The Rise of Populism in Europe and the United States: Implications on Liberal International Order Assessing the Impact of Populism on Liberal Order

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The recent rise of populism in Europe and the United States has challenged the 70 years of western-led liberal international order. The populists’ blame of inequality and terrorism to globalization and immigrants has undermined the liberal order and often in their rhetoric they have expressed xenophobic, racist, and anti-immigrant sentiments. This paper examines the health of liberal international order by assessing the impact of populism. Hence, the liberal order is framed based on 4 elements namely, international institutions, the rule of law and human rights, economic order and the security order. When assessing the impact, this paper discovers that populists are very skeptical about European integration, NATO, TTIP, TTP, DCFTA, CETA and other international institutions and multilateral agreements. For instance, UKIP was very successful to pressure their anti-EU message into mainstream party’s agenda and eventually, Conservative party had to call upon referendum. As a result, Brexit came into force. In a similar situation, President Trump withdraw from TPP and the Paris Climate Agreement. Not only that, populists constantly attacked Courts and judges, media, and even criticized EU and the UN. Especially, right-wing populists in Europe has shown their admiration for Vladimir Putin and aspires Russia’s sovereignty.

The Rise of Populism in Europe and the United States: Implications on Liberal International Order Assessing the Impact of Populism on Liberal Order Advisor Dr. Benjamin David King Senior Thesis Presented to the Department of Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies Rangsit International College Ugyen Tshering 5709365 27 April, 2018 In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree in Philosophy, Politics and Economics. Abstract The recent rise of populism in Europe and the United States has challenged the 70 years of western-led liberal international order. The populists’ blame of inequality and terrorism to globalization and immigrants has undermined the liberal order and often in their rhetoric they have expressed xenophobic, racist, and anti-immigrant sentiments. This paper examines the health of liberal international order by assessing the impact of populism. Hence, the liberal order is framed based on 4 elements namely, international institutions, the rule of law and human rights, economic order and the security order. When assessing the impact, this paper discovers that populists are very skeptical about European integration, NATO, TTIP, TTP, DCFTA, CETA and other international institutions and multilateral agreements. For instance, UKIP was very successful to pressure their anti-EU message into mainstream party’s agenda and eventually, Conservative party had to call upon referendum. As a result, Brexit came into force. In a similar situation, President Trump withdraw from TPP and the Paris Climate Agreement. Not only that, populists constantly attacked Courts and judges, media, and even criticized EU and the UN. Especially, right-wing populists in Europe has shown their admiration for Vladimir Putin and aspires Russia’s sovereignty. Keywords: Populism, Liberal International Institutions, International Institutions, UN, EU, Europe, US. i Table of Contents Abstract…………………………………………………………………………….i List of Acronyms……………………………………………………………….….iv List of Figures………………………………………………………………….…..vi List of Table……………………………………………………………………......vi Acknowledgments…………………………………………………………….…...vii CHAPTER 1 Introduction 1.1 Background……………………………………………………………………....1 1.2 Research questions……………………………………………………………....4 1.3 Methodology……………………………………………………………………...4 CHAPTER 2 Understanding Populism 2.1 Concept of Populism……………………………………………………………...6 2.2 Populism and Democracy………………………………………………………..13 CHAPTER 3 The Rise of Populism 3.1 Right Wing and Left Wing populism in Europe…………………………..…16 3.1.1 Right Wing Populism 3.1.1.1 Eastern Europe……………………………………………………………......21 3.1.1.2 Western Europe…………………………………………………………...…..25 3.1.1.3 Northern Europe………………………………………………………...……29 ii 3.1.2 Left Wing Populism 3.1.2.1 Southern Europe………………………………………………………………31 3.1.3 Differences between Right Wing and Left Wing Populism………………...33 3.2 Populism in the United States………………………………………………...35 CHAPTER 4 Implications of Populism on Liberal International Order 4.1 Liberal International Order……………………………………………………37 4.2 Implications on Liberal International Order 4.2.1 International Institutions…………………………………………………………...41 4.2.2 The Rule of Law and Human Rights………………………………………………46 4.2.3 Economic Order……………………………………………………………………..54 4.2.4 Security Order……………………………………………………………………….57 CHAPTER 5 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………...60 Bibliography………………………………………………………………………....63 iii List of Acronyms AfD Alternative for Germany ANEL Independent Greeks CETA Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement DCFTA Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas DF/DPP Danish People’s Party EP European Parliament EU European Union FEPS Foundation for European Progressive Studies Fidesz Hungarian Civic Alliance FN National Front Party FPO Freedom Party of Austria GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade GERB Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria IMF International Monetary Fund ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and Syria Jobbik Movement for a Better Hungary LN Lega Nord/Northern League M5S Five Star Movement Political party NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization OVP Austrian People’s Party PiS Law and Justice PTMS Populism Tracker Monitoring System PvdA Labour Party iv PVV Party for Freedom SD Sweden/Swedish Democrats SPO Social Democratic Party SYRIZA Coalition of the Radical Left TPP Trans-Pacific Partnership TTIP Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights UK United Kingdom UKIP United Kingdom of Independent Party US United States VB Flemish Interest/Vlaams Belang VVD People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy WTO World Trade Organization v List of Figures Figure 1. Percentage vote share of populist parties in Europe from 2008 to 2018……………………………………………………19 Figure 2. Average voter support for populist parties from 1980 to 2017……………………………………………………………….20 Figure 3. The total support of populist parties in Eastern Europe in 2016……………………………………………………….22 Figure 4. Percentage votes for right-wing populist parties in Eastern Europe in 2016……………………………………………………….25 Figure 5. Average electoral support for right-wing populists in Europe from 1980 to 2017……………………………………………………30 Figure 6. Voters support for left-wing populists in Europe from 1980 to 2017…………………………………………….……...33 Figure 7. Difference between left-wing and right-wing Respondents in support of the refugee relocation policy………………………..51 List of Table Table 1. Percentage vote share of populist parties in Europe, 2008-2018………………18 vi Acknowledgements In completing this dissertation or thesis, first and foremost I am indebted to my advisor Dr. Benjamin D. King for his unending guidance and support. He was the key contributor to my completion of thesis and without his guidance and support, I would not have written a complete and holistic dissertation. So, I solemnly offer my sincere gratitude and appreciation for his impartial guidance and encouragement. Secondly, I would like to acknowledge my partner and her mother for their support and printing papers for my research. Especially, my partner supported me mentally and physically by consoling me when I was stressed and accompanied me on the weekends during her off days. So, I sincerely offer my respect and appreciation to her and her mother. Finally, I would to acknowledge every individual who were part of my existence and offer my gratitude to all those leading scholars, academicians and pundits who shared their insights. Without their insights and compassion to share their knowledge my work would be completely fruitless and would not have benefited at all. Their detailed analysis in the form of reports, books, articles, and journals have provided essential insights and informations for the development of this dissertation. vii CHAPTER 1 Introduction 1.1.Background In recent years, after 70 years of founding liberal international order, the rise of populism in Europe and the United States has challenged the viability of liberal order. Since 2016, following the incidents of Britain withdrawing from EU (Brexit) and rightwing populist Donald Trump becoming the president of United States, the western politics has undergone major change. In Europe after the refugee crisis, the populists are increasingly gaining their popularity and influence in EU, especially in eastern Europe right-wing populists are the major parties and even runs the government notably, Fidesz in Hungary, PiS in Poland, and GERB in Bulgaria. In western Europe right-wing populists such as FN, FPO, AfD, and VB are also gaining popularity, particularly, FPO is in coalition with major conservative party OVP, and Marine Le Pen of FN was the candidate for French presidential election in 2017 but she lost to Macron. In Northern region, right-wing populists like DPP, Finns Party, SD, and UKIP are very influential, especially UKIP was the main force for Brexit as UKIP’s agenda of anti-EU message has pressured conservative party to adopt in their agenda because the topic Brexit was so popular among the British voters that UKIP even won the 2014 European parliament elections, having overtaken both the Conservative and the Labour party (Boros, Freitas, Kadlot, & Stetter, 2016). However, in southern region, left-wing populists are dominant such as SYRIZA in Greece and Podemos in Spain, in fact, SYRIZA is the major party and now leading the government. In Italy, there are two populist parties, one right-wing 1 pg. populist called Lega Nord and another M5S who neither considered as right nor leftwing. The difference between right-wing and left-wing populism is right-wing tend to be eurosceptic, anti-immigrants and exclusive as they claim they are the real people against corrupt elites and these real people are considered as homogenous. Often rightwing populists express xenophobic, racist, and prejudice views, for instance President Trump calling Mexican as rapist and his anti-Muslim rhetoric. On the left, they are antiglobalization, anti-austerity and more inclusive as they accept other ethnic societies. However, both populist parties backlash against globalization and international institutions, which has threatened the western-led liberal international order, an order established based on the rule of law with the purpose to bring peace and promote values of liberal democracy such as freedom of rights, openness and multiculturalism. As professor Jay-Werner Muller said, “populists are inherently dangerous because they see themselves as the only legitimate political actors and seek to take over the judiciary to gain control of the media and to co-opt other institutions.” Likewise, professor Francis Fukuyama also argued that the rise of populist nationalism constitutes the chief threat to the liberal international order that have been the foundation for global peace and prosperity since second world war (2017). This paper aims to check the health of liberal international order by assessing the impact of populism, particularly the populism in Europe and the United States. However, this paper will only assess the impact of populism on liberal order from 2015 onwards after refuges crisis in Europe and the subsequent occurrence of two incidents, Brexit and Trump’s presidency. The main purpose of this paper is to reflect the essence of liberal international order and at the same time assess the behavior of populists. 2 pg. In the first chapter of introduction, it is divided into 3 topics, the first topic will describe a brief introduction of research topic, followed by second topic, it will display the main research questions and the third topic, methodology will show the steps and approach to answer the research questions. The second chapter consists of two topics, first topic will define the concept of populism and explain its nature. The second topic will explain the relation between populism and democracy. The third chapter is divided into two main sections. The first section will describe the rise of populism in Europe and will give the brief introduction of some major populist parties in Europe consisting both right-wing and left-wing. Further, under this first section, it is divided into 3 subsections and these 3 subsections will talk about right-wing populism, left-wing populism, and the differences between right-wing and left-wing populism in Europe, respectively. The first subsection is segregated into 3 components, Eastern, Western and Northern Europe and the second subsection have only one component, Southern Europe. The first 2 subsections will illustrate and show the percentage vote share of major populist parties notably the right-wing populist, Fidesz, GERB, PiS, FN, FPO, M5S, LN, PVV, Jobbik, AfD, VB, DF, Finns Party and SD and the left-wing populist, SYRIZA, Podemos and few other populists. Finally, the second section will talk about the rise of populism in the United States. The fourth chapter comprises of two main topics, the first topic will give a brief synopsis of liberal international order and second topic will try to answer the main research questions. To answer the main research questions, the second topic is divided into 4 sub topic, namely, international institutions, the rule of law and human rights, economic order, and the security order. These 4 elements are the attributes of liberal international order. Finally, the last chapter five draws conclusion by summarizing the 3 pg. nature of right-wing and left-wing populism and the real impact of populism on liberal international order. 1.2. Research Questions This research paper embarks on two main questions: 1. How the populists in Europe and the United States are shaping the international politics? and 2. What are the impact or consequences of populism on liberal international order? 