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Agreement on new law gives green light to local elections

Last minute agreement on a new election law means that local elections will go ahead on schedule next year. The electoral register will be updated in May, when the rainy season is finished, and local elections can take place any time between July and September.

The elections in the 33 cities and towns are now seen by all parties both as important in their own right and as an important pilot experience for 2004 national elections. The 33 municipalities include one-quarter of Mozambique's population.

The first local elections in 1998 were not taken seriously, but all parties now realise that municipal councils and elected mayors have real power and some resources, and can play an active role in local development. People are increasingly comparing the piles of rubbish in Maputo to the clean streets of a municipality like Maxixe and realising that a competent local administration can make a difference to the living conditions of local people. The best municipalities really are promoting local initiative and stressing local priorities in a way that does not happen with administrators sent in from central government.

At the same time, politicians are learning for themselves the experience of other countries – that

local government provides jobs, management experience and political training.

Local elections will also provide an important testing ground for national elections in 2004. For Frelimo, the question will

be if voters simply follow the same party lines as in national elections, or if particularly good local administration, as in Nacala and Dondo, wins votes in strong opposition areas. For Renamo, for the small parties, and for independents such as Raul Domingos, this will be an opportunity to build party machines, to test the potential for alliances and coalitions, and to test how much support can be generated by concentrated political activity.

Renamo seems likely to win at least a dozen municipalities (see page 6), which will provide the first experience in Mozambique of Frelimo giving up at least limited power in some parts of the country. Frelimo is reported to be already training some local party cadres on how to be in opposition. For Renamo, it will be its first taste of having to deliver services rather than simply oppose and block.

At the last minute

Dhlakama accepts more independent electoral process

At the last possible minute, Renamo president Afonso Dhlakama ended an 18-month long confrontation over election laws by accepting a substantial concession on offer from Frelimo. Changes to the National Election

Inside

Law changes	pages 2,3
Cities with close contests	page 6
Montepuez	page 7
Books	page 12

Changes to the CNE and STAE

- The National Election Commission (CNE, *Comissão Nacional de Eleições*) serves at all times, not just during election and registration periods.
- The CNE president is nominated by civil society and selected by a secret ballot of other CNE members. (Previously the President of Mozambique named the CNE president.)
- The Technical Secretariat for Electoral Administration (STAE, *Secretariado Técnico da Administração Eleitoral*) is under the independent CNE rather than being part of government. The job of director-general is to be advertised.
- The CNE will have 19 members – the president, 2 vice presidents named by the main parties, and 16 others selected by the parties in parliament in proportion to their number of seats. (Previous CNEs had 21 members in 1994, 9 in 1998 and 17 in 1999.)
- The CNE must rule within 48 hours on any protest over decisions taken at lower levels.
- If any protests are made against the CNE over the final count, the CNE must provide all documents requested to help the complainant formulate their case. (This change follows complaints that documents on excluded polling stations were not made available in 1999.)
- There are to be provincial, district and city election commissions with 9 members – a president nominated by civil society, 2 vice presidents and 6 ordinary members. These commissions serve only during election and registration periods. STAEs also exist at these levels.
- Senior government and party figures, local government officials, directors of state companies and anyone nominated to a post by the President or Prime Minister cannot be election commission members at any level.

One thing retained from 1999 is that during the election and registration periods, the two main parties have the right to nominate deputy director-generals to national STAE and to name technicians to work within STAE.

Commission (CNE, *Comissão Nacional de Eleições*) and the Technical Secretariat for Electoral Administration (STAE, *Secretariado Técnico da Administração Eleitoral*) will make the electoral process much more independent of government (see box above)

A parliamentary ad hoc commission to revise the electoral laws had been deadlocked since early last year. The dispute crystallised around Renamo's demand that all decisions relating to the electoral process be taken by consensus, or at least that Renamo have the power to veto any decision. Discussion on other changes in the law was largely blocked by Renamo in an attempt to force acceptance of this demand.

A special session of parliament (*Assembleia da República*) was called for mid-September, to approve the law changes in time to hold local elections next year. But when the session opened, the ad hoc commission reported that it had no agreed proposal. Negotiations during the week were unsuccessful.

Suddenly, in the late afternoon of the final day of the special session, Friday 20 September, Maximo Dias, a prominent member of one of the small parties in the Renamo-União Eleitoral coalition, announced that agreement was possible. Talks continued into the late evening, with Renamo members of parliament in regular telephone contact with Dhlakama.

In the end, three laws were agreed – on the CNE, on registration, and on local elections. Only the CNE law has significant changes. Registration and electoral procedures will be virtually identical to those in the past. Renamo asked two small changes which Frelimo readily agreed: that party delegates receive written copies of the results in each polling station (instead of making their own copy, as in the past) and that partial results be announced by each municipality. (Another law on 2004 national elections still needs to be agreed by early next year, but agreement on the CNE removes the main stumbling block.)

Dhlakama had come under growing pressure to agree a law, and not to boycott the elections as he did in 1998 and partially did in 1994 and 1999. The international community, including the local embassies, the international Christian Democratic movement, the Carter Center and the Electoral Institute of Southern Africa all brought the message that it was time to play the game and stop threatening to take his ball and go home and sulk. Internally, the small parties in Renamo-UE and Renamo activists at local level, who feel it was a mistake have boycotted the 1998 local elections, also urged Dhlakama to agree.

The donor community in Maputo is increasingly disappointed by Dhlakama's very centralised control of Renamo and by his lack of strategy and negotiating skills. By holding out for a veto, a demand he could never win, he wasted the opportunity to negotiate changes in the electoral law which might have been of more use to Renamo.

Local elections during July-September 2003

Following agreement on the new law, the election machine is moving into gear. Both Frelimo and Renamo promptly submitted their CNE nominations to parliament during the first week of the regular session in October. This should allow the CNE to begin work in November and choose a president in December, which would be sufficient to guarantee that registration and elections take place on time. But the CNE will have to move quickly to set dates, to organise its management of STAE, and then do the tenders and advertisements needed for both supplies and staff.

The next step is to update the electoral register, which should happen annually but which has not been

done since 1999. This can only occur after the rainy season, and António Carasco, the current STAE director, will propose to the CNE that this should take place from 20 April through 6 June. The existing register has been computerised and will be used as a basis for an update, which will also correct errors introduced during the computerisation. Registration will take place nationally, not just in the cities which are to vote. (A Renamo proposal for a totally new register was accepted by Frelimo but then dropped when Carasco publicly said it was unnecessary and donors said they would not pay.)

Carasco will also propose that elections should be held in the second half of September. But he admits that it would be possible to hold them as early as July, if the CNE wanted to.

