Controversy & Clarity

 In this episode, we discuss:

*Mr. Smith joining 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines, in Vietnam and assuming command of his platoon 

*His staff NCOs, especially SSgt Richard Jackson and Gunnery Sergeant Alan Sora, and other Marines and Sailors who deeply influenced him

*Coping with the loss of subordinate leaders and advice on dealing with such losses

*Combat decision-making

*The challenges of returning home from war and transitioning to the civilian sector

*The Ken Burns’ documentary series The Vietnam War

*The US strategy in Vietnam 

*The role veterans played in building and expanding FedEx

*The cutting-edge technologies FedEx has used, emerging technologies, and the future of warfare

*The central role of logistics in war

*Leading FedEx through the Arab Oil Embargo Crisis of 1973 and advice for leaders dealing with crises

*How Mr. Smith’s approach to leadership has evolved

*The value of reading for leaders

Links

The Grunt Padre: Father Vincent Robert Capodanno, Vietnam, 1966-1967 by Father Daniel L. Mode

In this episode, we discuss:

*Col Glantz’s Vietnam service

*How his experiences in Vietnam influenced him as a military historian and researcher

*What led him to study the Nazi-Soviet War

*The Army’s Art of War Symposia from 1984-1987

*How the Soviet Army and US Army defined doctrine (move???)

*The case for an operational level of war

*The introduction of the operational level of war to US Army doctrine

*The origins of the US Army’s AirLand Battle doctrine

*The 11 January 1976 Incident

*The evolution of Soviet operational mobile groups, tank corps, tank armies, and mechanized corps

*The concept of lessons learned and Col Glantz’s critique of it

*The Soviet approach to lessons learned, including the practice of Socialist Criticism

*The effect Stalin’s purges on the officer corps had on the Soviet military’s performance in World War II

*Col Glantz’s thoughts on why the Soviets didn’t march on Berlin in February 1945

*Comparing and Contrasting Zhukov and Rokossovsky

*How and why Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of the Soviet Union, failed

*Turning points of the Eastern Front

*Forgotten battles of the war

*Major myths of the war

*Correlation of forces

*Initiative and risk-taking in the Red Army

*Improvements in Soviet training

*German and Soviet penal battalions

*The work of Jack Radey and Charles Sharp

*Notable Soviet and German amphibious operations

*Some of the discoveries Col Glantz made in writing his trilogy on Stalingrad

*Similarities between the Soviet storm groups and the German stormtrooper units of WWII

*The 7th and 8th Guards Tank Armies as a potential “pocket force” at the end of WWII

*The relative levels of military-theoretical development the Soviets and Western Allies had reached by May 1945

*The Russian-language military history websites Col Glantz uses for research

*The movies Enemy at the Gates and Stalingrad

The founding of The Journal of Soviet Military Studies, now The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, and some of its more noteworthy pieces

*Persistent errors, misconceptions, and faulty interpretations in the literature of the Nazi-Soviet war

*Col Glantz’s advice to young scholars of the Soviet-Nazi War

*What service members can learn from the Eastern Front today, and Col Glantz’s advice on studying the war

*Areas of the Nazi-Soviet War we know relatively little about and where Col Glantz would like to see research done

*Col Glantz’s current projects

*His thoughts on the war in Ukraine

Errata

*Col Glantz states that Hermann Balck was the commander of 48th Panzer Corps during the German relief attempt of the Stalingrad Pocket. Balck, however, was the commander of 11th Panzer Division, a subordinate formation of 48th Panzer Corps.

Links

In this episode, we discuss the following topics.

*What drew Kendrick to study military innovation

*How he defines military innovation

*What conventional wisdom says about military innovation

*How innovation differs from adaption

*Some recent historical examples of military innovation

*Whether military innovation fails more often than it succeeds

*Popular instances of military innovation in the West

*Kendrick’s essay “Dangerous Changes: When Military Innovation Harms Combat Effectiveness” 

*What drives innovation in military organizations

*Warped innovation

*Incremental vs. radical innovation 

*What drew Kendrick to studying British armored warfare innovation during the Interwar Period and the British Army’s experiences in North Africa as a case of military innovation

*The US Army’s Pentomic Divisions 

*Guarding or hedging against dangerous innovations

*The claim that the character of war is changing rapidly

*Force Design 2030

*Communication strategies in support of military innovation efforts

*The innovator's dilemma as it applies to the military innovator

*Innovation and adaptation in Ukraine 

*Recommended books on military innovation and military effectiveness

*Defining and measuring military effectiveness

*The prospect of the US forces fighting another counterinsurgency war or low-intensity conflict 

*Kendrick’s upcoming articles

Links

“Dangerous Changes: When Military Innovation Harms Combat Effectiveness,” by Kendrick Kuo, International Security

Erik's Social Media Links

In this episode, we discuss:

-What drew Col Reynolds to studying history 

-The value of history for the military professional

-Avoiding traps and pitfalls in studying and using history

-Studying at Oxford

-German General Ludwig Beck

-Doctrine in the German army (1914-1945)

-How the Marine Corps used history while Col Reynolds was a company-grade officer

-His time as a student at The Basic School (TBS)

-The state of the Marine Corps in the mid to late 1970s

-The decision to leave the Marine Corps and transitioning

-Col Reynold’s time in the Central Intelligence Agency

-His experiences at TBS as an individual mobilization augmentee

-How TBS had changed since his time as a student

-Tactical decision games (TDGs) and sand table exercises as intellectual revelations

-Writing good TDGs

-Col Reynold’s contest-winning article, “Turn on Your Lights!”

-Criticisms of studying and drawing from the 20th-century German military tradition

-Researching and writing Just Cause and A Skillful Show of Strength

-Serving as the officer-in-charge of Marine Corps Field History in Operation Iraqi Freedom-I

-Interviewing Marine and Coalition leaders in Iraq

-Writing Basrah, Baghdad, and Beyond

-Areas where Marine forces in Iraq could have improved

-The relief of Colonel Joe Dowdy, the commander of Regimental Combat Team-1

-The turnover of Tikrit from Task Force Tripoli to the US Army’s 4th Infantry Division

-The U.S. failure to adequately prepare for Phase IV (stability) operations

-How Marine Corps historians seem less critical of Marine leaders compared to Army historians writing about Army generals

-The controversy and conversation surrounding Force Design 2030 

Links

In this episode, we discuss the following:

-Ben’s forthcoming book on modern ground combat

-The lack of definitions of the terms “character of war” and “nature of war”

-The “debate” on FD 2030

-The supposed massive changes touted in modern warfare, like drones

-Ben's research methods and case sample set

-Coding cases

-The problem with how the US military records modern cases of military operations

-The Battle of Cuito Cuanavale

-Cases of armor operating independently successfully

-Learning about modern combat from the Syrian Civil War

-The claim that urban warfare is costlier than other types of warfare

-Modern amphibious operations

-How military professionals can become less ignorant of modern warfare

-How professional military education could benefit from Ben’s work

-The 3:1 ratio in military offensive operations

-The Value of detailed small unit operational accounts

-The ideal organization for conducting research like Ben’s

-The practical and ethical challenges inherent to primary source research of modern combat