1.3. Research Methodology This thesis paper exclusively uses only secondary sources as most of the informations are extracted and referred from books, articles, journals, reports and other reliable websites written by scholars, professors, and other pundits. In this paper some of the most controversial questions that faced is the initial definition of populism as the idea of populism is a contested concept as many scholars’ questions whether the political parties that are against elites or claims they represent the people are considered as populists or not, whether populists are inherently a threat for democracy, and whether populists have a real impact on liberal international order. In this paper, I have classified the concept of populism based on three core features as mentioned by professor Ronald F. Inglehart and Pippa Norris, populists are anti-established, authoritarian, and nativist. In addition, I have also used the definition of professor Cas Mudde as he defined populism as, “a thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups: “the pure people” and “the corrupt elite” and politics considered to be the expression of the general will of the people.” 4 pg. To substantiate and demonstrate the rise of populism in Europe, I have used the statistics of rising populist parties published by the Foundation for European Progressive Studies, in which they have used “Populism Tracker Monitoring System” to classify the populist parties and monitor their election scores. I have also used Melbourne Dataset published by an author Paul D. Kenny from Australian National University, which is used to track the number of right-wing populists in Europe from 2000 to 2017. In addition, I have incorporated two more datasets to track the rise of right-wing and left-wing populists, such as “Timbro Authoritarian Populism Index 2017” published by Director and deputy head of liberal think tank Timbro and European election database. Nonetheless, I have segregated right-wing and left-wing populism based on regions, as the right-wing populists are predominantly present in Eastern, Western and Northern region, and left-wing populists in Southern region. Finally, to answer the main research questions, first I have framed the definition of western-led liberal international order based on four elements namely, international institutions, the rule of law and human rights, economic order and the security order. Subsequently, to check the impact of populism on these four elements of liberal order, I have assessed their impact based on their rhetoric and the implementation of policies and also argued their possible impact theoretically based on their behavior and nature of populism. However, to find the impact of populism on liberal order, I have referred and given the example of only the most prominent rightwing and left-wing populists who are more popular nationally and regionally and influential in setting up the foreign policy. The time frame for the impact of populism on liberal order is calculated from 2005 henceforth but mostly I have emphasized from 2015 onwards after refugee crisis. 5 pg. CHAPTER 2 Understanding Populism Understanding the pellucid concept of populism facilitate to expound the rise of populism in 21st century and its implication on international events. In addition, it will give you a bigger picture of how the populist ought to think and how they act. The notion of populism in applied in the field of leadership, political parties, and the movement. For instance, the populism in Europe is predominantly lean towards rightwing populist parties and historically the populists in Europe are embedded in political parties but not necessarily, whereas in the United States it is the matter of leadership rather than the party that is considered as the populists. Nonetheless, the following study will explain the simple concept of populism though the term populism is a politically contested concept but this paper will interpret general common concept basing it as a general acceptable definition for further study. 2.1 The Concept of Populism The term populism is a contested concept among scholars, academician and pundits over its meaning and it is applied variously to leaders and parties of the left and right politics. The fact that populism is widely described in imprecise way and often susceptible to easy misunderstanding. For those interested in the contemporary political events and phenomena, it often furnishes with loaded concept that perplex the readers as the concept is widely used. Professor Jan Werner Muller of Princeton University mentioned in his book called “What is Populism?” that back in the late 1960s populism appeared in debates 6 pg. about decolonization, speculations concerning the future of peasantism. However, today, especially in Europe all kinds of anxieties and hopes are coalesced around the populism. Literally, liberals seem to be worried about increasingly illiberal masses falling to populism, nationalism and xenophobia and proponents of democracy are concerned about the rise of liberal technocracy corresponding to responsible governance by an elite who are democratic representative of people but they do not consciously represent the wishes of their supporters or voters. On the other hand, in the United States, the word populism is mostly associated with the concept of egalitarian left-wing politics in oppose to Democratic party (2016). Professor Muller, distinctively draw the difference about the conception of populism in Europe and the United States. He said in the United States, the concept of liberal populism is very common but by contrast in Europe, populism can never be combined with liberalism because liberal is the acceptance of pluralism and an understanding of democracy with necessarily involvement of checks and balances. How are we going to judge this contested concept of Populism, left or right politics, democratic or republicans, and liberal or illiberal? Scholars such as Cas Mudde, a Dutch political scientist who emphasis on political extremism and populism in Europe, Pippa Norris a professor of University of Sydney and lecturer of Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, and Ronald F. Inglehart, a political scientist at the University of Michigan are very influential in defining populism. According to the paper titled, “Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism” written by Ronald and Pippa, populism is defined based on three core features, anti-establishment, authoritarianism and nativism. To elaborate on these features, both authors explained, populist are against establishment, in other words, anti-establishment or anti-elitist as 7 pg. populist are skeptic and aggrieved of the established authorities or elite such as mainstream politician, multinational corporation, government officials, experts, privileged rich or plutocratic and to name few. For example, How Donald Trump become so popular and a successful populist? The answer to this question is very simple, he became popular and a successful populist because of his unconventional approach and rhetoric by winning the hearts of millions of Americans despite being a billionaire. His unconventional approach and rhetoric is presenting himself as an antiestablishment, against the mainstream politician which he pronounced as a corrupt elite. The clear anti-establishment rhetoric he gave was during the inaugural speech on 20th January 2017 he said, “Today’s ceremony, however, has a very special meaning because today we are not merely transferring power from one administration to another or from one party to another, but we are transferring power from Washington, D.C., and giving it back to you, the people. For too long, a small group of our nation’s capital has reaped the rewards of government while the people have bore the cost. Washington flourished, but the people did not share its wealth. Politician prospered but the jobs left and the factories closed. The establishment protected itself, but not the citizens of our country. Their victories have not been your victories. Their triumphs have not been your triumphs. And while they celebrated in our nation’s capital, there was little to celebrate for struggling families all across our land” (The White House, 2017). Another example of anti-establishment is the leader of the Dutch political party called Party for Freedom (PVV) Geert Wilders, he scorned the established elite by denouncing the Dutch National Assembly and its MPs, calling it a fake Parliament which evade the representation of the will of the people. Moreover, he has also publicly 8 pg. accused judges and prosecutors of being politically biased against him and his party (The Social Humanist, 2017). In line to this anti-establishment, Cas Mudde said populism is an ideology that populist claim that of pure people against corrupt/dishonest elite. However, in counter to this, to elucidate the doubt, Jan Werner Muller argue that not everyone who criticizes elites are populist or it is plainly inadequate to say that all appeals to “the people” qualify as populism. He instead argued that populists claim that they and they alone speak in the name of what they tend to call the “real people” or the “silent majority” and in which real people is all that matters (Brown, 2017, p. 3 and 4). So what populist tend to claim is they and they only represent the people and any other opposition political representatives or any people who does not really support them are not part of the real or authentic people. In other words, their political competitors are immoral and corrupt elite and people who does not support them are in the same category. For example, when Nigel Farage, a British politician and a former leader of United Kingdom of Independent Party (UKIP) won his Brexit campaign, he claimed that it had been a “Victory for real people” thus making 48 percent of those who opposed as not real people (Muller, 2016). So who are the real people in this context? The people may be referred to individuals with a particular nationality or culture excluding all other population groups as right wing populist demonstrate in Europe. For example, Lega Nord (North League), a Northern regional political party in Italy claim for the people and for them people means people of North in contrast to people from Southern Italy. What this define is people are referred based on regions, latter aligned with cultures. In other words, People according to populist are created as homogenous, 9 pg. excluding those who are different or belongs to other (Deiwiks, 2009). Basically, in a diverse and pluralistic democracy, populist define people by societal groups such as ethnic groups, minorities, race, and religion. To put into the case, the National Front (FN), French left-wing populist party, were once dubbed as Left-Lepenism (Worker’s Lepenism) because their voters or supporters were workers who previously belonged to the electorate of the classical left from Communist Party, so for National Front, their conception of real people were left-workers. According to Professor Ronald and Pippa, the term populist claim as real people are regarded as homogenous and inherently real and authentic in counter to corrupt elites. The second feature authoritarianism, populist display the power by exerting personal power and favors majoritarian voters as a promise for the voice of the people in the form of opinion polls and referendum rather than the institutional checks and balances and the protection of minority rights (Inglehart & Norris, 2016). According to Professor Muller, the general tendency of populist parties are particularly prone to internal authoritarianism because of the personality driven micopolitics (use of formal and informal power by individuals and groups) which oppose to a reasoned debate or rational decisions. For example, Geert Wilder is clearly an authoritarian populist, the founder and current populist leader of the Party for Freedom (PVV). In fact, PVV is a one-man party, allowing him to dictate party’s entire policy agenda and delegitimizing institutions such as media outlets and parliament by calling it as a fake news and fake parliament. Professor Muller argued the members of the PVV in Dutch parliament are merely delegates because they are extensively coached by wilders every Saturday on how to present themselves and how to do their legislative work. He related Beppe Grillo, an Italian populist and the leader of the Five Star Movement Political party 10 pg. (M5S) with Geert Wilder. He said Grillo exercises central control over his parliamentary deputies and expels from the movement those who dare to disagree with him. Another good example of the most authoritative populist is Donald Trump, as political scientist Cas Mudde said Trump targeted both Republicans and Democrats and he thought that politics should pretty much follow his will. Trump is a one-man party businessman with no real political ties, he has no history and no particular structure that ties him down (Knigge, 2016). In another account, Cas Mudde said, “He is showing clear signs of an authoritarian leader, most notably by blurring the national and the personal, considering a critique of him similar to a critique of the country and accepting none of it. He clearly considers dissent as unpatriotic and doesn’t believe it should be accepted or protected”. According to Professor Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt of Harvard University, they consider Donald Trump as an authoritative populist by categorizing based on the concern for the health of democratic institution demonstrated by Trump namely, rejecting or showing weak commitment to democratic rules, denying the legitimacy of political opponents, encouraging or tolerating violence and a readiness to stifle or limit civil liberties of opponents including media. However, it is ignorant and naïve to say that all authoritarian leaders are populist and all the populist are authoritarian. The last feature nativism, populist typically emphasizes nativism or xenophobic nationalism, which assumes that the people are homogenous and that states should exclude people from other countries or culture (Inglehart & Norris, 2016). 