Revisiting the Exegetical Tradition of Galen&#39;s Prologue to theArt of Medicinebefore Leoniceno: Logic, Teaching, and Didactics in Pietro Torrigiano&#39;sPlusquam commentum

Okihito Utamura

This paper investigates the prehistory of Nicolò Leoniceno's De tribus doctrinis ordinatis secundum Galeni sententiam (1508). It has been often maintained that Leoniceno's treatise broke with scholastic interpretations of Galen's prologue to the Art of Medicine by turning away from interpretations in terms of scientific method towards a didactic interpretation. This paper questions this common view by offering an in-depth analysis of a major, early-14th-century interpretation of Galen's prologue, Pietro Torrigiano's Plusquam commentum. I argue that Torrigiano read Galen's prologue as a didactic text, interpreting it in terms of demonstrative syllogisms, because he assumed that logic, and demonstrative syllogisms, have a didactic function. This suggests that this common understanding of Leoniceno's treatise is incorrect: Leoniceno did not break with scholastic interpretations by turning away from scientific method towards didactics, but by replacing previous didactic interpretations of Galen's prologue in terms of scholastic logic with an alternative didactic interpretation.

History and Philosophy of Logic ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/thpl20 Revisiting the Exegetical Tradition of Galen's Prologue to the Art of Medicine before Leoniceno: Logic, Teaching, and Didactics in Pietro Torrigiano's Plusquam commentum Okihito Utamura To cite this article: Okihito Utamura (2020) Revisiting the Exegetical Tradition of Galen's Prologue to the Art�of�Medicine before Leoniceno: Logic, Teaching, and Didactics in Pietro Torrigiano's Plusquam�commentum , History and Philosophy of Logic, 41:4, 352-375, DOI: 10.1080/01445340.2020.1799622 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/01445340.2020.1799622 © 2020 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group Published online: 02 Nov 2020. Submit your article to this journal Article views: 200 View related articles View Crossmark data Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=thpl20 HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF LOGIC, 2020 Vol. 41, No. 4, 352–375, https://doi.org/10.1080/01445340.2020.1799622 Revisiting the Exegetical Tradition of Galen’s Prologue to the Art of Medicine before Leoniceno: Logic, Teaching, and Didactics in Pietro Torrigiano’s Plusquam commentum OKIHITO UTAMURA Center for the History of Philosophy and Science, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands o.utamura@gmail.com Received 25 June 2020 Accepted 20 July 2020 This paper investigates the pre-history of Nicolò Leoniceno’s De tribus doctrinis ordinatis secundum Galeni sententiam (1508). It has been often maintained that Leoniceno’s treatise broke with scholastic interpretations of Galen’s prologue to the Art of Medicine by turning away from interpretations in terms of scientific method towards a didactic interpretation. This paper questions this common view by offering an in-depth analysis of a major, early-14th-century interpretation of Galen’s prologue, Pietro Torrigiano’s Plusquam commentum. I argue that Torrigiano read Galen’s prologue as a didactic text, interpreting it in terms of demonstrative syllogisms, because he assumed that logic, and demonstrative syllogisms, have a didactic function. This suggests that this common understanding of Leoniceno’s treatise is incorrect: Leoniceno did not break with scholastic interpretations by turning away from scientific method towards didactics, but by replacing previous didactic interpretations of Galen’s prologue in terms of scholastic logic with an alternative didactic interpretation. 1. Introduction At least since W.F. Edwards’ pioneering articles on medieval and renaissance interpretations of the prologue to Galen’s Art of Medicine,1 it has often been maintained that Latin scholastics interpreted Galen’s prologue in terms of scientific method.2 Similarly, another claim of Edwards has also been accepted, namely that the exegetical tradition of Galen’s prologue underwent a fundamental shift in the early sixteenth century, decisive for which was the treatise De tribus doctrinis ordinatis secundum Galeni sententiam (1508) of Nicolò Leoniceno (1428–1524).3 According to Edwards, this treatise by the celebrated court physician and university teacher in Ferrara replaced earlier interpretations in terms of scientific method with a didactic interpretation. After Leoniceno, Galen’s prologue was no longer considered to be about research and discovery, but about teaching and didactics. In his 1976 article on Leoniceno’s De tribus doctrinis, Edwards described its contribution: Leoniceno focussed attention on a concept of method which – though not unknown to the earlier tradition [sc. of interpreting the prologue to Galen’s Art of Medicine] – had certainly not been its primary object of attention, namely, on method as a logical instrument for the organizing or structuring of a science as a whole, rather 1 2 3 Edwards 1967, 1976. While my focus here is on Edwards, Edwards was following himself the lead in Randall 1940, whose discussion of the so-called ‘demonstrative regress’ had called attention to the tradition of Galen’s Art of Medicine. For this historiographical development, see Ottoson 1984, 98–101. Cf. Wallace 1995; Boudon 2000, 164–172; Grendler 2002, 327; Ashworth 2013, 538. However, for a cautious dissent from Edwards, see Ottoson 1984, 98–126. Edwards 1976. See my references below, at n. 8, to Grendler 2002 and others. Note that Edward’s claim is anticipated in Gilbert 1963, 102–104. For Leoniceno, see Mugnai Carrara 1979, 1991; Hirai 2011, 19–45. © 2020 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4. 0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. Revisiting the Exegetical Tradition 353 than for the solution of particular problems within a science. It is method in the latter sense we tend to think of when we use the phrase ‘scientific method’ [ . . . ].4 In other passages, Edwards situated Leoniceno’s contribution against its scholastic background. He believed that before Leoniceno, scholastics had interpreted the prologue in terms of scientific method by ascribing to Galen a twofold process of research and discovery, which consisted in demonstrating causes from their effects in order to demonstrate, in turn, these effects from their causes.5 It was on this assumption that Edwards maintained that De tribus doctrinis turned Galen’s scientific methods into didactic ones for the ‘organizing or structuring of a science as a whole’.6 Since then, Edwards’ interpretation has not been straightforwardly contested,7 and his claims have been taken up by other scholars such as Grendler, whose description of De tribus doctrinis’ contribution reads as follows: Leoniceno argued for methodological change. In a treatise of 1508 [sc. De tribus doctrinis] he analyzed the comments on method found in the prologue to Galen’s Ars medica [sc. Galen’s Art of Medicine]. Galen had stated that one might teach a subject in three ways [ . . . ] But the looseness of Galen’s terminology, his philosophical eclecticism, and his lack of clarity left his readers puzzled. Medieval scholars resolved the difficulty by viewing this prologue through Aristotelian eyes; they reduced Galen’s method to Aristotelian demonstration and dialectic. By contrast, Leoniceno freed Galenic method from enveloping Aristotelian dialectic. He pointed out that Galen wrote about techniques of teaching, not methods of philosophic inquiry [ . . . ].8 It is my contention, however, that this understanding of the exegetical tradition of Galen’s prologue prior to Leoniceno is inaccurate: already scholastics before Leoniceno had interpreted Galen’s prologue didactically.9 But, perhaps counterintuitively, they had done so on the assumption that logic has a didactic function and that teaching ideally consists in demonstrative syllogisms. For these reasons, scholastics understood Galen’s didactic methods in terms of Aristotelian demonstrations. From this perspective, Leoniceno’s De tribus doctrinis was not radical in the way that Edwards and Grendler assumed: it did not replace interpretations in terms of scientific method with a didactic interpretation, but rather it replaced ‘scholastic’ didactics with an alternative form of didactics.10 To substantiate this picture of the exegetical tradition of Galen’s prologue before Leoniceno, I shall present a case study which shows that a major scholastic interpreter of the prologue (and a main target of Leoniceno’s critique) had already interpreted it didactically, assuming that logic has a didactic function and that teaching ideally consists in demonstrating. The scholastic interpreter at the center of this case study is the Florentine physician Pietro Torrigiano de’ Torrigiani ( = Torrigiano), who lived in the late 13th and early 14th Edwards 1976, 284. I have silently added dashes here to facilitate understanding. Edwards 1967; Edwards 1976, 287–288; cf. Wallace 1995. For the historiography of the demonstrative regress, which began with Randall 1940, see Sgarbi 2013, 1–8, and Jardine 1976. 6 Edwards 1976, 284. Although Edwards tends to play down the didactic dimension of Leoniceno’s interpretation, he is clearly aware of it, e.g. in Edwards 1976, 299. His dismissive attitude towards teaching has been rightly noted in Mugnai Carrara 1983, 45: ‘ [ . . . ] Edwards trova [sc. l’applicazione pedagogica del concetto di metodo] di banale e secondaria importanza [ . . . ]’. Cf. also Edwards’ remark on pedagogy at Edwards 1976, 300. 7 But see my reference to Ottoson at n. 2. 8 Grendler 2002, 327; my emphasis. For similar accounts of Leoniceno’s treatise (and its pre-history), see Boudon 2000, 164– 176; Serjeantson 2006, 141; Wilson 2017, 136. 9 This is noticed but not emphasized in Ottoson 1984, 98–126. 10 I cannot elaborate here Leoniceno’s complex position in detail, which I plan to do elsewhere. For now, see my remarks in this paper, and Edwards 1976; Mugnai Carrara 1983. 4 5 O. Utamura 354 centuries.11 His interpretation of Galen’s prologue is found in his substantial commentary on the Art of Medicine, the Plusquam commentum, which earned him the byname ‘Plusquam Commentator’. Born into a well-known Florentine family, Torrigiano studied medicine in Bologna with the famous physician Taddeo Alderotti (ca. 1206/1215–1295) and continued his studies in Paris, where he later taught medicine; Torrigiano is not known to have practiced medicine himself. At some later point in his life, he returned from France to Italy, and it was presumably in Italy that he entered a religious order and turned to theological studies. Perhaps completed around the 1320s,12 his Plusquam commentum enjoyed considerable popularity in later centuries. While its manuscript circulation seems to await further research, this commentary was reprinted at least ten times in the 15th and 16th centuries, which suggests a significant influence on the medical tradition.13 By providing an in-depth account of Torrigiano’s interpretation of Galen’s prologue in his Plusquam commentum, this study aims to make an original contribution. While some of the pertinent passages from the treatise have been treated in the scholarly literature (Edwards 1967, 1976; Ottoson 1984), they have not been discussed in detail. Moreover, previous studies have not paid sufficient attention to the very point which, I argue, is crucial: Torrigiano interpreted Galen’s didactics demonstratively precisely because he understood logic didactically and teaching demonstratively. 