

# Did "Peace Through Strength" End the Cold War?

Lessons from INF

Thomas Risse-Kappen

Now that the Cold

War seems to be over, with the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the transition of the Central Eastern European countries toward democracies and market economies, two important debates are taking place among scholars, policy-makers, and the public at large. The first concerns the future of European security and the question of whether the post-Cold War world will be a safer or a more dangerous place.<sup>1</sup> The second debate focuses on the reasons for the recent changes. An emerging conventional wisdom seems to hold that the end of the Cold War represents a victory for Western strategies of "peace through strength" or at least "containment." Standing tough against the Soviets seems to have paid off, leading to a complete turnaround in Soviet foreign policy, revolutionary arms reduction treaties, and the collapse of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe. Therefore, the lesson to be learned, in this view, is that resolve and "bargaining from strength," rather than strategies of reassurance, are likely to produce cooperative outcomes, particular in times of increasing uncertainty about the future of the Soviet Union.<sup>2</sup>

This paper builds upon and expands an argument originally developed in Thomas Risse-Kappen, *Structure and Process in Superpower Arms Control: Lessons from INF*, Working Paper (Los Angeles: Center for International and Strategic Affairs, UCLA, 1989). I am very grateful for comments on earlier versions of the paper by Matthew Evangelista, Ann Florini, Gert Krell, Richard Ned Lebow, Robert Nurick, William Potter, Richard Rosecrance, Leon Sigal, Michael Stafford, Janice Gross Stein, and James Thomson. For a more historical account of the INF story, see Thomas Risse-Kappen, *The Zero Option: INF, West Germany, and Arms Control* (Westview, 1988).

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1. See, for example, Jack Snyder, "Averting Anarchy in the New Europe," *International Security*, Vol. 14, No. 4 (Spring 1990), pp. 5-41; John Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," *International Security*, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer 1990), pp. 5-56; Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe After the Cold War," *International Security*, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Winter 1990/91), pp. 7-57.
2. "What made the start of [arms] reductions possible was the willingness of the democracies to maintain an adequate deterrence posture. What will sustain the process of reductions is the willingness to ensure that at every level of reductions, deterrence is maintained and preferably strengthened." Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, Yasuhiro Nakasone, and Henry A. Kissinger, "East-West Relations," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 68, No. 3 (Summer 1989), pp. 1-21, at 8-9. See also Robert

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One of the first events that led many to believe in the wisdom of "peace through strength" was the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which eliminated all U.S. and Soviet land-based medium range missiles, and also systems of shorter ranges above 500 km. (See chronology pages 164-165.) The treaty contains intrusive verification procedures unprecedented in nuclear arms control, including on-site inspections at deployment and maintenance facilities. The agreement was concluded only after the West had deployed new Pershing II and cruise missiles in Europe in response to the Soviet SS-20 buildup. While earlier attempts to reach a negotiated outcome failed, the INF Treaty became possible when the Soviet leadership finally accepted the 1981 Western proposal of a "zero option" of eliminating all U.S. and Soviet land-based INF missiles world-wide.

Thus, the treaty is widely regarded as the result of effective Cold War diplomacy. As George Bush argued,

I was in Europe trying to convince European public opinion that we were going forward with the deployment of the INF weapons, and thank God the freeze people were not heard—they were wrong—and the result is we got the Soviets kept deploying, and then we negotiated the INF strength, and now we have the first arms control agreement in the history of the age to ban weapons. You just don't make unilateral cuts in the hope that the Soviets are going to behave themselves.<sup>3</sup>

I will argue in this paper that this evaluation is flawed. A closer look at the history of the INF treaty reveals that tough bargaining strategies adopted by the West throughout the process, but they failed prior to the INF treaty was only achievable after the leadership change in the Soviet Union. This means, first, that reference to bargaining strategies alone is not an account for the final outcome. Second, I will argue that crucial events in

J. Einhorn, *Negotiating from Strength: Leverage in U.S.-Soviet Arms Control Negotiations* (New York: Praeger, 1985); John Lewis Gaddis, "Hanging Tough Paid Off," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 45, No. 1 (January 1989), pp. 11-14; Richard Pipes, "Can the Soviet Union Reform?" *Affairs*, Vol. 63, No. 1 (1984), pp. 47-61. For an excellent overview of the debate on the INF Treaty, see Matthew Evangelista, "Sources of Moderation in Soviet Arms Policy," in Philip E. Tetlock, et al., eds., *Behavior, Society, and Nuclear War*, Vol. 2 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 251-354.

3. Then Vice-president George Bush in the second Presidential Debate, transcript, 1988, October 15, 1988, p. 11. For a similar assessment, see David T. Jones, "How to Deal with Gorbachev's Team," *Orbis*, Vol. 33, No. 3 (Summer 1989), pp. 357-374. For an analysis of the INF episode as a battle between the forces of liberal democracy and totalitarianism, see Jeffrey Herf, *War by Other Means: Soviet Power, West German Resistance, and the Battle for Europe* (New York: Free Press, 1991). For a more balanced evaluation see Lynn I. Cohen, "Lessons of the INF Treaty," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 66, No. 4 (Spring 1988), pp. 720-734.

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From "Dual Track" to "Double Zero:" A Chronology of the INF Treaty

Early 1970s NATO's Nuclear Planning Group starts evaluating U.S. short- and medium-range nuclear arsenals in Europe.

April 1975 U.S. Secretary of Defense demands modernization of U.S. nuclear forces deployed in Europe.

Early 1977 USSR begins deploying a new medium-range missile with three warheads, the SS-20.

October 11-12, 1977 NATO appoints a High Level Group (HLG) to advise on modernization of U.S. INF in Europe.

October 28, 1977 West German Chancellor Schmidt, in a speech in London, points to increasing nuclear imbalances in Europe.

March 1978 The HLG demands "evolutionary upward adjustment" of NATO's INF posture.

April 7, 1978 President Carter cancels development of the "neutron bomb," preempting a NATO decision in support of the weapon and its inclusion in arms control. The neutron bomb controversy has repercussions for public opinion, transatlantic relations, and U.S. policies in the INF case.

Summer 1978 The Carter administration decides to support the emerging NATO consensus; the European governments urge the U.S. to complement a NATO modernization decision with an offer to negotiate.

January 5-6, 1979 The heads of the U.S., British, French, and West German governments decide to combine INF modernization with an arms control offer (the "dual-track" approach).

October 6, 1979 Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev announces unilateral withdrawal of some troops and tanks from East Germany. The proposal offers too little too late to affect NATO's decision-making process.

December 3-7, 1979 The German Social Democrats decide to tolerate the NATO dual track decision, if the West is prepared to forgo deployment in exchange for substantial reductions of Soviet INF.

December 12, 1979 NATO's foreign and defense ministers make the INF "dual track" decision to deploy 572 U.S. Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe, and at the same time to offer INF negotiations to the Soviet Union. The decision document contains a vague reference to a "zero option."

December 27, 1979 The USSR intervenes in Afghanistan.

July 1, 1980 During Schmidt's visit to Moscow, the Soviet leadership announces it will embark upon INF arms control talks.

January 20, 1981 President Ronald Reagan takes office.

February 23, 1981 Brezhnev proposes a moratorium on INF deployment while negotiations take place; NATO rejects it on the grounds that it would freeze the existing imbalance.

May 4-6, 1981 Under increasing European pressure, the Reagan administration is prepared to enter INF negotiations.

October, 1981 Hundreds of thousands demonstrate in Western Europe against proposed deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles.

November 18, 1981 President Reagan proposes global elimination of all U.S. and Soviet land-based INF missiles (the "zero option").

November 23, 1981 Visiting Bonn, Brezhnev rejects the zero option.

November 30, 1981 INF talks start in Geneva.

February 4, 1982 The Soviets propose reduction of existing INF missiles and aircraft to 300 systems each (including French and British forces on the U.S. side), with deployment of no new systems.

June 1982 The chief INF negotiators, Paul Nitze and Yuli Kvitsinsky, work out a compromise proposal during a "walk in the woods" in Geneva. U.S. and Soviet INF launchers in Europe would be considerably reduced, and the U.S. would forgo deployment of the Pershing II missiles. The compromise is rejected both in Washington and in Moscow.

December 21, 1982 Soviet General Secretary Andropov proposes to reduce SS-20 force in Europe to the same level as British and forces, if the U.S. forgoes deployment of new missiles.

September 22, 1983 The U.S. proposes an INF "interim solution" which would the USSR with extra SS-20 missiles in Asia.