11 pg. However, do not confuse populism with nationalism as they are the two different kinds of politics. According to Benjamin De Cleen, an assistant professor of Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB), he said many researchers and commentators of populist politics tend to confuse populism with nationalism. This confusion makes the study of populism in the European context particularly difficult. He made a clear distinction between what populism and nationalism is by stating “populists are not all nationalist and if you look at nationalist they are not all populists”. An analogy between populism and nationalism is, he stressed, the difference between vertical dimension of populism and a horizontal dimension of nationalism, populist politics construct ‘the people’ by opposing it to ‘the elite’ and claim to represent ‘the people’ but nationalist politics construct and claim to represent the nation, which is discursively constructed by distinguishing between those who are ‘in and those who are ‘out’ of the nation (2016). The populist nativism can be explained explicitly by the two varieties of populism called inclusionary and exclusionary populism. Dr. Paul D. Kenny, a Research Fellow in Indian Political and Social Change at the Australian National University explicitly state the distinction between inclusionary and exclusionary populism. He argued, exclusionary populism threatens immigrants (refugees) and minorities and is very common in Europe, especially right-wing populism such as FN, Alternative for Germany (AfD), PVV, Freedom Party for Austria (FPO) and to name few. The most common exclusionary rhetoric is “America First, France First, Netherland First” demonstrating anti-pluralism and mono-culturalism. Trump’s rhetoric is the most conspicuous example of exclusion, when he demonstrates antiMuslimism (Islamophobia), racial resentment, intolerance of multiculturalism (antipluralism and xenophobia), misogyny, sexism and isolationism. This exclusionary 12 pg. populism will be explained in great details in chapter 3, subsequently in the Right-Wing and Left-Wing populism. On the other hand, inclusionary populism demand for the political integration of excluded social groups and this inclusion is common in Latin America and southern Europe. The inclusionary populism such as SYRIZA in Greece and Podemos in Spain, a left-wing populist has emerged because of the outbreak of the global financial crisis that changed the fundamental believe in southern Europe. These inclusionary populist are dependent economically and culturally on the west, so they tend to adopt inclusion. Both SYRIZA and Podemos opposed neoliberalism and austerity policies. 2.2 Populism and Democracy Understanding the relations between Populism and democracy will facilitate to prognosticate the implications on international liberal order and the effects of representative democracy. As Professor Jan Werner rightly pointed out that populism arises with the introduction of representative democracy; it is its shadow. In other words, populism is a shadow of modern representative democracy. In a similar manner a political theorist Benjamin Arditi from the University of Mexico explained, “as a symptom of democracy, populism functions as a paradoxical element that belongs to democracy – they both endorse the public debate of political issues, electoral participation, informal forms of expression of the popular will, and so on (2007). One of the main reason why it became a shadow of representative democracy is as Dr. Giorgos Katsambekis, an associate researcher in the Center for Southeast European Studies said, “something went wrong, the bond and relations between representational and the governed and the governors, common citizens and the political elites”. 13 pg. He argued “citizens feel misrepresented or not represented at all and perceives mainstream political parties as self-serving and unresponsive. This is particularly important in today’s Europe, where mainstream political forces of centre-left and centre-right seem to have lost their links with civil society, becoming all the more attached to the administrational workings of the state; what the renowned political scientist Peter Mair has described as the ‘cartelization’ of political parties, which has spread to the EU itself, making it a remote ‘protected sphere,’ unaware of people’s agonies and grievances. In this kind of cartel systems populist parties are gaining ground against mainstream political parties and they are doing so not only in cases where economic hardship has hit hard, but also in cases where the economy has performed rather well and institutions are stable and efficient” (2016). The isolation and the distance bond between representative and the voters and the disorientation of confidence and trust for representative has created an opportunity for the emergence of populism as the populist leaders claiming to close that gap by “putting the power back” into the ‘people’s’ hand (Deiwiks, 2009). “Populist are illiberal in this view, but not undemocratic”, Dr. Paul D. Kenny mentioned in his report titled “Understanding Populism and Why It Matters” inference to what Takis S. Pappas, an associate professor of comparative politics, set up a distinction between democratic and non-democratic political context, arguing that populism, by definition, can only occur in the former. Chantal Mouffe, a Belgian political theorist and Ernesto Laclau, an Argentine political theorist, both argued that populism actually constitutes the essence of democratic politics. Their argument came after the rise of leftwing populist movements and parties which caused a shift in the 14 pg. public debate about the populism. According to Cas Mudde both Chantal and Ernesto viewed populism is good for democracy but blame liberalism as the real problem. The main good of populism is that it brings to the fore issue that large parts of the population care about, but that the political elites want to avoid discussing. For example, immigration for the populist right or austerity for the populist left. In short, Cas Mudde said, “Populism is not necessarily antidemocratic, it is essentially illiberal” and he paraphrased Benjamin Arditi’s statement about populism, “populism behaves like the drunken guest at a dinner party, who doesn’t respect the rules of public contestation but spells out the painful but real problems of society. What does it mean? Benjamin Arditi is trying to say that populism is not something that came outside of democratic system but it is the symptom of representative democracy and when the populist come into action, they do not obey the democratic rules and order. The duality between populist politics and democracy is, populism challenges the common sense of liberal democratic practice and may have ominous implications for liberal democracy but at the same time, populism may serve to identify or overlooked political problems and give marginalized groups a legitimate voice. Because of these equivocal argument, academicians and scholars are increasingly induced to find whether populism is really a threat or remedial for democracy. This issues have been addressed from the perspective of democratic theory and empirical research on the impact of populism politics on the quality of democracy (Gidron & Bonikowski, 2013). 15 pg. CHAPTER 3 The Rise of Populism 3.1 Right-wing and left-wing Populism in Europe Indeed, Europe’s political culture and landscape has gone through enormous change since the end of the Cold War. Since after the Cold War, populist parties have gained substantial support from the people, later securing access in most national parliaments and soon, the populism spread all over the east, west, north and south of Europe. The prime outpouring of populism has been in Eastern and Southern Europe but soon it progressed to Western and Northern Europe notably, France, Germany and Spain and Scandinavian countries such as Sweden and Finland. According to Ruth Wodak, a professor of Lancaster University, the wave of populism in Europe began with the 9/11 attacks and the security crackdown legitimized cutting back on human rights and helped far right populist parties to rise. Subsequently, the heat of financial crisis in 2008 has fueled populism further in Europe, especially in southern part amid fear over poverty and unemployment. Not only that, Philippe Marliere, a professor of French and European politics from University College London, said since after World War 2, the region was in a political crisis and mainstream parties have become so unpopular because their policies are being rejected by the people and that’s created a vacuum in which those populist parties can step in. The year 2015 was an appalling year for European countries, especially for EU as Europe has suffered a massive shock, starting from the terrorist attack (ISIS) in Paris killing 130 people, and simultaneously, EU was battling with an economic crisis 16 pg. in Greece threatening single market, the entire eurozone and the most conspicuous and the biggest challenge is the increasing influx of refugees from Middle East and other war-torn regions such as Syria, Afghanistan and to name few. Subsequently, year 2016 became even worse when Britain exit from EU on 23 June 2016 and terrorist attack transpired in other member states, namely, Brussel attack in Belgium killing 35 people, followed by Nice attack in France killing 86 people, Berlin attack in Germany killing 12 people and eventually London attack in 2017, killing 6 people. However, the tension of influx of immigrants has subsided because EU has outsourced the immigrant issues to Turkey by sending them to Turkey with the deal of long term promises such as visa free travel for Turkish nationals to EU members, giving 3-billion-euro financial assistance to support approximately 3 million refugees and Turkey’s EU accession negotiation. All these incidents, starting from 2015 to current year has fueled populism to take a foot-hold in running governments and eventually in EU Parliament, as political scientist Cas Mudde described “a development that pushed populist movements (development of all these incidents) to the center of European politics”. He argued, the threat of terrorism and anxiety about a massive wave of immigrants from the Muslim world, coupled with the widespread belief that the EU hinders rather than helps when it comes to such problems, have created a perfect storm for populists, especially, enhancing the standing of right-wing populists in many countries. Meanwhile, the eurozone crisis has aided the rise of left-wing, anti-austerity populists in Greece and Spain. He noted, although the threats to security and economic stability that have rattled Europe in the past few years may have spurred the current populist surge, they did not create it (2016). According to the Trans-Regional University of Melbourne Dataset, since the year of 2000, the number of populist parties in Europe has almost doubled from 33 to 63, precisely, the database tracked 102 17 pg. populist parties in 39 European countries between 2000 and 2017. The Melbourne Dataset has classified political parties as populist based on a party that opposes the political class, financial institutions, immigrants or ethnic minorities; depended on the personality of a leader; and violated liberal democratic norms (Eiermann, Mounk, & Gultchin, 2017). The following Table 1 will show the percentage vote share of populist in Europe from 2008 to 2018 and the classification of populist parties are based on Melbourne Dataset. The table 1 is in descending order from highest to lowest vote share in 2018, counting both right-wing and left-wing populism in Europe. Subsequently, I have converted table 1 into graph to get the graphical picture of the rise of populism in Europe. Table 1 Percentage vote share of populist parties in Europe, 2008-2018. (Source: Euronews,2018) 18 pg. Figure 1 Percentage vote share of populist parties in Europe, 2008-2018 (Converted from Table 1). % vote share of populist parties in Europe, 2008-2018 Hungary Greece Poland Italy Czech Republic Cyprus Slovakia Estonia Lithuania Bulgaria France Austria Finland Netherland Germany Spain Denmark Sweden Ireland Romania Portugal Slovenia Latvia Croatia Luxembourg Belgium United Kingdom 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% 2008 2018 The figure 1 shows that Hungary, Greece and Poland are the most favorable countries where support for populism is the strongest with Hungary having the largest percentage of vote share 65.09% for populist parties in 2018, followed by Greece with 54.60% vote share for populist and so forth. The verdict of this graph is that in Hungary, Greece and Poland more than half of the electorate cast its vote for populists, and these three countries are governed by populist parties. For instance, Hungary has been governed by right-wing populist called Fidesz since 2010, Greece is governed by the coalition between right-wing called ANEL and left-wing called SYRIZA, and Poland is governed by the sole right-wing populist called PiS since 2015. In contrast, populist supporters in UK, Belgium, Latvia, Netherland and Austria has declined as depicted above. By far, Belgium has declined from 16.02% in 2008 to 4.09% in 2018 (-11.93%), followed by Austria from 28.24% to 26% (-2.24%), and rest, UK, Latvia and Netherland are declined by less than 1 percent. 19 pg. Nonetheless, in the report titled “Timbro Authoritarian Populism Index 2017” authored by Andreas Johansson Heino, a publishing director and deputy head of liberal think tank called Timbro, expressed about the continued high record of populism in Europe. Despite an increase in one part of Europe and decrease in another part of Europe, however, the overall support of populism has continued to grow and in average the support is at 19 percent. This will be demonstrated in the following figure 2, showing the average support from 1980 to 2017 (The year 2017 is missing in the graph but it will show the average point). Figure 2 Average voter support for populist parties from 1980 to 2017 The average voter support that is depicted in the above mentioned graph from 1980 to 2017 is calculated based on the election result of the preceding year in each country. 