and the first phase of the
Centroport project were configured in such a way that benefits accumulated on the west side of the Industrial Canal, while environmental
risks and ecological regime shifts were concentrated to the east side – in
the Lower Ninth Ward, St. Bernard Parish, and the entire Lake Borgne
estuary. These political decisions and subsequent material interventions
formed a cleavage in the region’s hydro-ecology and its polity. We now
turn our attention to the management of the Mississippi River, and how
controversies over the management of the river’s flows during flooding
events helped further solidify the socioecological cleavage between
10
It bears mention that the scheme to prevent pollution in Lake Pontchartrain also was
a failure. The beaches along the Pontchartrain shoreline were closed on multiple occasions due to bacteria levels in the water. This became a serious problem as other suburban
communities started pumping their drainage water into Lake Pontchartrain in addition to
New Orleans. By the late 1980s, most of the beaches and lakeshore attractions had been
closed and were rarely utilized.
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Table 2
Infrastructural zones, ecological regime shifts, and political contention associated with the Centroport USA initiative pursued by the Port of New Orleans between 1910 and the present,
and the urban drainage system constructed during the same time frame. Ecological figures from Shaffer et al. (2009) and Saltus et al. (2012).
Infrastructural Zones
PHASE 1
Industrial Canal 1917–2014
PHASE 2
GIWW – 1942-Present
MRGO – 1956–2009
PHASE 3
St. Bernard Channel & Lock – 1956–1977
Lock Replacement – 1956-Present
Canal between Lake Pontchartrain and Miss.
River. 5.5 mile length, 30′ depth, 500′ width
canal dredged through swamps, marshes,
neighborhoods.
Lock structure at terminus with Miss. River –
640′ length, 75′ width, 31.5′ depth.
Canal connection with Gulf Coast inland
waterway, 9–14 foot depth, additional Gulf
Outlet Canal, 75 miles length, 500′ width, 36′
depth.
Other features: Public housing clustered near
new port terminals. Levees from dredged
materials.
Canal between Miss. River and MR-GO. 5.3
miles length, 50′ depth.
Other features: levees, road and rail bridges,
drainage and sewer siphons underneath canal.
Lock structure 1200′ length, 150′ width, 50′
depth.
Levees, bridges, investments in community
parks, greenspace, other urban infrastructure.
Proposed ship lock scaled back in 2015, to
serve only shallow-draft traffic.
Ecological Regime Shifts
Major fish kills in nearby bayous. Conversion
of freshwater swamps to drained polders and
canal beds. 55 km2 of cypress-tupelo forest
converted to dredge spoil bank and open water.
Altered salinity and hydrological regimes
across the region. 210 km2 of wetlands
destroyed. 40 km2 of coastal forest converted
to open water. Additional loss of 30 km2 coastal
forest near Manchac. Conversion of 260 km2 of
Lake Pontchartrain bottom to a hypoxic “dead
zone.” Interrupted La LaLoutre Ridge, which
regulated water salinity regionally. Loss of
65 km2 of marshlands due to dredge material
disposal. Embankments formed by dredge
disposal restricted sheet flow and hydrological
regime in estuary. Overall shift of 64 km2 of
freshwater dominated wetlands to brackish or
saline marsh and open water.
Projects halted by collective action, Army Corps
still seeking lock replacement on Industrial
Canal. The waterways being “frozen” (neither
rolled back or expanded) still has ecological
effects as erosion, hypoxia, saltwater intrusion
continue. Some effects of phase 2 were
perpetuated by the political gridlock associated
with phase 3.
Formation of socioecological cleavages
and situational
dissensus
Local elite work with national partners in
Mississippi Valley to attract funds and expertise
for canal and lock construction.
Assemblage of Mississippi Valley states, port
clients, maritime interests achieve
Congressional authorization and funding of
GIWW and MRGO projects.
A broad coalition of local governments, civic
groups, and environmental groups disrupted
dozens of public meetings, lobbied
politicians, and sought financial redress for
damages. After Katrina, pressure on the port of
New Orleans resulted in Congressional deauthorization of the MRGO project, and
multiple engineered features to mitigate its
effects on regional hydrology, storm surge, and
salinity. (mrgomustgo.org)
Centroport clients and local elite press Congress
for funds, downplay local resistance, offer to
close MRGO in exchange for lock replacement.
Citizens groups, fishing associations,
neighborhood associations protested
infrastructure disruptions through formal
petitions and at public hearings.
Multiple coalitions to contest the connecting
channel and new lock/lock replacement
successfully sought an executive order to
cancel the connecting channel project. The lock
replacement on the Industrial Canal has been
help up in litigation by oppositional coalitions
since the 1980s.
Excavations associated with the lock
replacement likely undermined adjacent
floodwalls in the Lower Ninth Ward, where
residents had cited concerns for decades that
the replacement project might heighten flood
risks from the Industrial Canal.
Connectivity between Industrial Canal and
Bayou Bienvenue became major site of
contention with the Port and St. Bernard
interests pressing to keep the two waterways
connected. Drainage and public health officials
in New Orleans prevailed, erecting a dam
between the waterways in 1926.
Army Corps began new environmental review
process on the lock replacement in 2015,
proposing a “shallow draft” lock instead of the
deepwater locks previously sought.
Mississippi River compelled the same New Orleans-based port and
maritime interests to take action to reassure nervous investors and port
clients that the high water would not impact port operations and financial institutions in New Orleans. On April 27, 1922, the river levees
failed at the town of Poydras in St. Bernard Parish, opening up a rift (or
“crevasse”) over 100 feet (30.5 m) deep in the riverbank, and carrying
so much water into the adjacent coastal swamps and marshes that the
river’s overall level in New Orleans began dropping rapidly. Fears of
flooding in New Orleans quickly subsided, and some engineers and New
Orleans public officials began discussing the possibility of building
control structures that would mimic the natural tendency of such crevasses to form in the riverbank during floods. A committee comprised of
New Orleans newspaper owners, bankers, and port clients began pressuring officials in Washington DC to consider such infrastructures
(Barry, 2007). While initially resistant to the idea of engineers creating
New Orleans and its eastern periphery. These events foreshadowed and
helped produce the contemporary dispute over river diversions and
coastal restoration infrastructure that we will return to later.
The concentration of undesirable flows in the territories east and
downriver from New Orleans was not limited to sewage-laden drainage
water. The Mississippi’s natural tendency to break its banks and spread
sediment across its alluvial plain has been subject to increasingly intensive infrastructural control and political mediation.
In the New Orleans area, the benefits and hazards associated with
the infrastructural manipulation of the river’s dynamics have reflected
the territorial dominance of the city’s core public agencies and financial
institutions over its periphery. A pair of historic river floods in the
1920′s brought this dynamic into sharp relief. In April 1922, while Port
officials were appearing to cooperate with St. Bernard Parish on
maintaining Bayou Bienvenue as a short-cut to the sea, flooding on the
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J.A. Lewis, H. Ernstson
Fig. 7. The Army Corps detonates the levee at Caernarvon, 1927. This
event became synonymous with the territorial dominance of New Orleans
in the water politics of its periphery.
Source: NOAA.
parish” (Barry, 2007: 257).
The flood of 1927 also signaled the advent of centralized, command
and control management of the entire Mississippi river system. When
the US Congress passed the Flood Control Act in 1928, it positioned the
Army Corps of Engineers as the central agency in charge of managing
the entire course of the Mississippi River. This program relied upon
levees and large flood control outlets and aspired to manage the dynamic river by accounting for the flow volumes passing through its
various tributaries and distributaries.11 From 1927 until today, river
management aims to prevent flooding of communities and maintain
favorable conditions for the thousands of ships and barges that utilize
the Mississippi River system for waterborne commerce. This system of
flooding outlets and control structures was not fully implemented until
the 1970s, but its completion underscored a commitment by the US
Government that the Mississippi River would remain locked in its
present course, and its tendency to periodically abandon its primary
distributary would be prevented. The levees and control structures on
the Mississippi also ensured that its freshwater and sediments stayed
put, except during rare and extreme floods. During those emergencies,
much of the river’s flow could be diverted through several outlet
structures, sending floodwaters through sparsely inhabited areas that
were managed as “floodways.”
The implementation of this infrastructural zone fundamentally altered the river delta’s historical dynamics by holding its channel in a
fixed course and concentrating its floodwaters in a few outlets. This
achievement by the Army Corps served to place millions of people out
of the reach of the river’s floodwaters, but in interrupting the river’s
capacity to build its own delta, the Mississippi River levee system accelerated the pace at which remaining coastal wetlands and estuaries
were subsiding and eroding into the sea. Furthermore the intentional
breaching of the levees in 1927 validated the suspicions of many St.
Bernard Parish residents with regard to the territorial dominance of the
Port of New Orleans over the parish’s hydrological affairs. This has led
to accusations over the subsequent decades of the Army Corps intentionally flooding the city’s periphery to secure its core population
and critical infrastructure. The story of the 1927 dynamite-crevasse at
Caernarvon makes such accusations plausible from the point of view of
St. Bernard residents. The 1927 crevasse decimated fur trapping in the
Breton Sound estuary, just adjacent to Lake Borgne. While muskrats,
artificial crevasses, the chief of the Army Corps of Engineers, said
publicly in 1922 that instead of building control structures, which required massive capital outlays and maintenance costs, he would “…
rather blow a hole in a levee, if conditions became serious, and let the
water take care of itself” (Barry, 2007, 168). Some residents of St.
Bernard Parish looked with suspicion on the 1922 crevasse, wondering
if New Orleans interests may have intentionally undermined the levee
to cause the crevasse (Barry, 2007).
Five years later, the worst flooding along the Mississippi River in
modern history occurred, displacing hundreds of thousands of people,
mostly African-Americans, along the river’s lower course (Hornbeck &
Naidu, 2014). Floodwaters collected in the tens of thousands of tributaries in the vast Mississippi Valley, and a series of levee failures began
occurring in Arkansas, Mississippi, and finally, Louisiana. As the flood’s
crest moved towards New Orleans, the city’s elite again took steps to
reassure investors and port clients that the city would be safe from any
major flooding and operations would not be impacted significantly
(Barry, 2007). Further, engineers voiced serious concerns over the new
ship locks that connected the Mississippi River to the Industrial Canal.
Completed in 1923, port managers feared the lock gates might be
overtopped or otherwise compromised by high water in the river. The
destruction of these locks would have been a massive financial and
operational loss for the port, who, as we have mentioned, were in the
process of moving many of their facilities and operations onto the Industrial Canal and were pursuing federal funding for the second phase
of their Centroport project – a new shipping canal connecting the Industrial Canal to the Gulf of Mexico. As the river rose, St. Bernard
Parish mobilized hundreds of men to guard river levees, as speculation
circulated that New Orleans-aligned interests might attempt to open a
breach in the levees there. The levee guards actually opened fire on a
small river vessel near Poydras, killing one of its passengers (Barry,
2007). Engineers tracking river conditions in the spring of 1927 eventually concluded that breaches in the river far upstream from New
Orleans were lowering the river’s peak level in New Orleans, thereby
preventing any flooding of the city. Undeterred, the financial elite of
New Orleans and the city’s major newspapers pushed ahead with a plan
to “blow the levee” near Poydras, at a village named Caernarvon. They
mobilized their connections within national engineering agencies and
political networks to ensure that the Army Corps and the State of
Louisiana were behind the plan, which left opponents in St. Bernard
with little choice but to watch as engineers set off dynamite in the levee
and a torrent of river water poured into the swamps, marshes, and
coastal communities of lower St. Bernard Parish (Fig. 7). The Parish
president, after watching the dynamite go off, remarked to the many
onlookers that they had just witnessed “the public execution of this
11
Perhaps influenced by resentment from residents of the majority white St. Bernard
Parish over the 1927 flood, the plan included an artificial outlet structure a few miles
upstream of the city. This spillway, called Bonne Carré, instead involved the periodic
inundation of two African-American cemeteries where slaves and later free black people
had lived and worshipped.