2. The Prologue to Galen’s Art of Medicine Before turning to Torrigiano’s interpretation of Galen’s prologue, it will be useful to present the pertinent section from Galen’s prologue to the Art of Medicine, which is central to the exegetical discussion.14 This pertains to the first four sentences of the prologue, which read as follows: Greek (1) (2) (3) (4) 15 (Greek-)English (1) (2) (3) (4) There are only three teachings (Gr. didaskaliai, Lat. doctrinae) that have order. The first arises from the notion of the end according to resolution (Gr. analysis). The second is from the composition (Gr. synthesis) of those things discovered by resolution (Gr. analysis). The third is from the dissolution (Gr. dialysis) of a definition with which we begin now.16 ‘Scholastic’ translatio antiqua (Greek-Latin, 12th century) (1) 11 12 13 14 15 16 Tres sunt omnes doctrinae quae ordine habentur. For biographical information on Torrigiano, see Siraisi 1981, 64–66. For studies of his commentary, see Siraisi 1981, Ottoson 1984, Jacquart 2003. Cf. Jacquart 2003, 84. There are three incunabula: Bologna 1481/1482, 1489, Venice 1498 (ISTC it00504300, it00504600, it00505000); and seven 16-century editions from Italy: Venice 1504, 1512, 1517, 1519, 1526, 1543, 1557 (EDIT 16, CNCE 76884, 34936, 33055, 29270, 29304, 50104, 27237). For a similar assessment, see Ottoson 1984, 44–46. For the history of this text, see Boudon 2000. Galen 2000, 273.2–6 (ed. Boudon = ed. Kühn I, 305.1–5). This is my translation, which relies partially on Johnston’s Galen 2016, 156–157. Revisiting the Exegetical Tradition (2) (3) (4) 355 Prima quidem ex finis notione, quae secundum dissolutionem [!] fit. Secunda vero est, quae ex compositione secundum resolutionem inventorum. Tertia vero ex termini dissolutione, cui nunc insistimus.17 In these lines, Galen states that there are only three kinds of instruction or teaching (Gr. didaskaliai, Lat. doctrinae) that have order. As later scholastics put it, there are only three ordered teachings (Lat. doctrinae ordinatae): the resolutive ( = analytic), the compositive ( = synthetic), and the definitive. These are also the three types of ordered, or orderly teachings that Leoniceno reinterpreted in De tribus doctrinis ordinatis secundum Galeni sententiam (On the Three Ordered Teachings According to Galen’s View, 1532) as three distinct, combinable ways to organize the teaching of an entire discipline.18 3. Torrigiano’s Interpretation of Galen’s Prologue Generally speaking, in the interpretation of the first lines of Galen’s prologue in the scholastic tradition, the word doctrina (Gr. didaskalia) is of crucial importance.19 Appearing in the first sentence of the prologue, doctrina affects the interpretation of the three doctrinae, about which Galen speaks in the subsequent sentences: the resolutive, compositive, and definitive ones. It is generally accepted that scholastic interpreters before Leoniceno identified the first two of Galen’s ordered teachings – the resolutive and compositive – with Aristotelian demonstrations. In so doing, scholastics are said to have read into Galen’s prologue a scientific method, which consists of a two-fold demonstrative process for the sake of research and discovery: to demonstrate causes from effects in order to demonstrate in turn these effects from their causes.20 If this common view is correct, one might reasonably expect this interpretation in terms of scientific method to be reflected in the scholastic understanding of doctrina. After all, the meaning of doctrina must semantically accommodate interpreting the doctrinae ordinatae in terms of scientific methods. To elaborate, in the original Greek of Galen’s prologue, the noun didaskalia quite obviously bears the didactic meaning of ‘teaching’ or ‘instruction’. From today’s perspective, this seems less compatible with interpreting different didaskaliai in terms of scientific method (cf. Boudon 1993; Galen 2000). To scholastic interpreters, however, this might not have posed a problem, as the corresponding Latin term doctrina could have been less obviously tied to a didactic meaning. Indeed, Edwards suggests that doctrina translates roughly into English as ‘scientific knowledge’.21 If this is correct, it is not implausible that Galen’s different doctrinae would have been interpreted in terms of scientific method. But these considerations are misleading. This is because Torrigiano’s interpretation makes it unmistakeably clear that doctrina refers to an act of teaching, which takes place 17 18 19 20 21 Torrigiano 1557, ff. 1r–2v. For this translation, see Boudon 2000, 246–248. For Leoniceno, the analytic teaching teaches the structure or constitution of a discipline by teaching how to break down its goal into the subjects that must be studied in order to arrive at the goal, while the compositive teaching teaches a discipline systematically by following the inverse order, which begins with elementary subjects, proceeds towards advanced subjects and arrives at the goal. The definitive teaching teaches a discipline by breaking down the definition of a discipline for the sake of memorization. See e.g. Leoniceno 1532, f. 73r B, l. 47–v C, l. 23: ‘Quod autem tres [ . . . ] doctrinis suarum denominationum’. To facilitate reference to Leoniceno 1532, I include the first and last words of the pertinent passage and the line numbers. Cf. Boudon 2000, 164 (n. 41). See Edwards 1967, 1976, and the references given above, n. 2. For instance, Edwards 1976, 294: ‘Just as the Aristotelian commentators combined demonstration quia and propter quid to obtain a complete method for use in areas like natural science, in which the principia of demonstration are not naturally known to us, so the earlier commentators on the Ars combined resolutive and compositive methods, as they understood them, to obtain a similar method for medicine’. Edwards 1976, 285. But cf. Ottoson 1984, 98–126. 356 O. Utamura within teacher-student interaction: doctrina carries a didactic meaning.22 This emerges from Torrigiano’s commentary on Galen’s first sentence – Tres sunt omnes doctrinae quae ordine habentur – which begins as follows: Because Galen is going to teach medicine according to an unusual kind of teaching of scientific disciplines (docendi scientias), he prefaced his work with a prologue on the distinction between different kinds of teachings (distinctionibus doctrinarum) in order to clarify his own intention. And he says: ‘There are only three [teachings that have order]’; that is: all kinds of ordered teaching are three in number. And he understands ‘doctrina’ as instruction (doctio): as the teacher’s action upon a student, which is properly called ‘doctrina’ or ‘doctrinatio,’ and as the student’s being acted upon by a teacher, which is properly called ‘disciplina’ or ‘disciplinatio.’ Both are essentially the same, although they differ conceptually (in ratione). Since we learn and receive instruction only through these three orderly ways, Galen, for this reason, has stated that there are only three [kinds of] teaching which contribute indeed to [such didactic] action. But that there are only three orderly ways by which we are instructed is declared in logic (as we shall point out in what follows). Indeed, logic itself is the way of learning and teaching (immo ipsa logica est modus discendi et docendi).23 Clearly, Torrigiano’s doctrina here refers to an act of teaching (doctio), which he explicates as the ‘teacher’s action upon a student’ (actio doctoris in discipulum).24 Moreover, teaching (doctrina) is taken to refer essentially to the same process as learning (disciplina), understood as a ‘student’s being acted upon by a teacher’ (passio discipuli a doctore). Put differently, what the teacher teaches and what the student learns are ideally the same: they only differ conceptually. As Torrigiano maintains, Galen’s doctrina refers to that didactic sense of teaching and learning. According to that didactic interpretation, Galen’s first sentence indicates a numerical limit to the ways by which we receive and give instruction in an orderly manner: there are only three types of ordered teachings (Tres sunt omnes doctrinae quae ordine habentur). From this perspective, there is a tension between Torrigiano’s didactic interpretation of doctrina and the common view, noted above, of the tradition of interpreting Galen’s prologue before Leoniceno: the passage from Torrigiano seems to testify to a major didactic interpretation of Galen’s doctrina prior to that of Leoniceno.25 This casts doubt on the idea that Leoniceno’s De tribus doctrinis was groundbreaking in the didactic aspect of its reinterpretation of Galen’s prologue. Moreover, if that didactic interpretation of doctrina was more common than has been assumed, it seems unlikely that Leoniceno rejected previous 22 23 24 25 This has been noted in Ottoson 1984, 98–126. Torrigiano 1557, f. 1r D: ‘Galenus traditurus medicinam sub insueto genere docendi scientias, operi suo praemittit prooemium de distinctionibus doctrinarum, ut eliciat quam intendit et dicit “Tres sunt etc,” id est: omnes doctrinae ordinariae sunt tres numero. Et intelligit per “doctrinam” doctionem tam eam quae est actio doctoris in discipulum, quae proprie dicitur “doctrina” sive “doctrinatio,” quam eam quae est passio discipuli a doctore, quae proprie dicitur “disciplina” sive “disciplinatio”; quae duo idem sunt in essentia, licet differant in ratione. Quoniam autem tribus modis ordinariis tantum et discimus et docemur, propterea tantum tres dixit esse doctrinas quae ordine habentur admodum quidem actionem conferens. Quod autem tribus modis tantum ordinariis doceamur, in logica declaratum est (sicut et nos in sequentibus innuemus), immo ipsa logica est modus discendi et docendi’. Here, as in other citations from Latin sources, I do not necessarily respect the spelling and punctuation of my sources. This interpretation of doctrina goes back to Haly’s interpretation of Galen’s prologue to the Art of Medicine, which became available in the 12th century with the Latin translation by Gerard of Cremona. See Ottoson 1984, 102–103; Boudon 2000, 168–171; Hasse 2016, 373–374. Cf. with my quotations from Edwards and Grendler above, at n. 4 and 8. Revisiting the Exegetical Tradition 357 interpretations because they interpreted Galen non-didactically. At the same time, however, a puzzle remains. It arises from Torrigiano’s didactic understanding of doctrina. In his last sentence, he maintains that logic relates to teaching. What does he mean by this? As seen below, Torrigiano’s account establishes a precise meaning of doctrina as pedagogical instruction based on the demonstrative syllogism (section 4), which allows him to read Galen’s didactic prologue based on scholastic-Aristotelian logic (section 5). 4. Teaching and Logic In his discussion of the first sentence of Galen’s prologue (Tres sunt omnes doctrinae quae ordine habentur), Torrigiano explains the relationship between teaching and logic. According to him, scientific knowing, teaching, and learning ideally consist of demonstrations, that is, demonstrative syllogisms.26 Since scientific knowledge is demonstrative, teaching and learning scientific knowledge is also demonstrative. 