20 pg. 3.1.1 Right-wing Populism The political trend in Europe is predominately fortified by the rise of populism and since 2015 more right-wing populists have set foot in government across Europe, either as a ruling party or in coalition. However, there are a few strong left-wing populists in Eastern Europe, including Vetevendosje party in Kosovo and Direction Social Democracy in Slovakia but still by far the strongest populist present in this part of the region is on the political right (Eiermann, Mounk, & Gultchin, 2017). According to Melbourne Dataset, there are 74 right-wing populists out of total 102 populist parties and from 74 right-wing populists, 24 right-wing populist stood for election in 2000 and by 2017, 46 right-wing populist parties appeared for election. The dominance of rightwing populism is characterized by the embracement of exclusion as they demonstrate the sentiments of anti-immigrants, euroscepticism, xenophobia and nationalism. Therefore, to demonstrate the rise and involvement of right-wing populist parties in Europe, the following will examine the most notable right-wing populists across the Eastern, Western and Northern part of Europe as these regions are dominated by the right-wing populists. 3.1.1.1 Eastern Europe Countries that are situated in Eastern Europe namely, Hungary, Bulgaria, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia and to name few are the most affected by populism. In other words, right-wing-populist are the strongest in Eastern Europe as they have the highest aggregate support for populist parties. Not only that, right-wing populist are the ruling party and few in coalition, overall the right-wing populists in most of the countries in Eastern Europe runs the government. According to the investigation done by the 21 pg. Populism Tracker Monitoring System in 2016, developed by FEPS and Policy Solutions, three countries in Eastern Europe, notably, Hungary, Bulgaria and Poland will have more than 50% of voters likely to cast their vote for populist parties. The following figure 3 will show the total support of populist parties in Eastern Europe in 2016. I have created the following graph by borrowing the figures from FEPS report and also modified by removing the countries that are not in Eastern region. Figure 3 The total support of populist parties in Eastern Europe in 2016. The support of populist parties in Eastern Europe, 2016. 80% 70% 67% 60% 51% 51% 47% 50% 40% 40% Slovakia Lithuania 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Hungary Bulgaria Poland Czech Republic (Source: Foundation for European Progressive Studies (FEPS), 2016) Above figure shows that Hungary has the highest support for populist parties with 67%, followed by Bulgaria and Poland both scoring 51% and subsequently, 47% for Czech Republic and 40% for both Slovakia and Lithuania, respectively. The single largest populist parties in Europe is the ruling right-wing populist parties called Fidesz led by current Prime Minister of Hungary Viktor Orban. Fidesz was running government since 2010 with 53% support from voters and in 2014 it declined to 44.9% but still they were 22 pg. the majority and by 2016 they had support of 46% likely voters, according to the report published by FEPS in 2016. In addition, Fidesz has won all national election including two parliamentary, three local and two European Parliament elections in the last 10 years (Boros, Freitas, Kadlot, & Stetter, 2016). The competitor to Fidesz is another right-wing populist called Jobbik which is the third biggest party scoring popular vote of 14.35% in 2010 election and in 2014 election, their support has increased to 20.22%. By the end of 2015 to the end of 2016 their voting support remained at 21% (FEPS report). According to Tony Blair Institute for Global Change report published in 2017, Populism in Hungary is one of the few cases where populism become pervasive in Europe that the primary competitors to populist governments are themselves populist. Second to Hungary is Bulgaria where more than half of the voters sided populist parties at 51% majority voters (PTMS record), which means populist govern the country. Not only that, in 2016, Bulgaria’s populist party GERB was the second single most right-wing populist ruling party in Europe with 42% voters sympathizing with them. The GERB has won parliamentary elections in 2009 for the first time and since 2014 they have been in government led by its founder Boyko Borissov (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2016). Now the GERB dominates the vast majority of local government units: 21 of the 25 regional centers have GERB mayors, and one-third of all councils were elected from the GERB list. This is because GERB won easily in most of major cities as they faced with little competition. However, GERB is governing with other four minor parties as a coalition, together with Patriotic Front (PF), the center-right Reformist Bloc (RB), center-left Alternative for Bulgarian Revival (BV), and an alliance of two nationalist parties (Spirova, 2016). 23 pg. In the similar manner, right-wing populist is also ruling the government in Poland as the support for populist parties is at 51% in 2016. The ruling right-wing populist party, PiS have 41% voters, making it the most influential right-wing populist party in Poland and one of the most in Europe. PiS came to power in 2005 as they appeared as the largest party in the Poland’s parliamentary election scoring vote of 26.99% (according to European Election Database) and followed by 24.14% for Civic Platform party (PO). However, PiS lost in 2007 parliamentary election whilst PO took charge of government for next two terms. Nonetheless, in 2015 national election, PiS revived and won 37.58% of majority votes, followed by PO with 24.09% votes. Since then, PiS took complete control over the Polish government as PiS won the Presidential and Parliamentary elections in 2015. Significantly, other Eastern and Central European countries present lesser dominating populist parties compared to these three dominating countries. The lesser populist dominating countries are Czech Republic, Slovakia, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia and Croatia. In Czech Republic, there are three right-wing populist parties and all these three combined owns 47% of voter’s support in 2016. These populist parties are ANO 2011, the Party of Free Citizens (Svobodni), and Dawn-National Coalition (Usvit). In Slovakia, three right-wing and one left-wing populists are present and all combined they have 40% of voter’s support in 2016. In the Baltic states, namely, Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania, all these three countries present populist parties. In Estonia, right-wing and centrist populist parties can be found, in Latvia you can find right-wing populist parties such as National Alliance (NA) and in Lithuania both right-wing and left-wing are present with combined votes of 40% in 2016. Along the same lines, Croatia has also got both right-wing and left-wing populist parties but they hold only around 10% supports (Data from 2016 report, FEPS). 24 pg. The following figure 4 will show the percentage votes for the single right-wing populist parties in Eastern Europe in year 2016 and it is the brief summary of the above mentioned content about the right-wing populism in Eastern Europe. In other words, the above content is demonstrated in the form of figures to make it clear and simple. Figure 4 Percentage votes for right-wing populist parties in Eastern Europe, 2016. %votes for Right-Wing Populist Parties in Eastern Europe, 2016. 50% 45% 40% 46% 42% 35% 41% 30% 25% 20% 21% 15% 10% 5% 0% Fidesz (Hungary) Jobbik (Hungary) GERB (Bulgaria) PiS (Poland) 3.1.1.2 Western Europe Populism is also present in the most of the Western European countries such as, France, Germany, Austria, Netherland, and Belgium but despite the recent rise of populism, populist parties are not strong and powerful as compared to other parts of Europe, especially Eastern Europe. However, like Eastern Europe, Western Europe is also dominated by right-wing populist parties notably, FN, FPO, PVV, VB and AfD. The Populist parties here are not part of any country’s government except Austrian’s right wing populist is in coalition with OVP and Swiss People’s Party with Swiss Federal Council, the largest party in the Federal Assembly of Switzerland. 25 pg. In the densely populated country like France, right-wing populist is rising and simultaneously, causing turbulence against the mainstream parties. The most conspicuous rise of right-wing populist is FN led by Marine Le Pen, daughter of FN founder, Jean-Marie Le Pen. In 2007 general election before Le Pen was the leader of the party, FN won 4.29% votes in the first round and at the end of second round, they won only 0.08% votes. In the following election held in 2012, by the time Le Pen was the leader of FN, the party won 13.6% votes in the first round and by the end of second round they had only 3.66% votes. Nevertheless, in 2015 regional election, they were stronger and better as they gained 27.73% votes in the first round and subsequently, 27.10% votes in the second round. In the recent year, France held the presidential election in 2017 and two candidates was in competition, Le Pen, right-wing populist leader and on the other side, liberal Emmanuel Macron of En Marche!. In the first round of presidential round Le Pen gained 21.3% votes, around 7.6 million and in the second round, Le Pen lost to Macron, gaining 33.9% votes which is around 10.6 million. We can see the gradual gaining of votes by FN since 2007 election (figures of 2017 election is extracted from the report published in 2017 by transform! europe network). France’s neighbor, Germany the most populous country in EU also present the right-wing populists called AfD, established in February 6, 2013. The newly founded AfD entered in the 2013 federal elections and gained 4.7% votes, narrowly missed the legal 5% threshold to enter the national parliament (Schwander & Manow, n.d.). However, they became the third largest party by 2017 election, holding 12.6% votes, behind Christian Democratic Union and Social Democratic Party, both gaining, 32.9% and 20.5% votes, respectively (data extracted from the report published by The Federal 26 pg. Returning Officer in 2017). Not only they came third in 2017 election but they also hold 12.6% of seats (94 out of 709 seats) in Bundestag (Bundestag is the federal parliament in Germany, which is similar to lower house of parliament such as the House of Commons of UK and the United States House of Representatives). The Western Europe’s strongest populist party and the only country in Western Europe with the right-wing populist present in government as a junior coalition is the Austrian rightwing populist called FPO led by Heinz Christian Strache who is the current vicechancellor of Austria. They are also the fourth strongest right-wing populist in EU behind, Fidesz, GERB and PiS, according to the Populism Tracker monitoring system developed by FEPS and Policy Solution. FPO have a long history of political success in Austria as in 1999 election FPO gained the second highest vote share and entered a coalition government with the OVP that lasted until 2006. In the national level, FPO is the third largest party behind the conservative OVP and the Social Democratic Party however, they have a significant influence over Austrian politics as in southern part FPO is the strongest party and also across much of Austria they defeated Social Democratic Party and became the party with the second highest vote share (Eiermann, 2017). In 2014, FPO scored 20% of the votes in the EP elections and subsequently, the following two years, 2015 and 2016, their supports increased considerably by 32% and 35% votes, respectively. In the recent year 2017 parliament election, they came third by winning 26% votes and 51 seats in the National Council, behind OVP with 31.5% votes and 62 seats and SPO with 26.9% votes and 52 seats (figures extracted the website published by the Embassy of Austria in Washington, 2017). After 2017 election, FPO became a junior coalition with the conservative OVP led by current Chancellor Sebastian Kurz. The most distinctive part of FPO is, according to the Tony Blair 27 pg. Institute for Global Change report, the voters, as the FPO has won the highest vote share of 30% among voters below age 30. The report mentioned that the FPO is weakest among voters over the age of 60, with 19% of the vote compared to the other two major parties with 36% (OVP) and 34% (SPO) respectively. Alex De Jong, a historian, Co-director of the International Institute for Research and Education in Amsterdam rightly pointed out that in recent years, the Dutch far-right populist PVV has evolved into one the most successful ones of the European region in terms of electoral success and influence on national politics. He argued, its leader Geert Wilders has become a major political figure in the Netherlands. In 2012 elections, PVV has scored 10.1% of the votes and 15 seat out of 150 in the House of Representatives (lower house of the bicameral parliament) becoming the third highest party, behind VVP and PvdA. In the following election that took place on March 15, 2017, PVV garnered considerable attention as they were expected to do well. They gained 13.1% of votes and 20 seats in the lower house, just behind VVD winning 24.7% of votes and 39 seats (figures collected from the report published by Kristin Archick in 2017, specialist of European Affairs). PVV is now considered as the most influential rightwing populist party of current politics in the Netherland despite a decline in its votes as compared to 2012 elections. In the similar line, Belgium’s separatist and Eurosceptic, the right-wing populist, VB has maintained its influence despite recent decline in their votes. According to European Election Database, it shows that VB had acquired 11.99% of votes in 2007 election and in the subsequent two elections, in 2010 and 2014, they scored only 7.76% and 3.69% votes, respectively (2014 election figure is retrieved from the Fondation Robert Schuman report). 