By Jordan Reimer, B.A. Princeton University ’08

In his famous thesis, “The Clash of Civilizations,” Samuel Huntington observed the rise of a “Confucian-Islamic connection,” which emerged “to challenge Western interests, values and power.”[1] Strong ties between the Middle East and China in the present era are undeniable, and though Huntington envisioned this alliance strictly in military terms, it has extended in recent years beyond arms proliferation, into commerce, energy, and political support as well.

In 1993 China became a net importer of oil, a key ingredient to fueling its ever-expanding economy. Since 2004, it has become the world’s second greatest consumer of energy. These facts lead China to expand its focus to other countries, primarily those in the Middle East, where the world’s largest proven oil reserves lie, to secure future oil concessions as well as find markets for its goods in order to continue its remarkable economic performance. Military modernization is also an important objective, and has led to considerable ties with Israel. While certainly Chinese foreign relations existed with the Middle East throughout the existence of the People’s Republic, these dealings have expanded significantly beginning in the 1990s to the mutual interests of all parties involved. In its pragmatic approach to foreign policy, emphasizing economic relations over politics, China has demonstrated a unique capability to overcome potential political and social obstacles and deal constructively with all Middle Eastern states. The dimensions of China’s foreign policy are primarily three-fold: the primacy of its economy, its domestic concerns (i.e. Taiwan and human rights issues), and its perception of the international political order.

In contrast to the United States, China emphasizes commercial interests in its foreign relations due to its emphasis on modernization—both industrial and military. This emphasis also stems from an indifference to the domestic affairs of its trading partners, as it expects reciprocation vis-à-vis its denial of human rights and concern over Taiwan. Finally, China’s foreign policy aims to create a friendly international environment as well as a quietest challenge to the global hegemony of the United States.

My analysis will focus primarily on the three factors which contribute to China’s foreign policy and how they are employed in its Middle Eastern relations. I will also first briefly introduce the history of modern China and the history of its interaction with the Middle East. Finally, I will conclude with an evaluation of China’s foreign policy based on these motivating factors, as to whether the popular American notion of a “China threat” is viable, and what the future of China in the Middle East may hold.

Introduction: History of the PRC and its relationship with the Middle East

Following World War II, the “United Front” of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Nationalist Party against Japan collapsed, and civil war soon ensued. In 1949, the Nationalists retreated to Taiwan, and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was established under the leadership of Chairman Mao Zedong.[2]

The PRC was founded in the midst of the emerging superpower Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States. Mao immediately declared his pro-Soviet “leaning to one side” foreign policy, given the states’ ideological commonality. Mao had long recognized the Middle East as the primary region for superpower contentions. His “Intermediate Zone theory” linked all “colonial and semi-colonial countries of…Asia and Africa” together, separating them from the US and the USSR, and thus placing China and the Middle East in the same “zone.”[3] However, substantial interaction between the Middle Eastern states and China did not occur until 1955, at the Asian-African summit conference for developing countries in Badung, Indonesia. Though most of the Middle Eastern countries present were allied with the US, China achieved a diplomatic victory when Egypt, Yemen and Syria established formal relations with it soon after.[4]

Beginning in the late 1950s Sino-Soviet ties loosened and tension increased, Mao citing Premier Khrushchev’s timidity in the face of “Western aggression.”[5] Eventually, China accused the USSR of seeking “world hegemony” like its American counterpart.[6] In reaction to the this “betrayal of socialism,” Mao developed the now-famous “Three Worlds Theory,” the First World being the two “imperialist” superpowers; the second being developed countries such as Japan, Canada, and the European nations; and the third the developing world. According to this theory, the Third World “constitutes the main force in the worldwide struggle against the hegemonism of the two superpowers.”[7] It is upon “the revolutionary people of Asia [and] Africa” to fight the “expansionist activities of the superpowers” through “armed struggle” and world revolution.[8]

Domestically, in an effort to combat dependency on Russia, China launched the Great Leap Forward in 1959, which sought industrial self-sufficiency through highly ineffective means.[9] Following the failure of the program, Mao resigned as head of state. However, fearing a “revisionist” PRC, Mao initiated the Cultural Revolution in 1966, based primarily on the strength of his personage, to “recapture revolutionary fervor.”[10] The effect of the Cultural Revolution on foreign policy was Mao’s encouragement of world revolution and provision of rhetorical and material support to like-minded national liberation organizations. In the Middle East, China began to supply groups such as the Palestinian Liberation Organization and the Dhofar Liberation Front with “arms, light weapons, ammunition, explosives” and “military training.”[11] Though these groups did little to overthrow regimes, they were successful in disrupting the “delicate regional equilibrium” and “undermined the stability” of a few Arab states.[12]

However, as China began its rapprochement with the US to more effectively combat the designs of the USSR, its desire for global anarchy subsided. In 1971, the PRC was admitted to the United Nations, and earned a seat on the Security Council, replacing Taiwan as the representative of China.[13] This moderation, following the end of the militant phase of the Cultural Revolution, was evident in China’s relations with the Middle East. In 1972, China began a diplomatic drive to cultivate Arab governments, and its intergovernmental ties soon took priority over its relationship with revolutionary groups. With the exception of continued engagement with the PLO, China restricted its regional relations to only “intergovernmental activities.”[14] The exploitation and success of the “oil weapon” in reaction to the 1973 October War further ingratiated the region to China, reinforcing its call for “Third World control over Third World resources.”[15]

In 1978, following the death of Chairman Mao and the arrest of the radical yet politically-influential “Gang of Four,” former general secretary of the CCP Deng Xiaoping assumed control of the PRC. His vision broke with China’s revolutionary past, and he called for “Four Modernizations” as a comprehensive development program. Emphasis was now placed on modernizing “agriculture, industry, science and technology, and defense.”[16] In 1982, having successfully consolidated his power, Deng issued his foreign policy compliment to the “Four Modernizations” program. Moving away from the recent pro-American “leaning to the other side” foreign policy and declaring an “independent foreign policy,” Deng announced that China would no longer “be drawn into conflicts between the two superpowers.”[17] Yet, rather than isolate itself, China allowed its relationship with both the US and USSR to simultaneously improve through increased trade and cooperation.[18]

Here marks the beginning of China’s current foreign policy in the Middle East. Though in 1991 the USSR fell and ushered in unilateral American power, Chinese foreign policy has remained consistent since its “independent” status in 1982. It has been almost universally described by scholars as “non-ideological” and “pragmatic.” Rather than focus on Cold War considerations to initiate relations internationally, “benefits to China” became the sole “basis of decisions.”[19] In this manner, it aimed to create a “favorable international environment” for its modernization program.[20] In its “pragmatic” effort to maximize benefits, whether political or economic, China avoids addressing “governance, human rights, and other political issues” in its foreign relations.[21] This model serves China’s all three of its foreign policy interests: maintaining economic growth through increased trade and access to raw materials, minimizing the relevance of domestic political authority and its policies, and presenting a diplomatic alternative to the US to non-confrontationally counter its global influence.