In the period since the 1999 elections, STAE has concentrated on staff training and on the building and rehabilitating of facilities outside Maputo. However the lack of a CNE made it unwilling to tackle some of the most difficult problems, including computers. All three elections so far have seen delays and problems in the count caused by computer software. Nevertheless, STAE has made no changes to the software because it was unwilling to act without detailed party supervision. Renamo, in particular, is very distrustful of computers, and feels they have been used to cheat, even if it cannot figure out how.

CNE nominees

The new National Election Commission (CNE) will be quite experienced; eight of the 18 members have been on CNEs for previous elections.

The 10 Frelimo nominees to the CNE are: António Muacorica (CNE member in 1999), António Chipanga, Filipe Mandlate, José Grachane, Maria Angélica Salomão (member of all previous CNEs: 94,98,99), Paulus Gerdes, Percina Siteo (CNE 99), Rogério Utui, Rufino Nombora (CNE 94,98,99) and Isador Faztudo.

The eight Renamo nominees are: Francisco Marcelino (formerly José de Castro, and the only Renamo nominee to have been on all three previous CNEs), Tomé Fernando (CNE 99), Maria Joaquina Júlio Inácio (CNE 99), António Timóteo Mthini (CNE 99), Maria Joaquina Macuácuca (CNE 99), Isequiel Molde Gusse, Guimarães Mendes Lucas Júnior, and João José Cazonda.

Most organisations which had had computer problems would run a series of simulations and try to clean up the software and procedures before computers are used again for real. But STAE has no plans for simulations or software changes.

Changes to the local election law

The 2003 local election procedure will be almost identical to that of 1994, 1998 and 1999, but with these changes:

- As well as being posted on the door of the polling station, copies of results at each polling station are to be given to party delegates (previously delegates had to make their own copies, which caused problems for illiterate party monitors).
- At city, district and provincial level, copies of the results are to be given to parties, observers and press. During the adding up the results from individual polling stations, partial results should be posted at city, district and provincial levels.
- Partial results of municipal elections will be announced at municipal level within 72 hours of the polls closing. (Final results and assignment of assembly seats is done by the CNE.)
- Polling station staff as well as all of those involved in civic education and registration must be chosen via an open, public competition.
- Every polling station is to be supplied with a calculator, in an attempt to reduce the large number of errors in reports of the results.
- No electoral document can contain an alteration or correction (*rasura*).
- International as well as national non-party observation will be permitted. (In the past, national elections allowed both national and international independent observers, but local elections allowed only national observers.)

But two things which caused trouble in 1998 and 1999 are again not changed:

- All spoiled ballot papers (*votos nulos*) are reconsidered by the CNE. (More than 500,000 ballot papers were sent to Maputo in 1999, and it was suggested this rechecking could be done a provincial level.)
- Many polling station staff and other election workers, journalists, police, observers and even party agents will again be unable to vote, because people can only vote at the polling station where they are registered, even if they are assigned to work at a different polling station.

How will 'civil society' nominate the CNE head?

The presidents of the national and lower level election commissions are to be "proposed by civil society" and the other members of the election commission are to choose their president from those proposals by secret ballot. It is remarkable and, for Mozambique, unprecedented to give such a role to civil society. The idea comes from civil society and was taken up last year by Renamo as a way of making the CNE more independent.

But the law gives few guidelines on procedure. The election commission is to advertise for proposals, which must be submitted "by legally constituted civil society organisations" within 10 days for the CNE and 7 days for other election commissions.

There is no umbrella organisation for civil society, and no system exists yet to do this in an organised way.

The Movement for Peace and Citizenship (MPC, *Movimento pela Paz e Cidadania*) is one of the more broadly based civil society bodies, and it is moving to collect nominations. Although, like most national organisations, it is Maputo-based, MPC has begun a broad search for someone who reflects civil society outside Maputo. Meetings are being held in each provincial capital with representatives of six sectors of local civil society: religious, labour, mass organisations such as women and youth, advocacy, information, and professional. Each province will try to choose a single candidate for CNE president, and a national meeting will try to whittle down this list to three people, who will be submitted to the CNE. MPC hopes to be able to do this by the end of November.

In mid-2002 MPC ran four regional seminars on the election law and produced several suggestions for revisions in the law, which were presented to the ad hoc commission during the special session of parliament. Suggestions include:

- Lowering the barrier in national elections from 5% to 2% or 3%. (In national, but not local, elections, a party must gain at least 5% of the national vote to become eligible for parliamentary seats.)
- Election dates should be fixed by law.
- Voting should take place on only 1 day.

In addition, the conferences proposed that there should be established a National Council of Civil Society, as exists in South Africa and elsewhere, to allow civil society to take more coordinated actions.

Parties move quickly toward elections

In sharp contrast to 1998, all parties are taking local elections very seriously. At local level, Renamo is already electing short-lists of three candidates for mayor of all 33 municipalities. Renamo spokesman Fernando Mazanga said that the Political Committee will meet 15-20 November and will choose a candidate from each shortlist.

Local government in Mozambique

The 33 largest cities and towns, with one quarter of Mozambique's population, have elected local governments. These municipalities have substantial devolved powers and their elected governments should play a major role in local development. The remaining population is rural and lives in districts with appointed administrators. (See also page 8)

The mayor (*presidente*) is directly elected. Parties propose candidates and independents can stand. The local assembly is elected by proportional representation on a party list basis. In local elections (but not in national elections), local non-party citizens' groups can also put forward lists.

In most respects, municipal government reflects the structure and procedures of national government. The mayor picks a cabinet, whose members are known as *vereadores* and are responsible for sectors such as youth or street cleaning. As at national level, the President and cabinet hold the most power. Like the national parliament, local assemblies pass laws, approve the plan and budget, and monitor the work of the president and cabinet.

The municipal assembly elects its own president (speaker), and in several municipalities there have been conflicts between the president of the municipality (the mayor) and the president of the assembly (the speaker), even though both have been Frelimo.

The first municipal elections were held in 1998. Renamo and most small parties boycotted the elections, but citizens' lists and two small parties stood and won assembly seats in six municipalities: Maputo, Matola, Beira, Manhiça, Xai-Xai and Nacala.

Renamo has already made clear it will stand alone in local elections and that the Renamo-União Eleitoral parliamentary coalition with the 10 small parties will not operate at local level. Thus local elections are seen as a test on both sides – do the small parties and Renamo need each other, and how strong a showing can the small parties make. This will have an impact on 2004.