28 pg. 3.1.1.3 Northern Europe In the Northern Europe, the populism is a minority but in recent elections, they have gained an increasing share of votes. For instance, the most notable right-wing populist in Scandinavian country is the Danish People’s party (DF) in Denmark. In 2001 election, DF scored 12% votes, in the following election in 2005, they gained 13.25%, 13.9% votes in 2007 election, 12.3% votes in 2011 election, and the highest was in 2015 election, scoring 21.1% votes. In the recent local election held in November 2017, they scored 8.75% votes. Not only Denmark populist is on the rise but its neighboring countries like Sweden, Finland and Norway are also gaining more share of votes. Particularly, right-wing populist in Finland and Norway are representing their government and have great influence on national politics. The Finnish populist party called True Finns or Finns Party (PS) become the third largest party in 2011 parliamentary election winning 19.1% votes and in the following election held in 2015, astonishingly, they became the second largest party, gaining 17.7% votes and formed government in coalition with two other major parties (data collected from Statistics Finland). In line with that, Norwegian right-wing populist called Progress Party also became the third largest party by scoring 15.2% votes in 2017 parliamentary election, behind Labour Party (27.4%) and Conservative party (25%) and become part of the government coalition. In Sweden, the right-wing populist Swedish Democrats (SD) is the country’s third largest party with 12.9% votes and gaining 49 seats in Raksdag (Unicameral legislature) in 2014 elections, just behind Social Democratic Party and Moderate Assembly Party, both scoring 31.2% (113 seats) and 23.2% votes (84 seats), 29 pg. respectively (Figures extracted from the report published by Fondation Robert Schuman about the general election in Sweden in 2014). The most recent political turbulence and the change of European political landscape is the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from EU. In fact, most scholars and researcher of populism commented as “the the effect of populist forces” which they successfully influenced conservative to take their agenda into account and eventually, populist party UKIP achieved their agenda without holding real power in the government. However, UKIP’s share of votes has decreased to 13% in 2016 and by 2017 election, it came down to 1.84% (data from the report published by the House of Commons Library in 2017). The following figure 5 will show the average electoral support for right wing populist parties across Europe dating from 1980 to 2017. The following graph shows the average support for right-wing populist at 12.8% in 2017, increasing steadily from 1.5% in 1980 (the year 2017 is not mentioned in the following graph but the figure for 2017 is drawn on the right side of figure 2016). Figure 5 Average electoral support for right-wing populists in Europe from 1980 to 2017. (Source: Timbro Authoritarian Populism Index, 2017) 30 pg. 3.1.2 Left-wing Populism 3.1.2.1 Southern Europe The politics in Eastern, Western and Northern part of Europe are exclusively dominated by the right-wing populist parties, showing the sentiments of anti-immigrants and exclusionary policies. On other hand, Southern Europe is dominated by left-wing populists, a region that is hit hard by economic recession and Eurozone crisis. Leftwing populists in this region shows the characteristics of inclusion and against the austerity measures or anti-austerity, privatization and national political elites. The countries of Southern Europe that presents the left-wing populist parties are Greece, Spain, Portugal, Cyprus and populists in Italy neither left nor right. In the report Timbro Authoritarian Populism Index 2017, Andreas Johansson Heino, a publishing director and an expert in European politics mentioned that the support for left-wing populist parties has declined since the first half of 1990s and subsequently, reached to its lowest level in 2006 at 3.7% but remained only in Southern and Central Europe. However, in recent years, left-wing populist parties has almost doubled, especially in Greece and Spain. In Greece, left-wing populist parties, SYRIZA is leading government and astonishingly, they are in coalition with the right-wing populist ANEL in two consecutive elections. SYRIZA led by current Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras has won two elections in 2015, first election was held in January and second election in September and in both election, SYRIZA won with major votes (Majority), 36.3% and 35.46% votes and gained 149 and 145 seats, respectively out of 300 in Unicameral Hellenic Parliament (data extracted from Greek’s Ministry of Interior). With SYRIZA’s electoral victory in Greece, the emergence of Podemos in Spain, the M5S party in Italy and the coalition between social-democrats and radical 31 pg. left in Portugal, the creation of a peculiar left populism has been evolved in South (Mavrozacharakis, Kotroyannos, & Tzagkarakis, 2017). In Spain, left-wing populist party Podemos, the second second largest party by number of members which is founded in 2014, has gained 20.83% votes in 2015 parliamentary elections and got 69 seats in Congress of Deputies and 13 seats in Senate, respectively. Subsequently, in 2016 parliamentary election, Podemos scored 21.26% votes and gained 71 seats in Congress of Deputies and 12 seats in Senate, respectively. In a recent Italian election held between March 4 and 5, M5S became the single biggest party in Italy, gaining 32.22% votes and winning 133 seats out of 630 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 68 seats out of 315 seats in the Senate, respectively. In the similar manner, right-wing populist Lega Nord (LN) scored 17.6% votes and got 73 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 37 seats in the Senate, respectively. In Cyprus, the left-wing populism is also dominant as in the recent period the share of voters has been around 40% in the country and the Marxist-Leninist AKEL has remained the most successful populist party, currently standing at 30% both at the end of 2015 and 2016 (Boros, Freitas, Kadlot, & Stetter, 2016). The following figure 6 will show the voters support for left-wing populist parties from the year 1980 to 2017 (year 2017 is not mentioned in the following graph but the figure is drawn). 32 pg. The following figure 6 will show the voters support for left-wing populist parties from the year 1980 to 2017 (year 2017 is not mentioned in the following graph but the figure is drawn) Figure 6 Voters support for left-wing populists in Europe, 1980-2017. (Source: Timbro Authoritarian Populism Index, 2017) 3.1.3 Differences between Right-wing and Left-wing Populism in Europe The differences between right-wing and left-wing populism in Europe is determined from the ideology of “people” when populist claim that they represent the “real people”. In other words, as Dr. Giorgos Katsambekis, an associate researcher in the Center for Southeast European Studies best describes that the difference between right-wing and left-wing populism is the construction of “the people”. The concept of “the people” by right-wing populism is “us vs them”, the definition of the people is culturally homogenous, discriminating the minorities by implying “others” (Greven, 2016). For instance, the FN in France, FPO in Austria, and other right-wing populist parties in Europe, all seem to favor a strictly ethnic understanding of the people, represented as a homogenous community, opposing at the same time minorities who have different religion, are from different ethnic and so forth and expressing xenophobic, racist, bigotry, and homophobic views. So they tend to be exclusionary, anti-immigrants, and illiberal (Katsambekis, 2016). 33 pg. In contrast, left-wing populists construct ‘the people’ as a pluralist and heterogeneous collective that include different social classes, ethnicities, religions and sexual orientation. Not only that, they highlight the need to re-incorporate and represent the marginalized, the poor and lower classes or excluded society. So they tend to be more inclusionary, egalitarian, and against austerity by emphasizing to tackle the socioeconomic issues (Katsambekis, 2016). Since the inception of the Great Recession in 2008, eurozone crisis and the rise of austerity politics, SYRIZA, Podemos and other left-wing populist parties have waged campaigns for fiscal sovereignty, advocated for stronger fiscal transfers within the EU and promised to expand the welfare state (Eiermann, Mounk, & Gultchin, 2017). Leftwing populist parties in Europe are not really against the EU but they are against the system, the way it is functioning now, unlike right-wing populists who are skeptical about EU and often threatened to exit from EU. In fact, Britain is the good example of how UKIP were sceptic about EU and eventually succeeded in exiting from European Integration. If we look at the recent political situation in Europe, the right-wing populists are rising from the turbulence of the threat of terrorism, massive influx of immigrants from Middle – East such as Syria and the ineffectiveness of EU to tackle those problems. Meanwhile, in Southern Europe, the Great Recession and eurozone crisis has propelled the rise of left-wing populist parties. In general, the concept of exclusionary and inclusionary populism in Europe is, exclusionary populism, understands the people as an ethnically or culturally homogenous unit and excludes people such as migrants, minorities and to name few, on the grounds of racist and nativist premises. In contrast, inclusionary populism allows 34 pg. for the political integration of excluded social groups and people, thus enlarging the boundaries of democracy (Markou, 2016). 3.2 Populism in the United States As Dr. Thomas Greven, an Associate Professor, Senior Research Fellow of the German Institute for International Relations and an expert in US politics and foreign policy affirms that the origination of populism in the United States was the agrarian populist or people’s party in the 1890s. The party challenged the established two party system with its critique of the moneyed interests and ended up merging with, and somewhat transforming, the Democratic Party. While the Democrats moved to the left, however, the US experienced a period of Republican dominance. In the current political trend, US experience intraparty populism, Donald Trump in the Republican party and its allied, an American political movement called the Tea Party Movement (Tea Party Movement is formed to reduce the national debt of US and federal budget deficit by reducing government spending and lower taxes). Moreover, to a certain extent, Bernie Senders from Democratic Party is also considered as populist, often comparing Sanders with Britain Jeremy Corbyn, as both are socialist who are against big businesses such as corporation and promises to return society’s wealth back to the many, ignoring the minorities (Baggini, n.d.). If we examine the U.S. 2016 presidential election campaign, it reflects the phenomenon of populism as trumps rhetoric shows the xenophobic against Mexicans (build a wall on the US-Mexican border in which Mexico have to pay) and Muslims (threatening to deport all illegal immigrants to close border to all Muslims), racism, deep-seated misogyny and isolationist policies of America first. Not only that, he tries 35 pg. to distance himself from established republicans such as Jeb Bush, Elizabeth Warren, the senior Senator from Massachusetts, and socialist Bernie sanders. His populism is also characterized from the claim that he is an outside to D.C. politics, self-made billionaire bringing power back to ordinary Americans from corrupt establishment, dishonest Wall Street speculators, arrogant intellectuals, and politically correct liberals (Inglehart & Norris, 2016). As a result, the outcome of November 2016 Presidency election in the U.S. has fuelled debates on the global rise of populism, especially in Europe and the United States. Moreover, in the same year 2016 Britain conducted a referendum, subsequently, withdrawing from EU, giving UKIP populist party and its leader Nigel Farage the force of populist dominance. But, despite their electoral strength, increasing influence on national politics and shaping public debates, none of these European populist parties had yet come to real power in a long-established Western democracy. However, after Trump was elected as president, it marks a turning point by making the United States the first long-established Western democracy that is currently ruled by a right-wing populist leader (Aydın-Düzgit & Keyman, 2017). 