This is not to say that ideology does not play a role in its foreign policy. However, whereas Mao focused both on international communism and Chinese nationalism, only the latter remains. Yet, the form of this nationalism is not expansionist as was Nazi Germany’s—Beijing’s focus is simply to protect the “territorial and political integrity” of China as canonized following WWII.[22] Its nationalist ideology does not provide any barriers to trade, nor preclude relations with any country.[23] Thus, the denomination of “non-ideological” in effect simply means “non-discriminatory.”[24]

The application of this foreign policy in the Middle East has achieved significant gains for China as well as the Middle Eastern countries. Transitioning from an ignored political entity and an inconsequential trading partner, China has fully extended its diplomatic and commercial endeavors throughout the region. By July 1990 it had successfully established formal relations with every Muslim country (including recognizing the “State of Palestine” in 1988), and with the January 1992 normalization with Israel, completed the entire region.[25] Since 1991, trade between China and Arab countries has grown twenty-fold to $51.3 billion in 2005, and trade volume since 2000 has increased by an annual average of 40%.[26] Adding Israel and Iran, total trade in 2005 reached $69.34 billion. In fact, the Middle East is the only region in the world with which China holds a trade deficit.[27]

Historic Chinese-Middle East relations stretch back over 2000 years to the Silk Road. Though the PRC’s interaction with the Middle East governments was initially limited due to superpower considerations and Chinese domestic turmoil, since the 1980s and the launch of China’s current foreign policy, relations have been a tremendous success. The results have led it to achieve relations with the Arab world and Israel, Saudi Arabia and Iran, and the Muslim world at large despite its repression of Chinese Muslims and its communist philosophy. Its record of bypassing these potential challenges stems from to the magnetism of the Chinese market as well as the positive perception of China in the international arena.

The Political-Economic Dimension: Modernization

Since the inception of Deng’s “opening of China” in 1978, the Chinese economy has grown at a staggering pace. Now the world’s fourth largest economy, China averaged a GDP annual growth of a stellar 9.5% over the past 25 years.[28] In the past decade, per capita GDP has grown at an annual 6-7%, while the developed country average is only 2-3%.[29] In the past year, growth was recorded at an incredible 11.1%, which has even led to fears of overheating.[30] To sustain this blistering economic progress and to continue in its modernization program, China is in constant need of funds, modern technology, and most importantly, energy. To achieve these goals, China has extensive relations with the Middle East, buying and selling weapons, signing bilateral trade agreements, and securing oil contracts. Furthermore, even China’s political stance on regional issues is directly connected to this focus on maximizing economic benefit.

The goal of economic prosperity is emphasized regularly in Chinese diplomacy. China’s Five Year Plan for 2001-2005 highlights “energy security,” defined as “guaranteeing oil supplies from abroad” by forging “strategic oil partnerships” with its Middle East partners. [31] The aim of Chinese foreign policy has been described as “myopic,” serving the “central task of economic modernization” through “locking up barrels” of oil.[32]

China’s focus on economic advantage has even led it to seek relations with internationally-isolated countries. Whereas the United States and the European Union set up “artificial trade barriers” with certain regimes, China is willing to do business with any nation with the potential to serve its interests.[33] Often China is so economically successful precisely because of the vacuum left by Western withdrawal, such as in Iran and Sudan. Since Beijing has sought extensive international ties only relatively recently, these countries are “almost the only spaces left for Chinese operations.”[34] In regard to Sudan, China has justified its relationship with the pariah regime, stating bluntly, “business is business.”[35]

Industrial growth relies heavily on access to natural resources. China’s share in global consumption of aluminum, copper, nickel, and iron ore doubled from 1990 to 2000 and is “likely to double again” by 2010.[36] Accordingly, Chinese corporations in the Middle East and around the world are investing in infrastructure development needed to access these raw materials.[37]

More vital are China’s desperate oil needs and its dire oil situation. For a long while China was self-sufficient, remaining a net exporter of crude oil until 1993, and only beginning importation in 1986.[38] However, China has only about 2% of the world’s proven oil reserves, over 50% of which are extracted from only two oil fields.[39] Domestic oil output is expected to remain stagnant for the next ten years and ultimately, China’s resources will dry up by 2025.[40]

Between 1993 and 2002, oil demand in China increased 90%, while domestic production grew only 15%.[41] In 2004, China replaced Japan as the second largest consumer of energy.[42] Since 2000, China alone is responsible for 40% of the growth in world oil demand.[43] Beyond China’s blossoming economy, these large numbers stem from China’s inefficient use of energy and its burgeoning automobile market.[44] Although currently imports constitute only a third of Chinese oil consumption, by 2020 dependency will be up to 70%.[45]

To cater to these excessive needs, current president Hu Jintao introduced his “going out” policy in 2002, encouraging China’s three national oil companies—the China National Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec), the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC)—to establish oil bases overseas by investing in oilfield and pipeline development in order to guarantee “our country’s long term…supply of crude oil.”[46] However, most of the oil outside of the Middle East is either hard to develop, consumed locally, or pre-designated for export to a specific locale.[47] Furthermore, running pipelines through Central Asia, a key to this diversification program, is “significantly more expensive” than Middle Eastern oil.[48]

Thus, the Middle East, home to over 70% of the world’s proven oil reserves, remains the most attractive oil market for China.[49] Since 2000, China has consistently received over 50% of its oil imports from the region and by 2015 the number will rise to 70%.[50] Iran and Saudi Arabia are by far China’s leading oil exporters, having provided 15.32% and 16.41% of its total crude imports in 2002, respectively.[51]

Sino-Saudi cooperation has blossomed in recent years. In 1999 a Strategic Oil Cooperation agreement was signed in Riyadh, while in January 2006 another “broad energy, trade, and investment pact” was concluded in Beijing.[52] Though Saudi crude oil is high in sulfur and thus difficult to refine, a detail which precluded significant trade throughout the 1990s, China signed a $1.5 billion deal for 10 million tons of Saudi oil annually for 50 years.[53] Furthermore, a $3.5 billion refinery expansion project in China’s Fujian was arranged in 2005 to help better utilize Saudi oil. In return, China has invested $300 million to explore a natural gas field in the Saudi Arabian desert. [54]

Iran, China’s second largest oil provider, has also signed significant energy deals with China. In 2004 alone, two large oil agreements were negotiated, and by the end of the year China had become Iran’s top export market. In March of that year, a government-owned Chinese oil trading group purchased 110 million tons of liquefied natural gas (LNG) over 25 years for $20 billion, while in October Sinopec signed a record $70 billion deal to buy 250 million tons of LNG over a quarter century in exchange for the development of Iran’s Yadavaran oilfield. Another agreement will allow China to build a gas condensation refinery in Iran for $1.5 billion.[55]

China’s oil relationship with Iraq and Sudan are also noteworthy. In June 1997, as the “oil for food” program once again opened up Iraq’s trading potential after years of sanctions, China agreed to jointly develop the Al-Adhab oil field. The $1.2 billion deal also called for setting up oil production and collection, electricity services, gas treatment, as well as Chinese provisions of technology, equipments and management personnel over 26 years.[56] Meanwhile, Sudan is a “prime target” for Chinese energy cooperation outside the Gulf.[57] Since 1996, the PRC has become the country’s top oil producer as well as its top oil importer, as nearly 65% of its oil went to China in 2004.[58] CNPC began operating in Sudan in 1995 and increased its oil production significantly within a decade.[59] Beijing not only controls many of its oilfields, but has also signed agreements to build refineries, pipelines, petrochemical enterprises and an oil terminal.[60] Beyond energy, China is Sudan’s top trading partner and Sudan is first on the list of China’s contracted projects and labor services.[61] Total Chinese investment in Sudan is estimated at $15 million.[62]

To offset the growing importation of oil from the Middle East, China has made strenuous efforts to sign labor and service contracts and increase its export of goods to the region. China’s traditional exports have included fruits and vegetables, basic manufactures, electrical products, and clothing.[63] In recent years, it has provided more hi-tech gear such as data-processing units, satellite decoders and radio transmission equipment.[64] China’s goods are on average 30-60% cheaper than those of other countries and, since the 1980s, the quality of these goods has improved significantly.[65] A large part of China’s economic relations with the Middle East is its labor exports and contracts, which is both a hedge against rising Chinese unemployment and provides increased technical know-how for China’s own development. By the mid-1980s, over 80% of China’s labor export and nearly 60% of its construction projects were in the Middle East.[66] By 1990, over 50,000 Chinese workers were employed in the region.[67]