-Ben’s work on the will to fight

-The uses and limits of wargames 

-How Ben got into wargaming

-The Marine Corps Wargaming Center

-Open-source reporting on Ukraine

-What surprised Ben about Russian and Ukrainian combat performance

-Irregular vs. regular warfare

-Ben’s experiences as a doctoral student at King’s College London

Links

In this episode, we discuss:

*What an infantry battalion operations officer does

*How Jordan’s experiences at 2nd LAR, Marine Corps Recruit Depot Parris Island, and 1/8 influenced how he fought the battalion prior to HKIA

*The 24th MEU's deployment prior to heading to HKIA

*The exercises done in preparation for HKIA 

*The original plan to conduct the NEO

*Where Jordan thinks he could have done a better job of preparing the BLT for HKIA

*Communications challenges between the BLT and supporting units 

*Leaving for HKIA

*What HKIA was like on the first day

*Jordan’s reading of the terrain around HKIA

*The organization of the joint operations center

*The fight for the airfield 

*Learning the Taliban would assist with the evacuation 

*Operations at the gates

*Sending rejected Afghan families back outside

*The 82nd Airborne Division at HKIA

*How 1/8 Marines used maneuver warfare concepts and tool

*Responding to the Abbey Gate bombing

*Returning to Kuwait, observations of the Marines, and coping in the aftermath

*Coming home to Camp Lejeune

*Command relationships at HKIA 

*The presence and effect of cell phones and computers among 1/8 Marines at HKIA

*The most frustrating and rewarding aspects of the NEO

*What Jordan learned from the HKIA mission

*Using decision games as tools to prepare for a mission like HKIA

*The supposed animosity between members of 1/8 and 2/1

*The one thing Marines and other servicemembers should know about 1/8’s time at HKIA

Links

Escape from Kabul HBO Documentary

In this episode, we discuss:

*Connor’s Marine Corps career before joining the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit

*What his deployment was like prior to the HKIA mission

*The training Connor received in preparation for HKIA

*The organization of CLB 24

*Connor’s reaction to learning about the HKIA mission

*His understanding of the situation on the ground before arriving at the airport

*Connor’s first day at HKIA

*His reaction to learning that the Marines were working with the Taliban

*Processing evacuees and the challenges that arose therein

*Running logistics for the evacuation

*Leading Marines during the operation

*The role Connor’s leaders played at HKIA

*What Connor’s platoon was doing August 20-22, when the gates to the airport were closed

*The bombing at Abbey Gate

*Connor’s reaction to the death of Sergeant Nicole Gee

*The operations of Connor’s unit before it departed HKIA

*What Connor observed in his Marines after HKIA

*His advice to future NCOs on talking with and supporting their Marines after a mission as intense as HKIA

*The nations Connor served alongside at HKIA and how these interactions generally went

*Connor’s experience returning to Camp Lejeune

*Working with the State Department

*The MEU’s Female Search Team

*The effects of allowing Marines to keep their personal cell phones computers during the HKIA mission

*The roles that discipline and exhaustion played in the evacuation

*The most frustrating and rewarding aspects of the HKIA mission

*The actions of Connor’s platoon and CLB 24 that he’s proudest of

*The toughest decisions Connor made at HKIA

*Where he thinks he excelled as a leader and decision maker and where he fell short

*The lessons Connor learned from the mission

*Connor’s thoughts on the experiences of Dustin Casey, his cousin, at HKIA

*The one thing he wants Marines and other service members to know about CLB 24's actions at HKIA

*Connor’s advice for Marines transitioning back to the civilian world

Links

In this episode, we discuss: 

*Bravo Company’s deployment with the 24th MEU prior to heading to HKIA 

*Its training and preparation for the HKIA NEO 

*The company’s reaction to hearing it would go to HKIA 

*Nick’s understanding of the situation on the ground before arriving at HKIA 

*Bravo Company’s first day at HKIA

*Its role in clearing the airfield of civilians 

*The enemy fire 1/8 received

*Nick’s reaction to learning that the Taliban would assist in the evacuation 

*Bravo Company’s experience manning the North Gate 

*The role of trust and intent in Bravo’s efforts at HKIA 

*What the company was doing on 20-22 August 

*The enemy threat at HKIA 

*Bravo’s operations on 26 August, the day of the Abbey Gate bombing 

*Bravo’s operations between 26 August and its departure from HKIA 

*What Nick observed in himself and his Marines in the aftermath of the mission 

*His advice to future leaders whose unit members have gone through something as horrific as the HKIA mission 

*Nick’s homecoming to Camp Lejeune 

*The friendly nation forces Bravo served alongside at HKIA 

*The US Army elements Bravo worked with 

*Bravo’s interactions with the State Department at HKIA 

*The role of outside entities requesting special evacuations of personnel at HKIA 

*Bravo’s interactions with the MEU’s Female Search Team 

*The roles of discipline and exhaustion during the evacuation 

*Those actions of Bravo Company that make Nick proudest 

*The one thing Nick would like Marines and other service members to know about what Bravo Company did at HKIA 

Links 

In this episode, we discuss:

*What the Infantry Battalion-Experiment (IBX) is

*Alpha Company’s structure and rank-billet requirements

*How the company is supposed to conduct Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations

*Grumbling from some of the enlisted leaders over the new rank-billet requirements

*Lt Carreiro’s experience in A/1/2 so far including what’s surprised him most

*What it’s like having Sgt fire team leaders and SSgt squad leaders

*The expanded platoon and company headquarters elements

*The rifle squads’ two-fire team construct

*Advice for future platoon commanders who might serve in an IBX-like unit

*Gunny Baker’s experiences in the company so far, including what it’s like being a platoon sergeant again

*His advice for future gunny platoon sergeants

*The data being collected on A/1/2

*The drones in A/1/2

*The Arms Room concept

*Logistics in A/1/2

*The Infantry Marine Course

*The criticism that the IBX, in its current form, is trying to replicate a Ranger battalion with a portion of the gear and none (or comparatively very little) of the training

*How A/1/2 would have operated in places like Iraq or Afghanistan and in a counterinsurgency more generally

*What's been most surprising about the new kinds of equipment the unit is using or has experimented with

*A/1/2’s relationship with the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab

*Some of the training exercises and experiments A/1/2 has conducted

*The role of security clearances in the new technology available to A/1/2

*Where the company has failed

*The role of PME in the company

*Where IBX should go from here

*How the war in Ukraine is influencing A/1/2

*The one thing each guest would like the audience to take from what they’re doing in Alpha Company and the IBX

Links

In this episode, we discuss:

*Dustin's deployment prior to heading to Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA) including the training he received in preparation for the non-combatant evacuation operation there (NEO)

*His reaction to the news that his company was heading to HKIA

*His understanding of the situation at the airport before arriving 

*A/1/8’s first day at HKIA, 14 August 2021

*The events of 15-16 August and A/1/8’s struggle to clear the airfield of civilians