The 10 small parties met on 23 September and reached an agreement to stand together as the União Eleitoral in 2004 elections and to write a letter to Renamo president Afonso Dhlakama asking him to reconsider the decision to break up the coalition, at least for 2004.

At the meeting, the 10 decided it was foolish to compete with each other in 2003 and they agreed to try for joint local lists and a joint candidate for municipal president. Most of the small parties are active in only a few places, and local party activists will meet to try to determine which parties and candidates are strongest in each city, and try to select a candidate and list. But no formal mechanisms have been agreed to choose candidates, and it is admitted that it will require national

Election procedures in Mozambique

- Voting in local elections takes place on one day.
 - Each polling station (*assembleia de voto*) serves up to 1000 voters who are in one or two registration books. Where possible, a polling station is in a school classroom, and one school normally has several polling stations.
 - Each polling station functions independently, with its own staff of five (known as the *mesa*, meaning "table").
 - Only those who are already registered and are over 18 can vote. Each voter must show their voter's card or another identity document, and must be on the voters' roll.
 - There are two ballot papers, one for municipal president (mayor) and one with a list of parties standing for the local assembly. In a voting booth, the voter puts a cross or fingerprint in one box on each ballot paper, folds the papers, and deposits them in ballot boxes.
 - After voting, each voter dips their right index finger in indelible ink. Before voting, each voter shows their index finger to prove they have not already voted.
 - Party monitors (*delegados de candidatura*), independent observers and press are permitted to be in polling stations, but must be registered in advance by the CNE.
 - At the close of voting, each polling station immediately does its own count. Copies of the results are posted on the door of the polling station and given to each party monitor, which allows press and parties to do an independent count. (In many countries, ballot boxes are transported to central counting stations, which sometimes creates an opportunity for tampering with the ballot boxes. An immediate count in the polling station in the presence of party monitors and press sharply reduces the possibilities of fraud.)
 - Preliminary results are announced in each individual municipality.
 - Spoiled ballot papers (*votos nulos*) account for 5% to 10% of all votes. Every one of the tens of thousands of spoiled ballot paper is reconsidered by the National Election Commission (CNE), which in the past has accepted a significant portion as being valid. These are added to the preliminary results announced in each municipality, to give the final result, and assembly seats are then assigned.
- (National election procedures for 2004 have not been defined, but will be very similar to this.)

meetings and substantial horse-trading to ensure that all 10 party leaders are presidential candidates somewhere.

In Maputo, many of the small parties have already agreed to support Luis Loforte, the respected head of Radio Mozambique's technical department and FUMO's candidate for municipal president. Renamo may also support Loforte.

Lutero Simango, head of PCN, sees 2003 as a test for national elections: "if the opposition wants power in 2004, it must come together in 2003." And the small parties could win seats in parliament in 2004 if they stayed together. Simango adds, "local government will let the opposition prepare for power, because we can show people we can govern".

"But we have no capacity to invest in local elections," warns Simango. "Our biggest problem is lack of resources. We need money for car hire, for fuel, for communications." But there will be no donor money for parties in 2003, and if they are to succeed, they will have to learn to campaign on foot.

Raul Domingos moves toward party

For Raul Domingos, 2003 will also be a test. Independent citizens' lists can stand in local elections, and Domingos' organisation IPADE will surely put up candidates in Dondo and other municipalities in central Mozambique where he has support.

Domingos was Renamo chief of general staff during the war, and its chief negotiator in the 1990-1992 Rome talks. But he was expelled from Renamo in 2000 and set up an NGO, the Institute for Peace and Democracy (IPADE, *Instituto para a Paz e Democracia*). He and four others expelled from Renamo remain independent members of parliament, and have been negotiating with some of the small parties to leave the Renamo-UE coalition and join with the five independents to form a new parliamentary bench.

Domingos has made clear in recent statements that he will definitely form a new party, but it is unclear if this will occur before or after local elections.

Frelimo clearly hopes that Domingos and his party will stand in 2004, and take votes away from Dhlakama and Renamo in the centre of the county.

Donors lose interest

The donor elections working group has met only infrequently and donor interest in local elections and decentralisation has obviously waned. "Elections are off the donor radar" admitted one donor official.

Although there will be money for the 2004 national elections, donors expect Mozambique to largely fund the local elections from the state budget. There have been no government requests for donor funds, so few donors have money in their 2003 budgets. Nevertheless, UNDP, the European Commission and the Nordics are likely to find money for some of the costs of registration and running the local elections.

Close fights promised in Nampula, Quelimane

Nampula and Quelimane look likely to be the most intensely fought municipal elections, based on 1999 voting patterns. In that year, Renamo had a majority in 15 cities and towns and Frelimo in 18.

But only 7 of Renamo's municipalities can be considered "safe"; Frelimo could win the other 8 with a "swing" (change in vote) of 6% of the electorate. Winning Quelimane would require only a 3% swing.

Only 3 of Frelimo's municipalities are not safe; Renamo could take Nampula on less than a 3% swing and Tete on a 6% swing. Such swings are quite possible; Renamo had a tiny majority in Nampula in the 1994 national election and the swing to Frelimo in 1999 was 3%. Renamo can expect to win 2 provincial capitals and Frelimo 5, with the remaining 4 being contested. This pattern reflects the fact that Renamo did better in rural areas and Frelimo in urban areas in 1999, so Frelimo should win most municipal elections.

Local factors may also play a role. To win Nacala, Frelimo would need an 8% swing, but the present local administration has a very good reputation so such a swing is possible.

The table below looks at 1999 parliamentary results in the 33 municipalities, but needs to be treated with some caution, as districts for national elections do not correspond precisely to municipalities. In particular, many observers expect Renamo to win Montepuez, despite it appearing here as a "safe" Frelimo municipality.

1999 share of parliamentary vote in the the 33 municipalities

Renamo safe cities & towns		Contested cities		Frelimo safe cities & towns	
Milange	76% Renamo	Angoche	62% Renamo	Pemba	66% Frelimo
Lichinga	70%	Ilha de Moç.	60%	Manica	66%
Marromeu	68%	Mocuba	60%	Cuamba	70%
Nacala	66%	Gúruè	57%	Montepuez	71%
Monapo	65%	Chimoio	56%	Xai-Xai	73%
Beira	65%	Quelimane	56%	Maxixe	84%
Dondo	65% Renamo	Moçím Pr	54%	Inhambane	85%
		Catandica	52% Renamo	Maputo	86%
		Nampula	55% Frelimo	Matola	88%
		Moatize	55%	Vilanculo	89%
		Tete	62% Frelimo		
				Metangula	89%
				Manhiça	94%
				Chókwè	95%
				Mandlakazi	95%
				Chibuto	98% Frelimo

(Note: this data is only approximate, as national election data cannot be mapped precisely onto the municipal boundaries.)