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Fig. 8. Position of MRGO (blue) and GIWW (green) in reference to the study area. Bayou Bienvenue marked in green.
Levees in red. Note the “funnel” shape formed by the confluence of the two channels. A new storm surge barrier was
constructed here following Katrina. Base imagery 2015
Landsat 8. (For interpretation of the references to colour in
this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of
this article.)
brackish and freshwater ecosystems along Bayou Bienvenue (Saltus
et al., 2012; Shaffer et al., 2009).
Officials in St. Bernard, while voicing some initial support for the
MRGO project, became resolutely opposed to it as the Army Corps
dredges began cutting their way across the Parish’s estuaries. In 1957,
the year before dredging officially commenced on the MRGO project,
the St. Bernard government weighed in on the impending project with
clear concerns over its impact on the parish’s coastal landscapes:
mink, and otters prefer freshwater conditions, the intensity of the
floodwaters coursing through the crevasse caused widespread mortality
amongst these key commercial species, the sale of which accounted for
a substantial portion of the parish’s economy prior to 1927 (Barry,
2007). Thus, as urban-centered water management again compromised
livelihoods in St. Bernard, a political culture of skepticism towards infrastructural interventions championed by New Orleans interests and
federal engineering agencies was beginning to take root.
The upper reaches of the Parish heretofore have been protected from
excessive tidal waters due to the slowing down action of the outer
marsh areas. However, with the existence of a channel 40 feet
[12 m] deep traversing the marsh lands from the Gulf to the upper
Parish, the full fluctuation of the tide will be felt throughout the
Parish. The tidal action will have adverse effects on the entire marsh
area with consequent erosive action and the intrusion of high saline
content water into areas normally fresh or only slightly brackish.
During times of hurricane conditions, the existence of the channel
will be an enormous danger to the heavily populated areas of the
Parish due to the rapidity of the rising waters reaching the protected
areas in full force through the avenue of this proposed channel. This
danger is one that cannot be discounted. No matter how small a
flood may be, or how small the area to which it is confined, to the
families that have water in their houses, it is a major catastrophe (St.
Bernard Police Jury, 1957, as quoted in Shaffer et al., 2009).
3.4. Enrolling the Lake Borgne estuary into “Centroport, USA”
The second phase of Centroport produced the project’s most enduringly transformative effects in regards to infrastructural zones,
ecological regime shifts, and socioecological cleavages (Table 2). The
Gulf Intracoastal Waterway, dredged during the early 1940s, provides a
standardized inland shipping channel along the length of the US Gulf
Coast from Florida to the Mexican border. The route of this channel
essentially replicated that of Bayou Bienvenue, but straighter, with
standardized dimensions, and without the complication presented by
the pollution from the New Orleans drainage system. This also effectively impounded the drainage flows entering Bayou Bienvenue to the
southern portion of the Lake Borgne estuary, in St. Bernard Parish. A
decade later, the port scored a massive public subsidy when Congress
approved funding for the Mississippi River-Gulf Outlet (MRGO). The
“groundbreaking” ceremony, organized by the Army Corps and port
officials, involved setting off a charge of dynamite in the coastal cypress
forests the channel was to traverse (Fig. 9). Between 1957 and 1963,
the MRGO was dredged 122 km through the Lake Borgne and Breton
Sound estuaries, connecting the Industrial Canal with the Gulf of
Mexico (Fig. 8). As Fig. 9 illustrates, local port clients (Standard Fruit,
in this case) hailed the construction of the MRGO as an improvement
upon the connectivity offered by the Mississippi River (Azcona, 2006).
The MRGO severed the ridgeline formed by Bayou La Loutre, an ancient
distributary of the Mississippi, which had historically regulated salinity
between the Lake Borgne estuary and the Breton Sound estuary. This
permitted seawater to creep along the canal bottom and into the
This passage demonstrates that St. Bernard officials were keenly
aware of the risks posed by the MRGO, and their analysis was indeed
prescient with what transpired during Hurricane Betsy in 1965, and
Hurricane Katrina in 2005.
For Centroport to achieve its goal of attracting deep-water maritime
trade through the Port’s tidewater facilities, officials saw a need to
expand or replace the ship lock that connected Centroport to the
Mississippi River in the Lower Ninth Ward. As typical freighter sizes
grew rapidly after the Second World War, the ship lock on the Industrial
Canal, protected at St. Bernard’s expense in 1927, was too small to
accommodate the largest cargo ships of the day. If the port was to
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Fig. 9. Advertisement hailing completion of MRGO
canal by the Standard Fruit company (left).
Source: Times-Picayune, 23 July 1963. Image on
right shows group of engineers and port officials at
the MRGO’s “groundbreaking” in 1957. The coastal
forests they dynamited here succumbed to salinity
stress following Hurricane Betsy in 1965. Source:
USACE
discriminatory housing policies, leading to local officials publicly berating the federal government for its interventions in the parish’s internal affairs (Jeansonne, 2006; Wells, 2004). These confrontations
presaged the contemporary opposition to federal water resources
planning and river diversions.
The white residents of the Ninth Ward moving to St. Bernard in
large numbers were already familiar with the environmental and economic grievances voiced by St. Bernard officials towards the New
Orleans drainage authorities, the Army Corps, and the Port of New
Orleans. Residents of the Ninth Ward had dealt with all manner of
disruptions in drainage and sewer services during the excavation of the
Industrial Canal, which left some sewer lines overflowing and stagnant
for nearly three years while the siphons were completed (NOSWB,
1921). The civic associations in St. Bernard and the Ninth Ward communicated regularly on environmental concerns beginning in the
1920s, often acknowledging their shared frustration over policy decisions made by public agencies in New Orleans (Times-Picayune, 17
February 1923). Many Ninth Ward residents were also recreational
fishermen and hunters who regularly made use of Bayou Bienvenue and
the Lake Borgne estuary. A fishing association that worked to improve
environmental conditions along Bayou Bienvenue boasted hundreds of
members in the 1920s, and was headquartered in the Ninth Ward
(Times-Picayune, 27 February 1921). Between 1960 and 1980, thousands of residents of the Ninth Ward and other neighborhoods of New
Orleans settled in suburban subdivisions in St. Bernard Parish.
As white residents left the Ninth Ward in large numbers, AfricanAmerican residents were simultaneously moving in. The Centroport
plan included provisions for housing laborers, despite the transition
away from large labor forces in the port industry already occurring in
the 1960s, a trend greatly accelerated by the advent of containerized
shipping (Cowen, 2014). The swampy depression near where drainage
water was siphoned underneath the Industrial Canal was actually a
small remnant of Bayou Bienvenue’s former basin, bisected by the Industrial Canal. Prior to modern drainage, this area had been off limits
for development due to its flood prone topography and unstable soils,
but two large federal public housing projects, named Florida and Desire,
were constructed there between 1940 and 1960. Before 1940 almost no
one lived in this former cypress swamp. By 1965 it was the most densely
populated neighborhood in New Orleans as black residents displaced by
complete its transition from the riverfront to Centroport’s tidal canals,
engineers insisted that a larger ship lock had to be built somewhere –
either a replacement lock at the existing lock site in the Lower Ninth
Ward, or at a different location downstream in St. Bernard Parish.
The first Army Corps plan for an expanded lock called for a new lock
structure and an additional shipping channel through lower St. Bernard
Parish near the town of Meraux, about 4 miles (6.4 km) upstream from
the site of the 1922 crevasse at Poydras. Opposition to this new lock and
connecting channel was highly organized and unified amongst St.
Bernard residents and public officials (Mazmanian & Nienaber, 1979;
Shallat, 2000), demonstrating a capacity to mobilize collectively on
water infrastructure issues.
Anti-New Orleans sentiment in St. Bernard Parish has origins beyond struggles over infrastructure. Racial segregation and the politics of
white supremacist populism are also an important facet of the cleavage
that emerged between the two municipalities. At the time of the first
public hearings on the project in 1960, major demographic shifts were
taking place in St. Bernard Parish that signaled its growing urban and
suburban character, and budding political influence in state politics
(Germany, 2007; Jeansonne, 2006). The New Orleans public school
system was one of the first in the Deep South to end formalized racial
segregation of its students (Landphair, 1999, 2007; Wells, 2004;
Wieder, 1987). Schools in the Ninth Ward of New Orleans, home to
primarily working class residents, were selected by the city’s school
board as the test sites for the policy, which began in 1960. The integration process saw white parents boycotting the integration process
and holding protests outside schools as a selected few African-American
students, all girls, walked through the crowds under armed guard to
attend classes. Participation in the boycott by white families was near
100% (Jeansonne, 2006). Many Ninth Ward residents felt compelled to
avoid integrated schools entirely, and officials in St. Bernard and Plaquemines Parishes, long a site of strict racial segregation and domination by a small group of white landowners, offered incentives for white
Ninth Ward children to attend its public schools, where racial segregation was being preserved through careful legal maneuvers and posturing by Parish officials, a system of segregation lasting until 1989,
over 30 years after the US Supreme Court ordered public schools to
integrate (Wells, 2004). Federal officials took multiple opportunities to
put pressure on St. Bernard Parish to integrate its schools and end
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Coastal forests like those that dominated this area are typically resilient
to storm surges if the salinity shock is brief. Surge waters eventually
recede, and precipitation-induced runoff associated with the hurricane
might also create freshwater flows that flush surge out of freshwater
ecosystems (Tiner, 2013). But the infrastructural zones built and anchored by the Army Corps and other flood protection agencies over the
years prevented these processes from taking place. The result was that
nearly every bald cypress (Taxodium distichum) tree in the area was
dead within ten years of Hurricane Betsy (Saltus et al., 2012; Shaffer
et al., 2009). As the canopy died out, only large ponds of open water
and fragments of brackish and intermediate marsh grasses remained.
These landscapes are less capable of buffering tidal flows and storm
surges than coastal forests.
Centroport’s canals were thought by their architects to promise a
less dynamic biophysical context than the Mississippi River. Instead,
engineers found that their interventions tended to exacerbate already
existing issues like subsidence and saltwater intrusion, presenting them
with a shifting ecological baseline that offered a less favorable situation
for maritime industries and port terminals, including flood risks and
unstable soils. The lands that Centroport’s canals traverse is an expanse
of peaty soils, posing significant challenges for laying foundations for
small homes, much less large industrial facilities (Dokka, 2011;
Snowden, Simmons, Traughber, & Stephens, 1977). The fact that the
estuary in question had soils made up primarily of so-called “fat clay”
made it prone to a process called sloughing, in which levees and other
structures built atop these soils cause the lateral displacement of subsurface layers. Every time the Army Corps dredged the bottom of the
channels and deposited this material on its banks, the added pressure
from this material would push soil back into the bottom of the channel
(Seed, et al., 2006; Shaffer et al., 2009). In some locations, the original
500-foot width of the MRGO channel became over 1000 feet (i.e.,
widening from 150 m to 300 m), as the banks of the canal were exposed
to ship wakes and eroded into the channel (Shaffer et al., 2009).