36 pg. CHAPTER 4 Implications of Populism on Liberal International Order 4.1 Liberal International Order If we reflect the history of how Liberal International Order has evolved, just about four centuries ago after the peace treaties called the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, ending 30 years of war in Europe, has created a concept of sovereign states, indeed a new political system where a norm was installed against the invasion and interference of another state’s domestic or internal affairs. With the formation of sovereignty, the influence of European has disseminated across the globe thus bringing the concept of independent existence to the core of international order. In 18th century, Britain, the first industrialized country (1760) followed by other European countries was in the period of economic development, in this period of industrial development and nationalism, they extended their influence and power through imperialism as they ventured most of the world by colonizing other nationstates. Hence, as professor G. John Ikenberry, Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, said, along the way, new ideas of ‘the global’ emerged, intellectual and political visions of a rapidly developing global system. In the twentieth century there emerged a fully-fledged sense of liberal internationalism, understood as a set of prescriptions for organizing and reforming the world in such a way as to facilitate the pursuit of liberal democracy at home. In particular, it was after the Second World War that Liberal internationalism manifest as an organizing vision for the western-led order (2018). It was the United States, working closely with the United 37 pg. Kingdom and others that established the liberal world order in order to ensure the war that had been for 30 years would never again occur (Hass, 2018). However, it was particularly the rise of Cold War that led liberal international order to take in a new form. It was the era of American liberal hegemony, as Professor G. John Ikenberry said, indeed a US-led liberal hegemonic order. They were the producer of world order and the order was based on open and loosely rule-based international order. He argued, over the Cold War decades, American-led liberal internationalism emerged as a distinctive type of order. The United States took on a variety of functions and responsibilities and had direct role in running the order. Some of these functions and responsibilities are, they became a provider of public goods, it upheld the rules and institutions, fostered security cooperation, led the management of the world economy and shared norms and cooperation among the countries who embraced western-led liberal democracies. As Richard N. Haas, president of the Council on Foreign Relation expressed very briefly, to that end (he meant after the end of Second World War) democratic countries set out to create an international system that was liberal in the sense that it was to be based on the rule of law, respect for countries’ sovereignty and territorial integrity and protection of human rights. This was to be applied universally, making the participation open and voluntary for all (2018). Nonetheless, the most essential components of liberal international order are the rule of law, international institution, security order, economic order, and the human rights order. To outline the essences of each component, firstly, the rule of law was framed to protect the system and the abusive use of government power, secondly, international institutions such as United Nation (UN), and EU are formed to continue 38 pg. the longevity of international order, thirdly, security order such as NATO, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, and the United Nations Security Council, are for protecting the invasion and interference of other nation-state, it states what a state can do and cannot do, fourthly, economic order such as GATT, WTO, World Bank, IMF, NAFTA, TPP, TTIP, and so forth, are established to open for trade and exchange of goods and services, knowledge and technology based on mutual gains by reducing artificial barriers to trade, and the last component, the human rights order meticulously stated in the UN Charter known as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, “reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and member states pledged to promote universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political and other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status as all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights ( United Nations, 2015, pp. 2-6). The UN Charter of Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1948 which consists of 30 articles, each specifying the details. In short, Liberal International Order came into existence in a new form led by the United States and western European countries and the concept was based on the rule of law, open markets, multilateral cooperation, cooperative security and democratic system. However, today, after 70 years of founding western led liberal international order, an order that once embraced economic openness, security alliance, respect for the rule of law, respect for international institutions, respect of human rights, and 39 pg. collective problem solving, is under threat by its own proponents. The support for the liberal international order in the United States and Europe is in decline. Indeed, as Richard N. Haas said, its components, liberalism, universality, and the preservation of order itself are being challenged as never before in its 70-year history. One of the main reason why the liberal international order is being challenged and bear its impact is because of the effects of rising populism in Europe and the United States. 4.2 Implications on Liberal International Order Since the year 2016, both Europe and the United States faced backlash against the liberal international order and it was the founders themselves that violate the elements of liberal order, an order that has come into existence in the fully fledged form since after Second World War and subsequently the Cold War. As Professor Francis Fukuyama, an American political scientist and economist affirmed in his published article called populism is poisoning the global liberal order, “first the economic insecurity associated with the decline of the western middle class and greater income and wealth inequality in west and second, the cultural shift related to the resentment of inflow of immigrants and the feeling by some that the country’s traditional norms and values are eroding and their country has been claimed by foreigners has nurtured the growth of populism, especially right-wing populism which challenges the liberal international order” (2018). Thus, the following will examine how populism in Europe and the United States impact on Liberal order, in other words how they undermine the 70-years of established liberal order. To find the evidence of how populism affect liberal international order, the following will demonstrate the impact theoretically and 40 pg. empirically by investigating the action taken by populists, in the form of rhetoric and implementation of policies. 4.2.1 International Institutions Since the establishment of United Nation in 1945, and the subsequent establishment of other international institutions notably, WTO, World Bank, European Union and to name few, the international institutions became pervasive and important in the global world. The United Nation was formed to maintain international peace and security. Hence the idea of global governance came into existence where international institution that governs the world are expected to carry out functions such as promotion of international cooperation, common conflict resolution, collective problem solving such as climate change and terrorism, humanitarian aids, promotion of sustainable economic development and maintain peace and order. In the similar manner, European Union was also established after second World War by six founding members namely, Germany, France, Netherland, Italy, Belgium and Luxembourg to end the conflict and promote peace, security and economic development. Hence, these international institution has emphasized on multilateral agreement, free and open trade, multiculturalism or diversity, protection and promotion of universal human rights, and liberal democracy. However, in the current political scenario, the rise of populists in Europe and the United States are against the established institutions as they draw attention on national identities, shifting towards national sovereignty. This is clearly demonstrated by Trump as he mentioned in his first presidential inaugural speech ‘America first’, as Cas Mudde notes, “the main populist challenge to the international order is Trump, whose America first policy holds no place for supranational organizations or orders”. 41 pg. Donald Trump has criticized numerous international institutions, notably the United Nations and NATO and threatened to leave the World Trade Organization. He has resorted to isolationism and protectionism and often criticized international norms and proposed to ignore the organization’s rules (Bacaria, 2017). During his campaign he stated that he is skeptical about the international unions as he believes international unions tie Americans up and bring America down. He called NATO irrelevant and obsolete and called on their allies to pay more for their support (Schrank, 2017 ). Professor Eric Posner articulated a very brief synopsis of the United States showing the sign of declining support for international order. He argued that there are already multiple of signs stressed by the United States, the United States to withdraw its support for alliances, abandon free-trade accords, and end contributions to international institutions. In correspond to American populism, president Trump’s America first approach was praised and appreciated by French right-wing populist Marine Le Pen. As Jan Werner Muller notes, while populists may have won an initial election fair and square, they quickly start tampering with the institutional machinery of democracy in the name of the so-called real people and they also illegitimize their opponents. He argued populism distorts the democratic process as they prefer a direct, unmediated relationship between the personal leader and the people. Indeed, they dislike representation and opt for direct democracy, such as referendum. Hence, the most challenging to the international order is the rise of populism in Europe, especially rightwing populists in Eastern and Western europe. These right-wing populists are very skeptical about European Union and reject further integration as they are worried about losing their national sovereignty to Brussels and fears a loss of European identity. 42 pg. Among these skeptical populists are Hungarian right-wing populist Fidesz led by current PM Viktor Orban, FN in France, AfD in Germany, PiS in Poland, FPO in Austria, PVV in Netherland and lists go on. For instance, Fidesz of Hungary and PiS of Poland has argued that Brussels is the ‘new Moscow’, eroding their countries sovereignty. Not only that UKIP, PVV, VB, Finns Party and DF/DPP have all demanded referenda on EU membership, especially UKIP, PVV and DPP had the explicit intention of leaving the Union (Balfour, et al., 2016). In 2016, Britain conducted a referendum regarding EU membership and surprising UK voters decided in favor of exit from EU by winning 51.9% votes to 48.1% votes, voters accounting to 72.2% turnout, which is more than 30 million out of 65.64 million (2016). Thus, on 23 June 2016, Britain voted to leave EU. Scholars and many analysts believes that the conduct of referendum and Brexit is the outcome of UKIP pressure. They believe that UKIP’s eurosceptic and anti-EU arguments and debates forced mainstream conservative parties to shift politically further right and hold UKIP’s agenda. Consequently, the British Conservative Party put forward the UKIPdriven Brexit referendum even though UKIP has no power in the government (Mazarr, et al., 2017). This is one example of how populist party influence directly to the mainstream parties. There are other recorded incidents where populists influenced mainstream political parties, for instance populist parties that have been in coalition government such as Italy, Austria, Netherland, Belgium and Denmark. They have a track of record of influencing policy, especially migration policy in which mainstream parties in government have shifted towards the position of populist parties as populists have put the mainstream under pressure to take up their agenda. For example, in Slovakia, mainstream Social Democratic lead by Prime Minister Robert Fico took on a 43 pg. populist anti-immigration stance to ensure his re-election and then formed a government with the far right (Balfour, 2017). In the following year after the Brexit referendum, French presidential election was held and before actual election took place the polls indicated that leader of rightwing populist Marine Le Pen will most likely make it to final two round elections and the poll was right that it turns out Marine Le Pen made it to final second round of 2017 presidential election but lost to Macron, as Le Pen gained 33.9% votes and Macron with 66.1% votes. During her campaign, Marine Le Pen pledged to withdraw from the eurozone and to hold a referendum on EU membership within six months of taking office (Archick, 2017, p. 6). However, even though she lost to Macron yet it demonstrates that right-wing populist like FN has intended to undermine international institution like EU. Likewise, Geert Wilders also vowed to pull the Netherland out of the EU and drop the euro if he is elected, as James Traub notes. What is most worrisome and dangerous in Europe is the increasing rise of populism in both national and European parliaments. It is evident that in the era of globalization the relations between domestic and international politics has become interdependent as external issues have affected and become relevant in home and domestic issues have shaped foreign policy decision which affect international politics. So the crises caused by populism in the national level will impact directly to EU and its foreign policy. In recent year, we have seen populism in Hungary and Poland, nationalist governments with authoritarian aspirations coming to power notably, Fidesz in Hungary lead by Viktor Orban, the current Prime Minister, who just got elected for the third term in 2018 election and PiS of Poland a ruling government since 2015 44 pg. election. likewise, in the France, Germany, Austria, Netherland and other European countries, populist parties are gaining popularity and political influence. For instance, Finns Party in Finland became the second strongest party by winning 38 seats out of 200 seats in national parliament in 2015 election and most astonishingly, Fidesz-KDNP coalition gained 133 of 199 seats in 2018 election, followed by another right-wing Jobbik with 26 seats. In the international level, populists are visible in European parliament as the right-wing populist parties gained more parliamentary seats. In 2014 European parliament election, eurosceptic parties increased their seats from 121 (15.8%) to 174 (23.3%) out of 751 seats (Mazarr, et al., 2017). According to the results of the 2014 European election published by European Parliament, UKIP gained 24 seats in EU parliament, FN with 23 seats, M5S and LN both combined won 22 seats, PiS with 19 seats, Fidesz-KDNP with 12 seats, AfD with 7 seats, and PVV holding 4 seats, respectively. Thus, the increasing numbers of seats hold by populists in EU parliament will potentially disrupt the European integration by blocking progress especially in decision making and cooperation as EU require a wide consensus. Predominantly, the Brexit and Donald Trump taking over White House in 2016 has raised fundamental questions about the prospect of international organization and further integration, especially, the future of EU, UN, NATO and other international institutions. Aside from UN and EU, sometimes populists in power tend to be harsh with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that criticize them. For instance, Viktor Orban in Hungary and PiS of Poland have gone out of their way to try to discredit 45 pg. NGOs as being controlled by outside powers and declare them foreign agents (Muller, 2016). 