Turnout in 1999 was 75%

Missing votes made no difference to national election

The turnout in 1999 was 75%, compared to the 68% announced by the CNE at the time, and President Joaquim Chissano won with 51.8% of the vote compared to the official 52.3%, according to a study by Javier Puyol, the former European Commission delegate, distributed just before he left in September.

The Supreme Court's decision of 4 January 2000 acknowledge that votes were not counted in the presidential election for 550 polling stations and in the legislative election for 727 polling stations, about 6.6% and 8.7% respectively of the approximately 8340 polling stations. The polling stations were excluded from the count because of errors on the report forms (*editais*) that could not be corrected, such as reports of more votes than there were ballot papers. Most were probably mistakes made in the middle of the night by exhausted polling station staff. Some of the excluded *editais* had unexplained erasures and corrections, according to the Court, and one change in the election law for 2003 makes it clear than no erasures or corrections are permitted.

Puyol looked back to provincial level and made an estimate of the votes lost by the two candidates if the missing polling stations followed the provincial average. This gives Dhlakama an extra 178,388

votes and Chissano an extra 138,749, still leaving Chissano with a comfortable majority of 51.8%. (The *Bulletin* of January 2000 estimated Chissano's actual majority as 51.3%).

Finally, Puyol notes that parliamentary seats are allocated on a provincial basis, so lost parliamentary votes should have made no difference to the allocation of seats.

An analysis by the *Bulletin* suggests that more polling station were excluded than the Supreme Court reported – probably 600 (7.2%) in the presidential election and perhaps 900 in the parliamentary election (10.8%), but even these extra votes would not have made much difference to Dhlakama and Renamo.

The worst affected provinces were Sofala, where 17.5% of polling stations were excluded from the presidential count, Nampula (11.3%), and Cabo Delgado (9.4%). One quarter of the polling stations in Nampula City, Beira and Buzi were not counted.

Will Maputo allow local efforts?

Reducing tensions in Montepuez

In Montepuez, site of the worst violence since the end of the war a decade ago, local people are successfully working to reduce tensions, despite distrust and interference from higher levels. On 9 November 2000 armed Renamo men attacked the town centre, and 10 people were killed; there was a wave of arrests and on 22 November 2000 nearly 100 of those arrested suffocated to death in an overcrowded jail cell.

Tensions between Renamo on one side, and Frelimo and the government on the other, remained very high, with both sides taking a hard line. Renamo could win local elections in Montepuez next year, so there is a real possibility of further violence.

The initiative began in May 2002, when the Centre for the study of Democracy and Development (CEDE – *Centro de Estudos de Democracia e Desenvolvimento*) sent a small team including the director, Brazão Mazula, to Montepuez to talk to a wide range of individuals. A public meeting was attended by 100 people.

There was a strong feeling that violence had been brought to Montepuez by outsiders. Renamo brought in people from other areas for its 9 November attack, then local people were jailed and killed by police and officials that people felt was not theirs. One person told the meeting: "If you want to bring peace to Montepuez, you need to start at the top. If there is anyone to pacify, it must be our leaders". And this has remained the problem throughout the process.

The public meeting also showed the continuing strong hostility between Renamo and Frelimo, and non-party members made clear that they expected the two parties to come to some agreement. One speaker said: "If you do not agree to live in peace, we will force you to."

Since November 2000 there had been no direct contacts between Renamo and Frelimo and the government. Alberto Paissene had just become the new Renamo district head (*delegado político distrital*) after being held in jail for more than year in connection with the 9 November attack. He expressed a reluctance to a direct meeting when, he claimed, Frelimo was attacking his members, the government was keeping some of his members in jail, and many people had relatives who had died in the jail. He challenged CEDE, saying he would only meet the other side if CEDE could arrange a meeting with the top people at local level and gain approval from his Renamo headquarters in Maputo. CEDE succeeded, gaining approval from Renamo president Afonso Dhlakama in early July and then setting up the meeting.

On 9 August there was a meeting on neutral ground, a Lomaco guest house, of the new district administrator Magido Ali, the major (*presidente do município*), the Frelimo district first secretary, Renamo district head Paissene, and the Renamo youth head. Although the meeting was initially tense with charges and counter-charges, the five eventually

reached a remarkable agreement which they all signed as a "minute" (*acta*) of the meeting (which was eventually published in the new newspaper *Zambeze* on 10 October).

The five agreed to maintain "an open and frank dialogue" and a "permanent search for dialog and reconciliation and concrete actions for confidence building". A key concession of the government side was that in the event of "any disturbances" the group would meet and reach consensus on the actions to be taken. A key concession on the Renamo side was to recognise and respect the institutions of the state. And the five agreed their should be joint celebrations on 4 October, the 10th anniversary of the Rome peace accord.

A mark of the new improved climate was that in the week after the meeting, the four others accompanied the administrator for the ceremonies to open a new village well, and the Renamo delegate served as translator for the administrator. This was the first time that Renamo, Frelimo and government had appeared in public together.

But the 9 August meeting almost did not happen. By coincidence, a delegation from the national parliament (*Assembleia da República*) and government were in Montepuez at the time. In Mozambique, visitors from Maputo and the provincial capital always have higher status than local officials. The visitors said they wanted to participate in the meeting, which was a hard request to refuse. The five held an extensive discussion, and unexpectedly declined, saying it was a local meeting to resolve a local crisis. Although the result was a successful meeting and signed minute, and a reduction of tensions locally, there were repercussions at higher levels – concern at local initiatives and a loss of central control has continued to perturb the process in Montepuez.

The next step was six seminars on peace and reconciliation on 16-26 August run by the Association for Rebuilding Hope (*Associação Reconstruindo a Esperança*). This was delayed for nearly a week because local Renamo officials, facing growing pressure from above, said they could not participate without permission from Maputo. This was granted after CEDE programme officer Guilherme Mbilana spoke directly to Dhlakama. More than 80 people participated in six seminars, all of which brought together Renamo, Frelimo, government and civil society.

But at the end of August Frelimo secretary-general and presidential candidate Armando Guebuza visited Montepuez, and was said to be angry with the signed minute. The local Frelimo first secretary, Arcanjo Cassita, was heavily criticised from having excluded the outsiders from the meeting and for having signed the minute

without permission from higher levels in Frelimo. But Cassita successfully defended his position.

The next joint meeting, on 11 September, involved 13 people, the original five plus church leaders and additional Frelimo and Renamo members. The meeting had a good atmosphere and agreed that the minute of 9 August was being carried out. Plans were beginning to be made for 4 October.