*Dustin's reaction to learning that the Taliban would assist with the evacuation 

*A/1/8’s time manning the North Gate and what gate operations looked like

*Dustin's squad, platoon, and company leadership leadership at HKIA

*Some of the concepts and tools found in MCDP-1 and MCDP 1-3 that A/1/8 used during the evacuation

*A/1/8's operations at HKIA from 20-22 August

*The VBIED threat at HKIA

*What Dustin was doing on 26 August, the day G/2/1 got hit by a suicide bomber

*A/1/8's operations after the bombing and before it left HKIA

*What Dustin observed in his fellow Marines after leaving HKIA and his advice to leaders on helping their teammates deal with severe trauma

*What it was like returning home to Camp Lejeune, North Carolina

*Working with the MEU's female search teams

*The role of discipline in A/1/8's operations at HKIA

*The role exhaustion played during the NEO and how A/1/8's leaders sought to overcome or mitigate it

*The most frustrating and rewarding aspects of the NEO

*What it was like watching Marines bring rejected civilians back through the North Gate

*Working with other nations' armed forces and the US Army

*Those actions of A/1/8 that make Dustin proudest

*The role and value of decision games in training and preparing for missions like the HKIA NEO

*The one thing Dustin would like Marines and other US service members to know about what A/1/8 did at HKIA

Links

In this episode, we discuss:

*Alpha/1/8’s deployment prior to heading to Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA) including the training it did in preparation for the non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO)

*Sam’s reaction to the news that his company was heading to HKIA and how his Marines were informed

*Sam’s use of TDGs set at HKIA in preparation of the NEO

*His understanding of the situation on the ground before arriving at HKIA

*A/1/8’s first day at HKIA, 14 August 2021

*The events of 15-16 August and A/1/8’s struggle to clear the airfield of civilians

*Sam’s reaction to learning that the Taliban would assist with the evacuation and how he messaged this news to his Marines

*The mental, moral, and physical state and morale of the company around this time

*A/1/8’s time manning the North Gate and what gate operations looked like

*Some of the concepts and tools from MCDP-1 and MCDP 1-3 that Sam used during the evacuation 

*Alpha/1/8's operations at HKIA from 20-22 August

*The VBIED threat at HKIA

*What A/1/8 was doing on 26 August, the day G/2/1 got hit by a suicide bomber

*A/1/8's operations after the bombing and before it left the airport

*What Sam observed in his Marines after leaving HKIA and his advice to leaders on helping their teammates deal with severe trauma

*What it was like returning to Camp Lejeune, North Carolina

*The effect that Marines' personal cell phones and access to social media had on operations at HKIA

*The role of discipline in A/1/8's operations and how Sam and his leaders sought to maintain it

*The role exhaustion played during the NEO and how A/1/8's leaders sought to overcome or mitigate it

*A/1/8's logistics during the NEO

*The most rewarding aspect of the NEO

*What it was like watching Marines bring rejected civilians back out to the crowd

*Those actions of Sam's Marines that make him proudest

*The role and value of decision games in training and preparing for missions like the HKIA NEO

*The Marine Corps History Division's interviews of BLT 1/8 Marines about HKIA

*The one thing Sam would like Marines and other US service members to know about what A/1/8 did at HKIA

Links

*The battalion commanders Clardy had as a company and field-grade officer and how they influenced him on how he views and practiced battalion command

*What makes an ideal battalion commander. What makes a battalion commander from hell

*The single most important thing battalion commanders do or should do for their unit

*How Clardy’s time teaching at The Basic School and Infantry Officer Course influenced his preparations for and practice of battalion command

*What a light armored reconnaissance (LAR) battalion is and how it differs from an infantry battalion

*Clardy’s reaction to being selected for command of an LAR battalion

*The steps he took to prepare for battalion command

*Some of the inherent weaknesses of an LAR battalion and how he sought to overcome these

*His advice to future LAR battalion commanders

*His philosophy of command

*What excited him most about being a battalion commander. What concerned him most

*What the battalion commander’s relationship to the battalion’s staff sections should be

*Clardy's professional military education efforts within the battalion

*The one thing he wish he had known about his battalion before his assumed command of it

*His efforts in preparing his battalion for Operation Iraqi Freedom-I (OIF-I)

*A deep dive into the battalion's operations during OIF-I, including its role in Task Force Tripoli

*Clardy's experiences commanding Regimental Combat Team-2, Marine Air-Ground Task Force Training Command, and 3rd Marine Division

*Characteristics of the best and worst battalions he’s seen

*His thoughts on Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluations and Integrated Training Exercises

*Common mistakes he's seen new battalion commanders make

*What battalion command might look like in the context of Force Design 2030

Links

Liner Notes

*The battalion commanders Folsom served under and how they shaped the way he views and practices battalion command

*What makes an ideal battalion commander

*What makes a battalion commander from hell

*The single most important thing battalion commanders do or should do for their unit

*Where the battalion commander’s place should be on the battlefield

*Characteristics of the best and worst battalions

*Common mistakes new battalion commanders make

*Folsom’s experience as a company commander in Operation Iraqi Freedom I and how that affected the way he’s led his battalions

*Folsom’s reaction to being selected for infantry battalion command

*Some of the challenges, leadership and otherwise, inherent in commanding an infantry battalion

*What excited and concerned Folsom most about being a battalion commander

*The steps Folsom took to prepare for battalion command

*The battalion commander’s relationship to the unit’s staff sections

*Folsom’s expectations for his principal leaders and staff officers

*The one thing Folsom wish he had known about his first battalion before he assumed command of it

*What Folsom learned from going on numerous patrols with his squads in Sangin, Afghanistan

*Folsom’s thoughts for commanders on units that take consistent or heavy casualties

*How Folsom’s experience with 3/7 influenced the way he commanded Task Force Lion

*Some of the challenges present in Folsom’s current command

*His thoughts on what battalion command will look like in the future, particularly in the context of Force Design 2030

Links

In this episode, we discuss:

*Scott’s enlisted experience and its effects on how he views on leadership, command, and warfighting

*Scott’s experience as an artilleryman, his understanding of fire support, and how these things may influence how he commands his battalion

*Scott’s two deployments with Second Battalion, Eighth Marines, and how these experiences have influenced him as a leader

*His time at the School of Infantry-East and the similarities and differences between serving in a battalion in the operating forces and one in the supporting establishment

*Scott’s two deployments with Second Battalion, Second Marines, and what he learned from them

*His time at TBS and how it shaped him as an officer, leader, and teacher

*Scott’s views on decision-forcing cases

*His time as a battalion XO and what it taught him about command and leadership

*Scott’s advice to future XOs and battalion commanders about working together effectively

*The challenges that XOs and battalion commanders face while on a UDP and some ideas on handling them

*His time as the division secretary of the 2nd Marine Division

*His experiences as the division’s current operations officer

*Being the XO of the 6th Marine Regiment

*The ideal and worst kinds of battalion commanders

*The single most important thing battalion commanders do for their unit

*How teaching and leading are complimentary

*Scott’s PME plans for his battalion

*The steps Scott has taken to prepare for battalion command

*How Scott will use the history of his battalion to help with unit training, education, esprit de corps, identity, and cohesion