November 22, 1983 The U.S. starts deploying Pershing II missiles in West Germany. One day later, the USSR leaves the INF negotiating table in Geneva.

September 24, 1984 President Reagan proposes to resume nuclear arms talks. Secretary of State Shultz and Foreign Minister Gromyko to resume nuclear arms negotiations.

January 7-8, 1985 The Soviet Politburo apparently re-evaluates the SS-20 issue and concludes that it was militarily irrelevant.

Summer 1985 Gorbachev proposes to eliminate all nuclear weapons worldwide by the year 2000. Part of his proposal is an INF option confined to Europe.

January 15, 1986 The Soviet Union gives up its demand to count British and French nuclear forces in an INF agreement.

September 19, 1986 At the Reykjavik summit, Reagan and Gorbachev agree to eliminate all U.S. and Soviet INF missiles from Europe and to SS-20 arsenals deployed in Asia. But the Soviets link treaty to agreement on SDI. Many European governments criticize these results; Bonn and Washington finally convince other allies to endorse zero INF in Europe.

October 10-12, 1986 Gorbachev drops the linkage between an INF treaty and agreement on SDI. The issue of constraining shorter-range forces (SNF) now becomes the major block to an INF treaty. The U.S. proposes intrusive verification arrangements including on-site inspections, to supervise compliance with treaty. The Soviets later accept them, in substance.

February 28, 1987 Gorbachev suggests a "double zero" agreement, to eliminate in Europe Soviet SS-20 and U.S. Pershing II and cruise missiles, and also shorter-range (500-1000 km) missiles. After a protracted debate, particularly in Bonn, the Alliance accepts the proposal.

March 12, 1987 Gorbachev accepts global elimination of all land-based ranges between 500 and 5,500 km, in essence NATO's "zero option."

April 13-14, 1987 The INF treaty is signed at the Washington summit. It eliminates more than 3400 land-based U.S.-Soviet missiles with ranges between 500-5500 km, and provides for unprecedented destruction of modern weapons systems and intrusive verification measures including on-site verification at missile deployment and maintenance facilities.

July 21, 1987 93 U.S. senators approve the INF treaty; ratification documents are exchanged at the U.S.-Soviet summit in Moscow two days later, and the INF treaty enters into force.

December 7-10, 1987

May 29-31, 1988

NOTES: This chronology was compiled from various sources cited in the notes to the text. The following give especially useful background: Jonathan Haslam, *The Soviet Union and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons in Europe, 1969-1987* (London: Macmillan, 1989); Risse-Kappen, *The Zero Option: INF, West Germany, and Arms Control* (Boulder: Westview, 1988); Strobe Talbott, *Deadly Gambits* (New York: Knopf, 1984); J. Thomson, "The LRTNF Decision: Evolution of U.S. Theatre Nuclear Policy, 1975-1984," *International Affairs*, Vol. 60, No. 4 (1984), pp. 601-614. Note that the official U.S. history of the INF negotiations is not always correct. It erroneously assumes, for example, that NATO's High Level Group was established after Schmidt's 1977 speech, that the "walk in the woods" was only rejected in Moscow without mentioning the objections in Washington, that NATO's INF deployment began with cruise missiles rather than Pershing II. See States Information Agency, *Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Chronology* (Washington, D.C.: USIA, December 1987).

to the INF treaty can only be explained in the context of domestic politics in Western Europe, in the Soviet Union and, to a lesser extent, in the United States. These incidents are NATO's 1979 "dual-track" decision to deploy Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe, and at the same time to offer INF negotiations to the Soviet Union; the 1981 U.S. adoption of the "zero option" of no U.S. INF deployment in exchange for elimination of all Soviet SS-20s; and the turnaround of Soviet security policy in 1986-87.

It is essential not to misread the history of the INF treaty in seeking lessons from the end of the Cold War. An analysis of the first U.S.-Soviet agreement to eliminate an entire category of modern nuclear forces also serves to underscore or to modify certain assumptions in the theoretical literature on the conditions and constraints of international cooperation.<sup>4</sup> The INF case suggests, for example, that more attention must be paid to the international and domestic environment in which security cooperation among conflict opponents takes place. Scholarly attention should, therefore, focus on the interaction of these factors with bargaining strategies in order to explain cooperative outcomes.

In this article, I will first discuss whether the INF treaty can be explained with regard to the bargaining strategies of both sides. I will then look at the factors in the international and domestic environments of the negotiations that might account for the outcome. I conclude that both sides did react to external developments but in ways that were determined by domestic coalition-building processes. In other words, the history of the INF treaty does not support the conclusion that "peace through strength" ended the Cold War.

### Strategies of Cooperation and Coercion

Explaining cooperation among states has become a major focus of international relations theory. The literature dealing with bargaining strategies intended to facilitate cooperation seems to suggest that reassuring strategies

4. See, for example, Robert Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation* (New York: Basic Books, 1984); Alexander George, Philip J. Farley, and Alexander Dallin, eds., *U.S.-Soviet Security Cooperation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988); Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, "Beyond Deterrence," *Journal of Social Issues*, Vol. 43, No. 4 (1987), pp. 5-71; Kenneth Oye, ed., *Cooperation Under Anarchy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986).

of reciprocity are more likely to succeed than coercive diplomacy.<sup>5</sup> The "for Tat" strategy, for example, calls for one opening cooperative gesture; the subsequent move is cooperative or confrontational, matching the other side's immediately preceding move.<sup>6</sup> The efficacy of "Tit for Tat" was identified in small group experiments, and it is questionable whether it is at all applicable to the complexities of international affairs, because it ignores the political context in which the interaction takes place. The strategy also assumes that both sides are capable of determining precisely whether an action was meant to be cooperative or confrontational. "Tit for Tat" is, therefore, particularly vulnerable to the error of attribution: "When the other state makes a conciliatory gesture, policymakers conclude that the other side is attempting to deceive or lull them into lowering their guard; when they themselves make a concession, it is [thought to be] a response to international tensions and the need to prevent war."<sup>7</sup>

Some game theorists have proposed a more "forgiving" diplomatic strategy of reciprocity in order to overcome this problem of attribution.<sup>8</sup> It is similar to Charles Osgood's proposal of *Graduated Reciprocation in Tension-reduction* (GRIT), which requires repeated unilateral "friendly" initiatives in order to reassure the other side about one's own peaceful intentions.<sup>9</sup>

Coercive diplomacy forms the other end of the spectrum of bargaining strategies.<sup>10</sup> It communicates that failure to cooperate would result in a weakening of the other side's security: "You either give in and accept cooperation according to my terms or your own position will become worse." Thus, a "cooperative" outcome essentially means that the opponent backs off.

Conditional reciprocity is a more benign strategy. Similarly to coercive diplomacy, it communicates that the security position of the opponent will

5. For excellent reviews of this literature, see Alexander George, "Strategies for Facilitating Cooperation," in George, Farley, and Dallin, *U.S.-Soviet Security Cooperation*, pp. 692-711; Lebow and Stein, "Beyond Deterrence."

6. See Axelrod, *Evolution of Cooperation*. For a critical discussion see Deborah Larson, "Prevention and the Austrian State Treaty," *International Organization*, Vol. 41, No. 1 (1987), pp. 27-60; Lebow and Stein, "Beyond Deterrence," pp. 41-46.

7. Larson, "Crisis Prevention," p. 31.

8. See, for example, George W. Downs, et al., "Arms Races and Cooperation," *World Politics*, Vol. 38, No. 1 (October 1985), pp. 118-146; also George W. Downs and David M. Rocke, "Bargaining and Arms Control," *World Politics*, Vol. 39, No. 3 (April 1987), pp. 297-325.

9. See Charles Osgood, *An Alternative to War and Surrender* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1962).

10. See Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing, *Conflict Among Nations* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977), pp. 44-45, 118-122.

be worsened if the opponent does not compromise. Unlike sheer coercion, though, the strategy does consist of some concessions if the target shows restraint. In the arms control literature, the "bargaining chip approach" represents conditional reciprocity.<sup>11</sup> For example, a weapon is produced and deployed in order to give it away for substantial concessions at the negotiating table. However, there is an inherent dilemma with the bargaining chip strategy. If the bargaining chip has no military value at all, it is unlikely that the opponent will make significant concessions. But if the weapon is indeed valuable enough to induce cooperation, the domestic constituency which supported the weapon in the first place might create serious obstacles for trading it away later. More important, a bargaining-chip strategy faces a communication problem. The more the punishment side is emphasized (i.e., the closer the strategy comes to coercive diplomacy), the less likely it is that the negotiating partner will perceive the cooperative intention.