But the two sides also reported continuing tensions and fights. There was a long discussion over "credentials" which are still demanded by local officials such as neighbour secretaries from Renamo organisers trying to do political work. Such credentials should no longer be necessary, but after 9 August Renamo was sometimes asking for them and they were issued by the administrator. Renamo complained, however, that local officials were improperly demanding an unnecessary document as a way of impeding their work, and that fights had resulted. And the Frelimo first secretary admitted that "there are people who are not interested in us living together, and who think we have been bought."

Planning for joint celebrations went ahead, with care being taken to hold events in neutral places. But in the buildup to 4 October, positions hardened again. Senior Frelimo officials and the Prime Minister were in Montepuez. CEDE's idea had been to give the Montepuez celebrations a high profile, but senior Frelimo officials successfully put pressure on Brazão

Mazula and a diplomat from Maputo not to attend. Meanwhile, the Renamo provincial head went to Montepuez with hard-line officials and instructed the local delegate that there could be no joint events on 4 October. Renamo again brought in outsiders and the government sent in police reinforcements; by 3 October there was a fear of a repeat of 9 November 2000.

A day of intense negotiations and shuttle diplomacy brought agreement that there would be separate activities but that they would not conflict. There would be no marches (because these could lead to confrontations). Rallies would be well separated and held at different times so that neutral observers from CEDE could attend both sets of events.

The main victory was that, in the end, the day was peaceful. There were joint events, including football and a lunch which both Frelimo and Renamo attended.

For the mediators, the lesson of 4 October is that peace and reconciliation are possible in Montepuez – both only if provincial and national officials of both parties agree not to interfere.

One observer close to the Montepuez process commented: "Senior Frelimo officials seem to feel that this process only benefits Renamo. They do not realise that if they do not establish good relations with Renamo in Montepuez before the election next year, then if Renamo wins it will surely take revenge against Frelimo." (JH)

Government rejects increased local power

Plans for increased decentralisation and democratisation at local level, which were being widely discussed last year (see *Bulletin* 26), have been rejected by government. There will be no increase in the number of municipalities, and the proposed new law on "local state bodies" (*órgãos locais do estado*) largely maintains the present system of rigid hierarchies and tight central control. "Local state bodies" are provincial, district and lower level governments. The proposed law was approved by the Council of Ministers on 8 October and will go to parliament shortly.

The draft law makes clear that all officials respond upwards and there is virtually no requirement that officials pay any attention to the views of the people. An earlier draft of the law included a proposal for a consultative district council to include community leaders and representatives of local organisations, but this has been dropped.

This would have built on the experience of a UNDP project which created district consultative councils in Nampula. Various agencies are proposing similar councils in neighbouring provinces. But these will now remain aid agency linked, rather than becoming part of local empowerment.

An earlier draft would have made district administrators part of the formal provincial government, which would have encouraged contact with lower levels, but this, too, has been dropped.

The draft law makes few mentions of local people. Links are to be maintained with traditional authorities. The *chefe* of an administrative post (*chefe do posto administrativo*) is expected to "assure the link between the administrative authorities of the state and local communities", to "analyse complaints and

suggestions of citizens" and to "have public meetings to give information [and to] listen to local communities about their life."

At all levels, officials are expected to "promote the participation" of local communities and traditional authorities in development activities and in the solution of their problems. But in sharp contrast to the municipalities law, there is no suggestion that local people should have any power or any formal say in these activities.

This reflects a change in both donor and government thinking. Decentralisation was the fashion of the early 1990s. Donors pushed it and were an important support for those in government who wanted to decentralise. Donors have now shifted back to wanting central control of funds, through national budget support and SWAPs (Sector-Wide Approaches where donors join together at central level to set policy for health, agriculture, etc.). This, in turn, reinforced the view of those in Frelimo and government who oppose decentralisation.

This is also reflected in changes to the constitution. The 1990 constitution (art 185) said "local state bodies have the objective of organising participation of citizens in the solutions of their own problems and promoting local

development". The 1996 amendment to the constitution replaced this with "local state bodies have the function of representing the state at local level for administration and development."

The proposed law does *not*, however, encroach on the municipalities. It does formalise the legal responsibility of the governor for inspection, which is already in the municipalities law, but gives the governor no right to interfere except where there are violations of law. Indeed, the draft law says local state bodies must respect the autonomy of the municipalities and must coordinate their plans and programmes with the municipalities.

The proposed law will give local officials important powers over international NGOs and aid agencies working in their areas. Governors are to be given authority "to orient and accompany the conception and implementation of activities by agents of international cooperation in their province." District administrators will have the right to orient and accompany the implementation, but not the conception, of aid activities.

Following the experience of the 2001 and 2002 floods, governors and district administrators are to be given emergency powers in the event of disasters, including the power both to direct locally based military forces and to force the use of private resources for "civil defence".

Details of proposed law

In the era of democratic centralism, "local officials were the long arm of the President" explains the background document to the proposed law. While maintaining the concepts of centralised authority and hierarchy, local state officials are now to be seen in a more narrow way as "representing the central administration of the state".

Local officials direct a local government, inform higher levels of what happens at their level, take decisions which regulations devolve to them, and carry out orders and instructions from central government.

The law removes many of the arbitrary powers which were implicit in the old system. It gives governors and local officials broad powers to act "in the public interest in urgent exceptional circumstances" but requires that any such decisions be ratified and normalised afterwards.

The new stress on local state bodies as administrative leads to the creation of a new post at

provincial and district level of a "permanent secretary" who is responsible for the technical and administrative functions, and directs all areas of public administration. The governor and district administrator carry out the more political aspects and are responsible for planning and control.

The background document notes that the term "district administration" is used by the general public to mean administrative functions relating to documents, taxes, etc. The draft law reflects this, putting the new permanent secretary in charge of what the public calls the district administration, while trying to create a new and more active district government under the administrator.

The draft law maintains "the principle of double subordination". Provincial directors (for example of health and education) are named by line ministers in Maputo. They report to the governor and form part of the provincial government, but are expected to carry out national programmes, policies and regulations.

With a single exception, the law maintains the present policy that people do not appoint their own direct subordinates and at most can be asked for an opinion by a higher level making the appointment. The new exception, in a change in policy, is that ministers can only name provincial directors with agreement of the governor.