*What excites Scott most about being a battalion commander and what concerns him most

*The atmosphere and culture Scott wants to create in the battalion

*The characteristics of the best and worst battalions

*Scott’s take on battalion exercises like MCCREs and ITXs

*Common mistakes new battalion commanders, and commanders more generally, make

*How battalion command in the future will look, particularly in the context of Force Design 2030

Links

In this episode, we discuss:

*How the Germans and Soviets organized their forces in and near Ukraine on the eve of Operation Barbarossa and the principal senior commanders on each side

*Why the Southwestern Front put up a stouter resistance against Army Group South than did its counterparts against Army Groups North and Center

*The Uman encirclement and what this defeat meant for the Soviets

*The likelihood of a Soviet soldier captured in 1941 surviving until 1945

*The 3-month siege of the city of Odessa

*The capture of Crimea

*Where the Soviets thought the main German blow would land in the summer of 1942 and why

*The Second Battle of Kharkov

*The role the Dneper River plays in the fighting in Ukraine in 1941 and 1943

*Where the war in Ukraine stood by the end of 1943

*The Cherkassy Pocket

*Hube’s Wandering Pocket

*Stalin's role in military operations and how this changed over time

*Stalin’s working relationships with his generals and how these evolved

*Aspects of the war in Ukraine in WWII that Richard would like to research

*Two things Richard wants U.S. Marines and soldiers to know about Ukraine in World War II

*Some parallels between the fighting in Ukraine in WWII and the war there now

*Richard's assessment of the Russian and Ukrainian militaries’ performance so far

*How likely we are to see the war escalate to involve NATO forces

Links

In this episode, we discuss:

*Why Hitler wanted Ukraine

*How the average Ukrainian viewed the Soviets and Germans on the eve of Operation Barbarossa and how these perceptions changed over the course of the war

*How fighting in Ukraine went for the Soviets during Barbarossa

*The First Battle of Kiev and the largest battle of encirclement and capture of prisoners in the history of warfare

*The Enormity of the war against the Soviet Union

*The German massacre of Jews at Babi Yar

*The effect of ethnic cleansing of Jews and other populations on the Germans’ war effort

*The first Battle of Kharkov

*Some of the standout German and Soviet senior military leaders in the fighting for Ukraine in 1941

*The Axis allied forces that fought in Ukraine in Barbarossa and beyond

*The Soviet offensives at and near Stalingrad

*The subsequent Axis race to the Dnieper and Soviet pursuit

*Field Marshall Erich von Manstein’s defense of the Don River in February 1943 and his famous so-called “Backhand Blow” against the Soviets

*The accuracy of Manstein’s description of the Donets Campaign in his memoirs

*The accuracy of the description of the fighting in Ukraine in German General Herman Balck’s book, Order from Chaos

*The accuracy of Soviet memoirs of the war in Ukraine

*The logistics situation for both the Axis and Soviet forces in Ukraine in the winter of 1943

*What the Germans should have done with their forces in Ukraine in 1944

*The Soviet recapture of the Crimea in 1944

*The operations concerning the capture of the city of Lviv in 1944

*The encirclement and defeat of German troops at the city of Brody

*The roles that Hitler and Stalin had in operation in Ukraine and how these changed over time

*How well the Soviets and Germans learned from their experiences in Ukraine and how these experiences affected the Soviet way of war after WW II

*How does the war on other fronts—in North Africa, Italy, France—affected the fighting in Ukraine

*What aspects of the war in Ukraine Prit thinks deserves more attention or research

*The Germans’ use of Auftragstaktik or mission-type orders in Ukraine and the lack thereof of this approach in the Soviet forces

*The toll the war in Ukraine took on the civilian population there

*What books Prit recommends to Marines and soldiers wanting to learn more about operations in Ukraine in WWII

*What’s the one thing you’d want Marines and soldiers to take away about the war in Ukraine in World War II?

*What links, connections, or parallels can you draw from the fighting in Ukraine in WWII to the war we’re seeing there now, whether that be militarily, economically, culturally, or politically?

*What’s your assessment of the Russian army’s performance in Ukraine so far? What’s surprised you? What hasn’t? What about the Ukrainians’ performance?

Links

In this episode, we discuss:

*What is critical thinking and isn’t

*Some of the most common misconceptions of critical thinking

*The relationship between critical and creative thinking

*How critical thinking relates to divergent and convergent thinking

*The relationship between critical thinking, logic, and problem solving

In this episode, we discuss:

*Col Peznola’s education and training as a young officer

*Col Peznola’s take on what “blocking and tackling” and “the basics” means in a tactical sense

*His experience attending the Army’s Cavalry Leaders Course and what he learned from being around soldiers

*When Col Peznola first heard about what would later be termed maneuver warfare

*His time as an instructor at The Basic School (TBS)

*Who the “maneuver warfare instigators” in the TBS bullpen were

*How the curriculum at TBS had changed since Col Peznola had been a student there

*How Peznola approached teaching lieutenants in the field

*The central role that Lieutenant Colonel Ray Cole played in the shift to maneuver warfare at TBS

*Captain Paul Kennedy’s use of BB guns in force on force training and how this inspired Peznola to create the “Zen Patrol”

*What it was like facilitating the Zen Patrol

*How patrolling seemed to “stick” more with students when taught this way

*The role of the debrief and the instructor in the Zen Patrol

*How Peznola’s experiences at TBS fostered within him an inquisitive mindset

*Why Peznola thinks the Marine Corps needs to change its manpower system and truly reward Marines who innovate

*What it was like having 2ndLt Brendan McBreen as a student

*Peznola’s thoughts on command and control

*What it was like sitting through John Boyd’s briefings and interacting with Boyd

*What it was like having now-Major General Roger Turner as a student in Peznola’s platoon at TBS

*Peznola’s interactions with John Kelly and John Allen at TBS and the impact Kelly and Allen had on the effort to infuse maneuver warfare into the curricula at TBS and IOC

*The dearth of communication that occurs today between TBS and IOC instructors and how that wasn’t the case in Peznola’s time

*What TBS and IOC would look like if Peznola were king

*Peznola’s experiences at 1st Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion

*Peznola’s deployment with the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit and his time in Somalia

*His time serving in manpower at Headquarters Marine Corps

*His time as the general officer monitor officer

*Why some Marines leaders resisted maneuver warfare

*Peznola’s reaction to the publication of Warfighting

*His thoughts on and experiences with Bill Lind

*On whether the Marine Corps practiced maneuver warfare in its invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan

*What maneuver warfare looks like in garrison

*Whether the Marine Corps’ current model of recruit training helps or hinders new Marines from executing maneuver warfare

*Peznola’s thoughts on SOI-West’s inclusion of Chess in its Infantry Marine Course

*His time as the commanding officer of the Marine Special Operations Advisor Group

*His criticism of special operations in Afghanistan

*How the US created the Afghan forces in its own image

*Peznola’s time as the chief of staff of a special operations task force in Afghanistan