Once the initial investments in canal infrastructure were made,
billions of dollars in additional infrastructural investments followed in
the form of flood control systems and ecological restoration measures
devised to mitigate the flooding hazards, soil instability, and ecological
changes brought on by the canals themselves – a layering and interrelating of the material path dependencies associated both with ecological regimes and infrastructural zones. More and more state capital
became bound up in Centroport’s infrastructures, despite the fact that
by the 1980s it was clearly failing to generate economic returns
(Azcona, 2006; Gramling, Freudenburg, Laska, & Erikson, 2011). Centroport attracted much less traffic than port officials anticipated, and
their limited depths prevented the massive ships being built by the
1980s, from using Centroport. Attempts to convince the US Congress to
fund the deepening of the MRGO and Industrial Canal were unsuccessful, in part because of vocal opposition to the projects by residents of St. Bernard Parish (Mazmanian & Nienaber, 1979).
The dynamics of contention around Centroport illustrate the power
of port interests to act collectively to generate and respond to political
opportunities and attract state capital and compete for maritime traffic,
but also, since the 1960s, the power of local groups to contest and indeed shape port development policy. As we saw in our account of the
1927 flood on the Mississippi, maritime transportation and its related
industries comprise a hegemonic assemblage of political, economic, and
cultural power in New Orleans and the state of Louisiana, which for
many decades had a relatively free hand in reworking the region’s
waterways (Azcona, 2006; Barry, 2007; Freudenburg, Gramling, Laska,
& Erikson, 2009b; Lewis, 2015). Since the 1920s, this powerful network
of businesses, elected officials, and port agencies has relied upon the
hydrological engineering expertise of the Army Corps of Engineers to
produce and maintain an infrastructural zone made up of a matrix of
land and water conducive to the demands of global maritime transport.
New Orleans port officials have built effective political coalitions
comprised of key leaders and business interests in the Mississippi
slum clearance projects elsewhere in the city took advantage of the lowcost apartments the developments provided (Breunlin & Regis, 2006).
This simultaneous eastward migration placed thousands of people in
flood vulnerable terrain when Hurricane Betsy struck the region in
1965. The storm surge devastated much of St. Bernard Parish and the
Ninth Ward of New Orleans (Azcona, 2006; Shallat, 2000). The drainage siphon under the Industrial Canal failed and flowed backwards
under tidal pressure, flooding the Florida and Desire projects, along
with thousands of other homes on the west side of the Industrial Canal.
Hurricane Betsy killed hundred of people and caused more property
damage than any storm in US history up until then. In response, flood
protection agencies made new investments in flood control infrastructure in the Lake Borgne estuary (Colten, 2006). Betsy also triggered ecological regime shifts in the Lake Borgne estuary (Saltus et al.,
2012) and galvanized the communities along New Orleans’ eastern
periphery against the third phase of the Centroport plan (Shallat, 2000,
2014). Betsy demonstrated how storm surge posed a serious threat not
only to the coastal zone, but also to New Orleans itself. Having secured
the city from the threat of riverine flooding following 1927, the Army
Corps set its sights on preventing storm surge flooding after Hurricane
Betsy, proposing an elaborate system of concrete floodwalls, earthen
levees, and other structures. Immediately following the storm, St. Bernard officials placed the blame for the storm surge’s severity on the
MRGO, which had recently been put into commission when the storm
surge struck. Army Corps officials denied that MRGO had any role in
the flooding, but Betsy catalyzed what became a fifty-year struggle by
St. Bernard residents to close the channel and address the changing
ecological conditions in the region (Times-Picayune, 15 March 1967).
The adversarial politics of blame following Betsy were yet another
contributor to the formation of a socioecological cleavage between
areas on either side of the Industrial Canal.
3.5. Centroport’s failure and ecological legacy
Many ecosystems are dependent upon particular temporal patterns
of disturbances. Fluvial-dominated river deltas like that of the
Mississippi typify this as they require regular pulses of freshwater and
sediment across their deltaic plains to remain above the level of the sea
(Tessler et al., 2015). Carried forth by technical standards, infrastructural zones have become embedded within these deltaic systems in
and around New Orleans. This has, on the one hand, altered the temporal patterns and territories through which riverine flooding operates,
transforming what was a frequent occurrence into a relatively rare and
infrastructurally mediated event. These same infrastructural zones have
become articulated with the increasing encroachment of oceanic forces
and acute pulses of saline water. Saltwater intrusion (or marine transgression) is an historical ecological process that proceeds through what
some non-equilibrium ecologists refer to as an interaction between
“slow” and “fast” variables—increasing gradually through coastal erosion, and in times of storms and hurricanes, as acute, “fast” pulses.
Ecosystems can rapidly shift in response to these acute events. Freshwater ecosystems that have emerged and been reproduced over thousands of years in the vicinity of New Orleans, depend upon regular
freshwater and sediment inputs from the Mississippi River, a mechanism that distributes sediments and displaces tidal action. By 1965,
marine transgression was accelerated by saltwater intrusion associated
with canal excavation, and the freshwater and sediments that would in
previous eras mitigate this land loss, were held captive behind the Army
Corps’ flood protection levees along the Mississippi River.
The freshwater ecological systems at the far inland reach of the Lake
Borgne estuary, where Bayou Bienvenue met the Industrial Canal, underwent an ecological regime shift between 1956 and 1978, much as
the St. Bernard government and coastal scientists had predicted. The
storm surge that entered this basin during Hurricane Betsy became
trapped between the Industrial Canal floodwalls to the west, and the
levees, elevated roads, and landfills to the east (Saltus et al., 2012).
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Valley, where agricultural exporting states rely upon the Mississippi
River and New Orleans to transfer their bulk commodities to ocean
liners. New Orleans’s position at the bottom of an extensive, navigable,
and fertile river basin has for centuries driven its competitive advantage
over other Gulf Coast ports, and nurtured a system of political advocacy
and patronage that for decades reliably delivered federal support for
infrastructural investment and navigation projects (Azcona, 2006;
Freudenburg, Gramling, Laska, & Erikson, 2009a; Freudenburg et al.,
2009b; Gramling et al., 2011). The port’s maritime connectivity with
the Caribbean has led to many private industries like the Standard and
United Fruit Companies having their headquarters in New Orleans, and
with the support of the US military, exerting considerable influence in
the geopolitics of Central America (Azcona, 2006).
The emergence of the environmental movement since the late 1960s
and the establishment of legal tools that empower communities to
contest certain aspects of the implementation and maintenance of
federal water resources projects have seriously challenged the dominance of these maritime and financial interests, and further entrenched
the rancorous politics between New Orleans and St. Bernard Parish. The
passage of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969 reconfigured political opportunities for the growing numbers of residents,
coastal communities, and environmentalists, who were alarmed at the
rapid ecological and hydrological changes that Centroport was inducing. While formal community opposition to Centroport began in the
early 1920s when Ninth Ward residents protested drainage disruptions
triggered by the dredging of the Industrial Canal,12 local residents had
very little formal power to obstruct or constrain the port’s agenda until
NEPA placed new regulations on water infrastructure projects nationwide and provided a legal framework for opponents to examine the
activities of the Army Corps and other water planning agencies. The
critical third phase of Centroport – the replacement lock and connecting
channel slated to be cut through St. Bernard Parish – has been tied up in
litigation and regulatory review since 1977, when US President Jimmy
Carter ordered systematic review of dozens of water resources projects
(Mazmanian & Nienaber, 1979). Since this time, the collective capacity
of port interests has been weighed against the capacity of community
groups and environmentalists to translate local grievances to the level
of legal challenges to national water resources projects. This is one
dimension of the politics of socioecological cleavages. Fig. 10 shows a
flyer produced by a neighborhood association in the Lower Ninth Ward,
which has since the 1980s opposed the expansion of the ship locks on
the Industrial Canal, citing concerns over flooding, neighborhood disruption, and the excavation of toxic sediments on the canal’s floor
(USACE, 2009).
Opponents have been remarkably successful in limiting further expansion of Centroport, but the ecological regime shifts it had already
triggered by the 1960s were difficult to reverse, especially with the
existing canals still in operation. Long-time activists who opposed
Centroport described this frustration in our interviews with them.
While US environmental laws made slowing down the expansion and
modernization of Centroport, the decommissioning of an existing and
operational project is considerably more difficult to achieve.
Take for example, the Mississippi River-Gulf Outlet (MRGO).
Decommissioning and closing a canal maintained by the Army Corps
requires action by the US Congress. While Congress has been receptive
to arguments from Centroport’s promoters that the project had national
economic and military significance, opponents of the project were long
denied the same listening ear. Despite dire warnings from dozens of
scientists, environmentalists, and coastal communities that the MRGO
was a “hurricane highway,” the Port of New Orleans continued to
support and promote the project, and the Army Corps continued to
faithfully maintain it to its standardized dimensions by dredging
bottom sediments and dumping them elsewhere. The Port of New
12
Fig. 10. Flyer from 1990s protesting the replacement of the lock on the Industrial Canal.
Neighborhood groups in the Ninth Ward have successfully prevented this project from
moving forward since the 1970s.
Source: Courtesy of Citizens Against Widening the Industrial Canal.
Orleans refused to consider closing the MRGO as long as the third phase
of Centroport remained tied up in legal challenges from environmental
and community groups (Slawsky, 2004). As an Army Corps official put
it in 2004, “[o]f course the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet is an environmental travesty…the unfortunate thing is that the New Orleans
area is not in a position to be able to afford the economic loss of just
shutting it down” (Slawsky, 2004).
This third phase of Centroport now hinged increasingly on the old
1923 lock on the Industrial Canal, which had gradually become what
transport geographers refer to as a “chokepoint” within the wider waterborne transport system. The lock limited maritime circulation, but
was not easily bypassed due to the centrality of the Mississippi River in
the inland waterway system. Without the MRGO open and dredged,
large ships would not be able to access the Industrial Canal and existing
Centroport terminals, and those facilities would thus need to be relocated to the Mississippi River (Slawsky, 2004). The maritime transport infrastructures along the Centroport canals represented a substantial investment in fixed capital, all sitting behind an aging and
narrow ship lock on one end, and on the other, a shipping channel with
chronic soil stability problems which demanded expensive, continuous
dredging. As opponents effectively stopped Centroport’s third phase
between 1960 and the 1990s, the project was becoming more of a
liability than an asset for the Port of New Orleans. In the mid 1980s,
port officials decided to build a new container-handling terminal along
the Mississippi riverfront in uptown New Orleans. This signaled the
port’s move to begin investing in critical infrastructure along the Mississippi riverfront, and shifting their infrastructural investments away
from Centroport and the Lake Borgne Estuary (Katz, 1984). Given the
flooding risks and ecological regime shifts associated with Centroport,
some residents wondered if it was time to close the MRGO altogether.
As a resident from the area remarked in a 1988 editorial:
If we had a hurricane from the southeast that would cause water to
surge up the MRGO, and [sic.] the devastation would be enormous.