The draft law maintains the four present levels of local administration, with minor variations:

- **Province**, with a governor appointed by the president, who oversees a provincial government with a permanent secretary effectively appointed by the Ministry of State Administration (MAE, *Ministério da Administração Estatal*) without approval of the governor and provincial directors appointed by line ministries only with agreement of the governor.
- **District**, with an administrator named by MAE but reporting to the governor, who heads a district government with a permanent secretary and district directors named by the governor. District directors, for the first time, can be responsible for several areas covered by more than one ministry.
- **Administrative post**, with a *chefe* normally named by the provincial governor and reporting to the district administrator.
- **Locality**, with a *chefe* named by the governor and reporting to the *chefe* of the administrative post.

Provinces and districts will have their own budgets, under the new national budget system to be introduced next year.

Provincial governors and district administrators are also responsible for the police in their areas, but not for the court systems, which are independent.

Researcher questions reintegration success

The reintegration of demobilised soldiers in 1994 was less successful than donors claimed at the time, according to Chris Alden of the London School of Economics. Writing in the September 2002 issue of the academic journal *Security Dialogue*, Alden says that donors in their own evaluations in 1997 "found unanimously that former combatants had been fully reintegrated into society." But one-third of community leaders interviewed for his study in 2000 and 2001 said there was still a problem with demobilised soldiers.

Alden argues that AMODEG (*Associação Moçambicana dos Desmobilizados*) is the association of those who did not reintegrate, and its continued prominence is a measure of the failure of the programme. Another measure is the high crime levels, and he suggests “that the bulk of the leadership of criminal gangs operating in Mozambique today is drawn from the upper echelons of the former military.”

Training and reintegration programmes failed to reach two key groups: Renamo fighters who did not have even the minimum level of education to enter programmes, and on the opposite side higher ranking government officers who had significant education and skills, often acquired in the former socialist countries. This latter group considered it an insult to be given a “kit” of hoe, seeds and bucket and be expected to go to the rural areas.

In general, training programmes were of little use; a weak economy meant there were no jobs.

Alden also says that the success claimed for “traditional” ceremonies and reintegration processes is a myth. Donors liked the idea because such reintegration “is self-administering and entails virtually no costs for the international community.” Such “ceremonies” were often no more than parties used to welcome home migrant labourers, he writes.

Despite not being as effective as donors claimed, Alden accepts that the reintegration programme was a relative success, for two reasons. The ex-combatants wanted “to turn their back on the pursuit of war”, and the programme did provide them with a “generous subsidy” for 18 months, which allowed most of them to start a new life.

US agency claims

Renamo voters stay poor while Maputo elites squabble

“Voters in strong Renamo areas tend to be poorer than those in Frelimo areas, and little has been done to rectify the situation since 1992,” warns an article in the January 2002 issue of *Journal of Democracy*, the publication of the US-government-funded National Endowment for Democracy.

It is “ominous” that voting patterns continue to “mirror patterns of economic inequality”, writes Jeremy Weinstein. “As time passes, and little changes at the local level, it is possible that those Renamo supporters who once bore arms but grew weary of war may grow less weary, and conclude that their only avenue to political change lies outside the system, in the realm of force.”

“Rural Mozambicans are largely left out of national debates and structures. Competing elites from Frelimo and Renamo squabble in Maputo to advance their own respective agendas, and spare little time or attention for local party administration and other matters relating to ‘grassroots’ politics.”

Weinstein conducted his research in formerly Renamo-controlled areas, and he does not spare Renamo from his criticism: “even the local Renamo officials are almost totally ignored by the higher-ups who debate national politics in Maputo.”

“Deep cleavages threaten the future of Mozambique’s democratic transition [and] dramatic changes in the structure of Mozambique’s democracy are required,” he says. “The structure of Mozambique’s political system is uniquely *ill-suited* to the challenges ahead. It lacks the capacity to govern effectively.”

The problem is that “control is excessively centralized and top-down”, according to Weinstein. “A presidential system without any devolution of electoral power to local level only strengthens these subnational divisions, laying the groundwork for future conflict and instability.”

His answer is locally elected governors and district administrators. This would build local capacities of both parties, but particularly in the opposition, where local party organisation is “almost non-existent”. Clearly Renamo would win in many areas, but this “would help to preserve a fragile peace [because] a Renamo with some offices to its credit would be less tempted to believe that trying to force change from outside the political system could be preferable to another five years of near-total Frelimo dominance.” Electoral decentralisation would also “strengthen the hand of the rural majority.”

Weinstein partly blames donors which “focused too squarely on the idea of national presidential elections as a way of legitimating governments.” Donors invested too heavily in parliamentary training programmes which “have had almost no local effect”.

Weinstein shows humility in a comment on his own country’s democracy: “with a razor-thin margin of victory and arguments about the validity of certain ballots, the 1999 Mozambican elections were a sad foreshadowing of the events to come in the United States one year later.”

Praise for election administration & EU aid

“A comparison between elections in 1994, 1998 and 1999 shows that the implementation capacity of the electoral administration has grown each time and achieved a professional standard. At the same time, the role of the international community has decreased, both in financial terms and in terms of influence on the process management. Through its consistent and reliable participation, which rapidly developed over the past years, civil society has earned its place in the electoral process in Mozambique,” concludes an evaluation of European Union support to the 1999 national elections published in September 2002.

But the evaluators warn that “as unfortunately demonstrated by the post-election period, the [election] process, and the project, did not consolidate multiparty democracy and national reconciliation.”

The EU was by far the largest donor to the 1999 elections. The total cost of \$33 million was paid 40% by the EU, 35% by other donors, and 25% by government. The evaluation by Tamme Hansma and Jérôme Pons

assessed EU assistance as “satisfactory”. This is the second of four levels of EU evaluations: highly satisfactory, satisfactory, less than satisfactory and highly unsatisfactory.

One “less than satisfactory” area was “taking into consideration beneficiaries”. Project design concentrated on the national Technical Secretariat for Electoral Administration (STAE, *Secretariado Técnico de Administração Eleitoral*), and ignored civil society as well as provincial and district STAEs.

The project was considered “highly unsatisfactory” on gender. Too little was done to encourage women’s participation in civic education and registration and polling station staff.

The European Commission office in Maputo in general wins praise for acting rapidly and flexibly, but EU rules still caused problems. The report suggests “because of EU procedures, EU funding should be limited to the purchase of services or items that can be organised centrally. Expenses at the local level (such as rental of vehicles, maintenance, fuel, fees etc) must be left to the Government budget or to other donors with more flexibility.”

Money was wasted because donors imposed too complex accounting systems on STAE. A financial system introduced for the 1999 elections by an EU-contracted audit firm has not been used since because it “presupposed computer skills and an educational background that did not exist within STAE staff”. Instead “a simpler system is recommended, based on Microsoft Excel, and adapted to Mozambican administration rules”, in order to create a sustainable system.