### 1975-85: The Failure of "Bargaining from Strength"

NATO's 1979 "dual track" approach combined the modernization and deployment of new U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe with an offer to negotiate reductions. This represented a strategy of strictly conditional reciprocity. Western INF were "bargaining chips"; the Pershing II and cruise missiles were "loaded" with military value, to counter the SS-20 build-up, to implement NATO's military doctrine of "flexible response," and to visibly couple the United States to West European security in an era of strategic parity.<sup>12</sup> There is plenty of evidence that the weapons were indeed perceived as a new threat by the Soviet Union.<sup>13</sup> The dual-track approach offered Western constraints only if the Soviets made drastic reductions in their INF.

11. See George Rathjens, "Unilateral Initiatives for Limiting and Reducing Arms," in William Epstein and Bernard T. Feld, eds., *New Directions in Disarmament* (New York: Praeger, 1981) pp. 174ff; George, "Strategies for Facilitating Cooperation."

12. For critical discussions of the military rationale for the INF deployment see, for example, Susanne Peters, *The Germans and the INF Missiles* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1990); Leon V. Sigal, *Nuclear Forces in Europe* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1984); and James A. Thomson, "The LRTNF decision: Evolution of NATO Theatre Nuclear Policy 1975-9," *International Affairs*, Vol. 40, No. 4 (October 1984), pp. 601-614.

13. See Raymond L. Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1985), pp. 1018-1019; Jonathan Haslam, *The Soviet Union and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons in Europe, 1969-87* (London: Macmillan, 1989), pp. 109-110; David Holloway, "The INF Policy of the Soviet Union," in H. H. Holm and N. Peterson, eds., *The European Missile Crisis* (New York: St. Martin's, 1983), pp. 92-114.

Thus, the strategy begun in 1979 resembled one of "bargaining strength."

How is it that the strategy failed to achieve an arms control agreement prior to the change in the Soviet leadership? It has been argued that the arms control track of the 1979 decision was a waste of time, because it prevented both sides from entering into serious talks before the deployment took place in 1983. The 1981-83 Geneva negotiations on medium-range missiles were doomed to fail, it is said, because NATO had to engage in diplomacy to appease nervous public opinion in Western Europe. At the same time, peace movements emerged in most deployment countries, particularly in West Germany, and launched vigorous campaigns against the Pershing II and cruise missiles.<sup>14</sup> Thus, it is argued, the Soviet Union could just sit and see whether the West was able to carry out its deployment decision given the domestic opposition.<sup>15</sup>

This argument incorrectly blames NATO's bargaining strategy for the absence of conditions conducive to its success. If the Soviet Union had known whether the West would be able to carry out its deployment decision, the dual track approach of deployment-plus-negotiations was not, as some have claimed, irresponsible. It was precisely worded and clearly defined as a strategy of conditional reciprocity.<sup>16</sup> Moreover, if the approach was not always successful, then that was so not on the coercive, but on the cooperative side.

14. See Thomas Rochon, *The Politics of the Peace Movements in Western Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988); Josef Janning, et al., eds., *Friedensbewegungen: Entwicklung und Folgen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Europa und den USA* (Köln: Wissenschaft und Politik, 1987). On West European public opinion at the time see Richard Eichenberg, *Public Opinion and National Security in Western Europe* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989). On the German peace debate, see Thomas Risse-Kappen, *Die Krise der Sicherheitspolitik. Neuen Ideen und Entscheidungsprozesse im politischen System der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1977-1984* (München: Grünewald-Kaiser, 1988).

15. See Lothar Rühl, *Mittelstreckenwaffen in Europa* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1987), p. 3. Jonathan Haslam argues that the Soviet leadership had learned the wrong lessons from the early successful European protests against the neutron bomb in 1977-78, and hoped that peace movements in Western Europe would be able to stop NATO's INF deployment. Haslam, *The Soviet Union and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons*, pp. 96-105, 115-118. Valentin Falin, former Soviet Ambassador to West Germany, particularly argued that domestic pressure in Europe would prevent NATO from carrying out the deployment. See his articles in *Pravda*, February 25, 1983; March 17, 1983; September 11, 1983. I thank Ted Hopf for alerting me to Falin's predictions.

16. The 1979 communiqué stated that "NATO's TNF [Theater Nuclear Forces] requirement be examined in light of concrete results reached through negotiations" (emphasis added). It thus made it abundantly clear that only a formal agreement could prevent NATO from the deployment.

the Soviets had doubts about the seriousness of Western intentions, they must have been about arms control, not deployment.

Many U.S. and NATO officials, for example, saw the arms control offer as mere rhetoric to cover the intent to carry out the deployment despite domestic pressures. The 1981 "zero option" was deemed to be unacceptable to the Soviets by most Western diplomats, including U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig. U.S. arms control opponents such as Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle supported the zero option on a take-it-or-leave-it basis precisely because they hoped it would block an agreement. The NATO military tolerated it, because they regarded it as a way to appease a pacifist mood in Western Europe, while assuring timely deployment in 1983.<sup>17</sup> It became obvious that leading U.S. decision-makers were not interested in a compromise at the time, when the only serious attempt to compromise was repudiated in Washington. In the summer of 1982, during the famous "walk in the woods," U.S. chief negotiator Paul Nitze and his Soviet counterpart, Yuli Kvitsinsky, had worked out a formula that would have severely reduced the Soviet SS-20 force and, in exchange, prevented the United States from deploying the Pershing II missile. The compromise was rejected in both capitals, and the first INF talks ended in a complete stalemate.<sup>18</sup>

Are there any indications that a more conciliatory approach on part of the West would have produced a more successful outcome prior to 1983? What would have happened, for example, if NATO had initiated a "Tit for Tat" strategy and announced a unilateral deployment moratorium in 1979 instead of the "dual track" decision?

There are very few indications that the Soviets would have acted differently if the West had adopted a more cooperative strategy. Jonathan Haslam argues that the Soviet decision to deploy the SS-20 was primarily made in response to the U.S. refusal to accept constraints on its forward-based medium-range aircraft during the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) in the early 1970s.<sup>19</sup> Other scholars argue that "the Soviets had considered the SS-20 a routine, if rather belated, replacement for the obsolescent SS-4 and SS-5."<sup>20</sup> If so, a U.S.

moratorium on deployment in 1979 would not have given Moscow a reason to forgo deployment.

More important, the Soviet Union under Brezhnev's leadership did show much readiness to accept constraints on its SS-20 build-up. Moscow must have been well aware that its behavior was perceived as threatening by the West, since there was no lack of communication between Western Europe and the USSR during the late 1970s. The 1979 NATO decision was prepared in an environment of détente in Europe, with diplomatic channels between East and West intact. While misperception because of communication failures is often responsible for unsuccessful conciliatory moves, it probably was excluded in this case. There was no indication that Brezhnev or trusted West European leaders like Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, James Callaghan, or Helmut Schmidt. These decision-makers made it clear that they regarded the SS-20 build-up as intolerable and that the West would not take action in the absence of Soviet restraint. From 1978 on, for example, the INF issue was at the top of the agenda in Soviet-West German relations. Indeed, a major conciliatory move by the USSR in summer 1979 probably would have prevented NATO from taking the "dual-track" decision because of domestic opposition in those countries where the new NATO policies were to be deployed.<sup>21</sup>

Instead, General Secretary Brezhnev and Foreign Minister Gromyko, for whatever reasons, played what game theorists call "deadlock."<sup>22</sup> They preferred continued INF competition instead of mutual cooperation. Was the Politburo preoccupied with the strategic relationship with the United States, or whether it hoped that NATO would not be able to carry out deployment because of domestic opposition, remain open questions.

21. See, for example, Helmut Schmidt's account of his talks to the Soviet leadership, *in* 1977: *Menschen und Mächte* (Berlin: Siedler, 1987), pp. 90–106. See also Thomas Risse, *The Zero Option: INF, West Germany, and Arms Control* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1988), pp. 44–45.