*His thoughts on America’s withdrawal from Afghanistan

*His thoughts on Force 2030

*His take on general officer and joint professional military education

*Who Ike Skelton was and why the US military needs another person like him

*If Col Peznola could change one thing about the Marine Corps

*What excites him most about the future direction of the Marine Corps

Links

In this episode, we discuss:

*Lindsay’s experience as a student at The Basic School (TBS)

*Her reaction to being assigned as a logistics officer

*Her initial impressions of her first unit, 9th Communication Battalion

*Her first year-long deployment to Iraq and experiences with “push” logistics

*What it was like working for a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF)

*Lindsay’s unusual experience serving first as the assistant battalion logistics officer, then as the battalion logistics officer, and finally as a truck platoon commander

*What a day in the 9th Communication Battalion’s logistics shop in Iraq might look like

*What it was like being the logistics officer for the battalion as a second lieutenant

*Lindsay’s next assignment as a truck platoon commander and the shift from being a staff officer to a commander of Marines

*The sorts of missions Lindsay’s platoon carried out

*The improvised explosive device threat during these missions

*How Lindsay tried to keep her Marines engaged during the year-long deployment

*Lindsay’s time as the truck company commander, Headquarters Group, I MEF

*Her second deployment to Iraq

*Lindsay’s experiences as a student at the Expeditionary Warfare School

*Her introduction to decision-forcing cases (DFCs)

*Lindsay’s time as a Warfighting Instructor at The Basic School (TBS)

*The “Bullpen”—the instructor office at TBS

*Lindsay’s time as the TBS Convoy Package Primary Instructor

*Her two times as a staff platoon commander and how her platoons differed from one another how and they were similar

*What she learned from commanding her first student-officer platoon and how she applied that to her second platoon

*Her time as the executive officer of a Warrant Officer Basic Course company

*Her advice to future and current TBS captain-instructors

*Lindsay’s experiences as the S4A of the 24th MEU

*Her time as a student at the UK’s Advanced Command and Staff Course

*Lindsay’s experiences with Task Force Al Asad, as part of Operation Inherent Resolve

*Some ideas for DFCs from Lindsay’s time with the task force

*How the Iraqis working with the task force did logistics

*Lindsay’s preparations for and experiences with working with the Iraqis as a female

*What it was like working with Colonel Seth Folsom, the task force commanding officer

*Lindsay's role in the Logistics Division, Futures Branch, Concept Section within the Deputy Commandant’s Office for Installations and Logistics

*Her advice to company-grade logistics officers

*Her advice to young people potentially interested in serving as Marine logistics officers

*The one thing Lindsay wished all Marines knew about logistics

*One thing Marines routinely misunderstand about logistics

*Lindsay’s favorite book on logistics

*Her preparations for taking command of Combat Logistics Battalion 15

*Her parting thoughts for our listeners

Links

Happy New Year, everyone!

In this episode, we discuss

*How the Björks define learning

*The difference between learning and performance

*The retrieval effect

*The relationship between forgetting and learning

*Some thoughts on why humans are terrible at predicting what they know vs what they don’t know and how well they think they’ll perform vs how they’ll actually perform

*How accessing memories changes them in our brain

*How our recall is highly dependent on contextual cues

*The myth of muscle memory

*How variability in practice conditions makes for better learning

*How our intuitions can mislead us about our abilities

*The benefit of educational and training simulations

*Bob’s work with the Nuclear Training Center

*Some ideas on how to introduce desirable difficulties to already successful students

*The difference between near and far transfer of learning

*The Björk’s take on the Marine Corps’ colloquial definitions for training (“preparation for the known”) and education (“preparation for the unknown”)

*The one thing Bob and Elizabeth hope US servicemembers take away from our conversation

Links

In this episode, we discuss:

*Gunner Gilchrist’s advice to his past self, Private First Class Gilchrist

*What Infantry Training Battalion-East was like when Ryan attended as a student in 2003-2004

*What Ryan’s first unit (Fox Company, 2nd Battalion, 2nd Marines) was like

*Ryan’s deployment to Karma, Iraq—what the experience was like and what he learned from it

*How Ryan attempted to get his Marines to adopt a population-focused approach to counter-insurgency when he was a squad leader and platoon sergeant

*Fox 2/2’s operations in Iraq

*Ryan’s experience as a team leader

*What makes a first-rate team leader

*What every team leader should be doing intellectually to get better

*The challenges of leading your peers

*Ryan’s first MEU: his expectations and experiences

*Ryan’s advice on keeping young Marines engaged on a MEU

*What Ryan learned from training with the Kenyan army

*His experience at Corporals Course and Drill Instructor School

*Ryan’s response to my calls to change recruit training

*The one thing Ryan would change about recruit training and why

*Ryan’s thoughts on the 4th Phase of recruit training

*Ryan’s experience at the Infantry Squad Leaders Course

*His deployment to Sangin, Afghanistan, as a squad leader with India Company, Third Battalion, Seventh Marines

*What lessons he took away from the deployment

*Ryan’s second deployment to Afghanistan, this time as a platoon sergeant, and what he took away from it

*What makes a good platoon sergeant

*As a platoon sergeant, what Ryan expected of his squad leaders

*Ryan’s experiences teaching at the Infantry Small Unit Leaders Course (ISULC) at the School of Infantry-West and how these influenced how he understands and practices maneuver warfare

*The challenges associated with running ISULC field exercises

*The intellectual shift Ryan experienced teaching at ISULC

*Ryan’s initial reaction to seeing me (Damien) at ISULC

*Why Ryan finds decision-forcing cases (DFCs) so effective

*Ryan’s favorite DFC and why

*Ryan’s facilitation of The Hornet’s Nest, a DFC that he built for ISULC

*Unexpected themes or uses of DFCs

*Ryan’s experience of having the protagonist of a case in the classroom while he’s teaching and his advice to case facilitators interested to employing this technique

*Ryan’s time as the operations chief for Weapons Company, Third Battalion, 1st Marines, including his deployment with the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit

*His experience working with Italy’s San Marco Marine Brigade

*Ryan’s time as the tactics chief at Officer Candidate School (OCS)

*The one thing Ryan would change about OCS

*Ryan’s experiences as a student at The Basic School and in the Infantry Weapons Officer Course

*Ryan’s work on reshaping recruit training at Parris Island and how he’s integrated DFCs into The Crucible

*The one thing Ryan would change about Marine enlisted professional military education

*The one thing he’d changed about how we train Marines

*The one thing he’d change about Marine infantry

*What maneuver warfare in garrison looks like

*Ryan’s thoughts on Force Design 2030 and what a war with China might look like for Marine infantry

*His reaction to discussed plans to make Marine infantry more like special operations forces

*What concerns Ryan the most about the future direction of the Marine Corps

*What excites Ryan the most about the future direction of the Marine Corps

Links

*What Dilan learned about company command from his time as a combined-anti-armor platoon commander and company executive officer

*What he learned about company command from his company commanders

*Dilan’s thoughts on what makes the ideal company commander and why

*What makes the company commander from hell

*The challenges and opportunities (leadership and otherwise) Dilan encountered in commanding a weapons company