4.1. Logic as a General Requirement for Learning Galen’s doctrina is related to logic, Torrigiano writes, because doctrina refers to teaching, and because teaching is what logic is concerned with: logic is literally about teaching and learning.27 Interestingly, Torrigiano corroborates this view by reference to the Aristotelian tradition, especially Metaphysics II.3, which is supposed to underpin his didactic claim that learning scientific knowledge requires logic instruction: But that there are only three orderly ways by which we are instructed is declared in logic (as we shall point out in the following). Indeed, logic itself is the way of learning and teaching (immo ipsa logica est modus discendi et docendi). And it is for this reason that Aristotle spoke in Metaphysics II about the three obstacles to knowledge, one of which (and the most important) is the ‘inability to follow’ (impotentia complectendi), which arises from the ‘lack of instruction in logic’ (paucitate instructionis in logica). He says that ‘it is absurd to seek [at the same time] knowledge and the way of attaining knowledge (modum scientiae),’ meaning by ‘way of attaining knowledge’ logic itself, as Averroes explains. Indeed, all disciplines of speech (scientiae de sermone) must be called ‘ways of attaining knowledge in scientific disciplines’ (modi scientiarum) rather than ‘scientific disciplines’ (scientiae), or as sort of ‘knowledge of the ways of knowing’ (notitiae quaedam de modis sciendi). It was for this reason that Avicenna too, at the beginning of his Logic, called logic the ‘instrument’ in philosophy by means of which a philosopher enquires into everything that can be known. Indeed, this noun ‘doctrina’ not only means ‘instruction’ but also the way or form by which one is taught (ipse modus aut forma qua docetur); philosophers often use it even for the term ‘scientific knowledge’ (scientia).28 26 27 28 At least since Barnes 1969, 1981, 1994, modern interpreters of the Posterior Analytics have tended to assume that Aristotle distinguished demonstrations (Gr. apodeixis) from syllogisms. By contrast, scholastic interpreters of the Posterior Analytics generally identified demonstrations with demonstrative syllogisms. See the brief remark in De Rijk 1990, 239: ‘Whereas in Posterior Analytics Aristotle deals with the scientific procedure of apodeixis in general, in which the apodeictic syllogism is merely a vehicle for correctly framing an apodeixis, the Medievals [ . . . ] were apt to reduce Aristotle’s theory of demonstrative proof to a theory of demonstrative syllogism’. Cf. Pasnau 2010, 358–359 and Longeway 2011. Although there were different medieval views of what a syllogism is (Thom 2016), a broader understanding will suffice here. Cf. Ottoson 1984, 109–110. Torrigiano 1557, f. 1r D–v A: ‘Quod autem tribus modis tantum ordinariis doceamur, in logica declaratum est (sicut et nos in sequentibus innuemus), immo ipsa logica est modus discendi et docendi. Et propterea Aristoteles in II Metaphysica loquens de tribus impedimentis ad scientiam, quorum unum et maximum est “impotentia complectendi,” contingens ex “paucitate instructionis in logica,” ait, “absurdum est quaerere scientiam et modum scientiae,” et vult per “modum scientiae” logicam ipsam sicut exponit Averroes. Omnes etiam scientiae de sermone potius “modi scientiarum” quam “scientiae” dici debent, aut 358 O. Utamura In this passage, Torrigiano identifies logic with the ‘way of learning and teaching’ and supports this didactic understanding of logic with the authority of Aristotle, Averroes, and Avicenna. Yet although he explains doctrina by reference to scientia (scientific knowledge), this neither excludes nor contradicts my claim that doctrina is taken didactically. Rather, Torrigiano implies that scientia itself has a didactic function, and his remark that philosophers identify doctrina with scientia simply highlights a common didactic ground shared by these two notions, which consists in the way or form itself by which one is taught (ipse modus aut forma qua docetur). I shall return to this phrase in the next subsection. The exegetical background to Torrigiano’s didactic understanding of logic is provided by Aristotle’s Metaphysics II.3 (994b32–995a14).29 In this passage, Aristotle maintains that listening to lectures (akroaseis) depends on each person’s habits, so that listeners must possess the right habits to listen successfully to lectures and learn from them. This involves having the right expectations. Discussing the expectations of different listeners, Aristotle contrasts the demand by some that all subjects should be treated accurately (akribôs) with the contradictory demand by others who suffer from such accurate treatment due to their ‘inability to follow’ (to mê dunasthai suneirein). Having discussed these cases, he draws a general distinction between two domains of knowledge: (a) scientific knowledge (epistêmên) and (b) the way of attaining such scientific knowledge (tropon epistêmês). On the basis of this distinction, Aristotle identifies the latter domain as a general requirement for all learning of scientific knowledge: since both of these subjects cannot be learned at the same time, one must learn the way of attaining scientific knowledge first in order to attain scientific knowledge itself. Torrigiano draws, then, on this Aristotelian passage, which he appears to have read in a Greek-Latin translation.30 But contrary to what he suggests, Aristotle does not actually distinguish three types of obstacles to learning, nor does he single out ‘lack of logic instruction’ as the ‘most important’ obstacle. He also does not identify logic with the ‘way of attaining knowledge’. In sum, although Torrigiano uses this Aristotelian passage, his use is creative rather than faithful to Aristotle’s text. The Latin translation of Averroes’ commentary on Metaphysics II.3 provides more support than Aristotle’s own text for Torrigiano’s didactic understanding of logic; Averroes appears to be the most decisive inspiration for Torrigiano’s view.31 Although Averroes does not distinguish three types of obstacles to learning nor single out ‘lack of logic instruction’ as the ‘most important’ obstacle, he nonetheless uses the very phrase ‘lack of logic instruction’ (paucitate instructionis in logica) as an important category to describe the problems of listeners.32 And more importantly, Averroes identifies logic with Aristotle’s ‘way of attaining knowledge’. Thus, already for Averroes, logic is a general requirement for learning. Referring to those listeners who suffer from an overly accurate treatment of subjects, 29 30 31 32 “notitiae quaedam de modis sciendi.” Propter quod etiam Princeps in principio suae Logicae vocavit logicam “instrumentum” in philosophia quo mediante philosophus inquirit omne scibile. Significatur etiam per hoc nomen “doctrina” non solum doctio sed etiam ipse modus aut forma qua docetur, immo etiam frequenter apud philosophos ponitur pro “scientia”’. Cf. Ross 1975, 220–221; De Rijk 2002, 12–15. I generally follow the English translation in Aristotle 1995. For instance, the Greek-Latin Aristotle renders Aristotle’s to mê dunasthai suneirein (995a9–10) as ‘impotentiam complectendi’ (Aristoteles Latinus 1976, 39.26 = Aristoteles Latinus 1995, 47.110–111), as does Torrigiano, whereas in the Latin Averroes, Aristotle’s phrase is expanded and duplicated, so that it reads: ‘aut quia non possunt retinere ipsum aut quia assimilatio eius est mala’ (Averroes 1562, f. 35ra A = Averroes 1966, 76.6). On the Arabic translations of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, see Bertolacci 2005. Averroes 1562, ff. 34va–36ra (In Metaphysicam II.3). In the Arabic tradition, Adamson 2010 notes, Metaphysics II was studied as the first book of Aristotle’s Metaphysics. I assume that this may have encouraged a didactic reading of Metaphysics II.3. Averroes 1562, f. 35ra B ( = Averroes 1966, 76.12–14): ‘Vult declarare in hoc capitulum quod accidit hominibus in scientiis propter diversitatem naturae et propter paucitatem instructionis in logica’. Revisiting the Exegetical Tradition 359 or – as we find in the Latin translation of his commentary – from a discourse that is overly inquisitive (per sermonem valde perscrutabilem), Averroes explains: And for this reason, Aristotle says that a person must be instructed in the cognition of the way of any subject [sc. of cognition] (instruatur in cognitione viae cuiuslibet rei ≈ modi scientiarum ≈ tropon epistêmês), which is what he wants to declare [sc. in this passage]. And he has said this, because the art of logic is, on the one hand, universal for all sciences and, on the other hand, proper to each science, and a human person cannot be instructed in any art except by knowing what holds universally and what holds with regard to [that] specific subject (universalia et propria de eis). And with this statement, he has formulated a very useful precept, namely that a person should not learn that [art of logic] in conjunction with other scientific disciplines [sc. first], because then [this person] learns neither one nor the other [sc. neither logic nor the science conjoined to it].33 In this passage, Averroes identifies Aristotle’s distinction between (a) scientific knowledge and (b) the way of attaining scientific knowledge, with the distinction between (a) scientific knowledge taught according to logic, and (b) logic taught as a subject on its own.34 Moreover, Averroes maintains that students must first learn logic as a subject on its own before they turn to other disciplines that are taught according to logic. This makes logic a general requirement for learning all scientific disciplines. It is this ‘Averroist’ idea, then, that supports Torrigiano’s corresponding identification of the ‘way of attaining knowledge’ with logic itself – even though his distinction between three major obstacles to learning and his emphasis on the ‘lack of logic instruction’ as the most important obstacle testifies to a creative rather than faithful interpretation of Averroes as well. Torrigiano’s next reference, this time to Avicenna, also qualifies as creative: he attributes to Avicenna the claim that logic is an ‘instrument’ for all philosophical inquiry. This is creative insofar as it refers to a passage at the end of Avicenna’s prologue to his Logic (Isagoge) which contrasts two views on the relationship between philosophy and logic.35 According to one view, logic itself is no part of philosophy but an instrument used within philosophy (non erit pars philosophie, sed [ . . . ] instrumentum in philosophia). According to the other view, logic is indeed a part of philosophy and an instrument for other parts of philosophy (pars philosophie et instrumentum ceterarum partium philosophie).36 In contrasting them, Avicenna’s point is that these two views are compatible and that the contradiction between them is merely apparent: they are simply based on different understandings of philosophy.37 Despite Torrigiano’s deviation from this Avicennan point, the 33 34 35 36 37 Averroes 1562, f. 35rb F (In Metaphysicam, II.3, t.c. 15 = Averroes 1966, 78.45–52): ‘Et ideo dicit Aristoteles quod necesse est ut homo instruatur in cognitione viae cuiuslibet rei, quam vult declarare. Et dixit hoc, quia ars logica quedam est universalis omnibus scientiis et quedam propria unicuique scientiae. Et homo non potest esse instructus in qualibet arte nisi sciendo universalia et propria de eis. Et cum dixit hoc, dedit praeceptum valde utile, et est ut homo non addiscat illam cum adiunctione aliarum scientiarum, quoniam tunc neque addiscent hanc neque istam [ . . . ]’. The variants in Averroes 1966 are negligble. This seems to relate to the logica docens/utens distinction, for which see Ebbesen 1980. Avicenna 1508, f. 2ra–va. The Arabic text is discussed in Germann 2008. Avicenna 1508, f. 2rb–va: ‘Sed [ . . . ] tunc secundum quod fuerit philosophia tractans et dividens et inquirens res secundum quod habent esse, et dividuntur in duo predicta esse [sc. vel habent esse non ex nostro arbitrio vel opere, vel habent esse ex nostro arbitrio et opere]. Scientia hec [sc. logyca] secundum eum non erit pars philosophie, sed secundum quod prodest ad hoc, eri[t] secundum eum instrumentum in philosophia. Secundum quem vero philosophia fuerit tractans de omni inquisitione speculativa et de omni modo, hec scientia [sc. logyca] secundum eum est pars philosophie et instrumentum ceterarum || partium philosophie. [ . . . ] Et inde deceptiones que sunt de huiusmodi questione frustra et superflue sunt, frustra quia non est oppositio in his dictionibus, unusquisque enim eorum intelligit de philosophia aliud quam alius. Superflue vero quia sollicitudo de huiusmodi non prodest. Et hec species speculationis vocatur logyca que est speculatio rerum predictarum per quas devenitur ad cognitionem incogniti et eius quod accidit ex eis ex hoc quod sunt ad hoc tantum’. Cf. Germann 2008, 20 (n. 47). 