It is not too late to fill in the MRGO and re-establish the marsh as a
buffer against the tidal surge of a large hurricane. Let us begin
correcting the mistakes of the past and insist the [Army] Corps fulfill
its obligation to this region (Times-Picayune, 14 December 1988: A22).13
But port officials and the Army Corps continued to keep the MRGO
open, dredging its channel to its standardized depth of 36 feet (11 m),
and in later years, dumping massive quantities of concrete and stone
along its banks in an attempt to prevent ship wakes from further
eroding the surrounding marshlands.
As we observed throughout this section of the paper, layering infrastructural interventions in a biophysically dynamic context like the
13
That the Times-Picayune, once the MRGO project’s chief public booster, began
printing editorials critical of the Port’s investment strategies demonstrates how the project’s light had faded in just two decades.
“Lafayette Avenue Sewerage Offends” New Orleans Times-Picayune. July 9, 1920.
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the structure of political opportunities again shifted, and opponents to
the project were able to mobilize their elected officials and
Congressional leaders that the MRGO was a major culprit in the
flooding, and should be closed with or without the replacement lock. In
2008, the US Congress ordered the Army Corps to close the channel to
ships permanently, and funded the construction of a rock barrier that
would close the gap and recreate the ridgeline that formerly regulated
salinity in the estuary. In 2010, the largest storm surge barrier in the
United States was constructed directly across the MRGO and GIWW.
The new closure structures almost immediately impacted salinities
across the entire region (Poirrier, 2013). Lowered salinities near New
Orleans have led local groups to experiment with replanting cypresstupelo trees in an effort to restore the ring of storm surge buffering
coastal forests that existed in the area prior to Centroport’s construction. The pattern of flood risk that persisted for most of the 20th century, in which the city’s eastern periphery was disproportionately exposed to hurricane storm surges has culminated in the construction of
the most expansive flood protection system in the US (discussed further
below), and again effectively split the Lake Borgne estuary in half. On
one side of the floodwalls, marine processes predominate. On the protected side of the floodwalls, tidal influence has decreased, and plans
are under development to introduce massive pulses of freshwater and
river sediment into this protected side of the estuary, aimed at creating
elevated substrate for fresh marsh and coastal forest plants to take root.
As ecological regime shifts played out throughout the Lake Borgne
estuary in the 20th century (Fig. 11), it would have been difficult to
read the changes as anything but degradation, at least initially. Familiar
places and species were gone. A once-forested landscape became wide
open and sparsely vegetated. Land was disappearing rapidly. But as
saltwater species established themselves in the emerging ecological
regimes in the estuary, St. Bernard fishermen began enjoying abundant
harvests of oysters, shrimp, and speckled trout in waterways closer to
their marinas. The intensification of marine processes in the estuary has
undermined the region’s natural storm defenses, while at the time,
rendered its fisheries more abundant and more easily accessed. Here we
observe a crucial paradox in the ecological history of the region. Deteriorating salt and brackish marshlands provide ideal habitat for key
commercial fisheries (Muth, 2014). These ecological regime shifts have
thus produced political constituencies with divergent interests when it
comes to implementing ecosystem-based strategies today.
To sum up, the infrastructural zones embedded in the swamps and
marshes of Louisiana disrupt, transform, and produce environments.
The most lasting and persistent of these transformations are ecological
regime shifts, which in our case are driven by historical changes in the
key variable of water salinity (Table 2). Being inherently embedded
within socioecological relations, infrastructural zones have a range of
implications for human livelihoods, circuits of trade and capital investment, and patterns of hazard exposure. The concentration of the
negative aspects of these processes into a single territory can lead to the
development of a socioecological cleavage with entrenched and persistent political divisions on water management policies. These cleavages can undermine attempts to achieve greater efficiency in the operation of infrastructural zones, and furthermore, complicate attempts
to mitigate negative impacts or unintended effects as they emerge.
Lake Borgne estuary can lead to one infrastructural zone undermining
the functionality of another. This shows how the complex interplay of
infrastructural zones and ecological regimes steers hydrological processes and has real impacts for the region’s populace. After pushing to
break ground on the third phase of Centroport since 1960, the project
received some limited funding to prepare the replacement lock site in
the Industrial Canal in the late 1990s, over the objections of many
Ninth Ward residents (Fig. 10). The Army Corps hired a contractor to
prepare the site along the Industrial Canal where a bypass channel associated with the new locks was to be excavated. The Industrial Canal
was equipped with concrete floodwalls following Hurricane Betsy, and
the demolitions and excavations carried out to make room for the bypass channel took place along a kilometer long section of this floodwall.
Long wooden pilings, underground storage tanks, and other utility
connections were excavated and removed. A report by a group of respected engineers claims that the improper backfilling of these excavations was a key factor in the catastrophic nature of the levee
breaches at this location in 2005 during Hurricane Katrina (Bea &
Cobos-Roa, 2008; Seed et al., 2008). According to these engineers, after
pushing up along the “funnel” created by the intersection of the MRGO
and the GIWW (Gulf Intracoastal Waterway), storm surge waters entered the Industrial Canal. Storm surge then pushed into improperly
backfilled excavations made at the site, and entered a permeable layer
of ancient swamp and marsh deposits. This caused water to seep underneath the floodwall to loosen it until it fell over with massive
amounts of water rushing in. In the words of the engineers:
Removal of barges, piles, underground storage tanks, and underground utilities (e.g. sewer, water, gas lines) reached to and substantially exceeded elevations of −10 ft [3.1 m] to 25 ft [7.6 m];
thus intersecting the underlying marsh deposits. When backfilled
with porous – pervious – materials, hydraulic connections were
developed between the backfilled excavations and the buried pervious – permeable marsh and swamp layers (Bea & Cobos-Roa,
2008).
The breach that occurred was the most catastrophic of all the failures in the flood protection system during Hurricane Katrina in 2005,
carrying a wall of water into the Lower Ninth Ward and St. Bernard
Parish that obliterated entire city blocks, moved homes off foundations
and placed them down the street. Even without these catastrophic
failures, these neighborhoods would still have suffered flooding, and
there is some debate amongst the engineers who examined the levee
failures after Katrina as to whether water seeping under the floodwall
caused its failure, though a majority believe that it was (Seed et al.,
2008).14 It is worth noting here that some residents of the Lower Ninth
Ward voiced publicly their belief that the US Government dynamited
the floodwall in their neighborhood, in an effort to prevent the flooding
of affluent neighborhoods and critical urban infrastructure (SBC, 2006).
This reflects the widespread belief east of the Industrial Canal that the
US Government and its allies in New Orleans are willing to sacrifice
certain communities to preserve their own interests. The events of 1927
reveal this to be at least grounded in historical events, even if such
accusations of intentional breaches are baseless with regard to Katrina.
This demonstrates how infrastructural zones can not only undermine
ecological processes in the systems in which they are embedded, but
also disrupt the functions of related infrastructural networks designed
to provide flood protection or drainage and further deepen socioecological cleavages.
When Hurricane Katrina’s storm water surge devastated the entire
Centroport footprint and catastrophically flooded nearby communities,
4. Reimagining and enacting ecosystems as infrastructure: the
river remedy
We now move into the contemporary situation to analyze the conflict around the ecosystem-based infrastructural features of the
Louisiana Coastal Master Plan, namely, river diversions. Diversions are
created to introduce water and sediment from the Mississippi into
nearby estuaries and basins. This plan has been supported since Katrina
by a broad coalition of environmental groups, engineers, and increasingly, the local business community. The production of an infrastructural zone organized around the notion of restoring the delta’s
14
A lawsuit against the Army Corps and their contractor by residents seeking compensation for flooding damages was rejected by a judge in 2013, though the dispute
between engineers over the cause of the breach continues and litigation associated with
these excavations is ongoing.
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Fig. 11. Salt-tolerant Baccharis hamifolia sprouting in the dead stumps of
the bald cypress tree. This location is only 4 km from downtown New
Orleans. Bayou Bienvenue passes just behind the tree line on the left.
Source: Joshua Lewis.
historical dynamics can be seen as a spatial and technological fix intended to reconcile the contradictions that emerged with the operation
and maintenance of the infrastructural zones profiled in Section 3. But
this time ecologists and their field of expertise (alongside engineering
science as before) are more central in structuring solutions and debates.
However, despite their obvious appeal to a region traumatized by storm
surges and concerned over rising seas, calls to “restore the delta” have
become mired in controversy much like earlier infrastructural initiatives. The Save Louisiana Coalition (SLC), a group founded with the
explicit intent of opposing river diversions, was formed in 2012. In this
section we trace the emergence of this opposition and situate it in the
historical findings described in Section 3.
4.1. Historical diversions: possibilities and problems with ecological
infrastructure
Fig. 12. The Davis Pond diversion, upstream from New Orleans, one of several smallscale diversion built by the state of Louisiana beginning in 1991 to prevent saltwater
intrusion and produce freshwater habitat. The effects of these structures are a point of
contention in the region.
Source: Joshua Lewis.
While the massive diversion structures being considered for the
Lower Mississippi River are only now being designed, other, smaller
diversion projects have been attempted nearby. The politics surrounding these smaller structures provides further context for the
projects currently under consideration.
By the mid 20th century, increasing salinities in the Breton Sound
estuary in southern St. Bernard Parish (induced in part by Centroport’s
shipping canals) worried state officials and some fishers that oyster
production could be compromised without the freshening influence of
the river’s floodwaters. The eastern oyster (Crassostrea virginica) requires a narrow salinity range to complete different phases in its lifecycle (Berringan et al., 1991). It was thought by state and federal
fisheries managers that the diversion of freshwater into the Breton estuary might support oyster production and other fisheries (Keithly &
Kazmierczak, 2006). Oyster fishermen actually requested that freshwater be pumped into the estuary in 1955, and over the subsequent
decades the Army Corps and the State of Louisiana developed a plan to
build a small diversion of the river at Caernarvon, the same site that
Army Corps dynamited in 1927. In 1991, the freshwater diversion came
into operation, delivering up to 7000 cubic feet per second (198 m3/s)
of freshwater into the estuary when operational.
The environmental effects of Caernarvon and other diversions
continue to be a source of controversy between proponents of the diversions in the 2012 master plan and the fishing industry (Fig. 12).
Owners of oyster leases in the Breton estuary filed a series of lawsuits in
the 1990s that sought compensation for the displacement of salinities
conducive to oyster harvesting from areas where a private leasing
system applies to oyster harvesting, into lands comprised mostly of
public oyster seeding grounds (Britton, 1996). While oyster productivity increased up to 300% in some areas in the estuary, it collapsed
in areas closer to the Caernarvon diversion itself (Avenal vs. State of
Louisiana, 2004). The Caernarvon case illustrates that while diversion
of freshwater into estuaries may increase overall productivity, such
increases can be unevenly distributed in space and thus produce winners and losers. This politicizes the process of coastal restoration and
adds challenges for the management of existing river diversions and
scaling up these small diversions into structures capable of conveying
10–35 times the sediment and freshwater volumes carried by the
Caernarvon diversion. Coastal restoration advocates must persuade the
public to support the adoption of a water management technique based
on a prototype whose benefits have not been entirely demonstrated
nearly 30 years into their operation.