As stated previously, trade between China and the Arab states has grown incredibly over the past decade and a half. To facilitate this phenomenon, the China-Arab Cooperation Forum was established in 2004, to “strengthen political, economic, and strategic ties” between the PRC and the Arab world.[68] The China-Arab Business Conference was launched as an initiative of the Forum and plans to increase trade volume to $100 billion by 2010. Furthermore, China is currently negotiating with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) for a China-Middle East Free Trade Area.[69]

As with all the Arab countries, bilateral Saudi-Sino trade has increased exponentially in recent years. Until 1983, China’s main importing partners were Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Iran. But between 1984 and 1996, products from the Gulf jumped from 56% to 94% of all of China’s Middle East imports. Imports from Saudi Arabia increased from $28 million in 1984 to $911 million in 1999. Furthermore, since the early 1990s, Saudi Arabia along with the United Arab Emirates have accounted for over 50% of Chinese exports to the region, 75% in 1995 alone. In 1999 exports to the House of Saud exceeded $944 million and rose the next year by 42%. In total, between 1992 and 2002, bilateral trade increased at an annual rate of nearly 30%.[70]

Chinese economic relations with Iran form a similar pattern. While bilateral trade only reached $314 million in 1990, but 1993 it had rose to $700 million. In 1995, a $2 billion trade agreement was signed between the two countries.[71] In recent years, Iran contracted Chinese firms for numerous domestic projects. A Chinese fiber optic firm is assisting in building Iran’s broadband network, and another company is making television sets in Iran. A military industrial firm agreed to construct Tehran’s subway system for $680 million, and China’s automobile corporation is building an assembly line in Iran that will produce 50,000 cars a year.[72]

Since normalization in 1992, trade with Israel has been ever expanding. In that year, China was granted most favored nation status and bilateral trade totaled $50 million.[73] By 1995 it grew to over $300 million.[74] From 1992-1996 Israel was China’s leading Middle Eastern partner for joint ventures.[75] Bilateral trade in 2005 reached $3 billion.[76] Today, China is Israel’s number three trading partner and Israeli exports to China have risen to over $740 million in 2006.[77] Investment in China in 2004 reached $23 million, five times greater than Iran’s, and today Israel has set up over 200 companies in China while over 800 are doing business with the East Asian giant.[78] These firms are contracted for over $4 billion worth of construction projects in China.[79]

Weapons make up a significant part of China’s relationship to the region as well. The commercial potential of arms was never conceived of by Mao and thus weapons were given cost-free to aid world revolution. However, during the 1980s, the Middle East had absorbed nearly 95% of its arms sales.[80] Though “defense modernization” was one of Deng’s four modernizations, it was of least importance, and thus the state defense budget decreased. Therefore, weapons sales became an important source of funds explicitly for defense modernization and for “acquiring advanced knowledge and technologies.”[81]

When the United States refused to sell Saudi Arabia intermediate range ballistic missiles, China stepped in and sold the Kingdom 36 of them in 1988. These missiles can travel 2,700km, reaching anywhere from Tel Aviv to Tehran, and are designed to transport a nuclear warhead.[82] China has also built two missile bases near Riyadh and has deployed troops to maintain them. In the 1990s, Beijing offered new missiles to Saudi Arabia, with a 3,500-mile travel range.[83]

China’s weapon sales to Iran have been much more extensive. Since the breakout of the Iran-Iraq war in 1980, China has sold Iran “armored vehicles, fighter planes, artillery, anti-tank, surface-to-surface, and anti-aircraft missiles, small ships, naval mines, and land- or naval-based cruise missiles.”[84] Beyond these conventional arms, there is “significant evidence” that China is assisting in Iran’s chemical and biological weapons program, providing it with “chemical weapons precursors” and “production technology.”[85]

China’s arms market has catered to Sudan as well. In the 1980s, China has sold “tanks, armored personnel carriers and artillery pieces… aircraft and light weapons.” In 1995, Sudan purchased F-7M Airguard Fighters, valued at $66 million.[86] Furthermore, today Chinese 4,000 troops are stationed in Sudan, though most probably to protect its own national oil concessions.[87]

More controversially, the PRC has actively participated in Middle Eastern states’ nuclear programs, most notably Iran’s. China has supplied the Islamic Republic with a “uranium conversion” facility and numerous nuclear power reactors.[88] It has sold nuclear reactors to Syria, Algeria, Egypt, and Morocco, and weapons-grade uranium and lithium hydride to Iraq.[89]

In order to more directly enhance its defense capabilities, China has purchased weapons technology from Israel long before establishing formal relations. In fact, one third of the income from China’s arms export has gone directly to military purchases from Israel.[90] In 1993, a US State Department report estimated Israel’s weapon sales to China at $8-10 billion.[91] As early as 1976, Israel has supplied China with weapons, and by 2005 it was the PRC’s second largest arms merchant.[92] In the 1990s, Harpy anti-radar drones, Python-3 air-to-air missiles, Mapatz anti-tank missiles, and Lavi jetfighter technology were sold to China.[93] In 2000, a deal was signed for the Phalcon early-warning system valued at up to $1 billion. However, American objected to the sale, and it was eventually canceled.[94] When Israel agreed to repair and upgrade the Harpy drones in 2005, the US once again intervened, and they were returned untouched.[95] It appears for the time being that Israeli weapons sales to China have stopped given the extent of American interference.

China’s diplomatic relationship to the region is tailored to foster this growing economic cooperation. Despite its increased diplomatic visibility in the Middle East through numerous high-level visits, China has doggedly maintained a limited role in Middle Eastern politics, in accordance with its proverb, “sit on top of the mountain and watch the tigers fight.”[96] Deng has stated that China should “keep a low profile and never take the lead” in international affairs.[97]

Though it is a member of the UN Security Council, China has usually abstained on regional resolutions and has never used its veto on Middle Eastern affairs. Despite its positive relations with all states in the region, Beijing has “hardly used [its] power” to mediate conflicts such as the Iran-Iraq war, the Gulf wars, and Arab-Israeli violence.[98] China seeks “impartiality” to “avoid being drawn” into regional altercations and to “keep normal relations with all parties” in order to “protect its long-term economic interests.”[99]

When the Iran-Iraq war broke out in 1980, China’s approach was one of “commercial opportunism” through “principled neutrality.”[100] In fact, supplying arms to both Iran and Iraq was the major contributor to China’s total weapon sales and accounted for over 70% of China’s total exports to the region in 1984 and 1987.[101] When Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, China initially condemned the aggression along with the rest of the Arab world. It supported a “peaceful resolution” within the “scope of Arab countries” in order to avoid taking sides. Though it voted for UN sanctions against Iraq, it abstained from Resolution 678 permitting the use of force, which was highly unpopular among Arabs.[102] In this manner, it placated its most important Western partners, as well as the pro-force Arab regimes, while not alienating the rest of the Middle East. Following Saddam’s withdrawal, China pushed for a quick end to the continued sanctions, to “please Saddam without antagonizing too much the US,” and to “resume its lucrative trading relationship” with Iraq.[103] In response to the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, although it once again abstained from allowing the use of force, it did not hesitate to “jump on the bandwagon of reconstruction” following the initial victory.[104] It similarly abstained in 2004, demanding a Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon. With regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict, China consistently advocates stability, decrying Palestinian terrorism and Israeli retaliation, and always emphasizes its commitment to solving the conflict by implementing the relevant UN resolutions. As an archetype for its Middle East political policy, “China’s chief concern has been to extract economic advantage from both supporters and opponents” of the peace process.[105]

A note should also be made on Taiwan. Though China is committed to world recognition of its “one-China policy” (see next section), it is not above economic relations with countries who recognize the Republic of China. It initiated weapon sales to Saudi Arabia in 1988, even though the Kingdom only revoked its relations with Taiwan when it normalized them with China in 1990. Israel began trading with China in 1976 though in 1977 it was in consultation with Taiwan to produce a tactical nuclear weapon.[106] Though China does refuse to establish diplomatic relations with a country which recognizes the ROC, clearly in this instance its economic desires trump political ones.[107]

Despite its physical size, population, natural resources, and military capability, which have often led it to be perceived as a “major global power,” indeed, leader of the Third World, it is essential to remember that China is still a developing country.[108] In this manner, China has sought continued modernization, whether industrial or military. It has increased its trade with the Middle East, in a constant exchange of goods, oil, and weapons. To accommodate these growing ties, it has sought a political stance which would maximize its potential for economic advancement, and ensure continued good relations with the region as a whole.