360 O. Utamura passage clearly supports his own view that logic is an instrument of philosophy, as both views share an instrumental understanding of logic. Having invoked these authorities creatively rather than faithfully, Torrigiano returns at the end of the passage to Galen. He relates doctrina, as found in Galen’s prologue, to the Averroist didactic identification of logic and the Aristotelian ‘way of attaining scientific knowledge’, referring to the philosophers’ identification of teaching (doctrina) with scientific knowledge (scientia). Importantly, this links logic, doctrina, and scientia by reference to their shared didactic approach, the ‘way or form by which one is taught’. To repeat Torrigiano’s pertinent remark: ‘Indeed, this noun “doctrina” means not only instruction (doctio) but also the way or form by which one is taught (ipse modus aut forma qua docetur); philosophers often use it [sc. doctrina] even for the term “scientific knowledge” (scientia)’.38 In Torrigiano, then, it is this didactic ‘way or form’ (modus aut forma) of teaching that enables him to identify Galen’s ‘doctrina’ didactically with Aristotelian logic and scientia. But what does he mean by ‘way or form’? 4.2. Demonstrative Syllogisms as the Way or Form of Knowledge, Teaching, and Learning Torrigiano’s ‘way or form’ of teaching is based on his position that scientific knowledge, teaching, and learning all consist of demonstrative syllogisms. Torrigano first establishes this position when he refines his definition of doctrina. It seems that the initial understanding of doctrina as the ‘teacher’s action upon his student’ was imprecise and that doctrina is better understood as the ‘teacher’s making manifest of something unknown’, which proceeds ‘through something known which is certain and determinate’ and ‘through a certain disposition and order’.39 Interestingly, the principal instruments for this ‘making manifest’ (manifestatio) are mental ‘intentions made known in an appropriate way and order by which we are carried forward towards something unknown’, to which yet another set of instruments is subordinate: signs, speech, and voice.40 Teaching, then, is about making unknown things known through mental intentions, supported by signs, speech, and voice. Having specified this meaning of doctrina, Torrigiano addresses the relationship between scientia and doctrina (Torrigiano 1557, ff. 1v G–2r C). Referring loosely to the Posterior Analytics, he points out that scientia stands for the knowledge of something in relationship to its cause, which explains why that something is as it is and cannot be otherwise.41 From an ontological-epistemological perspective, this corresponds to the knowledge of properties that are grounded in essential and necessary causal relationships, 38 39 40 41 Quoted above, at n. 28. Torrigiano 1557, f. 1v E–F: ‘Dicemus ergo quod doctrina, secundum quod est doctio, est manifestatio incogniti a doctore, et quoniam actio est quoddammodo etiam in instrumento, oportet quod intentiones cognitae atque sermones sub debito modo et ordine apud animam quiescentes etiam manifestent incognitum. Quot ergo modis manifestamus incognitum, tot modis docemus, sed (sicut iam diximus) incognitum non manifestatur nisi per cognitum; nec per quodcunque contingit, sed per certum et determinatum; neque per qualitercunque dispositum et sub quocunque ordine quiescens apud intellectum, sed per ipsius dispositionem certam et ordinem apud ipsum’. Torrigiano 1557, f. 1v E: ‘Melius est ergo dicere intentiones cognitas sub debito modo et ordine quibus provehimur ad incognitum esse ut instrumenta doctoris, sermonem autem et voces quae sunt eorum signa esse ut instrumentorum quaedam instrumenta’. Torrigiano 1557, f. 1v G: ‘Scire opinamur unumquodque simpliciter et non sophistico modo, qui est secundum accidens, cum causam propter quam est res arbitramur scire, et quoniam illius est causa, et non contingit se aliter habere. Principalissimum enim ipsius (sicut ait) est ipsum propter quid speculari. Si ergo cognitione causae necessitantis essentiam rei sine qua non est possibile quod inveniatur res illa opinamur nos scire; est autem demonstratio syllogismus ostentivus causae et ipsius propter quid, sicut dicit Philosophus: erit scientia cognitio per demonstrationem’. Cf. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, I.2. Revisiting the Exegetical Tradition 361 which exclude being equally grounded in other comparable causal relationshps, so that effect and cause are tied to each other ontologically and epistemologically. From a logical perspective, this corresponds to the demonstrative syllogism: scientific knowledge is the knowledge of essential, necessary, and exclusive causal relationships as represented in demonstrative syllogisms. Presumably, Torrigiano has in mind a syllogism of this type: Major premise: all animals are mortal. Minor premise: all human beings are animals. Conclusion: therefore, all human beings are mortal. In this example, the conclusion attributes the essential property of mortality to the subject of human beings: because it is essential for human beings to be animals (as stated in the minor premise), and because mortality is essential to animals (as stated in the major premise), therefore, all human beings are mortal. Here, the middle term animal identifies the cause: animality causes mortality in human beings essentially and necessarily. As regards these demonstrative syllogisms, Torrigiano puts special emphasis on what he calls the ‘way or form of teaching all sciences’. This seems identical to the notion of ‘way or form’ of teaching mentioned above. In fact, it consists exactly in the logical form of a demonstrative syllogism.42 In the present example, this corresponds to the scheme: ‘all A is B; all C is A, therefore all C is B’, which stands for the form of an argument the formal validity of which is indifferent to the material content that can be expressed by it.43 Torrigiano explains this particular emphasis on indifference to content in the following passage when, after briefly discussing an alternative view on demonstrative syllogisms, he presents his own view: Some call the demonstrative syllogism, insofar as it causes the conclusion ontologically and logically (est causa conclusionis tam ad modum essendi quam ad modum consequendi), the ‘efficient cause of the knowledge of the conclusion.’ And this pertains to matter and form, for some indeed call it [sc. the demonstrative syllogism] the ‘instrument of all sciences.’ It pleases us more, however, [to call the demonstrative syllogism] ‘way or form of the teaching of all sciences’ (modum aut formam doctrinae omnium scientiarum), and this pertains more to the form, which relates to scientific knowledge as the measure [relates] to something measured. For it is the same measure by which oil, corn, and wine are measured, and similarly, it is by the same syllogism that we learn and receive instruction in all sciences. Even if the matter of a syllogism changes here and there, the figure, mood, order, and composition of premises into their conclusion is nevertheless the same in all sciences. This is the reason why there are more sciences than ways to teach them. And this syllogism divides into two kinds about which we shall speak below; they are the two first ways of teaching which correspond to the two general ways of science previously discussed. We will speak later about the third teaching when we consider each teaching by itself.44 42 43 44 The application of Aristotelian hylomorphism to logic – entailing the notions of logical form and matter – has recently received considerable attention from historians of logic. See Dutilh Novaes 2011, 2012a, 2012b; Brumberg-Chaumont 2015. For my present purposes, a broader notion of ‘logical form’ will suffice, but see the next footnote. This notion of ‘content indifference’ is my preferred term for ‘topic-neutrality’, for which see Dutilh Novaes 2011, 314–316. I assume that this ‘topic neutrality’ in Torrigiano is further based on a ‘schematic’ sense of ‘formal’ (syllogistic figure, mood, etc.), for which see Dutilh Novaes 2011, 307–310. Torrigiano 1557, f. 2r B–C: ‘Hic ergo syllogismus demonstrativus secundum quod ipse est causa conclusionis tam ad modum essendi quam ad modum consequendi dicitur a quibusdam causa efficiens scientiam conclusionis et hic respectus eius est ad 362 O. Utamura In this passage, Torrigiano first outlines a view of the demonstrative syllogism which differs from his own. According to this view, it is the combination of material content and logical form in a syllogism that makes the demonstrative syllogism an ‘instrument of all sciences’. Opposing that position, Torrigiano presents an alternative view that singles out the logical form of syllogisms – ‘the figure, mood, order, and composition of premises into their conclusion’ – rather than their material content. As he suggests, demonstrative syllogisms are not just instruments but structural constituents of scientific knowledge qua their logical form. More specifically, it is the logical form’s indifference to material content that constitutes, unifies, and structures all scientific knowledge, teaching, and learning. Conversely, all knowledge, teaching, and learning ideally consist of demonstrative syllogisms. In summary, according to Torrigiano, there is an essential relationship between teaching and logic. Since teaching (doctrina) aims at scientific knowledge (scientia), which is a knowledge of causes that are described in demonstrative syllogisms, therefore, the activities of teaching and learning proceed through demonstrative syllogisms. In these activities, logical form plays a decisive structural role: being indifferent to the material content of demonstrative syllogisms, it structures the variety of scientific knowledge, teaching, and learning in all scientific disciplines precisely qua its limited formal variety and indifference to content. This is in contrast to the richer variety of material content from the different scientific disciplines which is taught in demonstrative syllogisms, and precisely in its indifference to content, logical form constitutes a didactic unity of all scientific knowledge. By means of signs such as the teacher’s voice and speech, these demonstrative syllogisms enter students’ minds as intentions to make ‘manifest something unknown’. Within this framework, it makes sense to view logic instruction as a fundamental requirement for the study of all scientific disciplines: students must receive logic instruction as the ‘way and form’ of teaching and learning before receiving instruction in scientific disciplines. Since knowledge, teaching, and learning in all disciplines are didactically structured by the same limited variety of logical forms, students should first study these logical forms in isolation before turning to their richer didactic application. Based on his ‘Averroist’ reading of Aristotle, Torrigiano argued that it is truly ‘absurd to seek at the same time knowledge and the way of attaining knowledge’, that is, to learn both logic and scientific disciplines that are taught according to logic simultaneously. For Torrigiano, Galen had this didactic outlook in mind when he spoke of three ordered teachings. 