*How Dilan attempted to get his lieutenants to interact competently and confidently with other leaders in the battalion

Dilan’s philosophy of command and how it worked in practice

The most important thing company commanders do or should do

How well the Marine Corps prepared Dilan for company command

Dilan’s thoughts on the Marine Corps having its own company commanders course

What excited Dilan most about being a company commander

What concerned Dilan most about being a company commander

What the relationship should be like between the weapons company commander and their operations chief and first sergeant

Dilan’s two deployments with his company

The designs, plans, or programs that Dilan implemented in his company and how they worked out

How Dilan tried to balance feeding the military bureaucracy with preparing his company for combat

The steps Dilan took to prepare for company command

Some of the books Dilan read while preparing for company command

The one thing Dilan wish he had known about his company before he took command

Where Dilan thinks he excelled as a company commander and where he fell short

The one thing Dilan would have changed about his time commanding his company

How Dilan attempted to practice maneuver warfare in garrison

Tips on physically and intellectually preparing for company command

Dilan’s expectation for his

*Executive officer

*Platoon commanders

*Squad leaders

*Junior Marines

*Battalion commander

*Battalion executive officer

*Operations officer

*Fellow company commanders

Links

This episode includes the preface and chapter 1 of "The Ghost and General Smith," a fictional--and frightening--look at the future of the U.S. Marine Corps.

For the written version, please visit:

In this episode, we discuss:

*What Zach learned about company command from his time as a platoon commander

*What he learned about company command from his company commanders

*Zach’s thoughts on what makes the ideal company commander and why

*What makes the company commander from hell

*How Zach’s experiences as an instructor at The Basic School shaped his view of company command, his preparations for it, and execution of it

*What a U.S. Marine Corps weapons company is, how it differs from a rifle company, and the challenges and opportunities inherent to commanding one

*Zach’s philosophy of command (or intent) and how it’s worked out so far

*Zach’s Combat Concepts

*Outside of commanding the company in combat, the most important thing company commanders do or should do

*How well the Marine Corps prepared Zach for company command

*Zach’s thoughts on the Marine Corps having its own company commanders course

*What Zach learned about company command at the Maneuver Captains Career Course

*What excited Zach the most about being a company commander

*What concerned Zach the most about being a company commander

*What the relationship should be like between the weapons company commander and their operations chief and first sergeant

*The events surrounding Zach’s taking of command of his company

*What he’s learned from participating in several large-scale exercises with his company in 29 Palms

*Zach’s co-founding and publishing of the Connecting File

*The designs, plans, or programs that Zach has implemented in his company and how they’ve worked out so far

*Zach’s use of educational wargaming in his company

*How Zach tries to balance feeding the military bureaucracy with preparing his company for combat

*Some of the books Zach read while preparing for company command

*Zach’s tips for future company commanders

*The one thing Zach wish he'd known about his company before he took command

*How Zach’s company attempts to embody and execute the maneuver warfare philosophy in garrison

*Zach’s expectation for his

Company executive officer

Platoon commanders

Squad leaders

Team leaders

Junior Marines

Battalion commander

Executive officer

Operations officer

Fellow company commanders

Links

In this episode, we discuss:

*The role that Rick’s father played in his son's interest in the US Army and military history

*The role that Rick’s time living in Germany had in his decision to write about World War II

*Rick’s interest in a career in the Army and his declined appointment to West Point

*What led Rick to leave the Washington Post to pursue military history

*What Rick means when he calls himself “a recovering journalist”

*What led Rick to writing Crusade, his book on the Persian Gulf War, and some of the challenges he encountered in researching and writing along the way

*Some of the surprises Rick learned while writing Crusade

*How Rick came to write his third book, In the Company of Soldiers

*The story behind how Rick got embedded with David Petraeus and the 101st Airborne Division during Operation Iraqi Freedom-1

*Rick’s experiences of witnessing a full-scale invasion of another country

*What it was like to watch Dave Petraeus command the 101st Airborne Division

*Rick’s observations of the Iraqi forces

*What a military historian learns from embedding with a combat unit, and how this affected Rick’s subsequent military history writing

*The American and German ‘ways of war’ in World War II

*Rick’s thoughts on the US 1st Infantry Division and 3rd Infantry Division in the war in Europe

*Rick’s take on US Army General Mark Clark

*The contentious relationship between Eisenhower and Montgomery

*Why Rick hasn’t written on the Pacific Theater and some of the historical actors, battles, and topics from that theater that interest him

*Rick’s experience researching and writing The British Are Coming

*George Washington as a tactical and operational commander

*The similarities between Eisenhower and Washington

*Washington as a kvetcher in his private correspondence

*Where the phrase “win hearts and minds” comes from

*Rick’s process for starting a book

*Rick’s use of outlines

*The cartographer for Rick’s books

*Rick’s lack of writer’s block

*Rick’s take on the state of military history today

*Why some journalists turn to writing military history

*Rick’s thoughts on professional military education, especially as it pertains to junior leaders

*Why all service members should know where their branch comes from

*Rick’s advice on getting started on professional military reading

Links

In this episode, we discuss

-The emphasis (or lack thereof) placed on self-study, critical thinking, and creative problem-solving during John’s time as a junior officer

-The four priorities of lieutenants when John served in the 2nd Marine Division

-On then-Major General Al Gray making maneuver warfare the official doctrine of the division

-The Marine Corps’ approach to warfighting before it adopted maneuver warfare

-The influence that Captain W.L. Smith had on Lieutenant Schmitt

-Some hypotheses on why maneuver warfare seems harder to practice in garrison

-John’s experience with commercial wargaming before the Marine Corps

-How wargames played a role in John’s eventual preference for tactical decision games (TDGs)

-How John first got into TDGs

-The origins of Enemy Over the Bridge, John’s first TDG and the first TDG of its kind published in the Marine Corps Gazette

-How writing FMFM-1 Warfighting influenced John’s writing of TDGs

-The experience of writing Enemy Over the Bridge

-How TDGs can bring to light the concepts of maneuver warfare

-The primary purpose of TDGs

-The creation and activities of Marine Corps University’s TDG Group

-How John and other member of THE saw themselves as maneuver warfare insurgents

-John’s thoughts on common TDG pitfalls

-How The MCU TDG Group came to the name “Tactical Decision Games”

-Where John draws inspiration from when developing a TDG

-Some of the more creative and unusual TDGs that John has created

-John’s thoughts on using TDGs at formal schools

-How John used TDGs as a Marine Officer Instructor with his Naval ROTC unit at the University of Illinois

-John’s thoughts on the Marine Corps’ renewed emphasis on wargaming

-The work that John’s been doing with online TDGs

-What John’s ideal unit PME program would look like

-How John first learned of maneuver warfare and what led him to contribute to it as Marine Corps doctrine

-The two stories of John’s “audition” to write FMFM-1 Warfighting and General Al Gray’s signing of it

-The Marines and military theorists who influenced John while he was writing Warfighting

-Which of the FMFMs/MCDPs that John wrote is the most enduring and which of them most requires revision