The Domestic Dimension: Maintaining internal affairs and isolating Taiwan

Throughout its 58-year existence, the People’s Republic of China has been consistently ruled under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. This ruling party is, above all, concentrated on ensuring its continued control of China. The PRC’s suppression of resistance to Communist rule has led to frequent international condemnation and even sanctions. China also places a high regard on territorial integrity and maintaining state sovereignty. While generally this policy finds mutual acceptance in the Middle East, as Arab states are similarly rebuked for their despotic political structures and can empathize with China on colonial infractions on their state sovereignty, the Sino-Islamic situation is unique in that a large contingent of politically-repressed Chinese are Muslim. This twist of fate adds a complicating dimension to Sino-Islamic relations and Chinese foreign policy is focused on employing effective means to divert Muslim critical attention away from this problem.

Given both Western and Muslim scrutiny of China’s handling of its citizens, Beijing’s foreign policy seeks to actively downplay the role of “internal affairs” as a basis for international attention by inducing states to ignore its authoritarian infractions. Reflexively, China advocates on behalf of Middle Eastern regimes that often come under criticism and are isolated for their own human rights records. In such a manner, a mutually-supportive symbiotic relationship emerges dedicated to preserving the status quo of authority.

The other major component of domestic concern in China’s foreign policy is the issue of Taiwan. A Japanese colony during WWII, Taiwan was reverted to Chinese control in 1945. When the Nationalists retreated to the small island and declared the Republic of China (ROC), China never recognized the new government as a distinct political entity. The PRC sponsors a “one-China” policy, maintaining that there is only one legitimate government of China. It is committed to reunification, and has threatened war if Taiwan should formally declare its independence.[109] This concern is evident in Chinese foreign policy in the Middle East, as its growing diplomatic ties to the region act as a hedge against the ROC. China’s objectives in the Middle East aim at “securing support” of its one-China policy and at “sidelining Taiwan diplomatically in the international arena.”[110]

Consolidation of power is essential not only for the CCP’s control of China but for the leadership’s control of the party. The CCP is headed by a general secretary, who chairs the Politburo and its executive Standing Committee. As the state remains under a single party, the president, as head of state, is a party member of high standing. China’s military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is also controlled by the CCP. Its executive body is the Central Military Commission (CMC), where real state power lies.[111] China’s leaders, with the exception of Deng, have all retained the presidency, the secretariat, and the head chair of the CMC simultaneously, consolidating power completely under their grasp.[112] In times of turnover, these three powerful positions are transferred incrementally, in order to ensure an easy transition towards a stable retention of power.[113] In this way, stability is secured not only in China but from within the party itself, ensuring that neither radical nor “revisionist-modernist” politicians seize power.

In order to maintain this hold on political authority, and ensure an international precedent, Chinese foreign policy strongly emphasizes a “Westphalian-style system of conducting international affairs,” championing “non-intervention, state sovereignty, and territorial integrity.”[114] Its Middle East policy corresponds to this goal of “setting dangerous precedents” of international interference in a country’s handling of human rights.[115]

China’s most infamous violation of human rights commenced on June 4, 1989 in Tiananmen Square. Students had collected in this Beijing central area for a month, voicing their criticism of the regime and openly advocating for democratic reform. Eventually PLA soldiers entered the plaza and killed several hundred, and possibly thousands of unarmed civilians.[116] While China maintained that what happened was “China’s internal affair,” the West reacted harshly, the US and European Union imposing harsh sanctions in protest of this violent suppression.[117]

Linked with China’s human rights record is China’s concern with the preservation of its territorial integrity. This issue of territory extends beyond Taiwan to mainland provinces which have actively sought independence as well, such as Tibet and Xinjiang. Control over the entire mainland is a priority “every bit as emotion-ridden as the PRC’s claim to Taiwan.”[118] In order to guarantee this territorial integrity, China has often reverted to violent and repressive measures, most notoriously in its dealings with Tibet. While Arab governments support China’s claims to “maintain internal affairs” given their own human rights record, and were therefore sympathetic in the wake of the Tiananmen massacre, a complicating factor emerges in that Xinjiang Province, which has long fought for its autonomy, is overwhelmingly Muslim. This is especially important given the current climate, where pan-Islamism has replaced “Third World solidarity” as the “wellspring” of (often-violent) “political energy.”[119] Muslim agitation in response to perceived disrespect or discrimination has manifested itself numerous times in recent years, frequently in violent rebuke of the offending country.[120] Thus, China has had to tread cautiously to please Muslim states and not inflame their passions in its own dealings with Xinjiang.

Following the Tiananmen massacre, though the West criticized and harshly punished the PRC, and tried to isolate the government internationally, there was “no perceptible adverse effect” on Sino-Arab relations. No Muslim government publicly condemned the action and the Middle East press virtually ignored the matter.[121] However, China understands that the Muslim world is not similarly willing to overlook infractions against coreligionists. The country is home to a significant Muslim culture: 35 million Muslims, 35,000 mosques, 43,000 Imams, and 433 Islamic organizations.[122] As early as the 1950s, China sent its Muslims to the Middle East as goodwill delegations to “demonstrate its benign rule over its Muslims” and its friendly intentions towards Muslim nations.[123]

Of the 56 minority groups residing in China, 10 are Muslim, all of them represented in Xinjiang, a northwest province which constitutes one-sixth of the mainland.[124] The predominant ethnic group is the Uighur, Muslims with Turkic origins, with 8 million Xinjiang residents.[125] Though Xinjiang was declared an “autonomous region” in 1955, the Chinese have diligently tried to maintain its local authority. Tensions rose in the wake of Tiananmen and have grown worse ever since. Between 1990 and 2001, Uighur fighters carried out more than 200 attacks, targeting buses, buildings, and development projects, killing over 150 people of all ethnicities, injuring several hundred more.[126] Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, China intensified its “strike hard” campaign against the ethnic minority, linking the “East Turkistan forces” to Osama bin Laden and the Al-Qaeda network to “launch a holy war with the aim of setting up a theocratic Islamic state in Xinjiang.”[127]

Both Saudi Arabia and Iran, who have each claimed the mantle of protectors of global Islam, have demonstrated an interest in the Muslims of Xinjiang. Donations from the two countries were used to build mosques and theological schools and have funded scholarships and the import of religious items.[128] Much rhetorical support was lent to the cause of the Uighurs, as former Saudi ambassador to China has stated that “the situation of the Chinese Muslims has always been of great concern to the Saudi government.”[129] The Kingdom’s grand mufti exclaimed that “we have a moral obligation to help our Chinese Muslim brothers.”[130] Iranian leaders, following the “success” of Islamic revolution in Lebanon, saw their next efforts as a “springboard for Islamic revolutionary operations in…Xinjiang.”[131] From here it is clear that the issue of Chinese Muslims is an important one in Saudi and Iranian policy.