5. The Three Ordered Teachings Torrigiano understands Galen’s doctrina in a logical-didactic sense, and thus he seeks to interpret Galen’s prologue as specifying three logically-didactically ‘ordered’, or organized ways of teaching. Of the three ways, two involve syllogistic, and the third, which does not involve syllogistic, highlights a tension in Torrigiano’s interpretation. materiam et formam. Dicitur enim a quibusdam instrumentum omnium scientiarum. Nobis autem placet plus ipsum appellare ‘modum aut formam doctrinae omnium scientiarum’ et hic respectus eius est magis ad formam cuius comparatio ad scientiam est sicut mensurae ad mensuratum. Eadem enim mensura mensuratur oleum, frumentum et vinum et similiter eodem syllogismo docemur et discimus omnes scientias. Materia siquidem syllogismi hinc inde mutuatur, sed figura et modus et ordo et compositio praemissarum ad conclusionem eadem est in omnibus scientiis, propter quod plures sunt scientiae cum pauciores sint modi docendi eas. Hic autem syllogismus distinguitur in duos modos ipsius de quibus adhuc infra loquemur, qui sunt duo primi modi docendi et adaequati duobus modis scientiae generalibus prius dictis. De tertia autem doctrina posterius fiet sermo, cum de unaquaque doctrina per se speculabimur’. In this passage, Torrigiano seems to refer to the demonstrations quia and propter quid, for which see my discussion in the next section. Revisiting the Exegetical Tradition 363 5.1. The Notion of ‘Ordered’ Teachings At the end of his interpretation of the first sentence of Galen’s prologue, Torrigiano turns to the notion of ‘order’ (ordo) which informs the notion of ‘ordered’ teachings (Torrigiano 1557, f. 2r C–v E). He understands ordo as merely explicating what is already entailed in doctrina: doctrina was about teaching essential, necessary, and exclusive causal relationships demonstratively, and ordo highlights the proper causal order of priority and posteriority according to which the teaching of these causal relationships must proceed.45 Since something is known scientifically in view of its most prior essential, necessary, and exclusive cause, an ordered teaching has to represent adequately the successive causal order between a given object of teaching and its very first cause.46 Torrigiano clarifies and exemplifies this: Since a teaching that does not proceed according to order does not extract an answer (quaesitum) (as Haly rightly says), it is also therefore rightly argued that what does not teach an answer is not a teaching. This is because, in inquiring into the scientific knowledge of something, order without doubt is not served when what is considered first is something discontinuous [to the thing in question], for instance what is neither the immediate cause of its discovery nor its sign, but very distant; [similarly, order is not served if] there is placed as prior something [actually] far off, leaving behind what is prior in the order of teaching – such as when it is stated that there is no music in Scythia because there is no vine. Or, if first is considered something from which the [pertinent] accidents are not obtained, so that [the objects of teaching] are neither proportionate in kind nor ordered, such as when it is concluded that man is an animal because man is musical, and what is musical is an animal, thus proceeding and concluding that man is an animal. Or, as regards the cause, when it is said that something that moves itself voluntarily is an animal, then there is no doubt that order is not served, because there is no order between things of different kinds [sc. voluntary self-movement directly pertains to man, but not to animal]. In the first case, the answer is shown by something accidental [sc. animality from musicality], in the second case by a remote cause [sc. animality from voluntary self-movement]. In neither case was there teaching, as the answer is not warranted – not because order is the cause of teaching, although it necessarily accompanies teaching, but because a mistake is made as regards the conditions of demonstration or teaching.47 45 46 47 Torrigiano’s view effectively entails that all kinds of instruction are orderly. Leoniceno will reject this idea and maintain that we can distinguish between kinds of instruction with and without order. Interestingly, he argues that teaching without order is possible by referring to an aphoristic manner of teaching, alluding presumably to Hippocrates’ Aphorisms. See Leoniceno 1532, f. 73r A, l. 9–B, l. 31 (partly quoted below, n. 69): ‘Neque enim ad rationem verae vel verissimae doctrinae [ . . . ] non tamen eundem ordinem servant in una aliqua tota scientia tradenda’. Torrigiano 1557, f. 2r C–D: ‘Et propter hoc nihil aliud est ordo quam recta antecedentia prioris ad posterius, vel recta dependentia posterioris a priori, cum quo recte continuatur et stat. Et quia “prius ad posterius” multis modis dicitur, secundum quemlibet illorum modorum est assumere ordinem in rebus, quae illis modis priores posterioribus et posteriores prioribus nuncupantur. Est autem ordo in doctrina hoc modo, quia cum alicuius rei scientia quaeritur (cum eius scientia non habeatur nisi per causas et principia) si causas habuerit, oportet quod prius aspiciatur in causa, quae propinquior et nobis notior est, quae “immediata” dicitur (nam quod propinquius et notius est, prius est quo ad doctrinam) deinde causa causae, quae “mediata causa” dicitur, et sic deinceps, donec resolvendo veniatur ad primum principium et causam in illo genere, ex cuius supposita cognitione quesitum extrahitur et completur’. Torrigiano 1557, f. 2r D–v E: ‘Nam, cum per doctrinam quae currit non secundum ordinem, non extrahitur quaesitum (sicut recte dicit Hali), recte etiam post illud arguitur non esse doctrinam, quae quaesitum non docet. Si enim, cum quaeritur scientia alicuius rei, aspiciatur primo in aliquo, quod secum non continuatur, verbi gratia in ea, quae non est immediata causa inventionis eius, aut immediatum signum, sed remotum valde, et apponitur prius, quod longinquius est, et dereliquitur illud, quod ad ordinem doctrinae prius erat, tunc sine dubio non servatur ordo, ut cum dicitur, in Scythia non est musica, quia ibi non est vitis. 364 O. Utamura In this passage, Torrigiano illustrates what Galen meant by his claim that all teachings are ordered teachings. According to his understanding – which roughly implements Aristotle’s requirements for scientific knowledge as stated in the Posterior Analytics – an ordered teaching must answer the question ‘why?’ about a property. This answer must provide a cause that is essential, proximate, necessary, and exclusive to the property at stake (that is, it cannot be otherwise). Torrigiano illustrates this interpretation by means of three examples. The first example presents a syllogism that mentions a cause that is too distant to answer the question ‘why?’, so that this syllogism does not teach in an orderly manner: Wherever there is no vine, there is no music; in Scythia, there is no vine; therefore, there is no music in Scythia. Similarly, the second example provides a syllogism that does not answer the question ‘why?’, because it infers from something accidental to something essential. This regards the conclusion that human beings are animals: Whatever is musical is an animal; human beings are musical; therefore, human beings are animals. This answer is not satisfactory, as musicality is merely accidental to animality. Since only some animals are musical, human beings are musical is not the adequate cause from which it follows that human beings are animals. Finally, the last example illustrates the case where the same question ‘why?’ is not satisfactorily answered because it appeals to a cause that is not properly tied to the property at stake: Whatever moves itself voluntarily is an animal; human beings move themselves voluntarily; therefore, human beings are animals. The problem here seems to be that voluntary self-movement is not directly linked to animality (there are irrational animals) so that it does not establish the essential, necessary, and exclusive causal relationship that is required between humanity and animality. 5.2. Resolutive Teaching In interpreting sentences two to four of Galen’s prologue, Torrigiano proceeds in two steps: he first provides a tentative interpretation of Galen’s ordered teachings and he then discusses it in light of Aristotle’s four basic questions as stated in Posterior Analytics II.1 (Torrigiano 1557, ff. 2v F–5r B).48 According to the traditional translation of the second sentence, the first (ordered) teaching comes about ‘from the notion of the end, which arises according to dissolution’. As Torrigiano understands this phrase, what ‘arises according to dissolution’ is not the teaching but the notion of the end.49 In his view, the first ordered teaching presupposes in the 48 49 Aut, si primo aspiciatur in aliquo, per quod non extrahitur || qualia sunt accidentalia rei quaesitae, quae secum non proportionantur in genere neque ordinantur, ut cum concluditur quod homo est animal, quia homo est musicus, et musicus est animal, deinde proceditur et concluditur quod homo est animal. Vel per causam, ut cum dicitur, quod est voluntarie mobile est animal, tunc sine dubio non servatur ordo, quia inter ea quae sunt diversi generis non est ordo. Primum namque quaesitum ostenditur per aliquod accidentale. Secundum vero per causam remotam. Nec etiam fuit doctrina quia non certificatur quaesitum, non quia ordo sit causa doctrinae, licet de necessitate comitetur doctrinam, sed quia peccatur in conditionibus demonstrationis sive doctrinae’. The reference is to Anarcharsis’ argument with Scythia, music, and wine in Posterior Analytics I.13. The four basic questions are ‘why?’, ‘what is it?’, ‘is it the case?’, ‘is it the case that A is in B (a property in a subject)?’. See Torrigiano 1557, f. 2v H: ‘Dicamus ergo, quod sicut dicit Aristoteles in secundo Analyticorum quaesita tot sunt numero quot sunt scientia, nam nos non scimus in fine, nisi quod quaesitum fuit in principio. Quaesita autem sunt quatuor (sicut dicit) duo scilicet simplicia et duo composita. Primum de simplicibus est, an res est inventa absolute, secundum est, quid est res. Primum aut[em] de compositis est, an hoc inveniatur illi, secundum est, quare hoc inveniatur illi’. See Ottoson 1984, 117–118. Ottoson 1984, 103–104, also notes that interpreting the Aristotelian demonstrations in terms of the four basic questions from Posterior Analytics II.1 goes back to Haly. In contrast to Torrigiano, who implies that dissolution/analysis precedes and gives rise to the goal, Leoniceno maintains that the goal precedes and is the object of analysis (Leoniceno 1532, f. 69v C, l. 16–D, l. 28: ‘Ex his omnibus volumus esse conclusum [ . . . ] notio finis antecedit resolutionem’.). For Leoniceno, the analytic teaching proceeds by analyzing the goal Revisiting the Exegetical Tradition 365 teacher a knowledge of the causal chain, which has been obtained by means of a ‘dissolution’ or ‘resolution’ from the ultimate effect towards its very first cause.50 Put differently, a teacher possesses the notion of the end of a given object by possessing knowledge of the resolution which resolves that object as an effect all the way back to its very first cause. Assuming such a successfully concluded resolution, Torrigiano maintains that the resolutive teaching corresponds to Aristotle’s demonstratio propter quid (Gr. dioti), which, according to Aristotle, is represented in a demonstrative syllogism as follows:51 Major premise: What is near does not twinkle. Minor premise: The planets are near. Conclusion: Therefore, the planets do not twinkle. For Torrigiano, this type of demonstrative syllogism constitutes the resolutive teaching because the middle term (being near) identifies the cause of the major term (not twinkling), which reappears in the conclusion. According to Torrigiano’s