The Diskin success story

Op-ed: Outgoing Shin Bet chief leaves behind defeated terrorists, relative quiet for Israelis

Roni Shaked|Published: 03.30.11 , 18:13

The Shin Bet security service that will be handed over to Yoram Cohen is an orderly, professional and well-oiled organization. Moreover, despite its size there are only few personal tensions among its top echelon. This should mostly be credited to Yuval Diskin’s leadership.

The outgoing Shin Bet chief is leaving behind him an organization boasting high-level operational capabilities, broad public support and plenty of success stories.

Yuval Diskin started his term as Shin Bet director in May 2005. The agency’s greatest achievement during his era was the persistent war on Palestinian terrorism. The security calm within the Green Line was secured via intense work by Shin Bet handlers in the West Bank, the expansion of the professional workforce, and the development of new intelligence tactics that thwarted attacks.

Under Diskin’s guidance and encouragement, the Shin Bet tightened its cooperation with Palestinian security arms. This collaborative work helped in minimizing Palestinian terror in the territories, and Diskin did not hide his satisfaction over the results.

During Diskin’s term, we also saw increasingly tighter cooperation with the IDF and Mossad. The collaboration with the army peaked during Operation Cast Lead in Gaza, where even relatively lower ranks such as regiment and platoon commanders enjoyed cooperated with Shin Bet agents, a fact that contributed to the operation’s success.

The Shalit failure

Another achievement on the southern front is the formulate of a modus operandi that facilitated the uncovering of many terror cells making their way from the Gaza Strip to the Sinai Peninsula and from there attempting to infiltrate Israel.

One of the most sensitive challenges addressed by the Shin Bet during Diskin’s term in office is the investigation of terrorism and political subversion among Israel’s Arab citizens. Diskin led the consistent effort on this issue, and as far as the Shin Bet is concerned the handling of the various affairs, including the Azmi Bishara Affair and Issam Makhoul’s arrest, were undertaken with both determination and sensitivity.

At the same time, at the end of his term Diskin is also leaving behind a few failures. The most prominent one is the inability to elicit operational intelligence information that could facilitate abducted IDF soldier Gilad Shalit’s release.

Almost five years have passed since Shalit’s abduction to the Gaza Strip, yet the Shin Bet has not been able to gather information that could help in securing his release.