22. At least some Soviet officials were aware of this possibility. The Soviet deputy foreign minister at the time, Georgi Kornienko, now concedes that it was indeed the "main" reason of the Brezhnev leadership not to have announced an SS-20 deployment moratorium in the summer of 1979. See Georgi M. Kornienko, "Pravda i domysly o raketakh SS-20," *SSh* (1989), pp. 46–48. For an analysis of the Kornienko article see Cynthia Roberts, "Adversaries, Limited Arms Control: Changing Soviet Interests and Prospects for European Security Cooperation," *in* Michael Mandelbaum, ed., *The Other Side of the Table: A New Approach to Arms Control* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1990), pp. 142–143.

23. See Downs, "Arms Races and Cooperation."

17. See Strobe Talbott, *Deadly Gambits* (New York: Knopf, 1984), part I; Alexander Haig, *Caveat: Realism, Reason, and Foreign Policy* (New York: Macmillan, 1984), p. 229.

18. On the "walk in the woods," see Talbott, *Deadly Gambits*, pp. 116–151.

19. Haslam, *The Soviet Union and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons*, pp. 58–69.

20. Michael McGwire, *Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1987), pp. 249–250. See also Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation*, pp. 870–879; and Holloway, "INF Policy." The SS-20 represented, however, a three-fold increase in warheads as compared to its predecessors.

In any case, Soviet behavior up to 1983 did not indicate that Brezhnev or his immediate successors were interested in an arms control compromise. During the first INF talks, the Soviet bargaining position did not change very much. Throughout the negotiations, the Soviets insisted that any U.S.-Soviet agreement had to take the British and French nuclear forces into account. This was unacceptable for the United States and NATO and was so communicated to the USSR.<sup>24</sup> The issue subsequently became the major obstacle to agreement prior to 1983. The Soviet leadership also rejected the "walk in the woods" formula in the summer of 1982, which would have spared it the deployment of the Pershing II missiles capable of hitting hardened command and control facilities in the Western USSR. Moscow's only major concession between 1981 and 1983 consisted of accepting constraints on SS-20 missiles based in the Asian part of the Soviet Union.

Thus, prior to Gorbachev coming into power, the dual track approach failed to achieve an agreement, but not because it was either too dovish or too hawkish. It just did not meet the circumstances. The Soviet leadership had defined the situation in a way that a mutually acceptable agreement was not possible. There are, therefore, two important lessons to be learned from the unsuccessful part of the INF history. First, the Western INF bargaining strategy was based on conditional reciprocity and, thus, came closer to coercive diplomacy than to strategies of reassurance. It nevertheless failed to achieve an agreement in the period prior to 1985-86. Since "bargaining from strength" cannot explain the failure to achieve an agreement during the first ten years of the INF episode, the strategy alone cannot be held responsible for the successful conclusion of the treaty in 1987, either. Second, no matter how well-defined or well-executed bargaining strategies are, they are likely to fail if they do not meet international and domestic conditions conducive to arms control. This is precisely the difference between the situation before 1985 and afterwards.

24. The decision not to accept limitations on third-country forces in bilateral U.S.-Soviet negotiations was made as early as January 1979 at the Guadeloupe summit of the United States, Great Britain, France, and West Germany. The decision was also consistent with U.S. policies throughout the SALT negotiations. Had the Soviet Union insisted on the inclusion of American INF aircraft based in Europe—the Forward Based Systems (FBS)—the West Germans, at least, would have been sympathetic. For the Soviet negotiating position during the first INF negotiations see Haslam, *The Soviet Union and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons*, pp. 106-140; and Andrew C. Goldberg, "Moscow's INF Experience," in Mandelbaum, *The Other Side of the Table*, pp. 89-119.

### 1985-87: Was "Bargaining from Strength" Responsible for Success?

The "peace through strength" explanation holds that it was the Western resolve to carry out the 1979 deployment decision that four years later brought about the "double-zero" agreement eliminating U.S. and Soviet and shorter-range missiles.<sup>25</sup> In 1983, NATO and the United States perceived that they would not give in to either Soviet or domestic (peace move) pressures. In the absence of the "concrete negotiating results" called for in the 1979 decision, deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles proceeded on schedule and worsened the Soviet security position with regard to Western Europe. Now the Soviet Union had a strong incentive to cooperate to pay a high price in order to get the Western INF removed. Others argued, in a variant of the "bargaining-from-strength" argument, that the threat of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) that convinced the Soviets to make concessions on INF.<sup>26</sup>

Indeed, NATO's INF deployment in 1983 did probably contribute to change in Soviet INF policy. Given the history of Soviet INF policy prior to 1985, Moscow would probably have viewed Western non-deployment precisely the same way as the "double-zero" agreement is now perceived in the West: as the result of "peace through strength." Under these circumstances, supporters of *perestroika* would have had a hard time convincing the Politburo and the military that Brezhnev's security policy had been a disaster for the Soviet Union and that the SS-20 had to be given up.

While NATO's INF deployment might, therefore, have been a factor in the turnaround in Soviet security policy, it was neither sufficient nor decisive. There are three reasons for this evaluation. First, despite the domestic threat the deployment created in Western Europe, there was nothing special about the deployment in light of the history of the East-West arms race. Stationing Pershing II and cruise missiles on NATO territory added another step to an ongoing competition. In the past, the Soviet Union usually reacted to what it perceived as a threatening move by the West.

25. See the sources quoted in note 3.

26. Haslam, *The Soviet Union and Nuclear Weapons*, p. 173. This argument is unconvincing. It does not explain why the Soviets shifted their position regarding the linkage between SDI and INF twice during 1985 and 1987. Soviet concern about SDI cannot account for the insistence that an INF agreement should only be concluded if progress were made in the prohibition of ballistic missile defenses, and the subsequent decision to drop this linkage in February 1987.

balancing rather than cooperative behavior. The SS-20 itself was viewed by the Soviets in this way. As a result, Moscow could simply have continued the INF arms competition. This is precisely what the Soviets did in 1984–85 (after the first Pershing and cruise missile deployment, but before Gorbachev). They left the bargaining table in Geneva, accelerated the deployment of new shorter-range missiles in Eastern Europe, and in 1985 tested a successor model for the SS-20 that was to meet what some Western analysts saw as a "very demanding requirement."<sup>27</sup> Had the Soviets continued on this path, the Pershing II deployment would have been just another episode in an ongoing arms race, rather than a turning point.

Second, the "bargaining from strength" argument cannot explain the scope of the change in Soviet INF policy. The 1987 INF treaty is not just another arms control compromise to which both sides contributed by making concessions. Step by step, Mikhail Gorbachev turned Moscow's INF policy around completely. The USSR no longer insisted on including British and French nuclear forces in a U.S.-Soviet agreement. As it had in SALT I, Moscow gave up again on placing constraints on the American Forward Based Systems. Finally and most important, Gorbachev accepted NATO's 1981 "zero option," to eliminate the entire SS-20 force, and he also offered to eliminate short-range missiles with ranges above 500 km, that is, the modern SS-13 and SS-12 missiles (the second zero of the "double zero" agreement).<sup>28</sup> The Western INF deployment in 1983 cannot explain any of these moves.

Finally, the "bargaining from strength" explanation would be stronger, if learning had occurred among the Soviet decision-makers, that is, if the same leaders who were responsible for Moscow's intransigence during the early 1980s had initiated the policy change in the mid-1980s. However, Soviet INF policy turned around following a leadership change that brought in new people whose outlook on Soviet foreign policy was different from that of the Brezhnev coalition. As I argue below, many "new thinkers" in Gorbachev's circle had never accepted the original deployment rationale for the SS-20 missiles and had considered Brezhnev's foreign policy legacy a disaster all along.

In conclusion, Western "bargaining from strength" did not cause the double zero agreement, but it was not totally irrelevant, either. The failure of

the earlier Soviet INF policy, symbolized by the Western deployment in 1983, might have contributed to the change in Moscow's foreign policy, serving as an additional argument for Mikhail Gorbachev and the new leaders that the Soviet Union desperately needed a new approach to security. However, without the change in the Soviet leadership, the U.S. strategy of "peace through strength" would have failed after 1985 as it did fail. Reference to negotiating behavior does not solve the INF puzzle. One must look at the international and domestic environments of the negotiating powers to explain the double zero agreement.

### *The Balance of Military Power: Limited Impact*

As argued above, the success and the appropriateness of either "hard" or "dovish" bargaining strategies depend on whether they meet the specific circumstances of the situation.<sup>29</sup> If at least one side plays "deadlock," as was the case throughout much of the INF negotiations, there is virtually no room for compromise, and bargaining strategies become irrelevant. If the game is a "prisoner's dilemma," in which mutual cooperation is preferred under certain conditions, bargaining from strength is likely to produce adverse outcomes by escalating mutual suspicion. Finally, if each side is prepared to cooperate no matter what the other side does, specific negotiating strategies are irrelevant as in the case of "deadlock." Which game is played depends on the preferences of decision-makers which, however, largely depend on the international and domestic environment in which they act. These conditions have to be understood in order to determine whether or not the actors are prepared to cooperate, and therefore which strategies are likely to be effective.