Subsequent Chinese efforts to quell these impulsive desires have been exhibited through numerous means. First, China reminded these regimes that continued “interference” in “the internal affairs of China” would hamper bilateral cooperation.[132] Second, China has been able to compel these countries through the weapons incentive, by “supplying arms and ‘problem technologies’…at generous prices.”[133] More positively, China has sought to funnel Muslim funds for Xinjiang towards loans and investments for modernization and development in the province for mutually-beneficial results.[134] On a diplomatic level, Beijing has tried to capitalize on the value of its Islamic citizenry, using them as a channel towards cultivating favor with Middle Eastern Muslims. In 1997, following a spate of Uighur riots, China initiated a “charm offensive” to “co-opt” these fundamentalist regimes.[135] Iranian president Khatami met with government-backed Muslim leaders and has subsequently declared optimistically that Xinjiang should serve as a “bridge connecting China…with the Muslim world.”[136] The Saudi government has avoided making strong statements on Xinjiang, emphasizing instead that “the Kingdom needs…the Chinese market because of the indefinite potential of what China will become one day;” continuing, “we cannot afford not to be a major player there.”[137] Therefore, following the post-9/11 Chinese Uighur crackdown, both Tehran and Riyadh have been “largely silent,” demonstrating the effectiveness of Chinese foreign policy.[138]

Given China’s sensitivity about the issue of force against a sovereign state and interference with internal affairs, the concerns have largely impacted its foreign policy in the Middle East. The PRC has contested President Bush’s unilateral Middle East democratization campaign, and though it “supports Arab domestic reform,” it “strongly oppose[s] any outside attempts to impose” change.[139] The issue is “closely linked to its sentiment of national sovereignty” and the understanding that economic reform without democratization is possible based on its own experience.[140] China’s decision to support an “Arab solution” to the Persian Gulf crisis and its insistence that no foreign troops enter the region stemmed from this priority.[141] With regard to the sanctions and weapons inspections that followed, PRC officials have lodged complaints at the UN, due to the inspections’ “intrusive…infringement of Iraqi sovereignty,” which could potentially establish an inspection precedent concerning China, asserting that “the legitimate concerns of Iraq as a sovereign state should be respected and the work of the special (weapons inspection) committee should be improved.”[142] Iran joined China’s criticism of encroachment on domestic issues after Tiananmen, lamenting “Western interference in the internal affairs” of Beijing.[143] China then supported Tehran following the adoption of the US Iran-Iraq Non-proliferation Act and the declaration of Clinton’s “dual containment” of Iran and Iraq. Chinese Premier Qian Qichen “dismissed as ‘unjustifiable’ the idea of using human rights for political gains and imposing views held by one group on others.”[144] Likewise, Sudan, a regime which is heavily rebuked by the West, most recently over its handling of the Darfur conflict, is supported by China, which has stated that “the internal situation in the Sudan is an internal affair” and thus one that “we are not in a position to impose” anything upon.[145] In fact, China has even been implicated in human rights abuse in Sudan, participating in the forced relocation of peasants residing in oil concession zones. The PRC has therefore “consistently rejected external interference” in Sudan, including in the UN, threatening to use its veto power should an oil embargo be imposed.[146]

China’s relationship to Taiwan has had a significant effect on its foreign policy. Taiwan’s main importance to China is three-fold. Since the Communist Party leadership has so consistently advocated on behalf of unification, should Taiwan declare independence, it would constitute a major failure on behalf of the administration and call its legitimacy into question, a consequence that the regime cannot afford. Such a move could inspire similar actions by separatists in Tibet and Xinjiang. Secondly, as a former Japanese colony and the current haven for the US-backed ROC, the island is perceived as the “sole remaining instance of Chinese soil under the influence and control of foreign powers.”[147] China’s sense of historical injustice at the hands of colonialists, primarily the Opium War of 1840, still lingers, and Taiwan serves as a constant reminder of China’s incapability towards self-assertion. Finally, the island is of strategic importance, “straddling sea lanes and potentially serving as a base for foreign military forces,” such as the US, whose regional (and global) hegemony China has opposed (see next section).[148]

Therefore, Taiwan considerations play an active role in Middle East relations. In the 1980s “one of China’s most prominent goals” in its regional foreign policy was establishing diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, and Bahrain—the only Arab nations still engaged with Taipei.[149] Although China conducts business with countries that recognize Taiwan, the principle of one-China is so important that ending relations with the ROC is the sine-qua-non of normalization with the PRC.[150] This prerequisite has succeeded in terminating formal relations between Taiwan and the Middle Eastern states.

China’s relationship to the region is often used as a bargaining chip against Western interference with China over Taiwan. Beijing’s weapon and nuclear technology sales to the Middle East have been interpreted by the West as a political move in “retaliation for sales to Taiwan.”[151] In 1993, China boycotted Middle East arms talks in protest of US F-16 fighter sales to the ROC. It similarly ended talks on the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) over the Taiwanese president’s visit to the US. This linkage issue has been primarily visible in US-China-Iran affairs. Only a week after the announcement of the F-16 sale, Iran and China announced an agreement to provide the former with several nuclear power plants.[152] Similarly, in 1995, when the Clinton administration protested China’s sale of a nuclear dual-reactor to Iran, Beijing suspended the deal “explicitly refer[ring] to China’s expectation that the US would be more prudent in the future” regarding Taiwan.[153]

Naturally, for China, “East Asian and domestic issues remain more important” than any Middle East discord.[154] However, that is not to say that the two issues cannot be linked. The leadership of the PRC is concerned with maintaining its domestic control indefinitely and thus this consideration invariably is infused in the formulation of Chinese foreign policy. This has been manifested in its inducement of states to support its positions on human rights and territorial matters like Taiwan and other provinces. Interestingly, the latter issue strikes directly at Sino-Islamic relations, given the large Muslim presence in the Xinjiang Province. But in exchange for Middle Eastern support and, if necessary, overlooking of China’s internal affairs, Beijing has actively advocated on behalf of these states’ rights to sovereignty and non-interference by the world community.

The International Dimension: Between opposing hegemony and US relations

The one consistent theme in Chinese foreign policy since the founding of the PRC has been the opposition to hegemony, whether American or Soviet. However, since the Sino-American rapprochement in the 1970s, positive bilateral relations between the two countries have been vital for Chinese economic growth. Balancing these two prerogatives, China rejects American unilateral action and will side with the Middle East on regional issues, but is generally careful not to actually prevent American interference. While US-Arab cooperation is traditionally strong, it is showing signs of straining—a ripe time for increased Chinese attention to the region. China therefore seeks to increase its own importance in the international arena, even at the expense of America, but without directly antagonizing and openly confronting the world’s leading nation. The goal of add is reflected in the ever-growing diplomatic presence of China in the Middle East and its continued efforts at directly international policy towards a multilateral framework.

Mao decried American-led “Western imperialism” in the 1950s, and then denounced both superpowers for world power collusion in the 1960s. Following the fall of Mao China actively resisted Soviet “expansionism” during its United States reconciliation phase. And since 1982 it once again has paved the way against superpower dynamics, albeit without the call for world revolution. Thus, while not supporting radical global reformation today, the Chinese communist leadership still preserves the Maoist philosophy of dominance rejection. As the communist party has remained in place, it is only natural that its identity politics remain stagnant as well. Thus, so do its foreign policy ends, if not the means. To quote Deng, “it doesn’t matter if the cat is black or white; as long as it catches mice,” it is still a cat.