understanding, this means that the syllogism resolves the effect (not twinkling = major term) into its cause (being near = middle term).52 In so doing, the proof proceeds in the inverse order: it shows that since the minor term (the planets) relates to the cause ( = middle term = being near), therefore – assuming the major premise is granted – its effect ( = major term = not twinkling) relates to the subject as well (the planets). While the syllogism resolves the effect into its cause, the proof proceeds inversely from the cause to its effect. This inversion is of fundamental importance for Torrigiano’s understanding of the resolutive teaching. This is because he interprets it in terms of a didactic scenario in which a teacher instructs his student by means of a demonstration propter quid.53 Given that the proof in such a demonstration proceeds from the cause to its effect, one might assume that a teacher uses that demonstration to teach analogously from the cause to its effect.54 But exactly the opposite is true: Torrigiano does not assume that teaching begins with premises and leads towards the conclusion. He holds instead that teaching always begins with a conclusion with which the student is already familiar: the student engages with a conclusion by raising a question concerning it.55 In the case of the resolutive teaching, which employs the demonstration propter quid, this means that the student already knows that the effect is found in its subject. Assuming this conclusion, the student raises a question: ‘The planets do not twinkle. Why?’56 To this, the teacher responds by reference to the middle term, namely the cause and the reason why the effect (not twinkling) is found in the subject (the 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 of a discipline through a practical deliberation that establishes which topics students need to learn before they can master the goal of a discipline, e.g. health in medicine. Torrigiano 1557, f. 2v F–G: ‘Cum dixit, quot sunt doctrinae ordinariae, manifestat unamquanque earum, dicens, ‘prima quidem’ etc., id est ‘prima’ quae est primarum maxima secundum veritatem (ut patebit), scilicet resolutiva, fit ex notione finis, id est, fit per finem notum, inventum per dissolutionem. Nam donec non pervenitur ad finem notum per viam solutionis, quaesitum non extrahitur neque certificatur ad plenum. [ . . . ] Incipit ergo haec doctrina ex finis notione, quoniam ex fine solummodo resolutionis per se noto incipit homo doceri dubitatum primum, et nullo modo prius’. Cf. Ottoson 1984, 116. For the demonstrations propter quid (and quia), see Aristotle, Posterior Analytics I.13. Torrigiano 1557, f. 3r B: ‘Et consideretur, si iste medius terminus est causa maioris extremi, quod scilicet praedicatur in quaesito, sive in conclusione, quod idem est, nam id, quod quaeritur primo, concluditur postea. Nam si sic, tunc proprie dicitur facta esse resolutio ad causam, nam ascensio fuit in ipsam per resolutionem causati, ut ostenderetur causatum, quod ab illa compositum fuit, et dicitur haec resolutio quaesiti in principia eius, quae ipsum causant’. See below, the quotation in n. 56. This seems to be Pietro d’Abano’s view. See Ottoson 1984, 113–115. Torrigiano 1557, f. 2v F: ‘Non enim potest intelligere quod haec doctrina incipiat ex quaesito, quod finaliter intendit notum facere (sicut multi voluerunt) [sc. the conclusion] quoniam non incipimus inde doceri, sed dubitare’. This question ‘why?’ is one of Aristotle’s four basic questions in Posterior Analytics II.1. See Torrigiano 1557, f. 3r A: ‘Verumtamen, sicut dicit Aristoteles, demonstratio quae dat causam inventionis est alia a demonstratione quae dat inventionem tantum. Nam ea quae dat causam inventionis dicitur demonstratio propter quid, quae competit in quaesito de quare, et est ista 366 O. Utamura planets): because the planets are near, therefore the planets do not twinkle, assuming that what is near does not twinkle. As a result, the teacher has guided his students didactically from the granted effect (conclusion) to its cause (premises), by answering the question ‘why?’ with a demonstration propter quid that, inversely from the cause (premises), proves its effect (conclusion). By repeating these demonstrations propter quid, the teacher guides his students successively from a given effect to its very first cause. Torrigiano provides the following example of a resolutive teaching: Suppose that the statement at stake is this, namely ‘Whether putrid fever [sc. fever that goes along with decay] or accidental heat is found in a human body, or, why is it found?’ The demonstration from its cause responds: because a putrid humor has been found in that body which is warm due to accidental heat and heats the containing body. But if it is asked further why the putrid humor is found, the demonstration from its cause proceeds similarly: because in many humors, there has been found an impediment that corrupts the evaporation and ventilation of natural heat and adds extraneous [heat to it]. But if it is questioned again why the impediment to evaporation and ventilation has been found in a humor, similarly the demonstration from its cause responds: because an obstruction has been found in the body and its channels (meatibus) which gives rise to heat and fume. And if one asks still further why the obstruction has been found, the demonstration from its cause responds: because one of the causes of such obstruction has been found, which consists either in the abundance of humors (humorum multitudo), density or thickness, or an excess of coldness or of dryness, or in heat with a drying effect, etc. And which of these causes qualifies more as the actual cause [sc. of that obstruction] will be more known to the person who demonstrates it. But granting that the abundance of humors is the cause, it might be asked why an abundance of humors is found, and the demonstration from its cause responds: because there has been an excess of eating with indigestion and lack of movement (quiete). The excess of eating with indigestion has perhaps a further cause: because the ruling appetite exceeds the digestion. This, too, has a cause: a certain bad complexion, which, likewise, has another cause, either natural or extraneous to it. The resolution eventually concludes with the first principle of the entire answer; and if this process has satisfied the conditions of a demonstration, it is called ‘resolution by conversion,’ because a resolution which obtains a true demonstration must assume as the middle term the necessary cause without which the answer is not extracted. And from this point, a conversion of the argument can arise, just as when it is concluded that the feverish person is sick because he has observably damaged operations. For I can convert this, concluding that he has observably damaged operations, because he is sick. Yet this does not happen in topical arguments because they assume accidental things as the middle term. In any case, this resolutive teaching is used most of all in the ‘doctrinal sciences’, as geometry and others are called ‘doctrinal’ because they exercise teaching (doctrina) most in comparison to other sciences, for this teaching (doctrina) is called ‘teaching’ (doctrina) par excellence, because it obtains in the student a scientific knowledge from the cause (nam ex ea resultat scientia in demonstratio per priora natura, nam terminus medius in ea est causa quaesiti. [ . . . ] Ad unum ergo istorum quaesitorum, quod est quaesitum de quare, respondetur per demonstrationem quae absolute demonstratio dicitur, et est demonstratio propter quid, et haec est doctrina resolutiva’. Revisiting the Exegetical Tradition 367 discipulo per causam), and we say that we know something when we know its cause.57 In this example, Torrigiano illustrates how a teacher uses the resolutive teaching and demonstrations propter quid from the cause to the effect in order to answer the question ‘why?’ as regards a given effect. In this process from effects to causes, the demonstration propter quid always teaches how a given effect is grounded in its prior cause. As Torrigiano notes, when the teacher has in this way arrived at the very first cause, it becomes didactically possible to descend again from the cause to the effect. However, as his reference to topical arguments implies, such a change of didactic direction is possible only when the middle terms represent essential, necessary, and exclusive causal relationships that allow for this change of direction. For only in the case of such one-to-one correspondence is it possible to convert the demonstrative syllogism by rearranging the middle term and the major term. In Torrigiano’s example, the terms in the following demonstration propter quid are rearranged to obtain a change of direction: Major premise: Whoever has observably damaged operations is sick Minor premise: This person has observably damaged operations Conclusion: Therefore, this person is sick In this syllogism, the middle term (having observably damaged operations) qualifies as an essential, necessary, and exclusive cause of its effect (being sick). For this reason, it is possible to convert the syllogism by rearranging the major and middle terms, viz. the effect and the cause (being sick – having observably damaged operations): Major premise: Whoever is sick has observably damaged operations Minor premise: This person is sick Conclusion: Therefore, this person has observably damaged operations 57 Torrigiano 1557, f. 3r D–v F: ‘Exemplum autem conveniens resolutivae doctrinae est, ut sit propositum in quaestione nobis hoc, scilicet: “An febris putrida vel calor accidentalis sit inventus in corpore humano, vel quare sit inventus?” Demonstratio autem eius per causam est, ut respondeatur, quia putridus humor est in eo inventus, qui accidentali calore calidus calefacit continens corpus. || Si autem postea quaeratur, quare putridus humor est in eo inventus, demonstratio per suam causam similiter est, quia prohibitio expirationis et eventationis calorem naturalem corrumpens et extraneum superaddens est inventa in multitudine humoris. Si autem adhuc dubitetur, quare prohibitio transpirationis et eventationis est inventa in humore, demonstratio etiam eius similiter per suam causam est, quia oppilatio est inventa in corpore, in suis meatibus, per quos eventatur calidum et expirat capnosum. Si vero postea dubitetur adhuc, quare oppilatio est inventa, demonstratio per suam causam est, quia aliqua ex causis oppilationis est inventa, quae est autem humorum multitudo, aut grossities, aut viscositas, aut nimia frigiditas, aut siccitas, aut calor cum siccitate etc. Quaecunque harum causarum magis fuerit causa erit pariter notior apud demonstrantem. Si autem supposito quod multitudo humoris sit eius causa, quaeratur quare multitudo humoris sit inventa, demonstratio eius per suam causam est, quia nimia comestio cum indigestione et quiete est inventa. Nimia autem comestio cum indigestione fortassis habet causam adhuc, cum habeat dominum appetitus superans digestionem, quod similiter et causam habet, aliquam complexionis malitiam, quae complexionis malitia simul causam habet aut naturalem aut extraneam et hucusque pervenit resolutio tanquam ad primum principium totius quaesiti. Et, siquidem fuerit huiusmodi processus in nullo peccans in conditionibus demonstrationis, dicitur haec resolutio per conversionem, quia resolutio veram demonstrationem faciens debet assumere pro medio causam necessariam sine qua non extrahitur quaesitum. Et ex hac potest fieri conversio argumenti, ut cum concluditur quod febriens est aegrotans, quia habet operationes sensibiliter laesas. Possum enim hoc convertere, concludens quod habet operationes sensibiliter laesas, quia est aegrotans, quod quidem non contingit in topicis argumentis propter assumi in medio accidentalia quaesiti. Hac autem doctrina resolutiva maxime utuntur scientiae doctrinales, ut geometria et reliquiae quae non ob aliud dictae sunt doctrinales nisi quia hanc maxime caeterarum artium exercent doctrinam, eo quod ista doctrina per excellentiam dicitur doctrina, nam ex ea resultat scientia in discipulo per causam, nos autem unumquodque dicitur scire dicimus, cum eius causam cognoscimus’. As noted by Ottoson 1984, 115–116, Torrigiano here modifies an extant example from a previous interpretation, and his source might be Pietro d’Abano’s Conciliator. 