The arms control literature has identified several factors in the international environment which are thought to be crucial to the success or failure of security cooperation.<sup>30</sup> Among those determinants, the balance of

29. For a similar argument applied to a different period, see Matthew Evangelista, "Cold War Theory and Disarmament Negotiations in the 1950s," *World Politics*, Vol. 42, No. 4 (1999), pp. 502–528.

30. See, for example, George, Farley, and Dallin, *U.S.-Soviet Security Cooperation*; Albrecht and Richard N. Haass, eds., *Superpower Arms Control: Setting the Record Straight* (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1987); Gert Krell, "Problems and Achievements of Arms Control," *Arms Control*, Vol. 2, No. 3 (1981), pp. 247–283; Joseph Kruzel, "From Rush-Bagot to START: The Evolution of Arms Control," *Orbis*, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Spring 1986), pp. 193–216; Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Learning and U.S.-Soviet Security Regimes," *International Organization*, Vol. 41, No. 3 (1987), pp. 370–402.

27. McGwire, *Military Objectives*, p. 515.

28. On the significance of these missiles see Dennis Gormley, *Double Zero and Soviet Military Strategy: Implications for Western Security* (Guildford, U.K.: Jane's, 1988).

power figures prominently.<sup>31</sup> Most analysts assume that arms control is more likely to succeed under conditions of a stable military situation. When the military balance favors one side, they suggest, the weaker side will refuse cooperation as long as it can restore parity unilaterally.

At first glance, the INF history seems to support the notion that security cooperation is more likely to succeed in an environment in which both sides perceive the military balance as settled. Prior to 1983, the nuclear balance in Europe largely favored the Soviet Union because of the massive SS-20 buildup. In 1983, with the Western INF deployment, Euro-strategic parity was restored. From now on, goes this line of thought, both sides had incentives to cooperate because the military situation was balanced and predictable.<sup>32</sup>

There are, however, some problems with this explanation. To begin with, it is not self-evident that the SS-20 upset the military balance.<sup>33</sup> After all, the Soviet Union had enjoyed INF superiority in Europe since the 1960s. The SS-20 buildup constituted a new threat to West European security only if one assumes in addition that the emergence of strategic parity in the early 1970s neutralized both sides' strategic nuclear arsenals and thus weakened U.S. extended nuclear deterrence for Europe. Moreover, many of the arguments in support of the Pershing II and cruise missiles had nothing to do with Soviet INF, but dealt instead with requirements of the NATO strategy of flexible response and of extended deterrence.<sup>34</sup> In sum, the military balance in Europe as such was indeterminate with regard to the issue of who enjoyed

31. This results from the predominance of the realist paradigm in the international relations literature. See, for example, Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979). For a clarification of the classic realist argument, see Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987).

32. For such an argument, see Ruehl, *Mittelstreckenwaffen*.

33. Much of the European debate on the wisdom of NATO's "dual track" decision centered on this issue. On the INF balance of power, see Gert Krell, "Zählkriterien für die Mittelstreckenwaffen (INF)," in Erhard Forndran and Gert Krell, eds., *Kernwaffen im Ost-West Vergleich* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1984), pp. 175-226.

34. Flexible response and the requirements for extended deterrence were actually at the center of the INF decision-making process within NATO's military organization. It was argued that the alliance needed the ability to strike nuclear targets in the Western part of the Soviet Union from European bases in order to secure a "continuous spectrum of nuclear escalation," and make the U.S. commitment for the defense of Europe more credible. See John M. Legge, *Theater Nuclear Weapons and the NATO Strategy of Flexible Response* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1983); Ernst-Christoph Meier, *Deutsch-amerikanische Sicherheitsbeziehungen und der NATO-Doppelbeschluss*, (Rheinfelden: Schäuble Verlag, 1986); Peters, *The Germans and the INF Missiles*; Ruehl, *Mittelstreckenwaffen*; David N. Schwartz, *NATO's Nuclear Dilemmas* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1983); Sigal, *Nuclear Forces in Europe*; Thomson, "The LRTNF decision."

superiority. The various assertions about the nuclear balance in Europe not constitute "objective" realities of the international system, but perceived categories depending on one's view of deterrence in general and the European relationship in particular.

The Soviet INF buildup had a very different impact in the United States than it did in Western Europe. The Carter administration, for example, not regard the SS-20 as a new threat. Its INF policy was not driven by concerns about the Euro-strategic balance, but by the notion that the Europeans had to be accommodated in order to preserve alliance cohesion and ensure the ratification of SALT II.<sup>35</sup> The same holds true for the Reagan administration. Most actors in Washington regarded the INF negotiations as a question of "alliance management," and discounted the military importance of both the SS-20 and the Western Pershing II and cruise missiles.<sup>36</sup> The INF policy of the United States cannot be explained with regard to considerations about the military balance.

Nevertheless, the SS-20 was important in shaping West European political perceptions. Political leaders in Western Europe pushed the INF issue onto the agenda of the alliance only after the Soviet Union had begun to deploy its new missiles in early 1977. West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt perceived the SS-20 as a new threat to which the West had to respond. He publicly asked the U.S. reaction to the buildup, after Washington had been reluctant to discuss INF in the SALT II negotiations.<sup>37</sup> Thus, the perception of the Soviet SS-20 as a new threat gave political momentum to a decision-making process already underway in NATO. It was also the only rationale able to generate sufficient domestic support for NATO's dual track decision in Europe. The argument was that the Soviet SS-20 should not be left without a Western response because efforts to convince Moscow to show restraint had failed, and it ultimately persuaded leading Social Democrats in West Germany, Britain, and the Netherlands whose backing was crucial.<sup>38</sup>

However, the same decision-makers in Western Europe who were concerned about the Euro-strategic balance and the SS-20 were also

35. See, in particular, Thomson, "The LRTNF decision."

36. See Talbott, *Deadly Gambits*.

37. Schmidt gave his famous speech in London at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in October 1977; see Helmut Schmidt, "Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture," *Survival*, 20, No. 1 (1978), pp. 2-10.

38. See Risse-Kappen, *Zero Option*, pp. 37-48.



anxious to bring about an arms control solution. Helmut Schmidt and his Social Democratic colleagues in Bonn, London, and The Hague were instrumental in pushing through the arms control track in NATO's 1979 decision, bringing both the Soviet Union and the United States to the negotiating table in 1981, and encouraging the West to accept the "zero option" as its bargaining position. This behavior, however, is inconsistent with the "balance of power" assumption, that those who perceive themselves in an inferior military position are unlikely to accept a cooperative solution prior to the restoration of the balance. West European leaders, in a weaker position, saw the situation as "prisoner's dilemma" in which cooperation could bring mutual benefits, while it was the Soviet Union, in the stronger position, that played "deadlock" and would not seek mutual gains. This is the opposite of what the "balance of power" argument would suggest.

But what about the proposition that security cooperation on INF became possible once NATO had restored parity by deploying the Pershing II and cruise missiles in 1983? First, the "balance of power" argument suggests that the weaker side will change its preferences toward cooperation as a result of having reestablished the military balance. As argued above, however, those in the West, who indeed saw themselves on the weaker side, wanted a cooperative solution all along, and would have favored an arms control solution prior to the Pershing II and cruise missile deployment. Moreover, the West did not change its negotiating position toward a more compromising stance after the deployment had begun in 1983. Second, with regard to the Soviet position, the implications of the "balance of power" argument may run counter to those of the "bargaining from strength" argument. According to the latter, the Soviets returned to the bargaining table because they felt themselves in a considerably worsened security situation, after the Western INF deployment. If this implies perceived inferiority, the "balance of power" argument suggests that such cooperative behavior was unlikely.

It follows that reference to systemic conditions in the international environment does not explain the "double zero" agreement, either. "Balance of power" considerations work through the perceptions of actors. Those actors on both sides, however, who actually were concerned about the military balance, did not behave according to this argument. Moreover, concern about the military balance was intrinsically linked to the domestic balance of power in Western Europe. Thus, if the INF puzzle is to be solved, one has to look at the domestic environment of the decision-makers involved.