4.2.2. The Rule of Law and Human rights Fundamentally, the rule of law, as Jeremy Waldron, a professor of law and philosophy said, “it brings to mind a particular set of values and principles associated with the idea of legality,” thereby these set of values and principles are required to be complied by government officials, lawyers, and individual citizens. The rule of law is enforced to constrain the misuse of power exercised by government and officials, and it is not just about government but it also requires individual citizens to respect and comply with legal norms. International law defines the legal responsibilities of states in their conduct with each other, and their treatment of individuals within state boundaries. These concerns comprises wide range of international issues such as human rights, refugees, migration, national conflicts, and so forth (United Nations, n.d.). According to the United Nations, all human beings have the right to be treated with equal dignity and respect and these equal treatments of respect and dignity should be protected through the rule of law. Hence the rule of law is framed based on the international human rights framework, together with international humanitarian law, and international refugee law. Particularly, the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) is the prime law in promoting and protecting all human rights, as it states, “where it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law. Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedom set forth in this Declaration, 46 pg. without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.” Thus, the international order embraced by the international institutions such as UN and EU is rule-based. However, the populists have taunt and violated the international legal order set forth by the UN, EU and other international institutions. As Eric Posner, an American law professor at the University of Chicago Law School notes that a populist backlash around the world has targeted international law and legal institutions. He argued, populists see international law as a device used by global elites to dominate policymaking and benefit themselves at the expense of the common people. Populism poses a threat to international law and order because international law is rule by established technocracy, while populists see established elites as corrupt and direct their exasperation to them. This was demonstrated in their rhetoric as populists frequently blame foreign influences and international institutions for the nation’s problem. Populists often explicitly contend that they are not bound by the constitutional and legal order but by the popular will. Populists on the left argue that the law is used to preserve and enhance the wealth and power of the elite, while those on the right contend that the law is manipulated by outsiders and criminals to the detriment of the people (Houle & Kenny, 2015, pp. 4-5). For instance, in recent years populists have targeted EU, IMF, and the International Criminal Court by mocking and downgrading international legal norms, including human rights law (Posner, 2017). To substantiate the case, in recent year, President Trump repeatedly criticized the news media such as CNN, and The New York 47 pg. Times for reporting and called reporters truly dishonest people. President Trump also attacked judges and the courts for rulings he disagree with. For instance, he attacked District Court Judge William Alsup for ruling against his administration as the court blocked his decision to end the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA). He tweeted, “it just shows everyone how broken and unfair our court system.” On October 31st, 2017, when a terrorist attack happened in Manhattan, Donald Trump criticized the judicial system calling the courts a “joke” and a “laughingstock”. In another account, soon after his presidency, Trump attacked on courts and judges when a federal judge in Hawaii temporarily blocked enforcement of the order of banning six countries from entering US. He made number of tweets by attacking judges, questioning the authority of federal courts, suggesting the court is biased and suggesting that the judges and court system would be to blame for future terrorist attacks. He also accused U.S. District Court Judge Curiel as biased when judge Gonzalo O. Curiel’s ordered lawsuit against Trump University. He said, “I’ve been treated very unfairly by this judge. Now, this judge is of Mexican heritage, I’m building a wall” (New York University School of Law, 2017). In parallel to Trump’s criticism, Dutch right-wing populist leader Geert Wilders called Tweede Kamer (house of representatives) a “fake parliament” with “fake politician”, as Jan Werner Muller notes. In Hungary and Poland, both Fidesz and PiS immediately dismantle key democratic institutions like the free media (Eiermann, Mounk, & Gultchin, 2017), moved against the independence of courts and procedures of existing courts as they amended and appointed new judges. Here, there is a gesture of authoritative rule, as previously reshaping of the entire system proved difficult, 48 pg. especially in the case of Poland so far, but now reshaping of judiciary demonstrate acceptance for governing party. In a similar case, in Hungary, the new constitutionalism used constitutions to set up conditions for the continuation of populist power, all in the name of the idea that they and only they represent the single constitutionalizing will (Muller, 2016). The core trait of the populism is “us vs them” as they differentiate “us” as pure and “them” as corrupt and foreigners. Hence, populists demonstrate the features of nativism as they considered society as homogenous and despise pluralism and diversity. Intrinsically, they are illiberal and use nationalistic sentiments to gain votes. As Cas Mudde rightly pointed out that populist radical right politicians like Marine Le Pen and Donald Trump profit more from their nativist positions on Mexicans or Muslims, as well as their authoritarian positions on crime and terrorism, as from their populist positions on “the elite” or “the establishment.” Likewise, right-wing populists, like FN or the FPO have mainly profited from the so-called refugees crisis of 20152016. It is clear that populists like Donald Trump, Viktor Orban, Geert Wilder, and Le Pen embrace mono-culturalism over multiculturalism, national interest over international cooperation and development aid, closed borders over free movement and traditionalism over progressive and liberal social values (Inglehart & Norris, 2016). For instance, Trump’s rhetoric manifests a mix of racial resentment, intolerance of multiculturalism, isolationism, nationalistic sentiments, misogyny and sexism, xenophobic, discrimination, and anti-Muslims. To substantiate this case, for example, in one of his speech he called Mexican immigrants as criminal and rapist and he even 49 pg. threatened to build walls near the border of US and Mexico and pressured Mexican government to pay. Not surprisingly, in January, 2017, executive action called for the construction of a multibillion dollar U.S.- Mexican border wall, detention facilities near the border and directed that 5,000 additional Border Patrol agents to be hired (Chan, Weber, & Foo, 2017). Consequently, he dispatched troops near US-Mexico order to tighten the security. However, the most surprising executive order he called forward is, signing an executive order temporarily banning immigrants and refugees from seven Muslim-majority countries namely, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Libya, Sudan, Somalia and Yemen. Reaction to this banning, Cecillia Wang, a deputy legal director at American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) comments, “travel ban targeting people from six Muslim-majority countries violates the U.S. Constitution by discriminating on the basis of religion.” He has not only violated the U.S. Constitution but also the refugee law amended by United Nations. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) it states, “respect for the rule of law and human rights forms the essence of the protection of refugees, returnees and stateless persons.” The office of UNHCR mandates, “human beings shall enjoy fundamental rights and freedoms without discrimination and assure stateless person the widest possible exercise of these fundamental rights and freedoms” (UNHCR, n.d.). Following his executive order to ban six countries, he proposed to cap the number of refugees admitted to the United States in the coming of 2018 at 45,000. The refugee ceiling has never been set below 67,000 since the amendment of Refugee Act in 1980, according to a report by Reuters. His anti-Muslim sentiment become sizable when he commented “I think Islam hates us” and in one interview, he said, “You look at the migration, it’s young, strong men. 50 pg. We cannot take a chance that the people coming over here are going to be ISIS affiliated.” In Europe, especially, in eastern and western region, extreme right-wing populists are notably well known for opposing immigration as their main concern is primarily immigration and refugees mostly coming from Middle East such as Syria where internal civil war is going on for seven years but these concerns are not necessarily set forth by all populist, especially left-wing populists as they tend to be more inclusive. The following figure 7 will show the difference between left wing and right wing populists respondents in support of the refugee relocation policy. This figure is extracted from the report published by European Policy Centre in 2016. Figure 7 Difference between left-wing and right-wing respondents in support of the refugee relocation policy (Source: European Policy Centre, Migration Policy and the 2015 refugee influx, 2016) The above mentioned graph clearly shows that, left-wing populists are more inclusive in terms of welcoming refugees than right-wing populists as they are exclusive and against immigrants. Especially, left-wing populist, Podemos in Spain and SYRIZA in 51 pg. Greece supports European migration policy, in contrast, right-wing populists like FN, and PVV are extremely against immigrants. The populists’ sentiments are often displayed in the form of euroscepticism, nativism, racism, xenophobia, prejudice, islamophobia, and ethnic exclusionism. They often exploit majority of people’s fears by politicizing the increasing Islamist terrorism, especially as some disaffected Muslim youth across Europe-radicalized by the Islamic State-have joined and returned from the war in Syria. As populists considered society as homogenous, often they discriminate minority that does not belong to majority ethnic or religion. For example, the FN took a strong stance in the debates about Muslim women concealing in public in France and imposing Muslim values on French society (Mazarr, et al., 2017). Geert Wilder, a leader of PVV said that he is the only one who dares to say what millions of Dutch people think-that refugees are not welcome in the Netherlands and that the borders should be closed. On 31 January, 2005, he gave a speech in Rotterdam and he stated, “Every week airplanes arrive at Schiphol airport coming from Turkey and Morocco with new immigrants with no perspectives. It would be good if the return flights also had some passengers. In a similar rhetoric, Haider, a leader of Austrian FPO party claimed that the identities must be preserved and kept pure. What he meant is the Austrians should not be mixed with other members of society (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2011). In Eastern Europe, where there is less immigration from within or outside Europe, indigenous minority groups such as Muslims, Jews, and Roma are targeted in a similar fashion. Consequently, these minorities join immigrants as scapegoats for unemployment and economic challenges but they are blamed by populists for taking 52 pg. advantage of the welfare system without adequately paying into it (Mazarr, et al., 2017). So it is not only immigrants that are targeted but also their own people, people who belongs to minority ethnically, culturally or religiously. The Countries like Hungary, Poland and other few EU members defied the European Court of Justice (ECJ) when ECJ dismissed their legal challenge to the quota system. According to the European Union’s migration policy (the quota system is backed by a majority of EU leaders) that was implemented in 2015, members are supposed to accept the relocation of 120,000 migrants and other asylum seekers from Greece and Italy and all members should accept under a compulsory quota but Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Czech Republic, and Romania refused to take in migrants under a quota system. Instead, Viktor Orban called the quota system as a controversial referendum and he also criticized Chancellor Angela Merkel for opening borders for Muslim migrants and refugees fleeing from Syria, Iraq and other Middle Eastern countries. He went even further by claiming that all terrorists were migrants (Balfour, et al., 2016). According to a report published by European Policy Centre, UKIP, FN, FPO, PVV, VB, and LN favor tough measures to block immigration, control the free movement of people within the EU, criminalize irregular migration, expel resident migrants if they commit crimes, and abolish family reunification in the name of the ‘multicultural demon’. Particularly, Finns Party and AfD wanted to limit or exclude immigrants from welfare provisions. Since the 2015 migration and refugee influx, these migration issues have given profound effect on EU integration as most of the populists clash with EU’s policies (Balfour, et al., 2016). 