-The efforts to revise Warfighting under Generals Joe Dunford and Robert Neller

-Why John thinks someone other than him should write the next version of Warfighting

-What defeat mechanisms are

-The recent critiques of Warfighting and John’s thoughts on them

-How John might expose the youngest generation of Marines to Warfighting

-Alternatives to the German school of maneuver warfare

-John’s evaluation of the trends he’s seeing in the Department of Defense regarding war and warfighting

Links

In this episode, we discuss

-The US Army’s individual replacement system in Vietnam

-McDonough’s experience serving as the aide to the commanding general of the 173rd Airborne Brigade in Vietnam

-McDonough’s thoughts on how technology has extended senior leaders’ ability to overexert influence or command on small units

-How McDonough’s Vietnam experiences shaped his approach to command

-Some of the mistakes McDonough made as a platoon leader in Vietnam

-The decision-forcing case The Farmer: its inspiration, development, and use with US Marines

-What it was like to serve in the ‘Hollow Army’ after Vietnam

-McDonough’s experience as a mechanized infantry company commander

-McDonough’s time as an S-3 operations officer for an infantry battalion in South Korea

-His experiences serving as the military assistant to General John Galvin, Supreme Allied Commander Europe

-McDonough’s observations of the maneuver warfare debates in the Marine Corps

-The value and pitfalls of studying German military history, especially the German forces of World War II

-The tight rope that military and military-civilian professionals must walk when studying the forces of the Nazi Germany a nthe Southern Confederacy

-The events leading to McDonough’s appointment as director of the School of Advanced Military Studies

-The process of revising FM 100-5 Operations

-The origin of the term “operations other than war”

-What inspired the writing of McDonough’s second book, The Defense of Hill 781, and what today’s soldiers and Marines can learn from it in light of renewed focus on large-scale conventional combat operations

-What lessons from Hill 781 might not apply to today’s battlefields

-McDonough’s third book, The Limits of Glory

-His experience standing up the brigade that would eventually get reflagged as the 173rd Airborne Brigade

-What it was like leading that brigade through the genocide, Cholera epidemic, and civil war in Rwanda

Links

Note: This is part one of a two-part discussion. The conclusion will be released shortly.

In this episode, we discuss

-The Strategic Hamlet Program (SHP) in Vietnam and the role of the 173rd Airborne Brigade in that effort

-How US platoon positions used in the SHP made enticing targets for the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army

-The layout of McDonough’s platoon position and the terrain surrounding it

-McDonough’s assessment of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, as well as the South Vietnamese Regional Forces and Popular Forces

-A particularly soul-shaking patrol that McDonough went on

-The writing of Platoon Leader

-The Viet Cong’s typical tactics, strengths, and weaknesses

-McDonough’s biggest fight: October 6th 1970

-The story of McDonough’s wounding

-The Viet Cong’s technique of employing M-79 ‘barrages’

-McDonough’s assessment of the small arms available to him and his men

-A hair-raising interaction that McDonough had with one of his soldiers and an M-79 grenade launcher

-McDonough’s relationship with Phil Nail, one of his radio operators

-Killigan, arguably the best combat soldier McDonough ever saw

-What it was like to lead a small unit with consistent attrition

-McDonough’s advice for small unit leaders who may face high unit attrition in their units in combat

-How well McDonough’s stateside tactical training lined up with his actual tactics in Vietnam

-The value of “tactical cursing”

Links

In this episode, we discuss

-What drew Sebastian to the Marine Corps and the infantry in particular

-The persistent public view of the Marine Corps as an all-infantry force

-The future of the ‘Every Marine a Rifleman’ ethos

-The wearing away of front lines and rear areas in modern-day warfare

-What Sebastian’s Marine Corps boot camp experience was like

-Sebastian’s thoughts on changing bootcamp

-His experiences at the School of Infantry-East

-What it was like serving as a reserve enlisted infantryman

-The stigma against reserve Marines

-Some things Sebastian wishes active-duty Marines understood about reservists

-Sebastian’s pre-deployment training and preparations for Iraq

-His experience of breaking the news to his mother of his impending deployment to Iraq

-Sebastian’s deployment to Ramadi, Iraq

-Sebastian’s interactions with the Iraqis

-What he took away from the deployment

-How Sebastian’s operational experiences have influenced how he designs, develops, and facilitates wargames

-How good decision games pose dilemmas to participants

-Sebastian’s words of advice to young Marine reservists and those interested in the reserves

-How Sebastian got into wargaming

-How he learned how to design and facilitate wargames

-How Sebastian defines “wargame”

-The differences between analytical and educational wargames

-Sebastian’s thoughts on the educational utility of commercial wargames

-The design “autopsies” Sebastian runs in his wargame design courses

-Sebastian’s two “translation points” for wargames

-How the wargame design process enriches the designer

-Why Sebastian prefers digital wargames for personal use and analog games for professional purposes

-What matrix games and operational decision games are

-The differences and similarities between different kinds of decision games

-Where wargames fail most

-The most common barriers to getting people interested in wargaming

-How Sebastian wound up teaching wargame design at Georgetown University

-Some of the standout student games from the wargame design course

-Where the historical settings for those games came from

-What inspired Sebastian to create the Georgetown University Wargaming Society (GUWS)

-What GUWS has been up to lately

-GUWS’ collaborations with the Army War College, Naval War College, and other organizations

-The value proposition of playing wargames for Marines

-Sebastian’s thoughts on the most effective way to introduce Marines to wargaming

-His wargaming work with the Marine Corps’ Command and Staff College and US Naval Academy

-Sebastian’s work with the Wargaming Division at the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab

-Sebastian’s thoughts on SOI-W’s incorporation of chess into the new Infantry Marine Course

-Sebastian’s contribution to the Rand report, “Next Generation Wargaming for the Marine Corps”

-The addendum Sebastian would write to the report to reflect the realities of COVID-19

-Where Sebastian thinks the Marine Corps gets wargaming right

-Where the Marine Corps could improve with wargaming

-What Sebastian would do with wargames if he were Commandant of the Marine Corps for the day

Links

(This is the conclusion to our interview with Colonel Barrick.)

In this episode, we discuss

-The work Barrick is doing with wargaming and force design at the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab

-The differences between wargaming for education, wargaming for analysis, and wargaming for training

-Assassin’s Mace, an operational wargame designed, developed, and used by the Warfighting Lab

-How Assassin’s Mace is currently being used beyond the Warfighting Lab

-Barrick’s favorite wargames

-The differences between educational wargames, decision-forcing cases, and tactical decision games

-The Marine Corps’ upcoming Wargaming Center and the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab’s possible relationship to it

-The role the Wargaming Center might play in educating Marines

-Potential ways the center could provide wargaming to the Fleet Marine Forces

-The role that matrix and analog games may play at the Wargaming Center

-Barrick’s concerns for the future of wargaming in the Marine Corps

-The case for gamification for learning

-How games can help learning

-Barrick’s thoughts on the future of tanks in the Marine Corps

-Why the Commandant of the Marine Corps cased the colors on his tank battalions

-How tanks contribute to the Marine Corps’ combined arms capabilities

-The challenges of creating a tank corps from scratch

-The future of combined arms

-The Marine Corps’ spotty record of institutionalizing experience

-Common misperceptions that Marines have about tanks

-Some of the creative ways Barrick has seen tanks employed

-The decision to send Marine tanks to Afghanistan in 2010

-The special capabilities added to Marine tanks deploying to Afghanistan

-Barrick’s favorite tanks from World War II and the modern day

-Barrick’s thoughts on the Russian T-14 Armata tank

-Barrick’s thoughts on some historical tank commanders

-The development of Soviet combat experience and skill in World War II

-Barrick’s favorite armored warfare books

Links

Note: This is part one of a two-part interview with Col Barrick. The conclusion will be released shortly.