Accordingly, Chinese Middle East foreign policy has and still aims to “diplomatically offset growing US influence in the region.”[155] Since the fall of the USSR, the US has become the world’s only superpower and has capitalized on its unilateral opportunities prominently. To respond to this state of affairs, Jiang proclaimed that China should “oppose ‘hegemony’ and ‘link up’ with ‘allies’” such as Iran and Libya, critical Washington foes.[156] China’s recognition of the vital role of the Middle East stretches as far back as WWII, when Mao feared German control over the region’s “oilfields and strategic crossroads.”[157] It has therefore conceived of a “counter-encirclement” strategy via a “diplomatic and economic offensive.”[158] By portraying itself as the “champion of the developing world,” China is ingratiating itself with Middle Eastern states, to act as “a potential check on US power.”[159] Egypt has recognized China’s relations with the region as “based on equality, mutual respect, and reciprocity,” a “subtle message” to the US.”[160]

Therein lay the secrets to China’s success in the Middle East. Beyond its attractive markets and booming economy, China does not have colonial or neo-colonial historical baggage, nor has it mapped out a vision for regional transformation. It is also willing to approach any government, especially those isolated by Western governments.[161]

However, China does not seek to actively antagonize the United States, nor challenge it directly, recognizing good relations as a “top strategic priority.”[162] Deng emphasized that China should “seek opportunities for cooperation” with the United States and “avoid confrontation”—advice which Jiang and his successors have followed, at the risk of being labeled “pro-American” by ultra-nationalist intellectuals.[163] In fact, despite “intermittent crises” between the two nations in the 1990s, relations have improved “with remarkable rapidity,” especially following increased US-China cooperation in the wake of 9/11 and the launch of the worldwide “War on Terror.”[164] In 2004, the two countries agreed to establish a US-China Energy Policy Dialogue, to further cooperation this area of vital concern.[165]

Beyond diplomatic harmony achieved in Sino-American bilateral affairs, economic interdependence between the nations are strong and only getting stronger. In 2006, China sold approximately $287 billion worth of exports to the US, by far its largest market.[166] Beijing currently holds $1.1 trillion in foreign currency reserves (growing annually by $200 billion), over $400 billion of which were in US reserves in 2004.[167] Beyond America’s strong appetite for Chinese goods, China relies on the US as a significant source of investment; on the American economy to generate continued global economic growth; as well as its role in ensuring global financial markets remain stable.[168]

Yet, despite this entrenched collaboration, it is still deeply resentful of American power manipulated in the Middle East. Following the Gulf War, in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, America “dominated the Middle East.”[169] Even after Saddam withdrew from Kuwait, a large contingent of US troops remained in Saudi Arabia with “formidable amounts of equipment in bases throughout” the Gulf.[170] It devised a “unipolar security system,” guaranteeing Gulf security and encouraging military buildup, while simultaneously advocating arms control, excluding regimes such as Iran and Iraq from this defense framework.[171] The US commands the world’s waterways, and could thus prohibit Chinese access to Middle Eastern oil. It has on occasion stopped Chinese ships and coerced inspection to prevent the transfer of nuclear material.[172] During the current Bush administration, the state-owned People’s Daily asserted on the eve of the invasion of Iraq that “the US is now pretending to advance along one path while secretly going along another…launching an anti-terrorism struggle in name while actually making a layout of hegemonic strategy.”[173] The US suspended Chinese oil concessions in Iraq following the toppling of the regime and has barred many of its companies from competing in Iraq’s reconstruction.[174] Ultimately, China opposes the “cardinal elements of the Bush Doctrine: unilateralism, regime change, and preventative war.”[175]

United States economic involvement in the Middle East is extensive. Over the past three years, US-Arab trade increased over 20% annually reaching $94.4 billion in 2005—almost twice that of Sino-Arab volume.[176] It currently receives 17% of its oil imports from the region and the percentage is predicted to rise to 50% by 2030.[177] However, the US-Arab relationship is far from secure. The current American administration is pushing these regimes to simultaneously work harder in combating terrorism and reform their political systems—seemingly contradictory objectives, neither of which particularly appeal to the Arab governments.[178] American democratization efforts, launched in 2002 as the Middle East Partnership Initiative, have made a “consistent effort to restrain the behavior of oppressive Arab regimes.”[179] If anything, these states are more afraid of the effects of US policy on the region than are assured by it. The results of the Iraq war have unleashed Shia political currency as well as empowered Iran as a greater regional player, two developments anathema to the Sunni Arab regimes. Saudi Arabia, a key to American stability in the Gulf, is wary of “over-dependence” on the US and is critical of the latter’s staunch support of Israel.[180] The post-9/11 revelations that Saudi citizens were responsible for the attacks and subsequent US actions freezing Saudi charities’ assets has led to significant tension between the two allies, the Kingdom accusing America of a “pressure campaign” against the country.[181] Considering the current low point in US-Arab relations, China’s increased overtures to the region come at an opportune time.

In contrast with the US, China and the Arab world retain similar positions on regional issues from Iraq to the war on terror to the Arab-Israeli conflict. All of these governments share the same desire for economic modernization without political liberalization and wish to “undercut” US intervention in human rights abuses. Unlike the US, China does not seek to change the Arab way of life, nor does it engage in “orchestrating regime changes to advance its interests.”[182] Just as Beijing has crafted an “Iran card” against US interference with Taiwan, the Middle East seeks a “China card” against US hegemony.[183] Accordingly, China has stepped up its diplomatic appearance in the region, though it is still cautious not to voice controversial opinions on critical issues.

As China gradually entered regional and international institutions beginning in the 1970s, such as the UN and its Security Council, it was reluctant to exercise its newly-held capabilities. However, recently China initiated a surge of international presence, actively enlisting in “intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations” and joining East Asian trade and security institutions.[184] China entered the World Trade Organization in 2001, and has begun talks with the G8 and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization—all institutions previously scorned as “tools of American imperialism.”[185] Thus the PRC launched a “positive foreign policy” shifting from “restive” to “active” diplomacy.[186]

Hand in hand with this new “active diplomacy” is a desire for increased multi-polarity. In contrast to US unilateral action, China attempts to work only with “multilateral mechanisms” in international affairs, i.e. the UN.[187] China’s approach has thus been termed “Neo-Bismarckian,” in its efforts to make itself indispensable to the international system, though this is evidenced most prominently in East Asian affairs.[188] China’s efforts at multilateralism stem from the assumption that “good relations with many other big countries” make it harder for the US to ever consider China an enemy and provide the opportunity to stop conflicts before they emerge.[189] In 2004 Hu endorsed the “Four No’s,” a “manifesto for multipolarity:” no hegemony, no power politics, no alliances, and no arms races.[190]

As late at the 1980s, China ignored invitations to Middle East (Arab-Israeli) peace conferences lest it take a stand on such a “touchy” issue “so peripheral to China’s vital interests.”[191] However, in 1991, as the US convened the Madrid Conference, China was eager to attend, and quickly normalized relations with Israel in order to gain admission. It even began participating in Middle East multilateral talks on “regional security, water, and refugees.”[192]