53 pg. 4.2.3 Economic Order Economic order, in western perspective it refers to an open and free exchange of goods and services in the international arena. Thus, the key element of liberal economic order is openness, by removing all the artificial barriers such as tariffs for the free flow of goods and services, capital, technology, and knowledge. In other words, liberal economic order can function only if globalization is closely part of the international order as they are inevitably linked together. Since the formation of international economic institutions such as World Bank in 1944, IMF in 1945, and WTO in 1995 and subsequent multilateral agreement such as GATT, TTIP, TPP and NAFTA, they were preeminent in practicing, maintaining, and functioning of the liberal international order. In fact, open and free exchange of goods and services and multilateralism has brought world closer and produced deeper integration regionally and globally. Consequently, free and open international trade has facilitated economic growth and encouraged the flow of knowledge and technology (Ikenberry, 2018). The United States, the chief creator of economic order has exerted its effort to open the world economy by embracing liberalism, a free trade that was essential for economic growth and stability. Simultaneously, Western European countries followed this economic order, especially United Kingdom, Germany and France and enhanced economic growth and stability under the auspices of EU. However, now liberal economic order is under attack by the populists as there is clear evidence that they fear of globalization. The most conspicuous infringement of free trade done is by the right-wing populist Donald Trump. As Jordi Bacaria, a director of think tank, Barcelona Center for International Affairs, expound, “during his campaign, Donald Trump threatened to leave the WTO and as president he has 54 pg. proposed ignoring the organization’s rules.” Right after he took office in the White House, he signed an executive order to withdraw from TPP, an agreement signed in 2016 comprising of twelve countries, representing 40% of the world GDP. The TPP was designed to deepen economic ties by reducing tariffs and fostering trade between twelve nations bordered near the Pacific Ocean. He also threatened to pull out of NAFTA, a trilateral agreement signed by Canada, Mexico and the United States. The trilateral trade bloc came into force in 1994 with an aim to eliminate barriers to trade and investment. His isolationist and protectionist policies become more translucent when he imposed tariffs on imported solar panels and washing machines. The tariff for solar panel is levied at 30% and for washing machine, 20% tariff is levied on the first 1.2 million imported large residential washers in the first year and a 50% tariff above that number (The Guardian, 2018). The most recent backlash against free trade by Trump is the imposition of tariffs on Steel and Aluminium. He signed an order imposing 25% on steel and 10% on aluminium (Canada and Mexico are exempted), undermining the international trade, dismantling multilateralism and opening door for a trade war. Not surprisingly, China reacted to Trump’s protectionism policy by increasing tariffs on consumer goods such as pork and fruits. The EU has also said they will take action against the Trump’s tariffs before a WTO dispute panel (Alden, 2018). Subsequently, this trade retaliation has created tensions between the world’s two largest economics. Trumpism is now the most predominant example of right wing populism. His rhetoric “America First” and “Make America Great Again” revealed protectionist policies that eventually will lead to unilateralism and hence, breaking down multilateral institutions and agreements (Bacaria, 2017). 55 pg. The ideological difference between left-wing and right-wing is, left-wing populists are the critique of international trade, an anti-neoliberal and anti-globalization, whereas right-wing populists tend to favor economic nationalism (Balfour, et al., 2016) but however, both right and left claim globalization as the source of inequality and the failure to distribute the benefits of trade. The right-wing virtually blame immigrants for taking jobs and all other social benefits. Thus, they breed the nationalistic sentiments which in turn, affect integration processes and opening up to trade through trade and investment treaties (Bacaria, 2017). For instance, populists in Europe are against the TTIP, a bilateral trade agreement between the EU and the United States to bring down trade barriers and promote trade and multilateralism. In fact, Marine Le Pen argues that TTIP threaten the sovereignty of EU member states and promised to unite with parties on the left to fight and block TTIP. In a similar way, Nigel Farage of UKIP said, “I do not believe that the EU should be negotiating trade for us under any circumstances.” It is not only right-wing populists that are critical of TTIP but also left-wing like SYRIZA who is also very suspicious of TTIP. They claim that they will use its parliament majority to sink TTIP (Michalopoulos, 2015). Since both left and right populists make quarter of the current European Parliament, at the EU level, they voice concerns, and push for amendments and negotiation of TTIP (Balfour, et al., 2016). They are also the critique of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), an agreement between Canada and the EU member states with the aim to eliminate tariffs between them. Another example of economic nationalism is, according to the European Policy Centre report, Netherland could jeopardize an EU agreement called the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTA), an agreement between EU and Ukraine 56 pg. with the purpose to create a single market for non-EU member countries, because the right-wing populist call for referendum regarding the acceptance of DCFTA despite Dutch Parliament approving it but according to Dutch law, any group that able to secure at least 300,000 signatures is legit to ask for referendum and surprising PVV able to gather 440,000 signatures on internet blog (2016). 4.2.4 Security Order The security order is the core reason for establishing the liberal international order to make sure 30 years of war would never happen again and it was to be based on the rule of law and respect for countries’ sovereignty and territorial integrity (Hass, 2018). As Hans Kundnani, a Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States affirms, “it is an order in which what states can and cannot do is not simply determined by power. Rather, international law constrains the action of states.” Hence, institutions were built to promote peace such as the United Nations, United Nations Security Council, EU, and NATO and thereafter, other international laws and agreements came into force namely, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Paris climate agreement and to name few. These international organizations like NATO were constructed for the security cooperation and democratic stability. For the last 70 years, the United States was the focal point of helping to maintain stability in regions and promoting security cooperation. However, as Ikenberry said, “today, after 70 years of liberal international order, the United States has elected a president who is actively hostile to liberal international law, trade alliances, multilateralism, climate treaty, and human rights.” And in Europe, especially, Hungary and Poland has elected authoritarian populists who are also hostile 57 pg. to international order. Thus, the rise of populism in Europe and the United States has generated a doubt about the role and vibrancy of NATO. There are multiple of signs that the United States might withdraw its support for alliance as Trump repeatedly called NATO “irrelevant and obsolete” and refused to endorse, instead ask other members to pay more. Not only was he skeptical about NATO but also he was very skeptical about Paris climate agreement. On June, 2017, he announced that the U.S. will withdraw from Paris climate accord. He stated, “The bottom line is that the Paris accord is very unfair at the highest level to the United States and further argued, “it is simply the latest example of Washington entering into an agreement that disadvantages the United States to the exclusive benefit of other countries, leaving American workers – who I love – and taxpayers to absorb the cost in terms of lost jobs, lower wages, shuttered factories, and vastly diminished economic production” (Cama & Henry, 2017). In Europe, Marine Le Pen praised Trump for calling NATO obsolete and emphasized pushing France for independence from NATO as she feels the previous ruling parties have failed to put France first and instead put Europe first (Schrank, 2017 ). Trump’s absence of leadership and lack of commitment and enthusiasm for NATO and its alliance has left space for NATO members to take charge of its defense without them. Thus, Europe’s defense policy shifts toward Russia. This is clearly visible when both side of populists notably, FN, FPO, AfD, Jobbik, LN, M5S, PVV, UKIP, Fidesz, SD, Podemos, and SYRIZA favors Russia and rally against Americanism. For instance, M5S is skeptical of the US and wants America to leave its military bases in Italy, according to European Policy Centre report. In France, anti-Americanism and antiNATO rhetoric is often used by FN, as Marine Le Pen denounces the logic of Euro- 58 pg. Atlantic integration in favor of an exit from NATO. However, as an alternative, she proposes a “Europe of Nations” and wants to offer Russia a strategic alliance based on a military and energy partnership. On November 2015, When there was attack in Paris, Le Pen criticize the domestic and foreign policy failures of Hollande and his predecessor, and argued that France should join forces with Russia to solve the Syrian Conflict. In a similar fashion, populists like Viktor Orban, LN leader Matteo Salvini, and Nigel Farage has expressed their admiration for Putin’s leadership and Matteo Salvini even said Russia represents the future. The relationship between Putin and populists in Europe has become so close that Putin is able to influence European politics. For instance, there are many reports that alleged Russia of providing financial support to populist parties and it turns out that FN received 9 million EUR loan from a Russian bank (Balfour, et al., 2016). As Rosa Balfour and his co-authors said, “some populists find Putin’s positions appealing because they share similar enemies EU, US and liberal order.” 59 pg. CHAPTER 5 Conclusion This paper has ventured to unfold the impact of the rise of populism in Europe and the United States on liberal international order. Initially, this paper tries to analyze the nature of populism to reveal their distinctive peculiarities in order to assess their actions and the impact they release. The rise of populism in contemporary era is the new political trend in Europe and the United State. The 2015 unprecedented influx of refugees and immigrants was the main force that gave space for populism to evolve and participate in national and European Parliament. Today, mainstream political parties face challenges from the populists as well as from their own people. In fact, populists became a blocking force for mainstream parties and least to say, few populists became an alternative choice for people, especially in Eastern and Southern Europe. They tend be skeptical of European integration, international institutions and are against immigrants and particularly the right-wing populist construct people as homogenous and discriminate others of different race, ethnic and religion. They often express xenophobic, racist, islamophobic, and prejudice view and tend to be exclusionary as they differentiate “us vs them” means “pure people vs corrupt elites.” For instance, in the United States, Donald Trump is against Mexicans and Muslims and in Europe, populists are against immigrants from Middle East, especially people from Syria. At the current stage, right-wing populists are predominantly benefiting from refugee crisis and they even run the government, for example, Fidesz of Hungary is leading the government, PiS of Poland is also leading the government, FPO of Austria is in coalition with major party, OVP and other right-wing populists are gaining popularity. Whereas, left-wing populist are not prominent as right-wing but in Southern 60 pg. Europe, especially in Greece, SYRIZA is leading the government and Podemos of Spain is the second largest party. Usually, Left-wing populist are against globalization and austerity measures and unlike right-wing populists, they tend to be inclusive and accept other members of society. What is most astonishing is the number of eurosceptic in European Parliament has increased, according to Rand Corporation report, a global policy Think Tank, the eurosceptic parties’ seats increased from 121 to 174 of 751 seats, occupying quarter of EU parliament. Hence, EU face challenges in making quick decision as populists often block EU’s decision and implementation of policy. There is clear evidence that populist parties like FN, UKIP, Fidesz, PVV and SYRIZA are skeptical of TTIP, CETA, and DCFTA which EU initiated as bilateral between EU and other non-EU countries. In fact, populists push forward for amendments and renegotiation and even threatened to sink these trade agreements, particularly, PVV called forward for referendum in Netherland regarding DCFTA acceptance. Another example is the American right-wing populists Donald Trump who attacked every single elements of liberal international order, beginning from international institutions to rule of law, human rights, economic order and security order, often criticizing and threatening them. For instance, soon after he took office, he signed an executive order to withdraw from TTP and thereafter, he withdraw from Paris climate agreement, calling TTP and Paris accord as the disadvantage for Americans. He also attacked judiciary system and media calling judge as Mexican heritage and biased and criticizing media such as CNN and New York Times. In Europe, Geert Wilder called Dutch parliament a fake parliament and PiS and Fidesz both tighten the control of media. 61 pg. What threatens the most to international institutions is the undermining of security cooperation and alliance. 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