### *Domestic and Alliance Politics: Crucial Factors*

While most studies of the conditions for security cooperation focus on the systemic level of international relations, the domestic environment of control is more often than not neglected. Little attention is paid to its side, such as public opinion, public interest groups, political party parliamentary processes.<sup>39</sup> The literature on arms control and security operation usually confines the analysis of the "domestic environment" to a study of belief-systems of top decision-makers and their ability to influence their bureaucracies or the domestic scene in general. If noted at all, the domestic environment or the involvement of the allies are mostly considered as "constraints" on U.S. policies. Some have concluded that "the public and the allies have been positively disposed toward every negotiated agreement."<sup>40</sup> If domestic and allied influence on security cooperation is negligible, strong leadership on the top level of national decision-making would be sufficient to carry out a consistent arms control policy.

However, I argue in the following that three crucial steps toward the zero agreement—NATO's 1979 dual track decision, the Western decision to propose a "zero option" in 1981, and, last not least, the turnaround in U.S. INF policy—cannot be explained without reference to domestic and alliance politics in the various countries. In particular, domestic coalition-building processes are essential to an understanding of the internal decision-making, and how external influences affect policy outcome:

39. Two recent U.S. collaborative efforts to analyze the lessons of U.S.-Soviet security cooperation, for example, do not systematically evaluate the impact of domestic politics. See Farley, and Dallin, *U.S.-Soviet Security Cooperation*; Carnesale and Haass, *Superpower Arms Control*. Compare the following studies: Gert Krell, *Rüstungsdynamik und Rüstungskontrolle: Die diplomatischen Auseinandersetzungen um Salt in den USA 1969-1975* (Frankfurt am Main: Herchen, 1976); Bernd W. Kubbig, *Amerikanische Rüstungskontrollpolitik: Die innergesellschaftlichen Kräfteverhältnisse in der ersten Amtszeit Reagans (1981-1985)* (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 1987); Steven E. Miller, "Politics over Promise: Domestic Impediments to Arms Control," *International Security*, Vol. 8, No. 4 (Spring 1984), pp. 67-90.

40. Albert Carnesale and Richard N. Haass, "Conclusions: Weighing the Evidence," in *Superpower Arms Control*, pp. 329-355, 352.

41. For coalition-building approaches, see Peter Gourevitch, "The Second Image Revisited: International Sources of Domestic Politics," *International Organization*, Vol. 34, No. 3, pp. 881-911; Gourevitch, *Politics in Hard Times: Comparative Responses to International Crises* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986). For applications to the Soviet Union, see Jack Snyder, "The Gorbachev Revolution: A Waning of Soviet Expansionism?" *International Security*, Vol. 12, No. 3 (Winter 1987/88), pp. 93-131; Snyder, "International Leverage and Domestic Change," *World Politics*, Vol. 42, No. 1 (1989), pp. 1-30. For the following into

Coalition-building among foreign and security policy elites in Western Europe and the United States largely accounts for NATO's 1979 dual-track decision. The modernization of Western INF was pushed forward by a transnational coalition of: NATO military and civilian strategists who demanded what was euphemistically called an "evolutionary upward adjustment" of NATO's INF posture to carry out the "flexible response" strategy; center-right politicians in Western Europe and the United States who were concerned that the strategic parity achieved at SALT would weaken U.S. extended nuclear deterrence for Europe;<sup>42</sup> and mainstream and center-left decision-makers in Western Europe, like then German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, who became deeply disturbed about the Soviet SS-20 buildup.<sup>43</sup>

The arms control track of the INF decision resulted from pressures by these mainstream and center-left politicians and by Social Democratic and Labor parties in Western Europe. Beginning in 1977, this group demanded arms control efforts to deal with the emerging buildup of medium-range weapons. Without an arms control component, NATO's 1979 decision would not have found majority support in the West German governing coalition that was crucial for the Alliance, since the Federal Republic was the most important deployment country.<sup>44</sup>

In other words, what looked like a well-designed and integrated strategy of conditional reciprocity was in fact the outcome of various transatlantic and domestic coalition-building processes which tried to reconcile at least partially incompatible policy goals. The U.S. role in all of this was one of "managing the alliance" and working out the details of the decisions, while the main objectives of NATO's INF policy were determined by domestic politics in Europe.

The controversial nature of the NATO dual-track decision in Europe, and the deterioration of the U.S.-Soviet relationship in the aftermath of the Af-

of the INF history, see also Richard Eichenberg, "Dual Track and Double Trouble: The Two-Level Politics of INF," paper prepared for the Ford Foundation Project on Domestic-International Interactions directed by Peter Evans, Harold Jacobson, and Robert Putnam, June 1990.

42. For evidence regarding these two groups see the sources quoted in note 34.

43. For details see Risse-Kappen, *Zero Option*, pp. 20-26.

44. In November 1977, three weeks after Helmut Schmidt's IJSS speech, the West German Social Democratic Party (SPD) Congress in Hamburg adopted a resolution which, among others, demanded INF arms control. In December 1979, Chancellor Schmidt had to threaten to resign in order to enlist SPD support for the dual track decision. Risse-Kappen, *Krise der Sicherheitspolitik*, pp. 261-276; Jeffrey Boutwell, *The German Nuclear Dilemma* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990), pp. 83-127. For the situation in Great Britain and in the Netherlands, see John Cartwright and Julian Critchley, *Cruise, Pershing, and SS-20: A North Atlantic Assembly Report* (London: Brassey's, 1985).

ghanistan crisis, led West European decision-makers to pressure both superpowers into resuming arms control negotiations. They were instrumental in convincing the Soviet Union to enter talks in 1980 and, in early 1981, overcoming the Reagan administration's initial resistance to INF arms control. Again, INF became a matter of "alliance management" for the United States.

More important, however, the 1981 U.S. zero option proposal, which would be accepted six years later by Mikhail Gorbachev, was NATO's response to domestic pressures in Western Europe. The origins of the proposal can be traced to the summer of 1979, when West German and Dutch Social Democrats suggested that NATO should not deploy the new INF missile if the Soviets substantially reduced their SS-20 force. From that time on, West European center-left insisted that a U.S. negotiating proposal should contain a "zero option." The possibility that under ideal circumstances, the West might forgo deployment of medium-range missiles first mentioned in NATO's still classified Integrated Decision Document containing the dual track decision.<sup>45</sup>

Two years later, the emerging European peace movements were instrumental in inducing NATO and the United States to adopt the zero option as the formal Western INF negotiating position. As mentioned above, the deterioration of the U.S.-Soviet relationship and Reagan's early rhetoric on fighting or winning nuclear wars had triggered mass protests against the deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles. To reassure a nervous public in Europe and, at the same time, to confront the Soviets with a tough opening proposal, an attractive negotiating objective was needed. The global zero option served both purposes. It came about through an unlikely transatlantic coalition comprising European supporters of détente and arms control like Schmidt and American opponents of East-West security cooperation, such as Richard Perle. The former group endorsed the proposal as a starting position that was abandoned later in favor of a more compromising stance,<sup>47</sup> while the latter supported it precisely because it was considered non-negotiable at the time.

45. Talbott, *Deadly Gambits*, p. 62.

46. Chancellor Helmut Schmidt convinced President Carter to include the "zero option" in the NATO decision document, according to senior officials who served in the U.S. administration at the time (author's interviews).

47. This is how Helmut Schmidt explained his original endorsement of the global "zero option" despite the widespread conviction among arms controllers that the proposal was non-negotiable. Author's interview with Helmut Schmidt, June 1985. The U.S. decision-making process leading to the zero option is described in detail by Talbott, *Deadly Gambits*.

However, the uncompromising anti-détente group in the Pentagon was able to dominate the U.S. decision-making process during Reagan's first term. It blocked various attempts by State Department officials and particularly by U.S. chief negotiator Paul Nitze (for example, the "walk in the woods") to move the U.S. negotiating position toward concessions in order to reassure the allies. Soviet intransigence during the first phase of the INF negotiations also played right in the hands of Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger and Richard Perle. As a result, the European peace movements lost the "battle of the Euro-missiles" when deployment began in 1983.<sup>48</sup> On the other hand, they ultimately won the peace, due primarily to the turnaround in Soviet foreign policy.

The "Gorbachev revolution" in Soviet foreign policy was indeed the decisive factor which brought about the double-zero agreement in 1986-87. Without the domestic changes in the USSR, one might perhaps have expected a more conciliatory Soviet INF policy in reaction to Western coercive diplomacy, but certainly not the acceptance of the zero option. This turnaround can only be understood in the context of *perestroika* in general and a broad change in Soviet foreign policy in particular.