The Caernarvon diversion project has illustrated another potential
problem associated with the diversion of river water into predominantly brackish and saline marshes. Anti-diversion activists frequently invoke the project as an example of what sort of ecological
blunders could be anticipated in a wider ranging and better-funded
restoration agenda. While saltwater and brackish marsh plants can be
killed and displaced by the introduction of freshwater, the freshwater
marsh plants that take root in their place are in some cases less resilient
to the impact of storm surges. This effect, noted by several coastal
scientists, shows that the high nutrient loads from fertilizer runoff in the
Mississippi (from upstream farming activities) might encourage marsh
plants to spread roots in a shallow formation to capture these suspended nutrients carried by river water. This shallow rooting depth,
however, contributes to soil instability and can lead to the marsh plants
uprooting when exposed to a tidal storm surge (Howes et al., 2010; Teal
et al., 2012). A 2010 study examined the impact of Hurricane Katrina’s
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devoted to exactly this practice. River diversions are seen as a way to
invest in fixed infrastructure to (cost effectively) build land over many
decades, mimicking the river delta’s historical dynamics and securing
the long-term survivability of the region’s population centers in the face
of rising seas.
The debate would seem to highlight a tradeoff – a “restored” coast
and “resilient” New Orleans implies a reorganization of the ecological
regimes in its periphery. This could transform the saltwater fisheries on
which many fishing communities depend. Some prominent coastal
ecologists like Dr. Robert Twilley from Louisiana State University,
admit that river diversions will displace saltwater species, but frame
these inshore saltwater areas as “artificial fisheries” – the result of the
human-induced saltwater intrusion that we documented in Section 3.
Speaking to a local journalist in 2013, Twilley stated that “[t]he problem in Louisiana is we’re addicted to salt… because that salt brings
tremendous benefits in fisheries” (Snell, 2015). Even amongst fishers
and hunters, there is disagreement over restoration strategies. Those
who focus on fishing for freshwater species like bass and hunting waterfowl have expressed support for diversions in many cases, whereas
some fishers focusing on marine species have vehemently opposed
them. In only a few years time, the broad consensus around “saving the
coast” has become more politically complex than many might have
anticipated.
This fragmentation can also be seen as splitting along temporal, as
well as spatial lines. Coastal scientists, public officials in cities, and
engineers often invoke the “deep time” perspective in developing their
arguments for river diversions, in that the land of the delta was built
over thousands of years and inferring that humans have effectively
stopped that process. But this deep time perspective is typically insensitive to the class-based nature of infrastructure projects that we
analyzed in Section 3. Diversion opponents, particularly those in St.
Bernard Parish, highlight other disastrous water infrastructure projects
implemented over past century, and propose dredging and pumping
sediments as a sort of “quick fix” for the worst problems associated with
coastal land loss.
It is from this context of division and conflict that we will follow the
articulation of a counter-narrative across community meetings and
public spaces (Ernstson & Sörlin, 2009; Ernstson, 2013), or counterexpertise. This means the weaving together of arguments and historical
experiences into an alternative narrative of understanding the delta and
its communities in opposition to the diversions. This narrative coalesced in 2010 and 2011, in particular during the planning phase of an
ecosystem restoration plan designed to address the impacts of Centroport on the Lake Borgne estuary.
Since at least the 1960s, formal public hearings on water infrastructure projects have become focal social arenas through which opposition movements coalesce. This is in some sense a product of the
geographical expanse of the parish. Fishing communities extend out
deep into the swamps and marshes, creating difficulties for regular
meetings amongst interested parties. Public meetings provide a physical
space where residents from throughout the region can come and voice
their concerns, and where public officials in St. Bernard can go on record in their opposition to a project, validating circuits of patronage
and reproducing political alliances at the local scale. Since the 1960s,
St. Bernard citizens and public officials have spoken in near unison on
hydrological issues – the product of a complex interplay between the
actual material interests at stake and an orchestrated political drama
that exhibits highly consistent features over time, and frequently referential of previous disputes and events in framing sequential political
debates.
Our observations conducted at these public hearings demonstrate
how St. Bernard residents have an acute awareness of how New Orleans
interests tend to dominate regional water politics, and how St. Bernard
has often been a “sacrificial zone” in times of high water. In one public
hearing in 2010, following a presentation of the MRGO restoration plan
by the Army Corps, the president of St. Bernard Parish, Craig Taffaro,
Fig. 13. George Ricks of the Save Louisiana Coalition, at the Caernarvon River Diversion
in lower St. Bernard Parish.
Source: The St. Bernard News, 23 September 2014.
storm surge on the freshwater marshes that emerged after the Caernarvon diversion was opened in 1991, finding that these freshwater
marshes “are vulnerable to bulk erosion of the marsh platform during
storms due to weaker soil strengths and reduced rooting depths”
(Howes et al., 2010). Diversion opponents in St. Bernard frequently cite
these observations (Fig. 13), and even paid for a large billboard on the
main interstate highway in downtown New Orleans that showed Katrina’s impacts on the freshwater marshes near the Caernarvon freshwater diversion. In response, a coalition of environmental NGOs also
bought advertisement space along the same stretch of highway, advocating for the construction of river diversions.
4.2. Articulating and organizing a counter-narrative against river diversions
The Louisiana Coastal Master Plan was developed by the state of
Louisiana’s Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority (CPRA),
which brought together a cadre of scientists, public officials, and other
stakeholders. Initially put forward in 2007, the plan was significantly
revised in 2012 and 2017 (Fig. 1). The plan’s geographical scope includes the entire Louisiana coastline, but the most significant interventions are slated for areas in the periphery of the city of New Orleans
and neighboring Jefferson Parish, which together account for nearly
one million of the region’s 1.2 million residents (US Census Bureau,
2010).
St. Bernard and Plaquemines Parishes, which lie downstream from
the New Orleans metropolitan area, have only 67,000 residents between them. The most critical element of the plan, according to the
State of Louisiana and its scientific partners, are large-scale river diversions, stating, “…sustainable restoration of our coast without sediment diversions is not possible” (CPRA, 2012: 106). While the plan
received unanimous support from state legislators in 2012, resistance to
major components of the plan has arisen, primarily amongst residents
of St. Bernard Parish. Diversions are the chief infrastructural tool by
which planners aim to prevent further catastrophic land loss in key
estuaries. Another component of the plan that opponents have questioned is the restoration of coastal forests, which dominated much of
the region prior to 1965. Diversion opponents have suggested an alternative strategy, which relies on the dredging and pumping of riverbottom sediments into eroding areas, quickly building land without
introducing massive quantities of freshwater at the same time (Fig. 14).
This is by far the most expensive land-building strategy in the coastal
planning toolbox, and nearly half of the funds in the current plan are
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Fig. 14. SLC Sign outside of a marina in coastal St. Bernard Parish.
January 2015.
Source: Joshua Lewis.
relation to the diversion projects is seen by some observers outside of
St. Bernard as disingenuous and hyperbolic. However, it resonates with
a wider historical sentiment of again being on the negative end of largescale projects directed by New Orleans interests. Similar public comments were uttered against the MRGO project decades earlier — and on
the banks of the MRGO in Shell Beach there is a memorial to St. Bernard’s Katrina fatalities (Fig. 14). Speakers at meetings often also
framed the Army Corps, the diversion project’s manager, as untrustworthy partners, citing their dismal track record in the area, and
their historical alignment with New Orleans business interests. Said one
commenter: “Do you know why MRGO was put there originally? For
some rich landowners in Eastern New Orleans that wanted build a boat
terminal in there” (USACE, 2011). Another resident of a fishing community also compared the diversion plans to earlier water infrastructure projects through the parish, and voiced concerns over the
ecological transformations that might accompany the new interventions: “The people of St. Bernard need to stand up and fight this project… you’re going to annihilate a recreational [fishing] industry, a
commercial industry, and all you’re going to be able to catch out there
is catfish… What are we going to do with that? Where did all the
speckled trout and red fish go?” (USACE, 2011) Beyond the fishing
impacts, then Parish president Taffaro made reference to earlier attempts to build water infrastructure through the area, stating that “to
dig out another channel again divides our parish geographically. It
divides us physically and it divides us culturally.”
This mobilization represented a galvanized civic moment, at least
locally. As opposition to the diversions became more organized following the release of the 2012 Coastal Master Plan, the St. Bernard
Parish council voted unanimously in 2013 to ban the construction of
any new river diversions in the parish, demonstrating the development
of the cleavage at a representational democratic level. This “ban” has
no firm legal standing, but reflects a 50-year history of the parish
council going on the record in opposition to major water infrastructure
projects.
rose to deliver a detailed presentation of his own. His presentation assessed the merits and shortcomings of the restoration plan at great
length. Perhaps most notable was a phrase included on the bottom of
each of the 30 slides in the presentation: “St. Bernard Parish is more
than a barrier for the rest of metropolitan New Orleans.” What became
clear in this meeting was that many attendees and local officials from
St. Bernard believed that the diversion of Mississippi River water into
coastal wetlands would do damage to saltwater adapted ecosystems and
thereby, the area’s economy, and that the restoration of freshwater
ecosystems in the Parish was an attempt by New Orleans-aligned interests to gain better flood protection at St. Bernard’s expense. Taffaro
advocated that the plan should rather focus on dredging sediments from
the bottom of the Mississippi, and pumping the muddy slurry across
great distances to “instantly” create new land, without compromising
saltwater fisheries. Taffaro’s comments called for residents to remain
unified in opposing certain features of the plan, to honor a “…commitment to those who have stood at this juncture for decades before us,
the commitment to those who died because of the neglect and coastalcide, demands that we push on.”
The diversion of river water into the Parish’s wetlands is ostensibly
intended to rectify this “coastalcide,” not re-produce an historical environmental injustice. Yet, over a century of contentious politics and
human suffering has yielded intense suspicion that any large-scale
transformation of the ecosystems in New Orleans’ periphery typically
benefits elite economic actors in New Orleans striving to secure their
critical infrastructure and accumulate capital, while off-loading environmental hazards and ecological uncertainty to peripheral communities with less political and economic power. This is especially true
with regard to the diversion of the Mississippi River through St.
Bernard. While the river diversion being considered in 2011 meeting
planned to only convey 5000 cubic feet per second (142 m3/s) of water
during a “spring pulse” – the Louisiana Coastal Master Plan, released
just a year later, proposed the construction of multiple river diversions
in the area, one with a capacity of up to 250,000 cubic feet per second
(c. 7 km3/s) – a third of the Mississippi’s average flow.
4.4. Diversion opponents in action: battle for the Bayou Bash
4.3. Memorializing historical experiences: solidifying a cleavage
Beyond the public hearings around relevant projects, internal
meetings and fundraisers are also important to instigate collective action. Internal meetings enable the recruitment of new support and to
solidify the resolve of those already mobilized. By observing a fundraising event organized by the Save Louisiana Coalition in 2013, we
are reminded how the historical construction of infrastructural zones
and the diversion of floodwaters through St. Bernard are perceived and
characterized to mobilize opposition to river diversions today (Fig. 15).
The event was billed as the “Battle for Bayou Bash,” a dinner, musical performance, and rally hosted at the St. Bernard Parish Civic
Center. For a $25 entrance fee, those attending could eat a variety of
As part of the Louisiana Coastal Master Plan, the MRGO Ecosystem
Restoration plan includes a river diversion at the same location as the
Port had planned its failed connecting lock and channel in the 1960s.
This contestation in particular helps to deepen our understanding of the
fault lines of the socioecological cleavage we are tracing through the
emergence of the counter-narrative.