Beijing’s “active diplomacy” towards the Middle East is manifested in two varieties: “in-reach” and “out-reach.” It has significantly increased “the scope and pace” of hosting international leaders and conferences “both quantitatively and qualitatively.”[193] In May 2006, Beijing hosted foreign ministers and their entourages from 22 Arab countries for the China-Arab Cooperation Forum.[194] Invited were representatives from the Hamas government of Palestine, internationally isolated in a US-led campaign to protest its Islamist and terror ties. This meeting was quickly followed by the annual summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Council in June and then by a conference for 1,700 delegates from 48 African countries in November, where several Arab states were represented.[195] With regard to “outreach,” China has made a concerted effort to increase its presence of diplomats in the Middle East. In 2004 Hu visited Egypt, Algeria and the Arab League on an Africa-Europe tour.[196] In May 2005, China’s foreign minister met separately with leaders in both Israel and Palestine.[197] More importantly, in 2002, China appointed a “special envoy” to the Middle East and reappointed another in 2006, to conduct frequent meetings with regional leaders and better learn the nuances of regional politics.[198] In typical Chinese foreign policy fashion, the envoy was unaccomplished in terms of tangible results. At the close of his three year service, he could only state that “I have made extensive exchanges with many leaders,” “expressing the hope…for a more active role for China to play” in the Arab-Israeli conflict, reiterating “we respect the choice of the peoples in the region.”[199]

In this context, we are better able to understand China’s foreign policy in the Middle East from an international perspective—it rejects US hegemonic action, but avoids confronting America directly, opting rather to increase its regional visibility as a peace- and consensus-seeking alternative, aiming to please all regional states. He too we see the overlap of China’s foreign policy goals. China’s drive to be perceived as a regional alternative stems from its priority of continuing positive relations with these states, not for the sake of global harmony in and of itself, but for its own economic benefit as well as to ensure a growing bloc of countries dedicated to preserving states’ sovereignty.

Thus, when divisive issues arise in the Middle East, China is quick to acknowledge the dominating role of the US and acts accordingly, rhetorically denouncing its hegemonic acts, amassing sympathetic states in the process, without significantly challenging US latitude in applying its agenda. In 1990, as President Bush was assembling a coalition to invade Iraq, China recognized this as an American tool to assert its will on Middle Eastern states and thus refused to participate or vote in favor of force. However, it did not veto the UN resolution, appreciating the value of US positive relations, having occurred soon after the Tiananmen massacre.[200] When a similar situation appeared in the form of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, China took a similar approach as it did a decade earlier—it voiced clearly its opposition to the war, as a principled stand against unilateral action, in order to “generate goodwill in the Arab world by distinguishing its policy from that of the US.”[201] However, it refused “take the lead in openly challenging the US” and thus declined signing the French-German-Russian joint statement denouncing the war.[202] With regard to sanctions, both on Iraq in the 1990s and on Iran in 2006, China recognized them as “strengthening [America’s] hegemonic position in the region”—but complied with the UN-mandated sanctions in an effort to appear as a responsible multilateral actor.[203] However, it used its power as a member in good standing to “dilute” the final content of these resolutions, both to undermine the American position and to maximize potential economic opportunity.[204]

In bilateral relations with the Middle Eastern states, Chinese opposition to US hegemony is more pronounced. When Saudi King Abdullah visited China in 2006, the trip was a momentous occasion in Chinese Middle East policy. Not only was it the new king’s first trip abroad since assuming power, but China was his first destination. A joint statement referred to the event as a “milestone,” launching a “new strategic relationship” and “substantial…cooperation.”[205] In essence, it symbolized Riyadh’s designation of China as a “‘pole’ in the reemergence of a bipolar international system.”[206] Similarly, when China sold Riyadh the IRBM missiles in 1988 after the US refused to do so, this indicated a move towards Saudi independence away from US dependency.[207] China’s relations with rogue states in and of themselves constitute a defiance of US policy and control. The PRC’s extensive business contacts with Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, contemporary Sudan, and the Islamic Republic of Iran, not to mention its recognition of Hamas undermines US efforts to isolate and punish these governments. In 2002, when Jiang visited Iran, he explicitly stated that “Beijing’s policy is against strategies of force and the US military presence in Central Asia and the Middle East.”[208] China continuously sells Iran highly-advanced weaponry in violation of US sanctions precisely because, unlike the UN resolutions on Iraq, these are unilaterally imposed. However, ever-mindful of China-US considerations, Jiang has repeatedly rejected Iranian attempts to forge a “Tehran-Islamabad-New Delhi-Beijing axis.”[209] Unlike Iran which seeks mutual characterization of the US as a “common enemy,” China emphasizes the “economic components” of its alliance with Tehran.[210]

It should be noted that there is a physical component to China’s plan to offset US dominance of the Middle East. As previously mentioned, it has good relations with all states, and thousands of workers, technical personnel, military advisors, and even soldiers throughout the region.[211] Around the Horn of Africa, directly facing Yemen and Saudi Arabia, China has “established footholds in or near strategic communication and commercial checkpoints.”[212] In what the US has termed a “string of pearls,” China has developed port facilities in Pakistan, “on the doorsteps of the Persian Gulf” as a check on US “policing waterways in the South China sea and Indian Ocean.”[213]

China’s efforts to undermine US hegemony in the Middle East beg the question: does the PRC seek a “new world order” in Middle Eastern affairs? The People’s Daily is intent on stressing that “opposing hegemony” is China’s first priority in China’s diplomatic strategy. It proclaims that placing “high expectation on the economic interdependence between China and the US” is folly, since the US is not reliant on China.[214]

Indeed, the Arab world would welcome such a change to the status quo. Esteemed Arab sociologist Dr. Saad Edin Ibrahim has stated in an interview with the author that “Arabs see China as a dormant rival to the US, and are waiting for the day that it becomes an…active superpower,” and challenges America on regional issues such as its support of Israel.[215] Statements from regional figures echo the sentiments from the Arab street. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad proclaimed: “China is now a superpower…China’s role has expanded across the world and has become more important especially for small countries like Syria.”[216] Saudi General Khaled triumphed that “China’s rapid economic growth will soon make it a formidable military power, which we, in the Middle East, must take into account.”[217] Upon visiting with President Hu, Jordanian King Abdullah has expressed a similar vision for the future.[218]

However, from all accounts it is clear that such a radical transformation is not China’s objective nor is such a dramatic challenge to the US in its interest. As stated previously, China rejected the “overt anti-US coalition” proposed by Iran.[219] Despite the grandstanding of the state-owned press, the Communist Party itself, for the first time in over a decade, did not mention “opposing hegemony” (clear “code for the United States”) in its party platform beginning in 2002.[220] Although Chinese analysts have asserted that it is a ripe time for China to drop its long-held “victim mentality” and adopt a “superpower mentality,” those same analysts acknowledge that China “cannot (and will not) challenge US global dominance.”[221] Thus, China “does not aim to transform the US-led international order.”[222]

It is clear though, that despite China’s dependence on the US for vital issues such as its economy and the safe transport of oil from the Gulf, America cannot stay the world’s policeman indefinitely. China therefore aims to act as a “strategic irritant” to US power in the region rather than deny it its dominance outright.[223] Its diplomatic actions indicate that, in a break from its past, it does want to be an international power in the Middle East; not a “dominant power” but a “swing power” whose approval is deemed important in going forth with a regional project.[224]

Conclusion: “China threat” or “benign phenomenon”?

We have studied the three dimensions of Chinese foreign policy and their application in the Middle East. Indeed, these same factors—political-economic, domestic, and hegemonic concerns—correspond to Chinese foreign policy the world over. China seizes all potential opportunities to advance her interests. Thus, Beijing has sought to “further consolidate [her] position in Latin America and especially Southeast Asia” and has “already displaced the United States as Africa’s big brother.”[225] Yet, rather than assert physical dominance given these successful overtures, China prefers to become a “responsible” global actor, intent on regional stability over a new status quo. While its rise may conflict with the US given a finite amount of global natural resources, this inevitable event is a chance for cooperation rather than hostility.