STAE won praise for being “able to conduct a satisfactory electoral process” which was “a positive step towards strengthening the democratic system. ... STAE was perceived as not merely depending on the Government but as having substantial impartial support for its work”.

But STAE was also criticised for “a lack of organisation”. Recruitment of staff was late and a team spirit could not develop in time. A UNDP technical assistance team and EU auditors “faced tremendous difficulties in getting STAE staff focused on the work requirement when election was over.”

“Information sent to provinces was scarce” and STAE even failed to create a regular flow of information between departments in Maputo. Better communication between STAE central and provincial and district offices is needed, with e-mail at provincial level and radio between provincial and district offices.

In each election, temporary staff are hired and trained for district STAEs, registration, civic education and polling stations, but nothing is done to guarantee the recruitment of experienced people for future elections.

The usefulness of inexperienced UN volunteers (UNVs) is “questionable”, say Hansma and Pons.

• The European Commission’s Delegation to Mozambique now has a website with evaluations, including this one:

<http://www.delmoz.cec.eu.int/en/evaluation/evaluations.htm>

Awepa to train party cadres for 2003

AWEPA will hold capacity building seminars for political party cadres in preparation for local elections next year. The seminars will cover training in the electoral process and training for the post-election period. As well as basic material on multi-party systems and elections, the seminars will also cover topics such as monitoring elections and dealing with the media. For the post-election phase, the seminars will cover decentralisation, the powers of local governments, organisation and functioning of municipalities, and the financial systems of the cities and towns.

AWEPA’s *Mozambique Political Process Bulletin*, which has been published since the 1992 peace accord, will cover both the 2003 and 2004 elections. As we did for the 1999 national elections, on election day and during the counting we will field a team of Mozambican and foreign journalists and researchers to give the widest possible coverage of the election.

Mozambique-related books and reports

Moçambique: 10 Anos de Paz, edited by Brazão Mazula, CEDE (Centro de Estudos de Democracia e Desenvolvimento), Maputo: 2002. 523 pp.

Different positions on current debates in Mozambique on economy and democracy are presented in a book edited by Universidade Eduardo Mondlane rector Brazão Mazula, and published 30 October 2002.

Of course the book reflects the successes of 10 years of peace. But it also presents some strong warnings. Several writers point to continuing weaknesses in Mozambican democracy

Some writers note that rapid GDP growth is not being translated into development of the majority, and gaps between rich and poor are widening. Prakash Ratilal warns that the income of most people has not changed since the end of the war, and that peace cannot be built on poverty and growing inequality. Agricultural economist Isilda Nhantumbo points to the relative lack of success of Mozambican rural development in the past decade, and warns that without urgent action “Mozambique could celebrate a second decade of peace without the ordinary citizens feeling they are benefiting from development.”

A History of Postcolonial Lusophone Africa, edited by Patrick Chabal. Hurst, London: 2002. pp 339, UK£14.95.

Malyn Newitt’s 50-page chapter on Mozambique in this book is one of the best summaries and analyses of the post-independence period and should be required reading for anyone going to work in Mozambique. The main weakness of his excellent *A History of Mozambique* (Hurst 1995) was that he effectively stopped at independence, and this chapter elegantly fills that gap. As a historian, Newitt is particularly good at highlighting

trends, bringing together the economic and political, and linking domestic decisions to international politics. He is provocative in putting Renamo's war in the context of similar 19th century actions.

The Lusophone countries came to independence together as a result of independence wars which eventually ended fascism in Portugal. But their post-independence courses have been very different. Patrick Chabal compares Mozambique and Angola, and argues that Frelimo had a unity and coherence and "was the single legitimate voice of independent Mozambique", whereas the MPLA lacked legitimacy and coherence and had to fight for hegemony. The division of Angola's nationalists was not the result of ethnic divisions, "but rather the result of the inability of its elites to form a broad anti-colonial coalition. Conversely the unity of nationalist purpose in Mozambique was achieved against considerably larger odds." As a result, Frelimo could be flexible and pragmatic, "whilst the MPLA remained obdurately Stalinist." This, in turn, had an impact in the 1990s, with Renamo only wanting a place in a political order dominated by Frelimo, and Dhlakama only wanting "a share of the spoils".

Both Chabal and Newitt are caustic about foreign involvement. Chabal warns that in Mozambique "the constraints of structural adjustment are so severe as to jeopardise the very viability of the country". Newitt talks of Mozambique being "virtually a protectorate of the United Nations" during 1992-94 and being "under the yoke of the IMF" subsequently.

Mozambique and the Construction of the New African State, by Chris Alden. Palgrave, Basingstoke (England): 2001. pp 166, UK£ 45.

Alden's book costs three times as much and is less clear and less interesting than Chabal and Newitt (above). Alden looks at the "international intervention into virtually all aspects of Mozambican political and economic life" over the past 15 years, and warns of a growing gap between the actual situation and what international community claims it has achieved. He notes that "the international community's desire to identify with success in an otherwise beleaguered intervention record in Africa put it increasingly in a position as 'captive' of the exigencies of the Mozambican situation" including "the willingness to turn a blind eye to rise in corruption".

The book gives an overview of intervention from the mid-1980s, and arguments in the final chapter are provocative. But the book seems to have been written in haste and has a number of errors. To give two examples. Rural Mozambicans live on less than \$1 per day, not \$12 a day as he says (p 120). And he claims a Minister of Agriculture was jailed for 22 years (p 119), when the reference he cites says it was just a ministry official.

Probing the successful application of leverage in support of Mozambique's quest for peace, by Dirk Salomons, New York University, 2000. <http://www.intlmgmt.com/publicmanagement/mozambique.htm>

The Mozambican peace process is now seen as an almost unique success. But it did not look that way at first. Dirk Salomons was Executive Director of ONUMOZ, the United Nations peacekeeping operation in Mozambique, and this is his insider's view of the "inauspicious beginnings of OMUMOZ".

Incompetence and infighting in the New York UN Secretariat "nearly managed to destroy the momentum of the peace process", Salomons reveals. In the first six months, the UN secretariat would not release money, so offices could not be rented and telephones installed; cars could not be bought and in the end hiring cars cost more than buying new ones. At first, no country except Italy provided soldiers. "ONUMOZ's administrative and political weakness fed straight into the resistance within both government and Renamo against the peace process."

The failure of the UN led to cynicism by the two parties. Renamo began to boycott the process. In April 1993 some government military officers who were pocketing a substantial part of the \$240 million per year military budget planned a coup. Salomons says the coup was averted when US Ambassador Townsend Freidman approached the military through informal channels, and told them if they staged a coup all aid would cease, and it was aid which paid the army budget. Donors agreed to dramatically increase the final pay-out to officers, and the coup was cancelled.