In a series of public meetings in 2011, diversion opponents attempted to draw connections between the two projects. Audience
members shouted of the diversion, “Its another MRGO!” and “Its gonna
kill us!” (USACE, 2011). Invoking the same existential urgency in
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the contemporary politics around river diversions and coastal restoration. In the next section we turn towards a discussion of how scientists
and state agencies have responded to the emergence of the SLC and
opposition to river diversions.
4.5. The controversy clarified through public dispute
The media coverage of the rambunctious public meetings began
putting pressure on local officials to oppose the diversion projects. This
compelled state coastal planners and environmental groups to “come
out” publicly in arguing for the creation of river diversions. This is a
crucial turning point in the controversy, which effectively politicized
river diversions and made available alternative interpretations of the
delta ecosystem. A striking example that outlines the contours of this
politicization was a full-page advertisement that appeared in many
newspapers and media outlets in Louisiana in 2015. Signed by nearly
30 prominent wetlands scientists and ecosystem managers and paid for
by a coalition of environmental organizations, the letter stated the case
for building large-scale river diversions. It began:
Fig. 15. Memorial to St. Bernard residents who died during Katrina. The memorial sits
along the banks of the MRGO channel.
Source: Joshua Lewis.
Louisiana seafood dishes prepared by local restaurants, including some
well known New Orleans establishments like Galatoire’s. Prominent
oyster distributors were also present. At the event’s peak, perhaps 200
people were in attendance. George Ricks, a recreational boat captain, a
founder of the Save Louisiana Coalition, and the evening’s master of
ceremonies, took to the stage and described the predicament that
brought the various groups together. Ricks explained that “St. Bernard
Parish has been through a lot, Katrina, BP [oil spill], MRGO. St. Bernard
Parish has become something like a whipping boy for the rest of the
state of Louisiana.” Ricks then introduced a video that featured a series
of images of life in coastal Louisiana communities, with a narration
called “So God Made a Fisherman,” celebrating the role of fishermen in
community life, as providers of food, and the bearers of heritage and
history. After the video concluded, Ricks himself sang lead vocals on a
rendition of “Louisiana 1927,” a song written by Randy Newman about
the devastation wrought by the great Mississippi River flood of 1927,
when federal authorities dynamited the levee at Caernarvon. The song’s
chorus goes “Louisiana, they’re trying to wash us away” – on the final
refrain Ricks added, “but we’re not gonna let that happen!”
Later, Ricks returned to stage and invited St. Bernard Parish
President David Peralta to join him. Peralta explained that the St.
Bernard Parish government was fully dedicated to preventing the
construction of new river diversions in the parish. Peralta stated that
the seafood and fishing industries comprised 20% of the parish
economy. He claimed that the parish council, usually a divided body,
had found consensus easily on their opposition to new diversions.
“Many of you know that I was police officer for 33 years, and I’ve never
been to jail,” said Peralta, “but the day they try to cut the levee, I will go
to jail to stop them.” Ricks invited key supporters of the SLC up to the
stage, which included the heads of many fishing and seafood commercial associations, like the Louisiana Shrimpers Association and the
United Commercial Fisherman’s Association. He highlighted the support of certain scientific advisors, including one from NASA who had
written about the problems with the Caernarvon diversion. Clint Guidry
of the Louisiana Shrimpers Association remarked that it was rare to
have all the various sectors of the fishing industry aligned behind one
issue and organization. Guidry stated that “if we don’t fight for our
cultures and way of life, we’re done… if we don’t stay together we
won’t be here very long,” echoing Ricks’s musical performance. Ricks
took the microphone to wrap up the event, explaining that “its just
wrong that state bureaucrats in Baton Rouge15 can push a button on a
computer and decide what our lives are going to be. Its all of it, the
fisheries, our heritage, but its also the friggin’ injustice of it all.”
How anti-diversion activists narrate their movement, and the historical conditions that gave rise to it, highlight how longstanding
cleavages in the landscape and society between the urban core in New
Orleans and the periphery in St. Bernard have developed and influence
15
What if you knew about impending disaster for one of the world’s
greatest wildlife and fisheries treasures and you knew there was
something that could be done to minimize it? The treasure being lost
is Louisiana’s coastal wetlands, which arguably hold the most
abundant concentration of fish and wildlife in America. This catastrophic loss is happening and will get worse as long as Louisiana
continues its present course. An objective examination of all of our
coast and all who depend upon it, now and in the future, reveals that
a solution is available: manage the Mississippi River to build new
wetlands and create a range of freshwater to saltwater habitats that
will provide a home for Louisiana’s fish and wildlife for years,
decades, and even centuries into the future. (Bahr et al., 2015)
Without the preceding years’ growth of a vocal opposition to diversions, it is unlikely that this letter would have been drafted or resources expended on its wide circulation. The letter goes on to reference
this opposition specifically, and its characterization is revealing:
Louisiana should not allow exaggerations and speculations regarding the effects of diversions on oysters, shrimp, speckled trout,
etc. to prevent action. In many areas where previous generations
grazed cattle and hunted ducks, and alligators, commercial and recreational fishermen now harvest oysters, shrimp and speckled trout
because of saltwater intrusion. (Bahr et al., 2015)
While noting the historical transformations of the coast, the letter
admits that diversions will have impacts on fisheries, but claims that
they won’t be destroyed, but displaced. As the authors state, “diversions
will not destroy saltwater fisheries but instead will immediately push
them farther from some parts of our coast. Unfortunately this will
economically harm some commercial fishermen” (Bahr et al., 2015).
In response, the Save Louisiana Coalition released a letter of its own
rebutting some of the claims made by scientists. The letter stated in part
that:
Those whose livelihoods depend on the seafood industry and ancillary businesses are often painted as the enemy of restoration and
concerned only for their “parochial” interests. This is not true. Yes,
they may have more concern than those whose personal livelihoods
don’t depend on the estuaries, but they are not the enemy and it is
not just “fishermen” who are voicing major concerns about these
diversions. What that letter failed to mention is that several federal
agencies, Parish Governments, Port Authorities, and even some of
the State’s own task forces have officially lodged their concerns…
The desire for a consensus in support of diversions seems to now be
more about maintaining political clout for funding than a realistic
attempt to evaluate the coastal situation. We all would like to see
our wetlands restored and hope for a magic bullet to do it, but
Baton Rouge is the capital of the State of Louisiana.
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design of these initiatives must be done with technical precision based on
engineering and natural science, with so much as stake there is also a
growing concern that planning needs to be done with greater political
transparency than during previous decades. In our last section we will
focus on pulling out key lessons that we believe our case study brings in
relation to planning practice in Louisiana and beyond.
considering the reality of sea level rise, geological subsidence, river
dynamics and many natural and man-induced liabilities, we need
more critical and independent thinking in consideration of these
huge and costly projects. (SLC, 2015)
Groups like the SLC who oppose large-scale river diversions have
produced a public scrutiny and a level of nuance into the public conversation around coastal restoration that would be unlikely to occur
otherwise, for instance as here, to insist of the deep uncertainties that
large-scale interventions carry. This could potentially have major impacts on how planning will be carried out since, if taken seriously, it
means that a wider cast of actors and associated ways of knowing the
delta will need to be acknowledged up front in producing planning and
action (Whatmore, 2009). Such radical re-imaginations of planning
practice might still not be there, but as we start wrapping up the empirical account, its important to acknowledge that one effect of the
counter-narrative has been the expansion and creation of more public
arenas for deliberation.
The “Expert Panel on Diversion Planning and Implementation” is
one such example. Convened by the State of Louisiana’s Coastal
Restoration Authority from 2013, it comprises of 12 scientists and environmental planning specialists drawn from universities and agencies
inside and outside of Louisiana. The panel is charged by the State of
Louisiana to “provide technical input, review and guidance as plans are
refined on diverting freshwater and sediment from the Mississippi and
Atchafalaya rivers into adjacent estuarine basins to build, maintain and
sustain coastal wetlands” (CPRA, 2015). The concept of “uncertainty”
permeates the reports developed by the expert panel on diversions, due
to the “complexity of the science and engineering associated with the
design and operation of major freshwater and sediment diversions, and
that there are no analogues of existing sediment diversions at an appropriate scale, it became clear that uncertainty was a highly relevant
and pressing topic for consideration” (CPRA, 2015). The expert panel’s
meetings include public hearing in which members of the public can
attend and comment on the diversion planning process. As has been the
case in so many public meetings on the construction of water infrastructures in St. Bernard Parish, many fishermen and other residents
attend these hearings to voice their concerns, which the expert panel
has summarized into seven categories16:
5. Discussion: implications for planning
A strong theme in our account is how infrastructure, urban-regional
politics, and ecological dynamics converge over time to generate distinctive political situations and environmental justice dilemmas. The
historical narrative foregrounds the extant tensions between institutional power centered in New Orleans, and the coastal communities and
ecosystems around the city. For over a century, the periphery of New
Orleans has been reorganized to serve the goals of flood protection and
capital accumulation. Here in our discussion we will focus on three key
implications that we believe our case study brings to the practice of
planning in Louisiana, and more generally to discussions of planning
theory when ecological and sociopolitical dynamics are tightly wedded
together. We first elaborate on how socioecological cleavages relate to
certain forms of infrastructure violence, which problematizes the relation between planning and its bias as a discourse of the core. We then
move to how planning practice could more explicitly deal with knowledge controversies that are inherent to such large-scale planning. And
finally, we focus on how various forms of politicization can challenge
asymmetrical power relations as a prerequisite to help democratize the
administration of planning, expanding it to be viewed practically and
theoretically as a much wider activity than simply the development of
expert-led master plans followed by stakeholder ‘dialogues’.
Together these three points help to scrutinize current policy discourses
around coastal planning and urban resilience where we emphasize that
“ecosystem-based” initiatives are not immune from or unaccountable to
earlier conflicts over infrastructural zones and environmental management. In contrast, such conflicts have become entrenched in how ecosystems and societies operate together in a path-dependent fashion, which
needs to be fully recognized in any planning practice aimed at restoring
(or changing) the functioning of large-scale ecosystems. This partly lies in
ensuring that just political processes and just outcomes are achieved for
groups marginalized and placed at risk by previous investments in infrastructure. If managers fail to acknowledge these historical dynamics and
injustices, opponents have demonstrated that they are capable of slowing
down and obstructing the implementation of large-scale water infrastructures. As sea-level rise projections continue to alarm coastal communities globally, the politics around river diversions in Louisiana reveal
the sort of tensions and potential impediments for large-scale coastal infrastructure planning moving forward.