In this episode, we discuss

-Barrick’s early military training and educational experiences at the US Naval Academy, The Basic School, and the Army’s Armor Officer Basic Course

-Barrick’s thoughts on the reaction course at Officer Candidate School

-The sandtable tests that Barrick underwent at the Armor Officer Basic Course

-Barrick’s experiences with FMFM 1 Warfighting and the Marine Corps Warfighting Skills Program as a company-grade officer

-The degree to which Marines actually practice maneuver warfare

-The role of trust and adaptation in maneuver warfare

-Barrick’s experiences as a staff officer with Combined Joint Task Force 76 in Afghanistan in 2004

-One instance of how Barrick’s formal PME schooling failed him during his interactions and collaboration with NATO planners in Kabul

-Another hard learned lesson, this one involving NATO planners and an Afghan military parade

-Barrick’s experiences attending the Advisor Training Group in 29 Palms and the limits of training

-Barrick’s time as a senior advisor to an Afghan National Civil Order Police Brigade in 2011-12

-Barrick’s hair-raising experience planning a Afghan National Army-led operation to counter Afghan warlords in Herat in 2004—all in 24 hours

-What lifelong lessons Barrick took away from hi advisor deployment

-How Barrick got into wargaming

-Barrick’s experiences wargaming at the Naval Academy

-The lack of wargaming opportunities throughout Barrick’s Marine Corps career

-The benefits and disadvantages of analog and digital wargames

-How tools like Zoom have facilitated virtual wargaming

-The many benefits of wargames for warfighters

-Creating a culture of wargaming in the Marine Corps

-Thoughts on creating wargame facilitators for the Marine Corps

-Leveraging the gaming habits of Marines to generate interest in wargaming

-Commercial wargames that could be used to generate such interest

-How Barrick used wargames at the Marine Corps Tactics Operations Group

-The limitations of wargames

-The value of wargaming for planning

-The Warfighting Lab’s use of games like Command: Professional Edition

Links

 In this episode, we discuss:

-What first attracted Chuck to military history

-How he came to study Scharnhorst and the Prussian military reforms

-Some of Chuck’s work at the United States Army Infantry School and the 21st Theater Army Area Command in Germany

-What led Chuck to joining the Army

-Chuck’s interactions with Major Richard “Dick” Winters of Band of Brothers fame

-What Chuck’s experiences as a student at West Point were like

-Chuck’s criticisms of West Point today

-The inspiration for Chuck’s work on Scharnhorst’s Military Society

-How Scharnhorst’s work and thinking are relevant to today’s warfighters

-The influence that Count Wilhelm Friedrich Ernst von Schaumburg-Lippe and Colonel Emmerich d’Estorff had on Scharnhorst

-The genesis of the Prussian military reforms and the role of the Military Society

-Scharnhorst’s role as head of the Military Reorganization Committee

-The resistance that Scharnhorst encountered from special interest groups

-Scharnhorst’s relationship with Carl von Clausewitz

-Scharnhorst’s relationship with his wife

-The genesis of Scharnhorst’s general staff

-What Scharnhorst might think about the size of today’s US military staffs

-Chuck’s speculation on what Scharnhorst would have turned his attention to if he had survived the Napoleonic Wars

-What fascinates Chuck most about Scharnhorst

-Chuck’s forthcoming book on Scharnhorst, Scharnhorst: The Formative Years, 1755-1801, and what he learned while writing it

-What Scharnhorst might think of current US military efforts to improve education for enlisted servicemembers

-Which aspects of Scharnhorst’s work still need attention in English

-What Chuck thinks every US servicemember should know about Scharnhorst and his contributions to the profession of arms

-Chuck’s reaction to the especially positive reception his work received from the US Marine Corps

-What Chuck’s other forthcoming work on Scharnhorst has in store for us

-Chuck’s critique of Martin van Creveld and John Keegan’s work

Links

In this episode, we discuss:

*Furness’ experience at The Basic School (TBS) as a student in 1987

*The degree to which the philosophy of maneuver warfare was present at TBS by that point

*What the Infantry Officer Course (IOC) was like as a student

*Furness’ experience as a TBS instructor, including learning how to teach maneuver warfare

*Why teaching at TBS and IOC saw the greatest professional development of his 34-year career

*What the atmosphere of TBS was like upon Furness’ return to the school as an instructor

*How TBS forced Furness to ‘up his game’ as an instructor and officer

*How teaching at IOC prepared him for company command

*The TBS staff’s acceptance and understanding of maneuver warfare

*How TBS attempted to teach maneuver warfare

*The “Zen Patrol”

*How IOC facilitated TDGs, including the “McNamara Method”

*How Furness applied the teaching methods he encountered at IOC to PME with the 2nd Marine Division staff

*The story behind Furness’ contest-winning Marine Corps Gazette article, “The NCO and Maneuver Warfare”

*How the issues addressed in the article persist in today’s Marine Corps

*How Furness has attempted to create a culture conducive to maneuver warfare in his units

*Integrating tactical decision games into ranges

*How maneuver warfare is akin to “institutionalized military excellence”

*Why the Marine Corps has been unable to execute maneuver warfare as a service

*Why the Marine Corps needs a reformed manpower system in order to fulfill General Berger’s vision for the Marine Corps

*Furness’s thoughts on General Neller’s efforts to “rejuvenate” maneuver warfare in the Marine Corps

*How the Marine Corps shapes the success of its staffs but not of its squads

*Why Furness thinks the Marine Corps requires more rigorous PME

*The PME program that Furness developed for his division staff

*The 2nd Marine Division’s experience at the MAGTF Warfighting Exercise (MWX)

*What Furness learned from the MWX

*How Furness models his approach to PME

*The effect that Anthony Zinni’s “Combat Concepts” had on Furness’ approach to modeling effective PME and self-development

*How Furness encouraged his subordinate leaders to develop their own PME programs

*What surprised Furness the most during the MWX

*Potential downsides (and possible solutions) to free play force-on-force exercises

*The steep learning curve of learning to command large units and formations

*The challenges facing the Marine Corps from Furness’ current position at Headquarters Marine Corps

*Furness’ thoughts on the future of Marine Corps PME and training

*His efforts to man all the rifle squads in 2nd Marine Division with qualified sergeants

Links

“The NCO and Maneuver Warfare” by Capts William H. Weber IV & David J. Furness