The crucial event was the change in the Soviet leadership, as a consequence of which a new coalition became responsible for Soviet foreign policy. Mikhail Gorbachev accelerated a trend which had already begun during the late Brezhnev years, and which loosened military influence on Moscow's foreign and security policy. First, the Foreign Ministry assumed full control over Soviet arms control policy. Second, "new thinkers" such as Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and Gorbachev's personal foreign policy adviser, Aleksandr Yakovlev, moved into key decision-making positions as the Gorbachev coalition consolidated its power in the Politburo. Third, civilian experts from various institutes of the Academy of Science—the "institutichiks"—assumed advisory roles and served as a counterweight to the military expertise in the policy-making process. The "old guard" in the military leadership was gradually replaced.<sup>49</sup>

48. See Herf, *War by Other Means*.

49. For details on the transformation of the Soviet security policy-making process, see David Holloway, "State, Society, and the Military under Gorbachev," *International Security*, Vol. 14, No. 3 (Winter 1989/90), pp. 5-24; F. Stephen Larabee, "Gorbachev and the Military," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 66, No. 5 (Summer 1988), pp. 1002-1026; Pat Litherland, *Gorbachev and Arms Control: Civilian Experts and Soviet Policy*, University of Bradford Peace Research Report No. 12, November 1986; Allen Lynch, *Gorbachev's International Outlook: Intellectual Origins and Political Consequences*, Institute for East-West Security Studies Occasional Papers (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1989).

The new thinkers in charge of Soviet foreign policy brought with them a different approach to international security centered around the concept of "common security" and the notion of "reasonable sufficiency." The content of the new Soviet approach to foreign affairs has been widely evaluated in the literature.<sup>50</sup> However, it is important to note that its intellectual origin combined lessons learned from the Khrushchev era with insights gained from transnational contacts with West European center-left politicians and peace researchers during the 1970s and early 1980s. At the time, "common security," the notion that security in the nuclear age cannot be achieved unilaterally and by military means, had become conventional wisdom among these Europeans.<sup>51</sup> The same reasoning process had led them to demand the zero option as the guiding principle for the Western approach to INF arms control during the early 1980s, as argued above.

In other words, it was not just coincidence that the Soviet new thinkers, as it centered around common security, finally accepted the zero option on INF. While the new concept of security did not determine a specific Soviet INF policy, the mutual elimination of weapons perceived as threatening both sides was clearly in line with it. In sum, there were indeed external influences on the turnaround in Soviet foreign policy, but they turned out to be different from what the "bargaining from strength" argument assumes. They were European, not American, and cooperation-minded rather than coercive in approach.

The complete shift in Soviet INF policy was one of the first examples of *perestroika* in security policy. When Gorbachev came to power in early 1985, the Politburo began re-evaluating the security policy of the Brezhnev era. In this process, the SS-20 decision was also reviewed and it was finally decided that its military importance was not worth its political price. As a result,

50. See, for example, Evangelista, "Sources of Moderation"; Raymond L. Garthoff, *Détente and the Revolution in Soviet Military Doctrine* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1990); Bruce Pauley, "Soviet National Security under Gorbachev," *Problems of Communism*, November-December 1989, pp. 1-36; Jack Snyder, "The Gorbachev Revolution."

51. For details, see Matthew Evangelista, "Transnational Alliances and Soviet Demilitarization: A paper prepared for the Council on Economic Priorities Project on Military Expenditure: Economic Priorities, October 1990; Stephan Kux, "Western Peace Research and Soviet Military Thought," unpublished manuscript, New York, April 20, 1989; Kimberly Martin Zisk, "Academic Theories on International Conflict and Negotiation: A Research Note," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 34, No. 4 (December 1990), pp. 678-693. On "common security" see also, Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues ("Palme Commission"), *Common Security* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982).

complete turnaround in Soviet INF policy began with Gorbachev's proposal in January 1986 to eliminate all INF from the European zone.

Many of those responsible for the new Soviet foreign policy seem to have considered the Soviet INF buildup as a political mistake from the very beginning. The Western counter-reaction only confirmed their assessment that a whole new approach to the issue was warranted. Evidence for this can be found in a debate in various Soviet journals which took place in 1987-88.<sup>52</sup> Three groups raised their voices. First, military officials, while endorsing the INF treaty on political grounds, stuck to the original deployment rationale for the SS-20 as a replacement for outmoded INF missiles. While they refrained from openly attacking the double zero agreement, they clearly felt uncomfortable with it. Second, officials involved in the earlier decisions continued to argue that the SS-20 buildup was justified, but that serious political mistakes had been made during the late Brezhnev years which then provoked the Western dual track decision. (It was this group, if any, which seems to have changed its mind as a result of NATO's policies.) Third, new thinkers, among them Eduard Shevardnadze, Aleksandr Yakovlev, Alexandr Bessmertnykh, and the prominent journalist Aleksandr Bovin argued that there was no compelling reason for the SS-20 buildup in the first place. They viewed it as another example of ill-conceived Brezhnev-era policy following a narrow military logic without taking the political consequences into account. This latter group argued from an explicit common security point of view; some of their claims looked very much like what European peace researchers would call the *Eigendynamik* view of the arms race, focusing on the domestic causes of an arms buildup.

In sum, the transformation of Soviet INF policy was the first indication of a broader reform process in Moscow's foreign policy outlook brought about

by the change in the ruling Soviet coalition.<sup>53</sup> The new Soviet leader Gorbachev relied on new thinkers whose foreign policy beliefs led them to advocate a turnaround in Moscow's security policy. The subsequent decision to accept the zero option was a logical consequence of the new belief system centered around the ideas of common security.

### Conclusions

I have argued in this article that the successful conclusion of the double zero INF treaty was not simply the result of Western bargaining from strength as many have argued. Instead, its content as well as its timing has to be explained in terms of domestic coalition-building dynamics, particularly in Western Europe and in the Soviet Union.<sup>54</sup> The first effort to solve the issue cooperatively failed, not because the Western dual track approach was too dovish or too hawkish, but because the Soviet leadership was uninterested in cooperation. Furthermore, during the first INF negotiations, the United States and the Soviet Union played "deadlock." Hard-line positions on both sides were able to prevail and to prevent security cooperation from getting started. Thus, in the absence of domestic conditions conducive to arms control, the dual track approach of conditional reciprocity had no chance.

However, the Western bargaining strategy may have contributed to a successful outcome, albeit to a limited extent. By carrying out its deployment decision in 1983, NATO made it clear to the Soviet Union that the SS-20 buildup was a complete political failure. This time, the message was clearly and vividly heard.

52. This debate took place *after* the event, i.e., after Gorbachev had accepted the zero option. It is, therefore, problematic to infer internal controversies that would have occurred *before* the important decisions were taken. However, even in an era of *glasnost*, this is about as close as one can get to an analysis of Soviet decision-making processes. See, for example, with regard to the military point of view, Yuri Lebedev, "Why the SS-20 Missile Appeared," *Moscow News*, No. 11. For the view of former government officials see Kornienko, "Pravda i domysly o raketakh SS-20," and Roberts, "Limited Adversaries, Limited Arms Control." For the new thinkers see, for example, Aleksandr Bovin, "A Breakthrough," *Moscow News*, No. 10 (March 8, 1987); interviews with Georgi Arbatov and Aleksandr Yakovlev in Stephen Cohen and Katrina Vanden Heuvel, *Voices of Glasnost: Interviews with Gorbachev's Reformers* (New York: Norton, 1989), particularly pp. 71, 317-318. The Soviet debate on INF was brought to my attention by Rebecca J. Dzmura, "INF and the New Thinking: Soviet Arms Control Decision-Making Under Gorbachev," unpublished Senior Honors Thesis, Cornell University, April 1990.

53. Most recently, Gorbachev seems to have realigned himself with conservatives. At the same time many of the new thinkers among his foreign policy advisers resigned or lost their posts. This only underlines the importance of coalition-building processes to understanding Soviet foreign policy. See Snyder, "Gorbachev Revolution"; Snyder, "International Leverage on Domestic Change."