1 Negative fisheries impacts (displacement of fisheries, fisheries kills,
loss of livelihoods)
2 Doubts as to the potential of newly built land to reduce storm surge
3 Prefer smaller diversions instead of the larger planned diversions
4 Prefer dredging over diversion projects
5 Flooding concerns and increased water levels
6 Concerns regarding nutrients and invasive species from Mississippi
River water
7 Large diversions take too long to build land
5.1. Socioecological cleavages and infrastructural violence
For scientists and environmental groups, the Mississippi Delta cannot
be sustained without the implementation of massive freshwater and sediment diversions. This is no doubt true for many locations in the deltaic
plain, but such plans necessarily come with high levels of uncertainty
that undermines commonplace authority of science and technical expertise. One response to this from the scientific community has been to
work closely with the State of Louisiana to develop novel and interdisciplinary research environments devoted to the design and management of coastal restoration projects. Much of this work is still focused on
the development of computer models that try to predict how diversions
will effect ecological systems in different contexts and use these to explore impacts on nearby communities and livelihoods. While a common
concern among scientists and environmentalists is that the planning and
16
Social inequality is inscribed in infrastructure networks, often in
complex and historical ways and as effects of core-periphery situations
like those we have studied here. One way to understand these composite effects is “infrastructural violence,” a concept that bridges burgeoning interest among anthropologists, geographers, and urban scholars in tracing how uneven distribution of benefits and hazards amongst
social groups arises as material infrastructure connects certain spaces
and disconnects others in contemporary urbanization (Anand, 2012;
Graham & McFarlane, 2014; Rodgers & O’Neill, 2012).17 Drawing on
Johan Galtung and Paul Farmer, Rodgers and O’Neil develop
17
The notion of “infrastructural violence” bridges burgeoning interest by scholars in
tracing how social inequality is inscribed in infrastructure networks (Graham & Marvin,
2001; Graham & McFarlane, 2014; Monstadt, 2009; Rabinow, 2003) with the concept of
“structural violence,” as introduced by Galtung (1969) and elaborated by Farmer (1996,
2004).
Slightly modified by the authors for clarity.
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Scholarship on climate change adaptation has for some time discussed how longer time perspectives make visible politically charged
issues of equity and justice (Adger, 1999; Adger et al., 2005; Paavola &
Adger, 2006; Thomas & Twyman, 2005; Tompkins & Adger, 2004; Wolf,
Adger, Lorenzoni, Abrahamson, & Raine, 2010). While we would like to
see more detailed historical approaches within this rapidly growing
field, review articles demonstrate that benefits and risks associated with
substantive ‘adaptation strategies’ along developed coastlines are likely
to be unevenly distributed both globally and within particular settings
(Adger, 1999, 2004; Paavola & Adger, 2006; Thomas & Twyman,
2005). We are thus in full agreement with Adger’s (2003) remarks, that
effects of climate change are “spatially and socially differentiated,” and
these changes “will be felt particularly by resource-dependent communities through a multitude of primary and secondary effects cascading through natural and social systems” (387). In relation to largescale water control infrastructures designed as adaptation measures,
Tompkins and Adger (2004) argue that rather than trying to hide away,
planning practice should highlight “technological solutions that have
had detrimental environmental or social impacts to excluded groups in
the past” (10). To address social justice both procedurally and programmatically is held as critical. As phrased by Paavola and Adger
(2006: 606):
infrastructure violence in a 2012 article as intimately connected to a
wider social order that both exerts and hides violence:
To a certain extent, it could be argued that infrastructure constitutes
an often-ignored material channel for what is regularly referred to as
‘structural violence’, which Paul Farmer (2004: 307) has defined as
‘violence exerted systemically – that is, indirectly – by everyone who
belongs to a certain social order’… Once considered from the vantage of widely constituted social structures, violence becomes
thinkable as an effect of what Farmer (2004: 307) calls a ‘social
machinery of oppression’: complex processes of production whose
outcomes are objectionable, in which all members of society are
implicated and yet whose effects are ostensibly nobody’s fault.
(Rogers and O’Neil, 2012: 404)
The literature on infrastructural violence has pointed out that the
power in question is not only material, but also symbolic. This plays
into the political dynamics of these situations in two ways. From the
viewpoint of the dominant center, peripheral communities are viewed
or casted as clinging to their historical, cultural and social traditions, as
being quaint and backwards. Elite actors in the center, as expressed by
Zarycki (2007), “frequently have serious problems with grasping the
very idea of the multi-dimensionality of the periphery’s social world”
(p. 128), and “are simply unable to see this aspect of symbolic violence
in their own behaviours, when they treat the center’s cultural values as
universal ones, and their transmission to the periphery – as beneficial
attempts at ‘modernisation”' (p. 125). For large-scale planning, an activity historically shaped by the core and elite groups, this becomes a
problem where planners and experts might think they are promoting
what is ‘best for all,’ that ‘everybody wins,’ because they cannot or they
choose not to recognize their own biased views. This boils down to a
central problem for planning practice in grappling with its own bias.
Speaking clearly into this impasse, and something we will develop
further below, Vanessa Watson (2003) has developed the useful concept
of ”conflicting rationalities”. Rather than a practice shaped by consensus-building and universalized ideas and values, most often formed
and shaped by the center’s institutions and discourses, planning should
fully acknowledge profound disagreements and radically different ways
of knowing and recast planning as a practice ”grounded in a deep understanding of contextual difference” and relational ways of knowing
(Watson (2003): 405, 406). This poses, we mean, critical political,
ethical, discursive and organizational challenges for planning practice
and the implementation of ecosystem-based infrastructures. While
materially seeking to rework urban peripheries, it also implies a reworking of the core’s understanding of itself, moderating elite interests
and public opinion.
The canals and swamplands of Louisiana complicate matters further. The discussions on infrastructural violence have so far centered on
service delivery and inequalities related to engineered infrastructures of
transport, water and sewage. Our study highlights the growing challenge to plan for infrastructure in the uncertain context of urbanized
coastlines, deltas and complex, dynamic ecosystems. In Louisiana a
pattern emerged where more ‘peripheral groups’ in the delta were
pitted against an ‘urban core’, a split not simply based on spatial distance or network connectivity, but on ecological regime shifts. In the
context of planning this has far-reaching consequences since unequal
outcomes emerge from the intersection of infrastructural zones and
ecological regime shifts. It is the unpredictable path dependencies associated with infrastructural zones, ecosystems, and territorial marginalization that became entrenched in the Louisiana landscape and
through which material and symbolic forms of violence played out. One
lesson for large-scale planning efforts might be to much earlier and
explicitly fund and promote autonomous interdisciplinary research
groups that can carry out situated, textured and historical ecological
studies to sensitize the planning situation to multiple ways of knowing
as part of a broader notion of democratic planning. Some literature
points to this need.
…social justice is an integral part of environmental governance
which is best addressed explicitly and directly. Fears that doing so
may escalate environmental conflicts are common but largely unwarranted. Quite the contrary, keeping social justice off the negotiating table denies the relevance and legitimacy of vulnerable actors’ concerns and interests.
We could add here that if not tackled directly, the investments in
planning and implementation might later be undone and wasted as
peripheral groups mobilize to redirect or obstruct large-scale infrastructure and ecosystem management programs. While the adoption
and implementation of infrastructure planning framed explicitly as
climate adaptation is a rather recent discursive shift, the situated socioecological contexts that these projects purpose to re-work carry
longer historical path dependencies that generate political and material
constraints around climate adaptation measures. Our historical and situated account of the formation of socioecological cleavages brings
greater empirical precision and analytical clarity to these ongoing discussions.
5.2. Knowledge politics and the problems of resilience-based coastal
planning
The deep uncertainties pervading large-scale infrastructure and
ecosystem-based strategies shape the politics associated with them. This
surfaces as discursive struggles of ‘who is in the know’ or who has legitimacy to speak technically or morally of what to do. While we in
Section 3 analyzed the articulation of a counter-narrative to ‘coastal
restoration’ by St. Bernard Parish residents, it is equally important to
ask what organizes the planning and expert narratives of the core. This
discourse is epitomized by the expert-led Louisiana Coastal Master Plan
from 2012 (CPRA, 2012). This plan interestingly shows an overarching
shift towards the dependence of ecological expertise in comparison to
previous large-scale infrastructure interventions that dealt with drainage from 1920s to 1970s, which were grounded firmly in engineering
science and practice. Centering ecological expertise, the discourse of
“urban resilience” has emerged as an organizing concept within regional water planning, still of course highly reliant on engineering expertise to carry out material interventions. It is important to recognize
that this has had positive effects in expanding the range of expertise.
Certainly, if scientific ecological knowledge had been acknowledged in
earlier planning phases around Centroport, some of the worst ecological
effects of the infrastructural interventions in the region might have
been avoided.
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problems, for which wider democratic practices and public disputes are
needed (see below), they could produce a richer and more textured
landscape of knowledge in which planning practice can be situated.
Rather than facing an already worked out coastal master plan, which in
its completeness tend to erase “all the uncertainties and provisos [from]
the process of scientific knowledge production,” competency groups, as
Whatmore (2009: 595) continues, represent a “civic apparatus” to slow
down thinking, open up various ways of knowing and show publicly
how intermediate stages of knowledge production are intimately attached to uncertainties and controversies. This aims to “redistribute
expertise across the ‘scientific’/‘vernacular’ divide”’ (Whatmore 2009:
595). In Louisiana, one could imagine 10–12 scientists and residents
meeting bi-monthly for say 12–18 months as an experiment in knowledge production, which could help the wider polity of Louisiana to dig
deeper into what is known of the delta, but also how the wide-stretching
delta is known—its dynamics, economic and cultural importance. Such
processes could anticipate, contest and possibly shape any serious
consideration of a state-led planning agenda, which ultimately seems
very much needed in some form to handle future sea-level rise, increase
hurricane activity and so on.
While the suggestion of ‘competency groups’ is an interesting one,
more experimental research and scholarly debates are needed to understand how they could be developed and ‘scaled up’ for the largerscale ecosystems that are of concern here, in particular how they might
be instituted within wider democratic institutions. Positive signs
nonetheless lie in how universities and coastal planning agencies in
Louisiana have recently initiated wider civic meetings. As we will turn
to next however, it is crucial to remember that this only happened after
the disruptive effect that the counter-narrative had on certain aspects of
the Coastal Master Plan. This raises questions around the role of more
fundamental aspects of democratic decision-making.
On the other hand, the resilience framework, both as a research
program and policy framing, is underdeveloped with regard to historical and geographical situatedness and it has been critiqued of eschewing asymmetrical power relations and drawing overly on a functionalist view of knowledge (Ernstson, 2013; Evans, 2011; Nadasdy,
2007). This is illustrated for instance by Folke et al. (2005: 441) in a
central paper when they argue, without acknowledging underlying
asymmetrical power relations, for “the potential in combining local
knowledge systems with scientific knowledge to cope with change in
resource and ecosystem management.”18 Here knowledge comes as neat
‘packages’ (scientific, local, traditional, etc.) that can be added to
‘complement’ each other, sidelining knowledge controversies and
building on an assumption that a common interest for the management
of the ‘social-ecological system’ can be forged (Nadasdy, 2007). Lodged
within consensual assumptions that seek to avoid disagreements
(Hornborg, 2009; Kaika, 2017), such a functionalist view of knowledge
risks gravely misreading knowledge controversies of the sort we find in
center-periphery situations. Indeed, as we saw in Section 3, scientists,
politicians and environmental organizations seemed to have been
looking to secure consensus and a techno-managerial solution by relying on experts and particular environmental organizations. However,
by using established democratic practices, the St. Bernard residents and
SLC activists successfully disrupted the smoothness of planning and
forced authorities to “slow down” their reasoning (Stengers, 2005).
Through their counter-narrative, the delta became more than a system
to be managed, more than a buffer, fishery, or wild-life habitat — but
became intimately viewed as part of a way of life, troubling the whole
idea that the delta could be ‘functional’. Somewhat unexpectedly this
means that while the conflict is intensely about material things, from
where diversions, flood walls, and fish species are to be located, the
conflict should (also) be profoundly understood as being about cultural
and knowledge politics. Put simply, the ability to ‘claim to be in the
know’ is central to understanding the conflict and what might happen.