As others, including UN Special Representative Aldo Ajello, have stressed, money was key. Salomons notes that Ajello's "astute use of flexible trust funds is a case in point: everyone has his price, and often that price is affordable". In addition, "the Italian ambassador, Manfredo Incisa di Camerana, repeatedly found essential money for things that auditors would not approve of, but that were crucial to keeping Renamo happy."

Salomons is critical of including the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (UNOCHA) as part of ONUMOZ. This "backfired: the UNDP Resident Representative and his staff, who had done an excellent job of running [emergency operations] basically washed their hands of the whole matter; if DHA wanted to take over, let them." Salomons argues that "conceptually as well this was an error"; UNDP is the UN aid presence in Mozambique which would continue after the peace process, and it proved "extremely difficult" to restore aid coordination when ONUMOZ finished.

Security and Development in Southern Africa, edited by Nana Poku. Praeger, London: 2001. 166 pp, UK£49.50 hb

The 1990s and the end of apartheid may have brought peace to southern Africa, but this has not brought security, according to this book. The threat is not military or external, but the unresolved problems of poverty and marginalisation.

"The region is quite literally being left behind in terms of the spoils of globalization. The promised advantages of economic restructuring as hailed by the leading international funding bodies at the beginning of the 1990s have not been borne out," say Nana Poku and Wayne Edge. "It is inescapable that the gaps between rich and poor have increased markedly", notes Stephen Chan,

while Poku argues that any hope that the benefits of globalisation "will eventually trickle down [is] an exercise in delusion." Structural adjustment has weakened states in the region, notes Maxi Schoeman. "Small, weak, debt-distressed states are a recipe for regional instability in the long run", warn Larry Swatuk and Peter Vale.

Faced with this crisis, instead of opting for regional solutions, national elites guard state sovereignty as a limited source of wealth and power, and liberal democracy in southern Africa has become little more than electing elites, Poku's authors find. "States in the region are sources of insecurity because they are 'predator' states that, through their control over their societies, have managed to extract wealth for the personal gain of state incumbents," conclude Anthony Leysens and Lisa Thompson. Fredrik Söderbaum goes further, and argues that "multiparty elections do not by themselves 'create' democracy, and as long as many of the political regimes remain authoritarian, centralistic, exclusivist and sometimes corrupt, the state-driven regional cooperation projects, including SADC ... will continue to serve authoritarian and militaristic, rather than democratic, interests."

Economic Change, Governance & Natural Resource Wealth: The Political Economy of Change in Southern Africa, by David Reed. Earthscan, London: 2001. 168pp. UK£15.95.

David Reed, director of WWF International's Macroeconomics Programme Office, argues that control of natural resources has simply been transferred to foreign companies and domestic elites. When southern African states controlled resources, often in the name of socialism, they wanted to extract maximum income to use for development projects. Now governments discard environmental restrictions to encourage foreign investment. Reed warns that "replacing state rent-seeking in natural resource sectors with private rent-seeking cannot provide the economic foundations" for development.

Poverty Reduction: What Role for the State in Today's Globalized Economy? edited by Frances Wilson, Nazneen Kanji & Einar Braathen. Zed, London: 2001. pp372, UK£ 16.95.

Despite its more general title, this book focuses on southern Africa. In a well-argued essay, Archie Mafeje says that in land surplus countries (such as Mozambique) investment should be directed toward poorer peasant farmers rather than richer capital-intensive farmers. The poor are more productive and save more as a percentage of income, while their productivity can be raised substantially by relatively smaller investment. This would lead to a "trickle-up" strategy for national development.

In a chapter on Mozambique, Einar Braathen and Alessandro Palmero say that "anti-poverty policies are designed and implemented without taking into consideration the beneficiaries' point of view and their needs. ... [T]he nature and scope of the poverty

problem tends to get defined externally." Civil society is sometimes involved in monitoring anti-poverty programmes, but not in defining them. The conclusion: "most programmes against poverty have failed because we have preconceived ideas of what the poor need."

But Braathen and Palmero find two important exceptions. "The new land law of 1997 might have been the most important pro-poor reform put in place under the new government", because the very active role of peasant and other associations made the law more pro-poor. And the new elected "municipalities enjoy the participation of civil society in terms of injection of skills and knowledge".

Independent Evaluation of Expenditure of DEC Mozambique Floods Appeal, by John Cosgrave et al.

DEC, London, 2001. Copies from info@dec.org.uk
Britain's Disaster Emergency Committee (DEC) is a unique system for British NGOs to make collective disaster appeals. For the Mozambique flood in 2000, the DEC raised £30 million (about \$45 mn). The evaluation has high praise for the agencies involved and for their use of funds in a timely and appropriate way to help reduce mortality and morbidity during the emergency and to help resettle people after the flood water receded.

The report says agencies underestimated the ability of Mozambicans to cope. They note many areas had functioning markets, and that especially later agencies should have given cash instead of goods and "complex kits". For example, World Vision's housing kits arrived "so late that many of the beneficiaries had already rebuilt their houses."

Agencies are criticised for bringing in too many international staff when local staff were available. Oxfam made "almost no attempt to recruit national staff" and Save the Children "sidelined" experienced national staff.

But NGOs which tried to use local contractors "had significant problems", both because contractors "failed to meet their obligations" and because some NGOs failed to manage the contracts properly.

Mozambique's Future, Modeling Population and Sustainable Development, by Annabette Wils et al. International Institute

for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg (Austria): 2001.
<http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/POP/pde/docs/ES-moz-en.pdf>
Using Mozambican statistics to look at 2020, the study makes grim reading. Despite high GDP growth rates, "poor farmers cannot benefit from exponential growth through capital investment" so the incidence of rural poverty will only fall from 90% to 70% by 2020; the income of small farmers will fall further behind that of urban dwellers. HIV/AIDS will reduce expected population by 22%-31%, leading to a population of just 18-20 million in 2020.

The Politics of Democratisation in Rural Mozambique by Graham Harrison. Edwin Mellen Press, Lewiston (NY, USA): 2000. pp223

Harrison's fieldwork in Mecúfi, Cabo Delgado, in 1997 and 1998 paints an interesting portrait of rural attitudes toward Frelimo, Renamo, elections, and "democracy".

New listserv: H-luso-africa is a moderated listserv about the Portuguese-speaking African countries, in English and Portuguese. To see recent messages and subscribe: <http://www2.h-net.msu.edu/~lusoafri/>.