China’s increased visibility on the global stage has not escaped the attention of American lawmakers and scholars. The notion of a “China threat” emerged in the 1990s, when Cold War-style thinkers were at a loss following the collapse of the USSR. The “threat” envisions China as a rogue regime “bent on a policy of proliferation for non-conventional military nuclear and chemical weapons of mass destruction, materials, and equipment.”[226] In 1999, the House of Representatives released a Report of the Select Committee on US National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic of China, accusing the PRC of “illegally obtaining sensitive nuclear and missile technology and design from the US.”[227] China has been charged for violating the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces agreement, and the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty.[228] When President Bush took office in 2001, he was “far more willing” than his predecessor to resort to sanctions that had “threatened serious injury to the overall Sino-US economic relation.”[229] Though following 9/11 cooperation improved, and the US in its National Security Strategy recognized China “as one of the great powers” and acknowledged its assistance in the “global struggle against the forces of chaos,” President Bush remained vigilant on Chinese violent suppression of Xinjiang and Tibet, stating: “the war on terrorism must never be an excuse to persecute minorities.”[230] Most recently, in April 2007, the US sued China in the WTO over “suspected trade barriers and piracy” of intellectual property.[231]

In truth, China’s arms policy in the Middle East does not pose a significant threat. Primarily, the US is the largest seller of advanced weaponry in the Middle East.[232] Whereas Chinese weapon exports to the Middle East accounted for 1.2% and 2.15% of total global arms exports to the region from 1991-1994 and from 1994-1997 respectively, the US was responsible for 56% and 35.5% respectively.[233] For all the US blustering about China’s non-conventional support of Iran, Western countries, including the US, have “leaked” similar “military equipment, materials, technologies and know-how” to the Middle East.[234]

The fact remains that China is determined to maintain a peaceful world order. In an archetype of its general foreign policy, Beijing has long upheld its “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence,” on which values it is determined to “establish and develop friendly cooperative relations with every country.”[235] They include: mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty; mutual nonaggression; mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs; equality and mutual benefit; and peaceful coexistence.[236]

With regard to her most salient regional interests, China enjoys good relations with “virtually every country around its periphery,” most importantly India and Japan.[237] Its 2006 Defense White Paper reflects this positive development: “China’s overall security environment remains sound.”[238] China has not been involved in a “large scale” military operation since its involvement in the Korean War.[239] It has shown no signs of military adventurism outside what it deems its inalienable “natural territory,” and thus, is not a threat for expansion. Since 1990, China has settled border disputes with six of her neighbors, often on unfavorable terms; and though it still contests territory with 13 other countries, it has signed a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea under the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, committing itself “to peaceful resolutions of outstanding issues.”[240]

With regard to Middle East concerns, China maintains its nonviolent disposition. Since the 1980s it has consistently called for a peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The PRC is committed to regional nuclear non-proliferation, as it refused to accede to Libya’s request for nuclear weapons, declined to outfit the missiles it sold to Saudi Arabia with nuclear warheads, and is careful not to supply “short-range missiles” that could “carry a non-conventional warhead.”[241] Contrary to American conception, China is concerned about Iran’s nuclear ambitions. It is “not especially fond of” Iranian president Ahmadinejad, and has “almost begged” Tehran to respond favorably to a Western incentive package to suspend its nuclear activity.[242] It still does not support the use of force against Iran, but in typical fashion, never said it would oppose such a drastic measure.[243] After Israeli Prime Minister Olmert visited Beijing to voice his fears of an Iranian bomb, he stated he was “positively surprised” by China’s assurances.[244]

China’s foreign policy indicates that it is determined to be a responsible actor in the international arena, albeit not a decisive one. It complied with UN sanctions against Iraq in the 1990s, patiently waiting until the “oil for food” program commenced and offered China the opportunity for further, UN-mandated, trade.[245] More surprisingly, China recently began participating in UN peacekeeping missions, in an approach “to protect its national interests through multilateral international interventions.”[246] This has bolstered China’s reputation as a “responsible world power.”[247] In order to offset the allegation that China is contravening its own principle of sovereignty, its contingents “remain far below that of other, much smaller countries,” and it recognizes that these missions are UN-sanctioned, and more importantly, do not employ force.[248]

Given these realities, China is intent in casting its remarkable rise as a “benign phenomenon” which is an inevitable result of a successful model of a developing country.[249] Though its disposition is peaceful, China’s rise will certainly challenge the US if not necessarily in the traditional military sense. US oil consumption accounts for 24% of the world market, while China is second with 12%.[250] By 2025, US oil consumption will double.[251] By 2020 Chinese dependency on foreign oil will reached 70% and by 2025 the same will occur in the US.[252] These extreme needs are bound to overlap as the two countries, let alone the rest of the world, compete for shrinking oil supplies in an ever-growing industrialized world. As China continuously grows dependent on Middle Eastern oil it might seek to strengthen its “string of pearls” around the Indian Ocean and grew fearful of the US monopoly of international waters, which would crippling should war ever erupt.

Above all, though, what Chinese foreign policy and its Middle East relevance have demonstrated is China’s ultimate commitment to international stability. From a political-economy perspective, the “basic cornerstone” of international behavior in post-Mao China is that “instability abroad—and at home—is detrimental” for growth.[253] A stable Middle East ensures a constant supply of oil to China’s hungry economic beast. China’s Israel-Palestine advocacy has constantly advocated stability, denouncing all forms of instigation. Following the 2006 summer war between Israel and Hizballah, China criticized the latter’s role “in triggering…the conflict.” However, it also emphasized its domestic dimension of foreign policy, rebuking Israel for “violating Lebanon’s sovereignty with force” and sustaining an unstable situation.[254] Its weapons sales policy to the Middle East also reflects these objectives. China stated that its position on arms control is that: “the purpose of weapons sales is to strengthen the self-defense” of the purchasing country, the weapons “must not upset the regional balance,” and that “China will not intervene in the internal affairs of other countries” via weapon sales.[255] China’s insistency on stability is a prime motivation for resisting America’s violent unilateral actions in the region, where war predictably yields volatility along with some unpredictably worse results. In a surprising role reversal, it appears that China, once the forbearer of “world revolution” and an unstable global environment, providing support to Middle Eastern revolutionary groups to undermine the region’s equilibrium, now pushes above all stability to further its interests, whereas the US, having used to tread carefully so not as to upset any balance of power, now dives headlong into regional transformation and rejects traditional international norms.[256]

The “China threat,” according to Dr. Yitzchak Shichor, Israel’s leading Chinese specialist, “is an invention,” “an obsession” based on “paternalistic and condescending attitudes” if not “outright racism.”[257] China is no match for the US militarily, given the latter’s unilateral control of waterways, a plethora of long-range missiles and nuclear weapons, and military bases throughout the world, most especially in the Middle East and on China’s borders in Japan and South Korea. There is no corresponding Chinese presence anywhere outside of its mainland.

Rather, it would be prudent to observe the current climate, given China’s Middle East priorities, as “an opportunity,” rather than a threat, to further China’s “integration into the international economic system.”[258] Beijing’s self-interest in Middle East energy construction projects is not a zero-sum situation—rather, these are beneficial to all. Chinese dependence on Middle Eastern oil will “likely push China toward greater cooperation with the US” rather than antagonize it.[259] As long as the US is willing to constrain its hegemonic activities, particularly on issues deemed critical to the “internal affairs” of China, the PRC will be content not to be “a Third World superpower,” but “the Third World’s superpower”—an inspiration to developing countries and a quietist challenge to earn the respect of the First World.[260]

It would be impetuous to classify China a threat, just as it would be ingenuous to categorize its rise as benign. Ultimately, China is looking out for her own interests above all. For the foreseeable future, this foreign policy fosters a model of stability, large economic growth, unprecedented universal positive relations, and a multilateral international system based on the equality of all states. To paraphrase the Prophet (PBUH), one should seek knowledge from China.