Arriving at this impasse, however, could also indicate constructive ways
forward.
In her own studies of flooding controversies in England, Whatmore
(2009: 587) argues that to “slow down” thinking is crucial for effective
public questioning of expertise. This in turn she argues has direct relation to what is later done in terms of material investments, and in redistributing expertise across a wider cast of actors:
5.3. Beyond knowledge: democratic practices and the political
For planning to change its course, political and properly democratic
mediation is necessary. Many think about planning narrowly, as
something carried out by ‘planners.’ But our account shows that a much
wider set of actors, spaces and forums are involved in planning’s real
administration and possible democratization. Throughout the historical
account, we see how expert plans again and again run up against a
mobilized civil society that in all its beauty and ugliness hurls stones
into planning’s machinery, demanding change. This goes beyond simply
“slowing down” thinking and entails the use of democratic practices
such as sit-ins, protests, town hall meetings and so on to shift on whose
terms problems can be framed. Our elaboration on ‘competency groups’
must consequently be couched within a wider understanding of asymmetric power relations, which is lacking from Whatmore’s (2009) theorization, as there is indeed a real risk that such gatherings of experts
and laypersons become transformed or co-opted into quite ordinary
stakeholder dialogues or adaptive co-management processes. While
Whatmore’s theorization is certainly more elaborated and sensitive to
constructionist ideas of knowledge, she seems overly invested in
knowledge production as the key driver of sociomaterial change, when
we mean it is simply one among other forms of power.
Again Watson’s (2003) idea of ”conflicting rationalities” could
provide a bridge out of this impasse. In highly conflictual situations,
where social groups have vastly different historical experiences of society, she critiques deliberative Habermasian-inspired processes since
they are “unable to comprehend the very real clash of rationalities
[that] so frequently occur when a plan or development project touches
the lives and livelihoods of households and communities.” (Watson
2003: 396). The real problem she identifies in deliberative modes of
planning, and thus how we see that asymmetrical power relations might
bias and stifle ‘competency groups,’ lies in how the dominant, hegemonic socialized order is never questioned. While supposedly open
toward a multifaceted society, there is still a carefully hidden order in
Expert knowledge claims, and the technologies through which these
become hardwired into the working practices of industry and government, manifest themselves in the products and policies we live
with and the sociomaterial environments we inhabit. Controversies
act as force fields in which such expertise becomes enmeshed with,
and redistributed through, ‘an ever-growing, ever-more-varied cast
of characters’ (Callon, 1998: 260) sufficiently affected by what is at
issue to want to participate in collectively mapping it into knowledge and, thereby, into its social ordering.
A possible lesson for planning theory is to look at case studies of
longer processes of public engagement between experts and residents,
what (Whatmore, 2009; Whatmore, Lane, Odoni, Ward, & Bradley,
2011; Whatmore & Landström, 2011) has coined ‘competency groups,’
and ask how this type of civic-public formations could more explicitly
grapple with socioecological cleavages and knowledge controversies.
While ‘competency groups’ might not resolve deeper-seated political
18
There has been extensions of how knowledge has been treated in social-ecological
systems theory, for instance through anthropological and indigenous knowledge frameworks (Berkes, 2012) as ‘communities of practice’ (Barthel, Folke, & Colding, 2010), as
embedded in social networks across scales (Ernstson et al., 2010), and as part of social
learning (Crona, Ernstson, Prell, Reed, & Hubacek, 2011; Reed et al., 2010). However,
these developments have mainly been organized—in particular when taken to the policy
level—under the frame of a functional view of knowledge as developed in the main text
(Ernstson, 2013; Evans, 2011).
26
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J.A. Lewis, H. Ernstson
accumulation and infrastructural services for urban interests in the
‘core,’ which lead to disputes and mobilization amongst communities in
the periphery. While more historical case studies are needed, we posit
that large-scale ecosystem restoration programs will necessarily confront not only the prospect of more hazardous hydrologies, but also the
historical legacies, material and political, of water infrastructures and
land use policies at the urban periphery. In these spaces, where vulnerability and hazard exposure has long been off-loaded from urban
environments, marginalized communities will need to develop political
strategies to protect their interests, as large-scale ecological changes are
being proposed and implemented in their immediate environs. How
democracies like that of Louisiana and the USA are to handle such
disagreements in the face of deep uncertainty requires more research
across different contexts.
These are difficult issues, laden with both ambiguity and urgency,
but nonetheless we hope that our case study and its associated framework can raise awareness and curiosity among planners and the broader
profession to seek out in their own planning context how infrastructure,
ecosystems, and planning disputes might be historically intertwined. As
argued by Watson (2003):
deliberative modes of planning that makes certain voices appear illegitimate from the outset, and only minor changes to this order can be
allowed, which also resonates with our earlier discussion of infrastructural violence. Simply put, Watson means that planning needs to
radically acknowledge deep differences and conflicts as a starting point,
and not what should be hidden.
This in turn, and finally, brings home that planning practice cannot
be viewed as an objective or neutral activity, accompanied with signifiers like ‘everybody wins’. Rather, planning should be seen as inherently political, operating through a wider set of democratic practices, which ultimately might produce winners and losers. This expands
planning to importantly be thought with how Rancière (2010) has
conceptualized democratic practices as the ability of those who are not
counted and have no voice, to rupture a given normalized order and
force a new arrangement of who counts as equals. The collective that
made their voices heard from the periphery of the Mississippi should
consequently not simply be labeled “stakeholders,” something nominally defined and “selected” by an external party, typically by authorities, consultants or experts. Rather, these voices should properly be
viewed as a political community, an entity in Ranciére’s terminology that
has rendered itself visible and audible to contest decisions and political
processes in which it was not invited to take part. As a collective they
forced themselves into the field of power, to interrupt and influence.
Thus, when we take in the wider image of what Farmer (2004: 307)
above called the “social machinery of oppression” in the form of infrastructural violence, ‘competency groups’ as a process within planning seem insufficient. Rather a rupture of a normalized order of reason
and reasoning, an acknowledgment of conflicting rationalities had to
occur in order to contest hegemonic categories of the center. As Zarycki
(2007: 125) alluded to above, the center needs to be taught about their
own ignorance in how they view the periphery, which was made possible through petitions, sit-ins, protests, and anti-violent demonstrations.
This sequence, rupture through democratic practices (Rancière,
2010), acknowledgement of conflicting rationalities as a starting point for
planning (Watson, 2009), followed by the “slowing down” of thinking
through constructionist knowledge production via competency groups
(Whatmore, 2009), might hold some promise for thinking through the
role of planning in relation to large-scale ecological interventions and
asymmetrical power relations. Indeed, the political community, here
consisting of St. Bernard Parish and SLC activists and members, came
into being through utilizing the democratic forums at hand — and articulated a potent counter-narrative that stretched back a century. Most
certainly, large-scale interventions of various forms are needed in
Louisiana for the region’s survival. A more geographically nuanced and
historically informed approach to the delta’s transformation might
bring about a more just and perhaps even a more expedient coastal
restoration praxis.
Planning research needs to return to the concrete, to the empirical
and to case research, not as a mindless return to empiricism, but as a
way of gaining a better understanding of the nature of difference,
and generating ideas and propositions which can more adequately
inform practice.
In this sense our case study is full of possibilities for scholars,
planners, ecologists — and activists, to translate and learn from
Louisiana how deep-time and large-scale ecological dynamics intersect
and become part of cultural, economic and planning politics.
What is clear is that ‘resilience thinking,’ if wedded to a policydiscourse where ‘everybody wins’ (which effectively distances it from
its more nuanced non-equilibrium ecological origins), severely downplays what is at stake. The alternative, which the public controversy in
Louisiana has demonstrated, is to acknowledge that resistance and
conflict can be generative and constructive. They embed environments
in historical relations, politicizing environments and opening them up
for what our democracies were set up to handle — dissensus and discontent. In this regard, our case study shows with all clarity that in the
context of global climate change, much is at stake in Louisiana and
across the world’s densely populated coastal regions. In certain communities and habitats, significant territories and indeed entire communities and cultural worlds could come to be submerged by rising seas
or destroyed by storm surges. The current policy trajectory for periurban coastal areas that relies upon ecosystem-based resilience strategies will be bound up in deeply fraught issues of land rights, sense of
place, community displacement, and resettlement (Dalbom,
Hemmerling, & Lewis, 2014). The wider questions on what to do, by
whom, and where, requires not only more research, but also democratic
institutional innovation.
6. Conclusion
While widely touted by scientists and policymakers, planning for
resilience along urbanized coasts implies a more-than-urban project.
Epitomizing ambitious spatial planning agendas, these proposals generate conflicts over design and implementation, regardless of how imperative a project may seem for the future viability of coastal cities and
communities. Indeed, if the principal benefits of ecosystem-based flood
protection are devised to benefit urban residents and firms in the form
of flood protection and risk reduction, the spaces and ecosystems enrolled to create these services are in many cases peri-urban, rural, or
remote coastal landscapes. These initiatives could therefore be forced to
confront long-standing tensions and environmental inequalities between urban cores and their coastal peripheries.
Our historical case study from Louisiana demonstrates how such
tensions emerged through 20th century urban water infrastructure initiatives. Elite actors mobilized peri-urban space to generate capital
Acknowledgement
We thank Sverker Sörlin and Andrew Karvonen for providing
feedback on earlier versions of this manuscript. We also thank the
editor of the journal and in particular two anonymous reviewers for
constructive critique. Ashley Carse is also acknowledged for discussions
that clarified our approach. We are of course wholly responsible for the
final text. The Swedish Research Council Formas is further acknowledged for providing funding through the research grant
“Socioecological Movements and Transformative Collective Action in
Urban Ecosystems” (MOVE; Dnr: 211-2011-1519, which has funded
interdisciplinary urban ecology research in Cape Town and New
Orleans. For more information, see http://www.situatedecologies.net.
27
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J.A. Lewis, H. Ernstson
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J.A. Lewis, H. Ernstson
outcomes and urban politics. This research is intended to present policy-relevant findings
that enable managers to better engage communities and understand the connections
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be found at http://www.situatedecologies.net.
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Dr. Henrik Ernstson is developing a situated approach to urban political ecology with
studies on urban infrastructure, collective action, environmental conflicts and ecosystem
management in Cape Town, New Orleans, Stockholm, and Kampala. He is currently finalizing two co-edited books—Grounding Urban Natures (Ernstson & Sörlin, MIT Press)
and Urban Political Ecology in the Anthropo-Obscene (Ernstson & Swyngedouw,
Routledge)—and a research-based film about race, nature, and the postcolonial city with
Jacob von Heland called One Table Two Elephants. He is Research Fellow at the KTH
Royal Institute of Technology in Stockholm, Honorary Visiting Scholar at the African
Centre for Cities at University of Cape Town, and part-time Lecturer in Human Geography
at The University of Manchester with a previous Postdoc at the Department of History at
Stanford University.
Dr. Joshua Lewis is a research assistant professor at the Tulane ByWater Institute and a
researcher at the Stockholm Resilience Centre. He has a background in systems ecology
and historical ecology, with a special focus on how water infrastructure shapes ecosystem
30