368 O. Utamura By thus rearranging the terms in the syllogism, it is possible to proceed didactically in the inverse direction as happens in compositive teaching. Importantly, the last sentence in this passage makes it unmistakably clear that Torrigiano intends this resolutive teaching to serve a didactic purpose: doctrina is about providing students with a knowledge of causes. This didactic purpose may explain why he assumes that, in order to teach students from effects to causes, the teacher has to demonstrate inversely from causes to effects: teachers need to be one step ahead of their students. 5.3. Compositive Teaching In the traditional translation of the third sentence of Galen’s prologue, compositive teaching arises ‘from the composition according to those things discovered by resolution’. As Torrigiano understands it, compositive teaching teaches essentially the same content as the resolutive teaching, but in a different order. Compositive teaching presupposes the very same knowledge as resolutive teaching: knowledge of a concluded resolution.58 But whereas resolutive teaching proceeds didactically from effects to causes by inversely proving effects (conclusions) from their causes (premises), compositive teaching proceeds didactically the other way round: moving from causes to effects by proving these causes (conclusion) from their effects (premises). Accordingly, Torrigiano identifies the compositive teaching with Aristotle’s demonstratio quia, which answers the questions ‘whether it is the case’ (absolutely speaking) and ‘whether A is in B’ (about a property in a subject).59 Aristotle’s example for the demonstration quia (Gr. hoti) reads:60 Major premise: What does not twinkle is near. Minor premise: The planets do not twinkle. Conclusion: Therefore, the planets are near. In a demonstration quia, the middle term does not identify the cause (being near) as in the demonstration propter quid. Instead, since this demonstration is obtained by converting the major and middle terms, viz. effects and causes (not twinkling – being near), it is the effect that is identified in the middle term (not twinkling), while the major term identifies the cause (being near). For Torrigiano, such a syllogism is compositive, as it shows that the effect (not twinkling = middle term) is composed of its cause (being near = major term).61 In so doing, the compositive teaching presupposes the very same knowledge as the resolutive teaching but regarded from a different perspective.62 Didactically speaking, a teacher uses this demonstration quia to guide students from a first cause to its effects. Here too, the student begins by assuming the conclusion, which 58 59 60 61 62 See below, n. 62. Torrigiano 1557, f. 3r A: ‘Ea [sc. responsio] autem, quae dat inventionem tantum, dicitur demonstratio quia, quae competit in quaesito dicente an hoc inventiatur illi, vel an inveniatur absolute. [ . . . ] Ad alia autem duo [sc. quaestiones ‘an hoc inveniatur illi’ vel ‘an inveniatur absolute’] respondetur per demonstrationem, quae dicitur demonstratio non absolute (sicut vult Aristoteles) et est demonstratio quia, et haec dicitur doctrina compositiva, quae est opposita primae [sc. doctrina resolutiva]’. See Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, I.13. Torrigiano 1557, f. 3r C: ‘Si vero medius terminus, qui sequitur ad subiectum et antecedit ad praedicatum, fuerit causatum maioris extremi, tunc non resolutio sed compositio facta esse dicitur, nam in causatum per compositionem descenditur, quod a causa compositum est, ut causa ostendatur, motus enim ad causatum ut ostendatur causa compositio quaedam est, et dicitur haec compositio quaesiti ad causata eius, quae ipsum sequuntur’. Torrigiano 1557, f. 2v G–H: ‘Sicut autem doctrina resolutiva fit, ut accipiatur quaesitum et consideretur in causa propinquiori, et resolvatur usque ad primum principium et causam eius, sic et doctrina compositiva fit, ut accipiatur quaesitum et componatur usque ad ultimum causatum ipsius, secundum contrarietatem primae, et hoc intendebat [sc. Galenus], cum dixit, “secunda vero” etc’. For Leoniceno’s view, see above, n. 18. Revisiting the Exegetical Tradition 369 now contains the subject and cause of a given effect: the planets (subject) are near (cause). Granting this conclusion, viz. that this cause is found in the subject, the student asks whether this is indeed the case: are planets really near? In response, the teacher guides the student from the cause to its effect by proving that cause (being near) from its effect (not twinkling): the planets are indeed near (conclusion and cause), because the planets are not twinkling, assuming that what is not twinkling is near (premises and effect). The effect has been found, and since the effect is caused essentially, necessarily, and exclusively, it is possible to prove that cause (being near) from its the effect (not twinkling). While the direction of proof is from the effect to the cause, the didactic direction is from the cause to the effect. In the course of his discussion, Torrigiano illustrates how these demonstrations are used to proceed didactically from causes to effects. Paraphrasing loosely for the sake of clarity: But the example for the compositive teaching is contrary to the example that is assigned to the resolutive teaching. For it can happen to a student that what is more familiar to him and that from which the teaching proceeds is the contrary of what was assigned [to the student] there [in the resolutive teaching], namely the middle term from which the answer (quaesitum) must be concluded [sc. the cause in the resolutive teaching]. Let that be posited in the question [and let it be asked] whether it is really found [sc. the cause, which is now in the conclusion]. For instance, let us begin to ask for the first principle of putrid fever, like the accidental heat generated in a body to which we had arrived by the end of the resolution, namely by asking whether this is really found: a natural or extraneous bad mixture (distemperamentum) of the stomach’s complexion. Then [the teacher responds affirmatively and] demonstrates it from its effect which necessarily accompanies [its cause], namely that the appetite does not equal the digestion. For in case of a balanced mixture, there is an equality, but in case of an imbalanced mixture which tends towards coldness, the appetite exceeds the digestion, which tends towards heat. Thereafter, when it is doubted whether the appetite exceeds the digestion, the answer will be demonstrated similarly, again from its effect which accompanies that cause by necessity, namely that [the patient] has eaten too much but digested too little. But when it is doubted whether this is indeed found, it will be answered that it has been found, since an abundance of crude humors has been found. And when it is doubted whether this is found, it will be answered that it is, with the reason that an obstruction has been found together with a lack of other causes of obstruction. And if this is questioned again, it will be responded that it is indeed found, with the reason that an impediment to evaporation and ventilation has been found. And when this is doubted again, it will be demonstrated that this has indeed been found, because putrid [fever] has been found. And if this is doubted again, it will be demonstrated that it has been found by the discovery of some sort of accidental heat, and this is the ultimate effect which appears observably [sc. the putrid fever]. And in this example, it is manifest how the compositive teaching arises from the composition of those things discovered by resolution. But in order for such composition to demonstrate truly on the basis of the cause, what must be assumed as the middle term is an effect that accompanies its cause by necessity, for the argument is converted, in the previously stated manner, from that [middle term]. But for someone who is trained in the art of syllogizing, it is not difficult to compose syllogisms and prosyllogisms when he possesses the middle term, yet because in the sciences, 370 O. Utamura syllogisms are rarely explicated completely, it suffices to indicate only the middle term.63 As Torrigiano explains, the compositive teaching proceeds in an order which inverts the resolutive teaching. In the resolutive teaching, the teacher had proceeded didactically from the effect to the cause by repeatedly proving an effect (conclusion) from its cause (premises). By contrast, in the compositive teaching, the teacher proceeds didactically from the cause to the effect with a demonstratio quia by repeatedly proving a cause (conclusion) from its effect (premises). In both cases, the student assumes the conclusion, and the teacher demonstrates that conclusion by reference to an essential, necessary, and exclusive causal relationship between cause and effect. In so doing, the teacher is always one step ahead of his student. Finally, at the end of this passage, Torrigiano seems to clarify that it is not always necessary to formulate syllogisms explicitly: since it is easy for trained persons to explicate syllogisms, it often suffices to teach the correct middle term. Interestingly, while Torrigiano allows teaching to occur without explicit syllogisms, he nonetheless maintains that teaching ideally consists of demonstrating, with the proviso that syllogisms can remain merely implicit. 5.4. Definitive Teaching In the traditional translation of the fourth sentence of Galen’s prologue, the third definitive teaching comes about from the ‘dissolution of a term’, and this is the teaching ‘to which we now adhere’. In Torrigiano’s understanding, the relative clause ‘to which we now adhere’ refers to Galen’s Art of Medicine itself and the order it follows in teaching the whole discipline of medicine.64 For Galen’s Art of Medicine proceeds by ‘dissolving’ a term that is to be defined into its defining terms. To give an example, Galen’s Art of Medicine continues immediately after the prologue: 63 64 Torrigiano 1557, f. 4r A–B: ‘Exemplum vero compositivae doctrinae est in opposito exempli quod assignatum est resolutivae: si forsan contingat apud aliquem discipulum notiora ex quibus proceditur in doctrina esse econtrario quam ibi sint assignata, scilicet ut quod ibi erat notius, scilicet medius terminus ad concludendum quaesitum, sit hic positum in quaestione, an sit inventum: ut si petatur illud, quod erat primum principium febris putridae, ut caloris accidentalis huius in corpore generati, ad quod deventum est per finem resolutionis, scilicet an sit inventum distemperamentum complexionis stomachi naturale vel extraneum, et demonstretur id per suum causatum, quod de necessitate concomitatur ipsum, scilicet quia appetitus non aequatur digestioni. Sub temperamento enim aequatur, sed in distemperamento ad frigiditatem appetitus superat digestionem ad caliditatem autem econtra. Deinde si dubitatur an appetitus superet digestionem, demonstrabitur id quaesitum similiter per suum causatum, quod de necessitate concomitatur scilicet quod nimis comedit et parum digerit. Si autem et hoc dubitetur an sit inventum, respondebitur quod est inventum quia multitudo crudi humoris est inventa. Et si de hac dubitetur an sit inventa, respondebitur