54. U.S. domestic politics also played a role in American INF policies, particularly in 1981. After the Reykjavik summit, President Reagan was considerably weakened domestically by the Iran-contra affair. Hence, he was eager to conclude an arms control treaty with the Soviet Union once the opportunity arose. The domestic situation in the U.S. might have helped administration to stick to its original bargaining position against those who rejected the option on military grounds. However, the main concessions that led to an agreement were made by the Soviets. As a result, the INF agreement might have been achieved even in the absence of domestic pressures in the United States.

The leadership change in Moscow that brought in a new ruling coalition was the decisive event that accounts for the conclusion of the treaty. The Western reaction to the Soviet SS-20 buildup may have served as an additional argument for the new thinkers: Gorbachev and his advisers might have referred to NATO's Pershing II and cruise missile deployments to convince a majority in the Politburo that Brezhnev's INF policy was a disaster for Soviet security interests. But there is ample evidence that the new thinkers themselves were already convinced of the wisdom of common security, and thus of the failure of Brezhnev's security policy. Moreover, their foreign policy attitudes seem to have been influenced more by Western supporters of arms control and détente than by "peace through strength" advocates.

Thus, domestic politics in the Soviet Union accounts for the timing of the INF treaty. Its content, the 1981 zero option, is also explicable in terms of domestic politics, in this case of Western Europe and the United States. While the European center-left had advocated zero INF in Europe all along, NATO had to appease a concerned public in Western Europe and to fight a growing crisis of legitimacy regarding nuclear deterrence during the early 1980s. The Western negotiating proposal of a global zero option then resulted from a strange coalition of détente supporters in Europe and arms control opponents in the United States.

There are at least three important lessons to be learned from the INF case. Two concern theories of cooperation, the third the end of the Cold War. First, the importance of a favorable environment for the conclusion of an agreement should not be underestimated.<sup>55</sup> In other words, a "good" bargaining strategy cannot make up for a "bad" environment that is not conducive to cooperation. Bargaining strategies alone are rarely able to induce cooperative behavior unless the target is perceptive to external influences and already prepared to respond positively.<sup>56</sup> The INF case shows that such a predisposition in favor of cooperation does not come about as a result of specific bargaining strategies, but rather as a consequence of broader conditions in the international environment, the domestic context, or the mindsets of the actors involved.

This does not mean, however, that bargaining strategies are irrelevant. Strategies of reassurance, especially, are most needed and most likely to

55. For a similar conclusion with regard to the early 1950s, see Evangelista, "Cooperation Theory."

56. For a similar point see George, "Strategies for Facilitating Cooperation," p. 705.

succeed in cases in which the circumstances on the target's side are anuous in the sense that they neither favor nor exclude cooperation. If example, a group of actors in the target's policy-making structure is already convinced that arms control is better for the country's security, but is unable to overcome internal opposition, actions to increase the incentives for cooperation might help to produce a "winning coalition" in favor of cooperation. This may have been the contribution of NATO's INF deployment to the outcome of the INF treaty.

However, even if one ascribed the cooperative outcome of the INF entirely to Western bargaining from strength, such an evaluation would allow for far-reaching conclusions. It would only show that it pays to be tough, if the target of the strategy behaves in a stubborn way. If, however, the target is prepared to cooperate, bargaining from strength is not useless, but is likely to backfire. The target might conclude that any nation it has to cooperate with will not pay off, because the other side is also interested in compromises.

The second lesson to be learned from the INF case concerns the significance of domestic politics for the analysis of security cooperation. The domestic context of security policy is still a neglected field in the study of international politics, particularly among U.S. scholars.<sup>57</sup> I have tried to show in this article that the cooperative outcome of the INF case cannot be explained without reference to the domestic changes in the Soviet Union and the pressure exerted on Western policy-makers by public opinion, peace movement, and center-left parties in Western Europe. International influences did not determine policy outcomes directly, but interacted with the domestic political conditions of international cooperation should, therefore, examine the process of coalition-building among ruling elites within given domestic political and societal structures. The impact of social forces such as public opinion and interest groups in liberal democratic systems deserves further research.<sup>59</sup>

57. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., and Sean M. Lynn-Jones, "International Security Studies: A Reflection on the State of the Field," *International Security*, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Spring 1988), pp. 27, at 25-26.

58. For a general argument see Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Case of Two-level Games," *International Organization*, Vol. 42, No. 3 (1988), pp. 427-460. Regarding the INF, see Eichenberg, "Dual Track and Double Trouble."

59. For a discussion, see Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies," *World Politics*, Vol. 43, No. 4 (July 1991); Bruce M.

The third lesson to be learned from the INF case concerns how the Cold War came to an end. Despite the difficulty of generalizing from one particular case to the broader issue of the profound changes in world politics since the late 1980s, the findings presented in this case study are consistent with those of other studies. They concern, for example, the impact of the U.S. defense buildup during the 1980s on the Soviet defense burden, as well as the reasons for the Soviet retreat from Third World conflicts.<sup>60</sup> These analyses corroborate the view that domestic politics in the Soviet Union are crucial to explanations of the fundamental changes in world politics. While Western behavior was not irrelevant, it did not determine the outcome.

Finally, the INF case clarifies the contribution of Western societal and political actors outside the policy-making elite to ending the Cold War. Supporters of arms control and détente in Western Europe and the United States continuously challenged the conventional wisdom of policy-makers, and confronted them with a vision of how to deal differently with the East-West relationship. They achieved some success in Europe, where détente survived the renewed U.S.-Soviet confrontation of the early 1980s. Most importantly, though, their visions of common security were embraced by the new thinkers in the East, and the result was profound. Contrary to what George Bush said, the "freeze people" were indeed heard, albeit by an audience of which they may never have dreamed.

*Controlling the Sword: The Democratic Governance of National Security* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), chap. 4.

60. See, for example, Fred Chernoff, "Ending the Cold War: The Soviet Retreat and the U.S. Military Buildup," *International Affairs*, Vol. 67, No. 1 (1991), pp. 111-126; Ted Hopf, "Peripheral Visions: Brezhnev and Gorbachev meet the 'Reagan Doctrine,'" in George Breslauer and Philip Tetlock, eds., *Learning in Soviet and American Foreign Policy* (1991), forthcoming. For an overview of various explanations for the change in Soviet foreign policy, see Evangelista, "Sources of Moderation."

## Correspondence

### Mobilization and Inadvertence in the July Crisis

Jack S. Levy  
Thomas J. Christensen  
Marc Trachtenberg

#### To the Editors:

Marc Trachtenberg's recent article makes an important contribution both to understanding of the origins of World War I and to some larger theoretical issues which the July 1914 crisis is a particularly important case.<sup>1</sup> By arguing that military leaders fully understood the implications of the military plans in 1914, that the politicians did not capitulate to the generals, and that the war resulted from the deliberate calculations of political leaders rather than their loss of control over events, Trachtenberg poses a serious challenge to the commonly-held view of World War I as an inadvertent war.<sup>2</sup> Trachtenberg asks us to rethink our understanding of the widely-acknowledged German policy of the evening of July 29-30, when German Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg yielded to his long-standing pressure on Austria to invade Serbia, and demanded that Austria accept great power mediation and a favorable negotiated settlement in or out of war. Trachtenberg argues that Bethmann reversed his policy in response to the imminent Russian partial mobilization rather than to a warning from the Foreign Secretary Grey that Britain would not stand aside in a continental war. If correct, this argument, in conjunction with Trachtenberg's assertion that the British had never been confident of British neutrality, would undermine the hypothesis that if Britain had made an earlier commitment to intervene on the side of Russia, this would have induced German leaders to restrain their actions. These historical issues are important for theoretical debates regarding the spiral model, the deterrent, and inadvertent war.<sup>3</sup>

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1. Marc Trachtenberg, "The Meaning of Mobilization in 1914," *International Security*, Vol. 16, No. 3 (Winter 1990/91), pp. 120-150. Subsequent references to this article appear in the text. I thank Jack Snyder, Ed Rhodes, and Roy Licklider for their helpful comments.
2. A classic statement of the "inadvertent war" interpretation is Barbara Tuchman, *The Guns of August* (New York: Dell, 1962). See also the citations in Trachtenberg, "The Meaning of Mobilization," pp. 120-124.
3. On the possibilities of effective British deterrence of Germany in 1914, see: Jones, "Detente and Deterrence: Anglo-German Relations, 1911-1914," *International Security*, Vol. 11, No. 2 (Fall 1986), pp. 142-145; Scott D. Sagan, "1914 Revisited," *International Security*, Vol. 11, No. 2 (Fall 1986), pp. 166-171; Luigi Albertini, *The Origins of the War of 1914*.

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