quod sic, quia oppilatio est inventa cum privatione aliarum causarum oppilationis. Et si hoc iterum quaeratur, respondebitur quod est inventa, quia prohibitio eventationis et expirationis est inventa. Et, si hoc iterum petatur, respondebitur quod est inventa, quia putredo est inventa. Et, si hoc iterum dubitetur, demonstrabitur inveniri per inventionem caloris accidentalis huiusmodi et hoc est ultimum causatum quod sensibiliter patet. Et est manifestum in hoc quomodo doctrina compositiva fiat ex compositione inventorum secundum resolutionem. Debet autem et talis compositio ad hoc, ut vere demonstret super causam, assumere pro medio tale causatum, quod de necessitate concomitatur causam: ex tali enim convertitur argumentum modo praedicto. Non est autem difficile exercitatis in arte syllogizandi habitis mediis terminis componere syllogismos, et prosyllogismos sic adinvicem. Sed quoniam in scientiis syllogismi raro proferuntur completi, sufficit nobis innuere medium terminum tantum’. Here too, Torrigiano seems to modify an extant example from an earlier source. See Ottoson 1984, 115–116. Torrigiano 1557, f. 5r C: ‘Exemplum autem conveniens huic doctrinae [sc. doctrinae definitivae] est illud, quod habemus prae oculis in hoc libro, ut assumatur diffinitio medicinae aut alicuius aliarum scientiarum, et dividatur, sicut supra diximus, et declaretur omne id, cuius intellectu indigetur in unaquaque partium, ita tamen, quod ex generalibus summis non declinetur’. Revisiting the Exegetical Tradition 371 Medicine is the (1) knowledge of those things that are (2) healthy, those that are (3) diseased, and those that are (4) neither (neutral) – it would make no difference if someone were to say sickly. It is necessary to understand the term (1) ‘knowledge’ generally and not specifically. [The terms] (2) ‘healthy,’ (3) ‘diseased’ and (4) ‘neither’ are each used in three ways: as pertaining (a) to the body; as pertaining (b) to the cause; and as pertaining (c) to the sign. Thus, the body is what is capable of ‘receiving’ health (2a); the cause is what is capable of creating and maintaining health (2b); and the sign is what is capable of indicating health (2c). The Greeks call all these ‘healthy.’ In the same way too, the term (3) ‘diseased’ refers to bodies capable of ‘receiving’ diseases (3a), ‘cause’ to what are capable of creating and maintaining diseases (3b), and ‘sign’ to what are capable of indicating diseases (3c). Furthermore, in the same way, ‘neither’ refers to bodies, causes and signs (4b–c).65 Torrigiano is clearly aware that this interpretation is not compatible with his own interpretation of the resolutive and compositive teachings. While he identified the first two ordered teachings with Aristotelian demonstrations that correspond to Aristotle’s basic questions, definitive teaching does not fit into that exegetical model: it neither corresponds to an Aristotelian demonstration nor to one of Aristotle’s four basic questions.66 Indeed, Aristotle did not even mention such non-demonstrative teaching.67 This poses a problem for Torrigiano, as Galen’s use of a teaching method not mentioned by Aristotle contradicts his general approach of interpreting Galen through Aristotle. Confronted with this problem, Torrigiano admits, on the one hand, that Aristotle had rightly neglected definitive teaching, as it fails to meet his requirements for logic. From this perspective, Galen’s third ordered teaching is superfluous.68 On the other hand, Torrigiano excuses Galen’s ‘superfluous’ teaching by noting that he had simply wanted to add to Aristotle’s didactics something that was not demonstrative. This weak excuse shows not only that Torrigiano struggles to appreciate Galen’s non-demonstrative didactics from his Aristotelian perspective, but also that interpreting Galen on his own terms was not Torrigiano’s primary aim. It is worth noting that with these statements, Torrigiano would fall prey to Leoniceno’s critique in De tribus doctrinis (1532). For Leoniceno, Torrigiano failed to do justice to the historical Galen and Aristotle, neither of whom had reduced teaching to demonstrative 65 66 67 68 Galen 2016 (tr. Johnston), 160 ( = Galen 2000, 276.6–19, ed. Boudon; ed. Kühn I, 307.5–17). The structuring numbers in parentheses are mine. See the elaborate discussion in Torrigiano 1557, ff. 4r B–5r D. Torrigiano 1557, f. 5r B: ‘Et Aristoteles de hoc genere doctrinae [sc. doctrina definitiva] nequaquam mentionem fecisse videtur, eo quod hoc genus doctrinae non videtur aliquod ignotum declarare per notum, sicut ex conclusione. Unde nec eo utimur ad particularia quaesita scientiae declaranda, sicut aliis duobus [sc. doctrina resolutiva et compositiva], sed utimur eo ad tradendam scientiam totam sub uno ordine simul, imo ad numeranda capitula scientiae generalia, ut habeatur per id aliqua memoria totius scientiae’. Torrigiano 1557, f. 5r C–D: ‘Haec autem omnia [sc. doctrina definitiva], et si ad medicinam superflua sint, tamen haec sunt visa bene dici ad excusationem Galeni qui non posuit diffinitionis venativam et conclusivam esse genus doctrinae, sed magis diffinitionis expositivam, et qui hanc doctrinam videtur adinvertisse et cognovisse, dictis Aristotelis addens eam, quam etsi Aristoteles praeterivit, non sine causa (sicut diximus) fuit’. 372 O. Utamura syllogisms.69 But what is more, Torrigiano failed to understand the concept of teaching itself, which does not need to prove everything out of necessity in order to teach something. Torrigiano’s interpretation of Galen’s three ordered teachings integrates a didactic interpretation of Aristotelian demonstrations. This involves a didactic interpretation of the two-fold demonstrative process from effects to their causes and, in turn, from these causes to their effects, which has commonly been taken as representing a scientific method. Yet for Torrigiano, such a two-fold demonstrative process plays a didactic role.70 Strictly speaking, this conclusion is not fully supported by his interpretation of the two first ordered teachings, as it mainly involved conversions of demonstrations propter quid from the cause to the effect (resolutive teaching) into demonstrations quia from the effect to the cause (compositive teaching) – not from effects to their causes and, in turn, from these causes to their effects. Nonetheless, in light of Torrigiano’s assumption that both ordered teachings presuppose a knowledge in the teacher which concerns a concluded resolution from effects into causes (ex notione finis), we can safely assume that his interpretation of Galen’s prologue presupposes that demonstrations quia (from effects to causes) are converted into demonstrations propter quid (from causes into effects) for a didactic purpose. In sum, Torrigiano’s interpretation of Galen’s three ordered teachings illustrates not only that, but also how, Aristotelian demonstrations and their conversion were interpreted didactically: on the assumption that teaching ideally consists in demonstrations and that logic has a fundamental didactic function. This fits perfectly well with Torrigiano’s understanding of ‘doctrina’ as teaching: ‘a teacher’s action upon his student’. Already for Torrigiano, Galen’s three ordered teachings were not about research and discovery, but about teaching and didactics. 6. Conclusion It is often maintained that, before Leoniceno, scholastic interpretations of Galen’s Art of Medicine had taken the prologue as a text about scientific method. It is assumed, in particular, that, prior to Leoniceno, scholastics identified Galen’s ordered teachings with Aristotelian demonstrations and that therefore they read Galen’s prologue in terms of a scientific method in which causes are first demonstrated from their effects in order to demonstrate, in turn, effects from their causes. According to that view, Leoniceno broke with this tradition by replacing interpretations framed in terms of scientific method with a didactic interpretation. However, this understanding of the scholastic exegetical tradition is inaccurate. Torrigiano’s case shows that scholastics interpreted Galen’s prologue didactically before Leoniceno. Assuming that logic is didactics and that teaching proceeds in demonstrative syllogisms, Torrigiano maintains that students have first to master the limited variety of 69 70 Leoniceno 1532, f. 73r A, l. 9–23 argues that the concept of teaching does not require teaching to proceed through proofs out of necessity, as subjects like grammar, (Aristotelian) ethics, and (Galenic) medicine can be taught without being grounded on the necessity required by demonstrative syllogisms: ‘Neque enim ad rationem verae vel verissimae doctrinae exigitur ut omnia ex necessitate probet. Alioquin neque grammatica neque scientia moralis, imo neque medicinalis essent verae doctrinae quoniam grammatica non rationibus sed solis constat auctoritatibus. Moralis autem Aristotele teste in libro primo Moralium circa iusta et honesta versatur, quae tantam varietatem habent ut lege dumtaxat, non autem natura constare videantur. Qui etiam Aristoteles in eodem libro postea concedit in materia morali nullam esse certitudinem sicuti neque in sanis adeo quod secundum ipsum neque philosophia moralis neque scientia medicinalis, quae tractat de sanis, non habent omnino necessarias conclusiones sive in universum sive particulatim ut etiam Aristoteles apertissime ostendit verba illa subiungens: “Cumque hoc habeat universum genus, multo magis in singulis esse est existimandum.” Galenus quoque in definitione quae dicit “Medicina est scientia”, “scientiae” nomen communius inquit audiri oportere, innuens per haec verba medicinam non esse certae et exquisitae veritatis scientiam, lato tamen vocabulo “scientiam” nominari’. This does not exclude that the two-fold demonstrative process can serve research and discovery. However, the process itself is not necessarily tied to research and discovery and can also represent a didactic process. Revisiting the Exegetical Tradition 373 valid logical forms before encountering their didactic application to all disciplines. From this perspective, the scholastic identification of Galen’s doctrinae ordinatae with Aristotelian demonstrations does not imply an interpretation of Galen’s prologue in terms of scientific method. Instead, this identification emerges as a didactic position. More research is needed to understand the historical context of Torrigiano’s views. However, since his argumentation assumes self-evidently that logic has a didactic function, and that teaching is ideally demonstrative, it seems reasonable to suggest that these assumptions must have been more common in the scholastic tradition. This could be substantiated further.71 If this view on Leoniceno’s pre-history is correct, it seems likely that Leoniceno did not turn away from scientific method towards teaching and didactics, as it has been commonly believed. Instead, he turned away from didactics in the scholastic tradition that was based on demonstrative syllogisms towards an alternative didactics. Acknowledgements This paper has benefited from encouraging discussions with my supervisors, Paul Bakker and Cees Leijenhorst, and from helpful comments by an anonymous reviewer, William O. Duba, and Heinrich C. Kuhn. My special thanks go to David L. Dusenbury for his stylistic corrections and suggestions, and to Steven Coesemans, Christophe Geudens, and Jan Papy for organizing the inspiring conference in lovely Leuven, which resulted in this paper. ORCID Okihito Utamura http://orcid.org/0000-0002-3813-5280 References Adamson, P. 2010. ‘Yah.yā Ibn ‘Ad¯ı and Averroes on Metaphysics Alpha Elatton’, Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale, 21, 343–374. Ashworth, E. J. 2013. ‘Logic’, in D. C. Lindberg and M. H. 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